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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the state of understanding about the value of latent health and 
fatality risk reductions, focussing on the effects of context and latency on the Value of 
Preventing a Statistical Cancer Fatality (VSLCAN) relative to road accident fatalities.  The 
conceptual, methodological and empirical contributions are derived from two stated 
preference studies.  The studies are designed to explore how the VSLCAN is driven by the 
context effect, which includes dread of the cause ‘cancer’ and the effects of illness prior to 
fatality; and the latency (delay) effect which depends upon time preferences and risk 
preferences.    
Study 1 develops a Risk-Risk survey protocol, and the resulting central tendency and 
regression analysis verify that the context of cancer increases the VSL and that latency 
decreases it.  The relativity between VSLCAN and the road accident VSL is then summarised 
into a simple relationship where the offsetting influences of context and latency are 
parameterised.  This novel tool has the potential to enhance the comparability and evaluation 
of a wide range of existing and future VSL studies involving context and latency effects 
through the elicitation of key underlying parameters such as the context premium and 
effective discount rate.  As such it represents a significant methodological contribution. 
Study 2 focusses directly on two aspects of the latency effect.  These relate to risk and time 
preferences, explored in Studies 2a and 2b respectively.  Delayed outcomes are inherently 
risky, so the exploration of latent outcomes requires controlling for risk preferences.  Study 
2a develops a theoretical and empirical framework for eliciting risk aversion proxies in the 
domain of health, which have not previously been fully developed in the literature.  The 
method extends the classic Holt-Laury risk preference elicitation framework into a new 
domain- health risks- and the method is implemented successfully in Study 2.  This chapter 
therefore makes both conceptual and methodological contributions through clarifying the 
utility theoretic basis of a health risk aversion measure and then developing a way to elicit 
such a measure in surveys.  Study 2b uses the novel VSLCAN:VSL relationship developed in 
Study 1 to elicit exponential discount rates from Risk-Risk data comparing latent cancer and 
road accident risks.  Regression analysis performed on these rates on a sample and individual 
level, provides strong evidence to suggest that a non-standard (sub-additive) discounting 
model is the most descriptively accurate discounting assumption for this sample.  It provides 
the first evidence regarding sub-additive discounting in the domain of health and fatality risk. 
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Executive Summary 
Background 
This thesis examines the underpinnings of the value of preventing a statistical cancer 
fatality (VSLCAN) relative to the value of preventing a statistical road accident fatality 
(VSL).  Cancer fatalities differ from road accident fatalities along two key dimensions.  
The first is the context of the fatality itself.  While road accident fatality is typically 
near-instant, cancer fatality usually follows a period of illness or ‘morbidity’ prior to 
fatality, and is often described as engendering a particular ‘dread’ or horror.  The second 
dimension is timing.  Exposure to a cancer risk today will not typically lead to 
morbidity and death until a number of years or even decades have passed.  This delay 
from exposure until fatality is known as latency.  These attributes of the cancer fatality 
scenario are hypothesised to influence the VSLCAN in two ways: 
1)  The main effect of the cancer context is to increase the VSLCAN.  This is 
through the influence of morbidity and dread effects. 
2) The main effect of latency is to reduce the VSLCAN.  This can be expressed 
through an effective discount rate. 
However, there is little consensus in the existing literature as to whether these 
hypotheses are correct, particularly because up to now efforts to disentangle context and 
latency effects have not been commonplace.   
Two stated preference studies are conducted to validate these hypotheses and to provide 
further insights about the effects of latency on the VSLCAN.  Alongside the empirical 
insights that are generated, the studies make significant methodological and theoretical 
contributions.  Future research related to latent fatality risks could benefit significantly 
from these developments.  
The thesis is structured in four parts.  Part I outlines the background and situates this 
research in the wider literature. Part II reports study 1, which explores the VSLCAN:VSL 
comparison in a broad sense, considering context, morbidity and latency effects.  Part 
III reports the results of study 2, which provides more in-depth investigation into 
latency.  Study 2 is presented in two distinct chapters, each of which explores a distinct 
aspect of latency.  Recognising that delayed outcomes are inherently risky, study 2a 
develops the theoretical and empirical frameworks for eliciting risk aversion 
coefficients in the domain of health. Study 2b investigates the appropriate rate and 
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functional form at which latent cancers are discounted.  Finally, part IV provides overall 
discussion and conclusions, with a particular focus on the relevant messages for policy 
analysis. 
Study 1 
Study 1 had the broad focus of considering the overall VSLCAN:VSL relationship and 
attempting to understand its underpinnings.  Specifically it aimed to test the hypotheses 
on pg.52, and to elicit information about the magnitude of these context and latency 
effects.   
Study 1 Methods 
Study 1 took place in Newcastle upon Tyne in Jan-Feb 2012.  The sample consisted of 
159 members of the public (plus further respondents interviewed during piloting), and 
all respondents were aged between 30 and 50 at the time of the study.  The study was 
administered to groups of around 10 people at a time, but the questions were answered 
on an individual basis.  The protocol for Study 1 is provided in Appendix A.  The study 
consisted of three sections, the learning rounds, the Risk-Risk survey and the 
supplementary questions. 
Learning rounds  
The sessions began with learning and teaching rounds.  Respondents were familiarised 
with the concepts of fatality risk and risk increases, risk trading mechanisms and the 
influence of timing.  These concepts were conveyed through examples and informal 
questioning.  Respondents practiced with the Risk-Risk trade-off mechanism using 
‘practice’ fatality contexts to learn the mechanism.   Finally, the cancer and road 
accident fatality scenarios were introduced and the key scenario assumptions were set 
out (for example, that the cancers are not behaviour-related and that the road accidents 
would involve fatality after minutes or hours of suffering). Throughout the learning 
rounds, respondents had the opportunity to ask questions and clarify concepts. 
Risk-Risk survey  
In the Risk-Risk (R-R) survey section, Respondents expressed their relative strength of 
preference for avoiding risks of certain fatality scenarios by trading-off risks.  Pairs of 
scenarios were presented to the respondent and their willingness to accept risk increases 
in one cause of fatality indicates their strength of preference for avoiding risk increases 
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in the other. For example, indifference between an x in 60 million increase in the risk of 
fatality by some cause A and a 2x in 60 million increase in the risk of fatality by some 
other cause B would imply that the respondent perceives fatality risk increases in cause 
A to be twice as bad as in cause B. 
The ten scenario pairs can be summarised in four blocks.  The first is the ‘overall’ block 
(Q1-3) where latent cancer fatality risks are compared with current road accident fatality 
risks, incorporating both context and latency effects together.  The second block (Q4-5) 
captures ‘context’ effects, because the fatalities in the scenarios would occur at the same 
time but one is death by cancer (with associated morbidity) and the other is death in a 
road accident.  The third block (Q6-7) considers latency, comparing cancer risk 
increases sooner with cancer risk increases later, ceteris paribus.  The fourth block (Q8-
10) covers the underpinnings of the context effect.  In Q8-9 the scenarios are all cancer, 
but the morbidity period varies between scenarios.  Q10 tests for ‘label dread’ by 
holding everything but the scenario label (cancer or roads) identical between the two 
scenarios being compared. 
Supplementary questions 
After the R-R survey had been completed, three supplementary questions were posed.  
First, respondents’ risk preferences were elicited using hypothetical financial lottery 
choices following the Holt and Laury (2002) elicitation mechanism.   Second, their time 
preferences were elicited using hypothetical money amounts, but this time comparing a 
smaller payoff to be received sooner with increasingly large payoffs to be received later 
following the Coller and Williams (1999) framework.  This allowed the exponential 
discount rate to be elicited.  Finally, the Holt and Laury (2002) framework was adapted 
for the domain of health, and the switching point used as a proxy for risk aversion in 
health.   This is explored in detail in Chapter 6.  Respondents then answered 
demographic questions.  The information in the supplementary questions would provide 
explanatory variables for subsequent statistical analysis. 
Study 1 Analytical Methods 
Basic analysis of the central tendencies is presented.  This involves examining the size 
of the relativity and observing whether the difference in responses between questions is 
in line with the expected movement (for example, does a longer latency period generate 
a lower VSLCAN:VSL relativity?).  Regression analysis is used to complement the 
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analysis of central tendencies and to control for demographic effects.  All of this is 
standard analysis. 
However, the second part of analysis of the relativities in study 1 is novel.  The 
VSLCAN:VSL relationship is proposed to be well approximated by a simple equation 
referred to as CTRt.  This equation suggests that  VSLCAN for a cancer at time T is 
equivalent to the VSL for a road accident at time t, adjusted upwards for the context 
effect (captured by a multiplier (1+x)), but deflated for latency effects through an 
effective discount rate r which is assumed to apply exponentially.  This generates the 
relationship in equation (i). 
            
  
  
 
     
        
      (i) 
From this basis, using simple simultaneous equation techniques, it is possible to use 
combinations of questions to elicit the underlying parameters r (the effective discount 
rate) and (1+x) (the context premium).  This is a key contribution from Part II of this 
thesis, and could be used in future with any relativities data for scenarios with different 
contexts and timescales. 
Study 1 Findings  
The main empirical finding from a policy perspective is that there is a 1:1 relationship 
between the VSLCAN:VSL for latency periods of 10 years.  This is evidence against the 
imposition of a ‘cancer premium’ in policy settings and contradicts the practice of 
applying a multiplier of 2 to the VSL for cancer which is advised in UK government 
bodies including the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 
In addition, the results of the central tendency and regression analyses confirm 
hypotheses (1) and (2) so provide evidence that the cancer context (including a 
morbidity period prior to fatality) increases the VSL ceteris paribus while latency 
reduces the VSL ceteris paribus. This provides support for the CTRt relationship in 
equation (i).  
The simultaneous equation analysis using this relationship estimates the context 
premium to be 1.4 so cancer with a year of morbidity is perceived to be 40% worse than 
a road accident fatality at the same time.  It estimates the effective exponential discount 
rate to be 7.37%p.a.  This value is in line with typical estimates in the domain of health 
and physical risk outlined in the literature review. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the ‘label dread’ of cancer appears to be very weak.  That is, 
there is no evidence on the basis of these results that cancer per se is perceived to be 
worse than road accidents.  Instead, the context premium appears to be driven by the 
preference for avoiding the associated morbidity.  This result would benefit from further 
investigation in future, particularly extending the analysis to consider severity effects. 
Study 2 
Consideration of latency in Study 1 was limited because dread, morbidity and context 
were to be investigated as well, so only a subset of the questions could focus on latency.  
Study 2 addresses this by focussing specifically on the effects of latency in determining 
the VSLCAN:VSL relativity.   
Study 2: design and implementation 
Study 2 was conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne in February 2013.  The sample (n=112) 
consisted of students aged between 18 and 25 enrolled at Newcastle University.  Again, 
the study was administered to groups of respondents but questions were answered on an 
individual basis.  The protocol for Study 2 is identical to that for Study 1, with one 
exception: the scenarios being compared in the R-R survey were different.  Q1-3 was 
identical to Study 1.  Q10 replicated a ‘context’ question by comparing cancer and road 
accident risk increases when both would occur ten years from now.  However, Q4-9 all 
compared latent cancer risk increases with road accident risk increases sooner.  This 
allows greater variation in timing than Study 1 and so allows greater confidence in the 
inference of discounting rates and functions.   
Study 2 is reported in two chapters, with Study 2a considering risk aversion elicitation 
and Study 2b using the R-R survey answers to draw inferences about discounting rates 
and functional forms. 
Study 2a 
Study 2a is motivated by the observation that delayed outcomes inherently incorporate 
more risk than immediate outcomes.  As such, risk preferences are expected to influence 
preferences over latent outcomes.  The current literature lacks appropriate theoretical 
and empirical frameworks within which to elicit estimates of the coefficients of relative 
risk aversion in the domain of health.  These frameworks are developed and 
implemented in Study 2a.  
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The structure of the argument in 2a is as follows.  First the utility theoretic 
underpinnings of the Holt and Laury (2002) (H-L) procedure for eliciting financial risk 
aversion are set out and explained.  This framework is converted to handle utility of 
health by assuming that health can enter directly into the utility function.  With this 
assumption, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the theoretical framework and the 
associated risk aversion elicitation procedures will transfer between these domains.   
Next the analysis considers how the new framework can be implemented in practice.  
To operationalize it requires a measure of health that increases in severity.  The author 
sets out a range of possible health state communication tools and selects the EQ-5D 
description system as the most appropriate of the currently available options.  As such, 
the elicitation procedure faced by respondents in Study 2 included an H-L elicitation 
table containing lotteries between financial outcomes and a second H-L elicitation table 
where the outcomes in the lotteries were health states of increasing severity described 
using the EQ-5D system. 
The interpretation of the health-state H-L data is not entirely straightforward.  There are 
two major sources of contention.  The first is the choice of input value for the EQ-5D 
health states.  There are two options, one is to use pre-existing population estimates of 
the value of these health states which were derived by the EuroQoL group.  However, 
the UK-specific values were elicited using a Time-Trade-Off method which is subject to 
problems with bias from time preferences.  A correction procedure is developed and 
presented.  The second option is to use Visual Analogue Scale values of the health 
states.  These are a visual representation of the loss from full health that each respondent 
considers to be associated with the health state description.  In Study 2 both the VAS 
and the TTO approaches are used. 
The second contentious point derives from what the VAS and TTO scores actually 
represent.  While the theory requires a measure of health severity (preferably on a ratio 
scale), the VAS and TTO scores in fact represent a value of health.  As such, the TTO 
and VAS scores will incorporate the effects of diminishing utility in health, which is of 
course a key aspect of risk aversion.  Algebraic manipulation is used to demonstrate that 
the interpretation of the risk aversion parameter in study 2 is limited to capturing the 
gambling aversion component of risk aversion.  While this is clearly a limitation, 
chapter 7 argues that the limitation would be resolved if a ratio scale measure of 
increasing health severity could be developed.  In addition, the theoretical work in this 
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chapter means that the interpretation of the measure is unambiguous.  The procedure is 
therefore argued to represent an improvement upon existing risk aversion proxies in the 
domain of health. 
Findings 
The main contributions of Study 2a are methodological or theoretical.  These have been 
mentioned in the chapter summary above, but are highlighted here for clarity. 
The key methodological contribution is the development of the empirical framework for 
eliciting risk aversion coefficients over health states.   Achieving this requires two 
innovative theoretical contributions as follows. 
The theoretical framework for eliciting financial coefficients of relative risk aversion is 
translated into the domain of health states.  Additionally, the theoretical link is 
formalised between the elicitation of risk aversion parameters (which are elicited when 
a direct measure of health severity is used) and the elicitation of gambling aversion 
(based on the currently available health values).  This lends additional clarity to the 
interpretation of the health risk aversion proxy. 
The empirical results from this chapter are a secondary concern compared to the 
methodological and theoretical contributions, but for completeness they will be 
summarised here.  Firstly, risks preferences defined over financial outcomes are found 
not to be highly correlated with the health risk aversion proxies generated by this new 
methodology.  This adds to the growing evidence that suggests risk preferences are 
domain-specific.  In terms of the levels of risk aversion, the tentative conclusion is 
drawn that risk aversion is lower in health than in finance, although acknowledging that 
this could be an artefact of the interpretation of the coefficient as a measure of gambling 
aversion as opposed to a measure of ‘full’ risk aversion. 
Study 2b 
The health risk aversion proxies elicited in Study 2a are taken forward into Study 2b 
which focusses on establishing the most descriptively appropriate discount rates and 
discounting functional forms.  This is to test the well-established finding in the financial 
experimental literature that exponential discounting is not descriptively accurate for the 
majority of individuals.   
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Study 2b: analytical methods 
First the VSLCAN:VSL relativities are plotted as a function of latency in order to make 
initial inferences about the effects of timing.  Next, the CTRt relationship at the heart of 
Study 1 (equation i) is used to elicit exponential discount rates for every individual in 
the sample, and these are tested for significant correlation with underlying time-related 
aspects of the fatality scenarios.  Specifically, the exponential discount rates are 
regressed on the average delay until the risk outcome, which tests for hyperbolic 
discounting, and on the difference between the time of the road accident and cancer 
fatalities (known as the latency differential) which tests for sub-additive discounting.  
Probit analysis is run to explore whether discounting behaviour is predicted by 
demographic characteristics.  Finally, the CTRt relationship is adapted for the different 
discounting hypotheses (hyperbolic and sub-additive discounting) and the discount rates 
are elicited and compared in each case. 
Findings 
The theoretical contributions in Study 2b relate to clarification of the way each 
discounting assumption would relate to, and be elicited from, the VSLCAN:VSL 
relativity.  The main methodological contribution is the procedure for categorising 
individual respondents by discounting type using basic OLS regression techniques.  
However, in this chapter the main contributions are the empirical results. 
The key finding is that based on the sample averages and on the individual 
classification, exponential discounting is not the most suitable discounting assumption 
for this sample.  Only 35% of respondents had discount rates that did not depend on the 
time parameters tested in this chapter.  Sub-additive discounting appears to best 
categorise the sample as a whole, and hyperbolic discounting is not well supported by 
these data. 
Finally, the levels that the effective exponential discount rates take (between 1 and 
20%p.a. based on sample averages) align well with the existing evidence about 
discounting.  However, eliciting rates and functional forms on the level of the individual 
highlights just how diverse and varied discounting is between individuals and domains, 
and the rates elicited on an individual level span from the strongly negative to high 
positive rates.  Dealing with such heterogeneity in time preferences is not 
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straightforward, but is a question that needs to be considered.  The procedure used here 
that allows the inference of discounting type on the individual level is arguably an 
important step towards allowing this debate to proceed. 
Policy implications 
The thesis as a whole has a number of implications for policy.  These categorise into 
two main areas: empirical and normative.   
The empirical or descriptive implications relate to the size of the VSLCAN:VSL relativity 
(shown to be 1:1, rejecting the 2:1 cancer multiplier recommended by the HSE).  
Alternatively, instead of applying a constant VSLCAN, policymakers could use a context 
premium to adjust for the disutility from the cancer context including morbidity effects.  
Then a discount rate could be applied to find the present for cancers with different 
latency periods.  Study 1 provides estimates of 1.4 for the context premium and a 
discount rate of 7.37%p.a. to be applied exponentially.   
However, this is called into question by the finding that the majority of the sample 
appears to consist of non-exponential discounters.  This is particularly important 
because the implications for policy values are shown to be large based on a simulation 
reported in Part IV.  While of course findings from the student sample in study 2 might 
not generalise to the population, comparing the two samples in terms of the questions 
common to both studies generates surprising similarities.  This gives the validity of the 
empirical policy results tentative support.  
However, arguably the more important policy implications fall into the normative 
category and relate to the appropriateness of reflecting public opinion over 
intertemporal choices in policy decisions.   
The inferred discount rate of 7.37%p.a. exceeds the policy rate typically used for fatality 
risks (the social rate of time preference (STPR)), which is 1.5%p.a.  However, because 
x and r are elicited jointly, use of the 1.43 context multiplier in combination with an 
alternative discount rate would imply overriding the overall relativity elicited in Study 
1.  This highlights the complexity of the policy interpretation of the results of this study.  
Bringing non-exponential discounting into the picture intensifies the conundrum.  This 
is because exponential discounting in policymaking is normatively appealing because it 
does not imply time inconsistency.  However, imposing exponential discounting would 
mean overriding public preferences.  For a policy maker that wishes to respect the 
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preferences of the public, while maintaining normatively appealing policies that are not 
time inconsistent and which reflect wider concerns such as intra-generational equity, the 
interpretation of the evidence in this thesis is clearly not straightforward.  Nonetheless, 
good policymaking can only be enhanced by better and more comprehensive 
information about the way that individuals approach intertemporal fatality risk 
considerations in practice.  This thesis adds substantially to that body of information, as 
well as to the tool kit for researchers that would contribute further in the future. 
Future research 
Part IV concludes with a set of questions for further research.  These include questions 
of clarification, for example research to clarify the influence of morbidity upon the 
context premium, and validation of the method employed to correct the TTO health 
scores for time preference effects.  However, a large scale question that is also raised is 
whether it would be feasible to develop a scale for health state measurement that does 
not draw on respondents’ value functions for health.  These areas for future 
consideration demonstrate the potential for this thesis to lead to further research and 
publications. 
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PART I.   
INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE AND MODELS 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1  Background and Scope 
Since the seminal work of Drèze (1962), Schelling (1968) , and Mishan (1971) on the 
valuation of a change in probability of dying, (elaborated in Jones-Lee (1969) (Jones-
Lee (1974)) Jones-Lee (1976) and Jones-Lee (1979)), there has been continued 
academic and policy interest in developing and refining an estimate of the value of 
reducing fatality risks.  This has resulted in an indicator referred to as the Value of 
Preventing a Fatality (VPF) or Value of Statistical Life (VSL) which is, in simple terms, 
the aggregated willingness to pay for small risk reductions for a population such that the 
mathematical expectation of the number of fatalities to be prevented is exactly equal to 
one
1
. 
There is much debate about whether applying a uniform VSL across all policy areas is 
appropriate, or whether different values ought to be used for fatality risks in different 
contexts, for different sections of the population, and at different times.  While this 
normative debate is on-going, in terms of a descriptive account of public preferences 
existing evidence suggests that different risks are perceived differently- and more 
specifically that their reduction is valued differently- by members of the public.  
Invoking the claim that good policymaking must utilise a firm base of evidence and 
understanding about public preferences, the overarching aim of this thesis is to 
contribute to knowledge about what drives the differences between public preferences 
for reductions in the risk of fatality in specific contextual and temporal circumstances. 
The specific focus of this work is a special case of fatality risk: cancer fatality
2
.  Since 
Kneese and Schulze (1977), economics has recognised its role in evaluating the impacts 
of cancer on the wellbeing of society.  UK policy guidance (from the Health and Safety 
Executive and other departments) suggests applying a multiplier of two to the VSL for 
cancer, while the OECD does not recognise such a cancer premium. This lack of 
                                                          
1
 Note that the US literature uses the concept of VSL slightly differently, to mean an 
individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for fatality risk.  This is an important 
distinction, and wherever the term VSL is used in this thesis it means the aggregation 
over the population. 
2
 More specifically, the study considers cancer fatality that is not linked to behaviour 
traits such as smoking, and which have characteristics that approximate those of typical 
occupational and environmental cancer fatalities.  The HSE will use insights from the 
work in application to occupational cancer risks. 
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consensus reflects wider disparity in the underlying theoretical, ethical and empirical 
evidence bases that support these policy positions.   
Reflection on the nature of cancer fatalities leads to the conclusion that they differ from 
accidental fatalities in two main ways.  Firstly, cancer fatality is usually preceded by a 
protracted period of pain, suffering and illness prior to death, and is often considered a 
particularly bad way to die as accounted for by the so-called cancer multiplier (see 
Jones-Lee et al. (1985a), Slovic (1987), Sunstein (1997) and Revesz (1999)).  Secondly, 
cancer fatality usually occurs many years after exposure to the carcinogenic (cancer-
causing) influence that triggered it; in other words cancers are latent fatalities (Rushton 
et al., 2010).  Heterogeneity in the cancer scenarios under consideration in valuation 
studies is likely to contribute to the lack of consensus in VSL estimates. 
A key question is then whether the prospect of fatality in the context of cancer does 
engender special “dread” or fear, perhaps because of the preceding illness (morbidity) 
period or for some particular psychological aversion to the ‘cancer’ label.  If so, does 
this context effect result in a higher VSL for cancer? A second question is whether 
latency tends to diminish the VSL for cancer.  If this is so, to what extent does this 
occur? 
In light of this, this thesis will examine the roles of morbidity, dread, latency and 
discounting in determining the value of preventing statistical cancer fatalities.  The first 
study (study 1)
3
conducted to this end employs quantitative survey methods to establish 
the existence and magnitude of the effects of context and delay on the relative valuation 
of cancer risk changes for a subset of the general population.  This provides the first 
dedicated and specific UK evidence in support of the hypothesis that context and 
latency act in opposing directions on the VSL for cancer, and provides a firm base of 
evidence upon which to build a framework for the elicitation of key underlying 
parameters in the cancer VSL, which are the premium placed on the context of cancer 
and the effective discount rate at which latent cancers are evaluated. 
A further study (study 2) adopts a narrower focus, investigating the implications of 
latency for the VSL.  This study provides a methodology for eliciting discount rates 
from Risk-Risk trade-off relativities data.  In addition, it allows the categorisation of 
respondents into discounting ‘types’ and allows an analysis of what drives the 
differences in discounting behaviour.  In order to fully understand discounting in the 
                                                          
3
 Study 1 is funded by the HSE and ONR (contract ND2484) 
14 
 
domain of health and physical risk, arguably a health-related measure of risk 
preferences is necessary.  This is provided in part III of this thesis, which uses novel 
estimation techniques grounded in newly formalised theory to provide a health-related 
measure of risk preference which is then used in the estimation of discount rates in the 
full analysis of study 2. 
Taken together, the results provide an array of insight into public preferences regarding 
the evaluation of latent fatality risk in general and cancer fatality risks in particular.  In 
addition, new methodological procedures and tools are generated to allow the elicitation 
of risk, time and context preferences from survey data.  As such, this thesis provides 
tools for future research alongside empirical evidence about existing public preferences 
over fatality risks. 
The thesis is structured in four parts.  Part I situates it in the literature.  Part II reports 
study I, which considers the overall relativity between latent cancers and current period 
road accidents.  Part III reports study 2 which explores latency effects (specifically risk 
preferences and discounting), and part IV provides discussion and conclusions, with 
reference to the policy implications of this work.
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
This literature review first outlines the background and history of the value of statistical 
life (VSL), and then presents the one-period model of valuing a change in risk. Next, 
the multi-period life cycle consumption model is presented and its relation to the VSL 
explained.  Empirical evidence about the level of the VSL for road accidents is 
presented in brief, highlighting UK policy values.  Attention is then turned to the 
specific case of cancer.  As set out in the introduction, cancer differs from road 
accidents in terms of the context (incorporating a period of morbidity prior to fatality) 
and because there is typically a lengthy latency period between exposure and fatality.  
The theory and the empirical evidence surrounding both of these aspects is presented 
and discussed.  The insights are combined in a multi-period model (Van Houtven et al., 
2008) and then a new, simple relationship is presented which links the VSL for cancer 
(hereafter VSLCAN) to the VSL for road accidents (VSL) incorporating both the 
proposed context premium and discounting for latency. 
2.2  Background and History of the VSL 
Policies that save lives are typically associated with costs of implementation, be they 
directly incurred monetary costs or foregone benefits in other domains.  In this respect, 
fatality risk reductions can be viewed as just one item upon an almost inexhaustible list 
of beneficial policy outcomes competing for the scarce resources available to society.  
Where markets exist and function well, individual agents acting in their own self-
interest will generate optimal allocations of goods and services.  However, in the case of 
publicly implemented fatality risk reductions there is no obvious market within which 
these self-interested interactions can take place, and as such prioritisation must rely on 
more structured information.    
Jones-Lee (1982) discusses the options for societal decision making with the conclusion 
that the most promising approach is to base policy decisions on information about the 
value of fatality risk reduction as perceived by members of the public
4
.  The 
monetisation of these life-saving benefits allows the beneficial policy outcomes to be 
                                                          
4
 A recent study by Roman et al. (2012) investigates the extent to which expert 
judgement can be relied upon to inform allocative policy decisions.  While the results 
are favourable, this author advocates reliance on preferences of members of the public 
where this is viable to avoid problems such as motivational bias in expert evaluations. 
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compared to the costs of achieving them, or to the benefits of alternative projects, and as 
such facilitates decisions surrounding legislation, regulation and public spending. 
Drummond and Torrance (2005) provide additional arguments to support using public 
opinion as the basis for policymaking, although caveat the economic evaluation 
approach, noting “none of these approaches is intended to be a magic formula for 
removal of judgement, responsibility or risk from decision-making activities”.  
Nonetheless, the book advocates the use of explicit valuation techniques as part of the 
decision maker’s toolkit. 
Of course, for the majority of people, the concept of placing a finite sum on money on 
the value of their life is inconceivable.  However, as first formally noted in Mishan 
(1971) and Schelling (1968), the good in question is not a life saved or a death 
prevented: it is a reduction in fatality risk.  It is a much less controversial statement that 
there is some monetary sum which a person would be willing to pay in return for a 
small reduction in their personal risk of fatality.  This is exemplified by the markets for 
seatbelts, smoke alarms and other risk-reducing devices which are readily available to 
purchase.  Although it might seem more difficult to imagine a monetary amount that 
would compensate for an increase in fatality risks, market based evidence again 
suggests the contrary: the labour market provides countless examples of jobs with a risk 
premium, for example.  As such, the concept of individuals making trade-offs between 
their personal income or wealth against their personal fatality risk does not seem to be 
implausible. 
Based on these foundations, Drèze (1962) formalised the expected utility framework 
that captures changes in the probability of fatality.  This framework has been elaborated 
upon and formalised through the work of Jones-Lee, including Jones-Lee (1969) Jones-
Lee (1974) and Jones-Lee (1989).  This body of work provides the basis for what has 
become the standard model of the valuation of a single period risk reduction.  The 
model is presented in the next section (2.3), and will be referred to and elaborated upon 
where appropriate through this theory and literature review (chapter 2).   
It should be noted at this stage that the model and its implementation takes as its basis 
the Von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) axioms underpinning standard expected 
utility theory.  There has of course been substantial and convincing criticism of standard 
expected utility theory with notable contributions from Schoemaker (1982) Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) and Starmer (2000), the latter of which highlights the diversity of 
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attempts to find an alternative to EUT.  The decision in this thesis to base the analysis 
within the expected utility framework was not taken lightly, but was taken in the 
interests of analytical tractability in the absence of a clearly superior alternative 
framework within which to consider the questions at hand. 
Theoretical models of willingness to pay for risk changes are presented next, beginning 
with the generic one-period model from Jones-Lee (1974) and then moving to the 
generic life cycle consumption models using Cropper and Sussman (1990) as an 
example.  These models are presented here because the framework they capture 
underpins the majority of empirical work estimating the value of a statistical life.  As 
such, the models provide a firm basis for understanding the existing literature about the 
VSL, and provide a platform for the development of the utility model at the core of this 
thesis and its analysis.  The Van Houtven et al. (2008) model is the most relevant 
existing framework for considering fatality risks from latent cancer.  It will be presented 
later, in section 2.11.1, after the different empirical and theoretical features that 
motivate it have been discussed.  The key insights from the Van Houtven model and 
additional insights from the theoretical and empirical literature will then be distilled into 
a very simple relationship (pg.53) which will underpin the analysis in subsequent parts 
of this thesis. 
2.3  The Basic Model of a Single Period Risk Reduction in Discrete Time 
This model is taken largely from Jones-Lee (1974), replicated here for reference and to 
provide a basis for the discussion of the likely effects of baseline risk and income on the 
VSL.  Consider an individual with initial wealth  ̅ with a subjective risk of fatality 
initially at probability   ̅.  That is, the individual places a probability  ̅ on the likelihood 
of their own fatality during the current period.  Defining utility conditional on survival 
as      and utility conditional on dying as     , the individual’s expected utility for 
the coming period is 
           ̅    ̅   ̅   ̅       (1) 
Further, assume that utility over wealth conditional on survival is strictly increasing and 
strictly concave, and that utility over wealth conditional on death is non-decreasing and 
concave.  Utility of wealth greater than zero conditional on dying would reflect some 
bequest motive, and the bequest motive is allowed to be zero. Given the concavity of 
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the utility of wealth functions, the individual is assumed to display risk aversion over 
wealth at least given survival. 
 
  
  
   and 
   
   
          (2) 
 
  
  
   and 
   
   
          (3) 
In addition, assume that utility of wealth conditional upon living is greater than utility of 
wealth conditional on dying. That is, the individual prefers life to death at any given 
level of wealth. 
                  (4) 
Finally, it is assumed that utility is more responsive to changes in risk conditional on 
survival than conditional upon death which is reflected in the higher marginal utility of 
wealth conditional on survival than on death.  
 
     
  
 
     
  
         (5) 
2.3.1  Introducing a risk reduction 
Consider a potential risk reduction which would reduce the subjective fatality risk from  
 ̅ to  .  This clearly reflects a welfare gain for the individual because of the assumption 
that life is preferred to death.  As such, there can be some reduction in wealth,  , which 
when received along with the risk reduction  ̅ to  , leaves the overall expected utility 
unchanged.  That is, 
     ̅    ̅   ̅   ̅          ̅         ̅      (6) 
To understand the significance of the value  , which Jones-Lee refers to as the Hicksian 
compensating variation in wealth for the risk change under consideration
5
, it is useful to 
consider how   changes with respect to changes in the probability.   
2.3.2  Willingness to pay for a marginal risk change 
Differentiating (6) with respect to   gives the following relationship 
                                                          
5
 An alternative definition for  , provided in Schmalensee (1972) and applied to the 
VSL definition by Smith and Desvousges (1987), is as an option price.   
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        (7) 
Where 
     ̅          ̅        
    ̅   
  
    
    ̅   
  
  
 then represents willingness to pay (WTP), defined ex-ante, for a marginal change 
in subjective fatality risk  .  It depends on both the difference between utility under full 
health and death, and on the probability-weighted marginal utilities under full health 
and death.  Some properties of this willingness to pay can be noted based simply on the 
assumptions provided above, in equations (2) to (5). 
First, the numerator of the WTP formula is always positive, because utility is always 
higher in full health than in death for a given level of wealth, as assumed in equation 
(4).  In addition, it is assumed that the marginal utility of wealth in full health is strictly 
positive, and as such, given that   is taken from wealth the partial derivative of the 
utility of wealth with respect to   (wealth loss) will always be negative.  This is strictly 
true for the condition of full health, and weakly true in death, so  
   
    ̅   
  
   and    
    ̅   
  
       (8) 
Given that equation (5) stated that utility is more sensitive to changes in wealth under 
full health than in death, it is natural to conclude that 
 
    ̅   
  
 
    ̅   
  
         (9) 
From this, the denominator of the willingness to pay equation is negative, and as such 
  
  
  .  
Jones-Lee (1974) derives that 
   
   
   which allows the relationship between 
willingness to pay for a change in risk ( ) to be plotted as a function of the new risk 
level ( ) as is shown in figure 2.1, which is adapted from Jones-Lee (1974, p.95).   
p
V


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The diagram in figure 2.1 demonstrates that   (WTP for a change in risk) is positive for 
reductions in risk (   ̅) and negative for increases in fatality risk (   ̅) reflecting 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation.  The limit    represents the maximum 
acceptable increase in risk, for which no finite sum would be sufficient to compensate 
the individual for accepting the risk increase, which would ceteris paribus cause a 
reduction in their expected utility, according to equation (2). 
2.3.3  Willingness to pay for a change from baseline risk 
Typically, policies that address risks are concerned with the effects of small changes in 
the probability of fatality.  That is, the willingness to pay for marginal changes in 
fatality risk evaluated from the perspective of the current risk level  ̅.  Given that where 
the risk change is zero (i.e.    ̅) WTP for the change in   is zero, then 
(
  
  
)
 ̅
 
   ̅     ̅ 
    ̅     ̅   ̅    ̅ 
       (10) 
For the risk reduction case,  (
  
  
)
 ̅
 is then the marginal value of a risk reduction from 
the baseline fatality risk,  ̅. 
2.3.4  Aggregation to the VSL 
The elicited private values for an individual’s marginal risk reduction are typically 
aggregated in order to provide a useful and easily interpreted unit of measurement for 
𝑝  ?̅? 
0 
𝑉 
𝑝 
Figure 2.1: Willingness to pay and willingness to accept for changes in fatality risk 
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use in policy making.  Traditionally this has been through aggregation into the Value of 
Statistical Life (VSL) also known in the UK as the Value of Preventing a Statistical 
Fatality (VPF)
6
.  The aggregation procedure is to take the mean of the marginal rates of 
substitution of wealth for fatality risk amongst a population.  This is explored in Jones-
Lee (1991).  The elicitation of marginal rates of substitution, however, is not 
straightforward in practice and instead what is typically measured is Willingness to Pay 
(or Willingness to Accept) for a small but defined change in probability of fatality.  
These WTP values are then aggregated over a population such that the expected change 
in the number of fatalities is precisely equal to one, hence the term VSL.  To illustrate, 
consider a population of size 10,000 which is offered a reduction in fatality risk equal to 
1/10,000.  The summation of the individuals’ WTP values for this risk reduction will 
provide an estimate of the VSL. 
2.3.5  A note on the interpretation of ‘VSL’ 
It should be noted that in the US, there has been a recent trend towards two alternative 
interpretations of WTP values for dissemination.  The approach taken by Hammitt and 
others (see for example Hammitt and Liu (2004b), Cropper and Sussman (1990))  is to 
define the VSL as an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between wealth and 
fatality risk.  Under this interpretation, unlike under the standard interpretation 
described above, it is meaningful to talk about an individuals’ own VSL.  It is important 
to recognise the difference in interpretation of the VSL concept in these different 
literatures, because the implications on a population level are only the same if the 
population is homogeneous in its preferences.   
The second approach, which is less easily confused with the standard VSL, is to 
disseminate the information in the form of a micro-risk reduction.  This approach, 
defined by Cameron and DeShazo in multiple works (see for example Cameron et al. 
(2009) or Cameron and DeShazo (2012)) is an attempt to avoid the public outrage that 
is sometimes associated with the misinterpretation of the VSL as a value to be placed on 
a particular fatality.  However while at face value the micro-risk reduction approach 
appears very different, in essence it is equivalent to the standard VSL as applied by 
                                                          
6
 The term ‘VPF’ is arguably more intuitively appealing than the term ‘VSL’ because it 
is less open to misinterpretation as being the value of a particular or identified life, 
which as discussed and as shown in figure 2.1 is arguably beyond value.  The VPF 
definition was recommended in a report to the World Health Organisation (Sommer et 
al. 1999) but for the sake of comparability with the majority of published literature on 
the valuation of fatality risks, will not be used here. 
22 
 
Jones-Lee and others in the UK and Europe, with the exception that the VSL estimate is 
divided by one million.  However, the author of this thesis is of the opinion that with 
due care of explanation, the VSL concept is a useful and intuitively appealing unit of 
measurement, and the standard definition Jones-Lee (1991)will be employed throughout 
the rest of this work. 
2.3.6  Factors predicted to influence the single-period VSL 
The VSL as defined over single period one-off fatality risks is theoretically predicted to 
respond to both baseline risk and wealth.  These predictions are discussed below, and 
will inform the treatment of baseline risk and wealth in the survey reported in part II 
(pg.63).  Existing empirical evidence about the influence of baseline risk and wealth on 
the VSL is provided later in this literature review, while this section focuses on 
predictions from theory. 
2.3.6.i  Predicted influence of the baseline risk level 
Equation (10) defined the marginal rate of substitution between wealth and fatality risk 
viewed from the baseline level of risk  ̅.  Taking the derivative of this function with 
respect to  ̅ allows predictions to be made about the way that the marginal rate of 
substitution between wealth and risk- and hence the VSL- is expected to depend upon 
the baseline risk.  Using the product rule it is possible to show that 
 
 (
  
  
)
 ̅
  ̅
 
     (     )
[    ̅     ̅ ] 
        (11) 
and given that         and          , then the expression in equation (11) is 
not greater than zero.  Recasting this in terms of willingness to pay for risk reductions 
generates equation (12).   
 
 ( (
  
  
)
 ̅
)
  ̅
  
     (     )
[    ̅     ̅ ] 
        (12) 
As such, the marginal rate of substitution of wealth for a reduction in risk, defined at 
current risk level p, is increasing in baseline risk. 
2.3.6.ii  Predicted influence of initial wealth 
Similar analysis allows the investigation of the impact of initial wealth on the VSL.  
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to the wealth parameter W gives 
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    (13) 
Again using the assumptions from equations (2)-(5), and the observations that    
     and          , it is possible to show that equation (13) is negative, and as 
such that the counterpart for a risk reduction is increasing in initial wealth  ̅. 
2.4  Multi-period Models of Utility Maximisation 
The model described and analysed in section 2.3 is restricted to consider a single time 
period which is a limitation that will become particularly pertinent when this analysis 
turns to consider cancer fatality risks.  In reality, it seems clear that an individual would 
have some preferences over the timing of risk changes.  There are two main classes of 
models that look at utility over multiple periods of time.  These are the life cycle 
consumption models (LCM), which originated with the work of Yaari (1965), and 
simpler extensions of the single period model as discussed in Jones-Lee (1982).  The 
life cycle consumption models involve restrictive assumptions, but they are more 
commonly used than the Jones-Lee models to explore willingness to pay for fatality 
risks over time under different assumptions.  As such, this review considers just the 
LCM to provide a basis for understanding the existing empirical literature and for the 
development of the van Houtven (2008) model which underpins the cancer VSL to be 
examined in this thesis.   
2.4.1  Set-up of the Life cycle consumption model- Cropper (1990) 
The life cycle consumption model is presented because it is commonly used in the 
literature as a basis for the theoretical exploration and survey design in studies 
investigating different influences upon the VSL where timing is important.  Examples 
are the work of Ehrlich and Chuma (1990)  in combining the Grossman model of 
investment in health (Grossman, 1972) with the LCM; and the work of Bleichrodt and 
Quiggin (1999) in combining the QALY
7
 model insights with the LCM.  Perhaps most 
relevant is the use of the LCM by Van Houtven et al. (2008) in setting up a risk-risk 
model of cancer risk reductions, which will be presented and discussed on pg.49 as a 
basis upon which the empirical work in this thesis builds. 
For a working example of an LCM see Cropper and Sussman (1990), from which the 
following exposition is adapted.  The pattern typically seen in these life cycle 
                                                          
7
 Quality Adjusted Life Year 
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consumption models is that utility over wealth is weighted by the probability of 
surviving, and as such they are comparable with the single period model- but these 
weighted utilities are modelled over multiple periods of time.  A simple basic model 
assumes additive periods of discrete time, such that the lifetime expected utility is given 
as 
    ∑      
            
 
         (14) 
Where expected utility as perceived at current age   is the sum of instantaneous utility 
of consumption       in each future period at age   up to the maximum age  .   
The instantaneous utility is weighted by      which is the probability, given that the 
individual survives to j, of being alive during period t; and also weighted by the 
discount factor          which assumes exponential discounting is applied by the 
individual at rate   over the     periods until the time period in question.  The 
probability of surviving to age      , given survival to age  , is 
      
    
. Let this be 
denoted by the probability     , where    is the probability of dying at age   
conditional upon survival until the     birthday. 
The next ingredient for the optimisation problem is the wealth constraint.  Cropper and 
Sussman (1990) demonstrate that this can be reduced to the assumption that the present 
value of expected consumption is equal to the present value of lifetime earnings plus 
initial wealth, i.e. 
 ∑          
     
 
    ∑          
     
 
         (15) 
where r is the riskless rate of return on savings and interest on borrowings. 
The individual therefore faces a maximisation problem, where expected utility from 
lifetime consumption (given in equation (14)) is maximised subject to the wealth 
constraint in equation (15) resulting in an optimal consumption stream.  
2.4.2  Eliciting willingness to pay from the life cycle consumption model 
As for the single period model, differentiation is used to establish the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for a reduction in risk.  Consider a regulation to reduce the probability of fatality 
during a given year, conditional on being alive at the beginning of that year.  
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Specifically, the regulation will reduce   , which as discussed is the probability of 
dying at age   conditional on having reached age  . 
The result was reached earlier that WTP for a risk change is the amount of wealth that 
an individual is just willing to give up in exchange for the change in probability of 
fatality.  Placed within an intertemporal frame, this becomes the amount of wealth that 
an individual will give up at age   for a reduction in   .  That is, the payment happens 
at present while the risk change may occur in the future.  This demonstrates the 
flexibility of the model.  To formalise, willingness to pay at age   for a reduction in    
is as follows 
         
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
          (16) 
Cropper et al state that applying the Envelope Theorem to the Lagrangean function that 
represents the maximisation of the objective function in equation (14) with respect to 
the constraint in (15) allows the       to be written as  
       [      
  ∑ [               
                  ]
 
     ]    
           (17) 
where    is the marginal utility of income in year  .  Cropper and Sussman (1990) 
provide an intuitive interpretation of this result.  Willingness to pay is equal to the loss 
of discounted utility from age     and all subsequent periods, which is converted into 
a monetary amount by dividing by the marginal utility of income   .  This is augmented 
by the impact of the change in    on the budget constraint, in that an increased survival 
probability will decrease the affordable consumption opportunities while increasing 
earnings potential.  The resulting influence is therefore ambiguous. WTP for a risk 
reduction therefore depends on a combination of utility and budget effects. Cropper and 
Sussman (1990) note that in abstracting from any value of longevity or survival per se, 
this framework likely provides a lower bound for the WTP for a given change in the 
conditional probability of fatality. 
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2.4.3  Age and the VSL 
In addition to the theoretical predictions about wealth and baseline risk, which were 
explored in section 2.3.6, introducing a lifetime frame provides a framework for 
considering two further influences upon the VSL.  These are latency of a risk, the 
treatment of which is postponed until section 2.10, and age.  Based on the life cycle 
consumption model, the effect of age on the VSL  is ambiguous, as described by 
Hammitt (2000): 
“Two factors influence the life-cycle pattern of VSL. First, the number of future life 
years at risk declines as age increases, so the benefit of a unit decrease in current-
period mortality risk declines. Second, the opportunity cost of spending on risk 
reduction also declines with age as savings accumulate and the investment horizon 
approaches. The net effect may cause VSL to fall or rise with age.” (Hammitt, 2000) 
2.4.4  Assumptions in the Cropper (1990) model of life cycle consumption 
The Cropper model of life cycle consumption presented above requires a number of 
assumptions, some of which have been discussed. They are summarised below. 
- The analysis depends upon the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and is therefore constrained by the same 
criticisms as the single period model regarding the realism of the underlying 
assumptions and the appropriateness of their application.  As stated previously, 
it is in this author’s opinion the most appropriate framework within which to 
work in the absence of clearly superior alternatives.   
- An individual’s utility is assumed to depend only on consumption, which is 
weighted only by discounting and survival probability.  This is a restrictive 
assumption but simplifies the analysis to the factors that are to be investigated in 
a wealth-risk trade-off. 
- Utility received if one dies is assumed to be zero.  This precludes the bequest 
motive for positive utility under fatality that was accommodated by the single 
period model, although this assumption can be relaxed if necessary.   
- Survival probabilities are assumed to be exogenous, as in the single period 
model.   
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- Utility over different life spans is represented by the additional consumption 
possibilities in those periods, weighted as discussed.  No utility is derived from 
survival per se, only from the consumption possibilities that survival presents. 
- Utility of consumption in any given period is independent of the other periods’ 
consumption and utility.  This additive separability assumption is arguably the 
most problematic assumption within these models, but its relaxation results in a 
loss of analytical tractability. 
- The assumption of perfect capital markets is be imposed (see Cropper and 
Sussman (1990) for a discussion). 
 
2.5  Insights Taken from the Jones-Lee (1974) and Cropper (1990) Models 
The influences taken from Cropper and Sussman (1990) and Jones-Lee (1974) are the 
weighting of utility of wealth by survival probabilities in forming an expected utility 
maximisation problem for the individual responding to risk trade-off scenarios.  These 
models have provided the theoretical basis for the assumed relationship between wealth, 
risk and utility that forms the basis of the mechanism of the Risk-Risk trade-off 
mechanism that will be discussed in section 3.2.  In addition, the insights about the 
importance of baseline risk and wealth in determining the VSL will inform the design of 
the survey and the analysis in parts II and III of this thesis. 
2.6  Existing VSL Estimates 
Having outlined the theory underpinning the elicitation of estimates of the VSL, this 
section now presents a summary of existing empirical work aimed at estimating the 
appropriate value for the VSL as defined over instantaneous accidental fatality.  This 
section is to be kept intentionally brief, because the main focus of this research is to 
consider the VSL for cancer.  Nonetheless, understanding the VSL defined over 
instantaneous accidental fatality will be important because road accident fatalities (a 
subset of instant accidental fatalities) are to be the comparator case in the theoretical 
analysis reported in section 2.11.1 and the empirical work in part II.   
2.6.1  Meta-analyses of worldwide instantaneous fatality VSL estimates 
There exists substantial literature dedicated to establishing the appropriate value of 
preventing a statistical instantaneous fatality (VSL).  For example, the meta-analyses by 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) or Mrozek and Taylor (2002) each provide a summary of 
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hedonic wage estimates of the VSL worldwide.  Alternatively, for meta-analysis of both 
contingent and revealed preference studies see Miller (2000) or Bellavance et al. (2009).  
A comprehensive review of elicitation techniques and estimates can be found in the 
report “Health of Nations” prepared for the Australian Safety and Compensation 
Council (ASACC, 2008), comprising over 200 estimates of the VSL, while the global 
meta-analysis of stated preference studies conducted by Lindhjem et al. (2011) is 
perhaps the most comprehensive in considering the factors that affect the VSL. 
Given this wealth of secondary analysis on the level of the VSL worldwide, further 
evaluation of individual VSL studies will not add value to the present discussion or to 
knowledge in general.  However, a key message from the meta-analyses is that 
estimates of the VSL vary substantially both within and between studies.   
2.6.2  Factors explaining the variation in VSL estimates 
The variation between studies is often due to differences in the exact scenario presented 
to respondents (see Chilton et al. (2006a) which shows the variation in strength of 
preference for avoiding instantaneous fatalities in different contexts) or in the elicitation 
mechanism (revealed preferences have repeatedly been shown to generate higher 
estimates of the VSL than stated preference studies (de Blaeij et al., 2003)).  These 
issues will be taken into consideration when designing the survey instrument for the 
empirical investigation in parts II and III.  In addition to the between-study variation, 
respondent characteristics have been shown to generate different VSL levels within 
studies. This includes the theoretically predicted influences of wealth and baseline risk 
(identified by Lindhjem et al. (2011) as the most robustly and consistently important 
factors influencing the VSL) but in addition age, gender and other demographic effects 
have been repeatedly shown to influence the VSL.  In depth discussion of these 
influences is provided in the meta-analyses mentioned above and will not be repeated 
here, but this observation will be taken forward to inform the regression models in the 
later analyses (see part II). 
2.6.3  UK policy VSL 
Since 1987 the UK’s Department for Transport (DfT) has based its value of safety on 
what it refers to as the VPF (Value of Preventing a Statistical Fatality- synonymous 
with the VSL as defined on pg.20) on stated preferences, with additional value included 
to account for the avoided lost output and ambulance and safety costs which would not 
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necessarily be incorporated into an individual’s WTP value.  The value has been 
updated for inflation and methodological advances (see Carthy et al. (1999)) with the  
progression of the VPF in 2009 prices shown in figure 2.2.  The leap in the value in 
1987 reflects the change (implemented in 1988) to using the Stated Preference values as 
opposed to the previous ‘gross output’ method where the VSL was based on the value 
of lost economic output that would be avoided by the prevention of a premature fatality 
as opposed to capturing the intrinsic value of survival.  The currently utilised VSL is 
around £1.6million in 2009 prices for all fatalities except cancer.  As such, the current 
UK ‘roads VSL’ is £1.6million.  The interested reader should consult Jones-Lee and 
Spackman (2013) for an up-to-date account of the development of the value of road 
safety in the UK. 
 
2.7  Variation in the VSL Across Contexts 
So far in this review, the focus has been restricted to consider the value of changes in 
the risk of instantaneous accidental fatalities, with a particular focus on road accident 
risk changes.  However, in reality fatality risks are diverse in their characteristics.  It is 
beyond the scope of this literature review to discuss the arguments- which are on-going 
in the literature
8
- pertinent to the appropriateness of applying differentiated VSLs in 
policy.  Whilst acknowledging the importance of this debate, this thesis adopts the 
                                                          
8
 The discussion of how far policy ought to reflect public preferences has been 
considered explicitly in McDaniels et al. (1992), Sunstein (1997) and Savage (1993).  
The pragmatic and ethical desires for a single VSL for policymaking must be weighed 
against the importance of consumer sovereignty principles.  
Figure 2.2: Value of preventing a UK road fatality: 1952-2009 
Source, Department for Transport, (2011), p.2 
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viewpoint taken by the HSE that policy decisions ought to reflect the preferences of 
members of the public as far as is practical.  To that end, it aims to provide information 
about the appropriate level of the cancer VSL, relative to the value of preventing a 
statistical fatality in the context of road accidents (which, as discussed on pg.28, is 
currently £1.6million).  A number of studies discuss the variation in VSL across 
contexts, with a notable recent meta-analysis by Dekker et al. (2011) which evaluates 
the possibility of conducting Benefits Transfer of VSLs across contexts.  Dekker et al. 
conclude that the procedure is not straightforward due to the importance of context to 
the VSL.  They do not, however, consider the case of cancer.  
There are certain elements of the prospect of cancer fatality which lead to the 
assumption that these risk changes will be valued differently than road accident fatality 
risk changes.   This is the focus of the next section of this literature review. 
2.8  Existing Evidence About the VSL for Cancer 
Based on the existing empirical literature on cancer, there is little consensus about the 
magnitude, or even the existence, of any cancer premium.  Like for the roads VSL, the 
broad range of values is likely to be due to differences between the studies eliciting 
them; particularly the specific context, the country in which the study was performed, 
the typical age, wealth and other characteristics of the sample and so on. However, there 
are two additional features of the prospect of cancer fatality that set it apart from road 
accident fatality, and which may well contribute to the very broad spread of results.  
These are the effect that the context “cancer” has on the prospect of fatality and the fact 
that typically cancer fatality occurs after a delay of some years after the change in 
underlying exposure risk.  This review will argue that the context of cancer engenders 
specific or additional disutility for two main reasons:  a dread of the particular label 
“cancer”, and the additional disutility that is associated with a period of illness prior to 
fatality.  For the delay- referred to as latency- this is likely to reflect discounting but 
also some additional timing effects reflecting age, life stage and susceptibility to risks.  
These will be discussed in turn in section 2.10, along with the existing empirical 
evidence.  To maintain clarity throughout this thesis, the key terms are defined in figure 
2.3. 
These definitions are used throughout this thesis.  At times, they differ from definitions 
used in the literature, because there is little consensus in the stated preference literature 
about how cancer fatality risks ought to be explained and presented to respondents.  
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This is arguably a key explanation for the differences in VSL between studies but so far 
studies are too few to conduct a full meta-analysis of these effects, and they have 
insufficient detail regarding the way that cancer fatality scenarios are explained.  
Instead, this review takes a more general approach and considers the evidence for the 
influence of these context and latency effects, concluding that the label ‘cancer’, 
morbidity preceding cancer fatality, and latency can all be shown at least by some 
studies to influence the perceived value of cancer risk reductions.  This will inform the 
survey design in part II which will explore these effects directly and explicitly. 
 
2.9  Context, Morbidity and Labelling Dread Literature 
2.9.1  Different valuation for different contexts: psychological underpinnings 
This literature review has made the assumption that there is likely to be differences of 
valuation of risks in different contexts.  Recall figure 2.3 which defined context effects 
as encompassing all of the differences between the prospect of a cancer fatality 
compared to the prospect of a road accident fatality, while holding the time of fatality 
constant.  In the lifetime consumption model by Cropper and Sussman (1990) which 
was presented on pg.23, utility of a change in the probability of dying is dependent upon 
Figure 2.3: Key definitions 
OVERALL PREMIUM the relative size of the cancer VSL incorporating all relevant 
effects (morbidity, label dread and latency) compared to the 
road accident VSL defined as an instant near-term fatality. 
CONTEXT PREMIUM the effect on the VSL of the specific cause of fatality, cancer as 
opposed to road accidents.  Context is defined as being 
independent of time, but incorporating the influence of the 
illness associated with cancer. 
LABEL DREAD a component of the context premium, ‘label dread’ is the 
particular influence of the term “cancer” on the VSL 
controlling for both timing and morbidity. 
MORBIDITY the time spent ill prior to fatality from cancer 
 
LATENCY the time from exposure to the cancer-causing substance until 
fatality.  As such, the latency period includes the morbidity 
period within it. 
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the risk change, wealth level, initial risk and timing.  In the assumptions on pg.26 it was 
discussed that lifetime utility depends on the utility of consumption in each period.  Any 
direct utility from a change in risk itself was assumed away.  However, there is evidence 
to suggest that individuals may value survival and survival probability for its own sake.  
As Slovic (1987) has it, “In short, "riskiness" means more to people than "expected 
number of fatalities."” 
This concept of valuing a risk change for more than the utility from the additional 
expected consumption is particularly pertinent when considering risk changes that are 
considered particularly “dreadful” ways to die.  Sunstein’s seminal work (Sunstein, 
1997)introduces the idea that deaths are not considered the same as one another, 
because “Some deaths are taken to be part of life, whereas others seem disruptive and 
terrifying.”  This idea is expanded upon in an extensive literature surrounding the 
practical and psychological differences between fatalities by different causes. 
2.9.2  Different valuation for different contexts: empirical evidence 
Slovic (1987) provides a seminal review of early studies into the influences of 
psychometric factors like voluntariness, dread, knowledge, and controllability of the 
risk; baseline risks; and benefits which combine to provide an individual’s perception of 
a risk scenario.  Slovic suggests collapsing the wide range of psychometric factors into 
just two dimensions, ‘dread risk’ and ‘unknown risk’.  The former captures (on a scale 
of increasing severity) perceived lack of control, pure dread, catastrophic potential, 
likelihood of fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits.  
Each of these is argued to increase how severe the risk would seem, even if the 
respondent was fully informed about the risk and what it would be like.  The second 
dimension, “unknown risk” captures to what extent the risk is judged to be 
unobservable, unknown, new to society or to science, and delayed in the manifestation 
of the harm.  As such, they are more to do with the uncertainty of the risk occurring and 
being detected, than to do with the severity of the scenario itself.  These definitions are 
adapted from Slovic (1987).   
A similar categorisation was provided earlier by Fischhoff et al. (1978).  Risk 
perception was described as depending upon a range of factors, sharing a number of 
common features with the Slovic factors, but with some differences.  Fischhoff’s factors 
are listed as the immediacy of the risk, the voluntariness of undertaking the risk, the 
knowledge of both those exposed and those in a position to deal with the risk (Fischhoff 
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cites the scientific community in this role), the controllability of the risk, its novelty, its 
potential to be catastrophic, its associated dread, and the perceived severity of the risk.  
In contrast to Slovic, Fischoff simplifies the factors by the level of technology (high to 
low tech) and the certainty of fatality if the risk materialises. 
Mcdaniels et al. (1992)  is a more recent example of a study that discusses the 
perception of risk in terms of the characteristics of that risk.   In this study, the authors 
find that the characteristics of a hazard influence WTP to reduce the risk.  They define 
“dread risks” as being severe, uncontrollable and catastrophic, but also note the 
importance of knowledge, controllability and voluntariness on the way that the risk is 
perceived.  The a priori discussion of these factors is confirmed using a contingent 
valuation and risk perception study.  This is replicated in Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995) 
who show that controllability, voluntariness and responsibility are more influential to 
the way a risk is perceived than its potential to be catastrophic (i.e. involve multiple 
fatalities).  This study provides further support to the emerging factors from previous 
work. 
Chilton et al. (2006a) conducted a study to consider whether the context of the fatality 
influences decisions in a risk-risk framework.  This study is an important complement 
to the above because it explicitly controls for baseline risk, which could arguably be 
driving the apparent preference for avoiding risks in certain contexts (see pg.22 for a 
discussion about the influence of baseline on the WTP for changes in risk).  The Chilton 
et al. study provides further evidence that differences in context generate different 
strengths of preference, even when all risks are instantaneous and when baseline risk is 
controlled for.  In contrast, Carlsson et al. (2010a) consider age and context effects on 
VSL in a choice experiment, and find that while age significantly influences the VSL, 
the context of the fatality does not.  However, the authors note that their study is framed 
in terms of risks to other people.  This may explain why the more emotive or affective 
factors described in the work of Slovic, Fischhoff and others may not have applied. 
To summarise this section, a range of factors has been considered in a literature 
spanning over three decades. These factors are presented in figure 2.4.  These factors 
allow a vast array of risk scenarios to be considered, and provide a rationale that is 
missing in the standard WTP models like the Cropper and Sussman (1990) model, for 
the difference between WTP for risks across different contexts. 
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The above discussion has confirmed that there are psychological reasons, supported 
empirically, for different fatality causes to be valued differently because of the affective 
or emotional considerations that they generate in individuals’ conceptualisation of the 
fatality and the risk.  However, up to now, the specific case under consideration in this 
thesis has been left aside.  The next section addresses this, relating each of the causes 
listed in figure 2.4 to cancer, and then exploring whether the existing empirical 
literature supports the hypothesis that cancer is considered worse than other fatality 
causes.   Notice that in this section, the influence of timing is set aside because the focus 
here is on the causes.  The timing element will be returned to in section 2.10, pg.42. 
2.9.3  Cancer context premium: predictions  
Figure 2.5 summarises the way that cancer is likely to be perceived on each of the 
dimensions discussed in section 2.9.2 and summarised in figure 2.4.  The direction and 
comments are speculative, but generate an overall summary of the likely implications.  
Figure 2.4:  Factors driving the context premium for general risks 
Voluntariness of undertaking the risk: WTP more to avoid risk that is not voluntarily 
undertaken 
Controllability of the risk:  WTP more to reduce a risk that is perceived to be 
outside of individual’s control 
Knowledge:  WTP more to reduce the risk of something that is poorly understood, 
either by those exposed or by science  
Novelty: If a technology or hazard is new, WTP more to avoid the associated risk. 
This links to knowledge. 
Associated dread: WTP more to reduce the risk of something perceived to be 
particularly dreadful.  This is related to the perceived severity of the risk scenario. 
Potential to be catastrophic (kill multiple people at once):  some evidence that WTP 
more to reduce catastrophe risks 
Benefits: Willing to accept a higher level of risk in an activity when the perceived 
benefit is higher 
Immediacy of the risk: WTP more to avoid immediate risk (links to time preference 
and latency) 
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Figure 2.5 shows that there is not an unambiguous consensus between the factors with 
respect to whether they are likely to have an upward or downward influence on the VSL 
for cancer.  However, there are some clear results, for example that cancer is typically 
considered a ‘dreaded’ fatality and that it is typically difficult to control, but that it is 
usually not immediate. 
Figure 2.5:  Applying the context factors to the case of cancer 
Characteristic Cancer on this 
scale 
Implication 
for cancer 
VSL 
Comments 
Voluntariness Ambiguous Ambiguous Behavioural or occupational 
cancer risks may be perceived 
more voluntarily undertaken 
than genetic cancer risks. 
Controllability Low (with 
exceptions) 
Decrease 
(with 
exceptions) 
Behavioural or occupational 
cancers may be perceived 
more controllable than genetic 
cancers 
Knowledge Low but 
increasing 
Increase (but 
at a 
decreasing 
rate?) 
Knowledge of cancer from a 
scientific perspective is 
improving. 
Novelty Low Decrease Perhaps depends on cancer 
cause- if occupational, what 
industry etc.? 
Dread High Increase See section 2.9 
Catastrophic Low Decrease Except in large scale 
occupational/environmental 
accident scenarios. 
Benefits Ambiguous Ambiguous Depends on cancer cause- if 
occupational, what industry 
etc.? 
Immediacy Low Decrease See section 2.10 
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To build upon this speculation, the next section of this review considers the empirical 
evidence that exists surrounding the characterisation of cancer as a “bad 
death”(Sunstein, 1997), ceteris paribus. 
2.9.4  Cancer context premium: empirical evidence 
Early empirical work which considered the cancer and road accident risk comparison 
was Jones-Lee et al. (1985a).  This Person Trade Off matching study did not explicitly 
describe the latency period involved in the cancer case, which means that the 
interpretation of the premium that they find is slightly problematic.  Under the 
assumption that respondents assumed that the risks would manifest at the same time, the 
cancer context premium is above 3 based on the cancer VSL at £23m and the road 
accident VSL at £7m.  Of course, as with all matching studies there is an element of 
other-regarding preferences which could have affected the values, but this ought not to 
dramatically affect the relativity between the two VSLs, if the effects of the other-
regarding preferences are similar in the cancer and road accident cases.   
The next notable study to provide empirical evidence about the cancer to roads relativity 
is Savage (1993).  This study addresses the comparison from a psychological 
perspective, eliciting information about public perceptions of the hazards in terms of the 
psychological factors presented in figure 2.4.  The results show that cancer (specifically 
stomach cancer) is “in a league apart from the other risks”, with a very high WTP for 
cancer compared to the other risks.  Magat et al. (1996) find contrasting results to the 
earlier two studies.  They find no premium for cancer compared to road accidents, even 
contemporaneously.  This difference may be a result of the Risk-Risk trade-off 
methodology or of the particular cancer specified (lymphoma), but as discussed the 
heterogeneity in survey mechanisms makes the results difficult to compare. 
At this stage chronologically, Revesz (1999) produced a report with a legal focus which 
considered the value of cancer risk reductions.  This article provides no new empirical 
evidence but is a comprehensive summary of thought and empirics up until that stage.  
The focus is largely on the latent nature of cancer risks, and this will be returned to in 
section 2.10.  Nonetheless, Revesz argues that discounting latent harms ought to be 
“accompanied by countervailing upward adjustments” and cites the dread of cancer and 
involuntary nature of the cancer harm. 
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After the Revesz study, the empirical work is noticeably more rigorous in its treatment 
of the characteristics of the cancer cases under consideration.  Hammitt and Liu (2004b)  
find no premium for cancer, but this is after controlling for the latency.  They report a 
preference for avoiding cancer ceteris paribus and discuss that this is due to the 
protracted suffering but also because of the knowledge of impending death.  It ought to 
be noted that they did not include an instantaneous accidental fatality as a comparator, 
instead considering different latent diseases.  In a study conducted for the UK’s Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE), Chilton et al. (2007) conduct a choice experiment (also 
referred to as conjoint analysis) which includes a direct cancer to road accident 
comparison.  They find a premium for cancer, and discuss that this is likely due to 
effects including blame and responsibility especially when comparing behavioural 
cancers like smoking-attributable cancers to work-related cancers like occupational 
mesothelioma, which is related to asbestos.  Their qualitative evidence does not suggest 
a particular dread of the label ‘cancer’, because “no specific or emotive comments were 
made about the fact that the deaths were labelled as ‘cancer’ death” (Chilton et al., 
2007).  This suggests that other features may have played more of a role. 
The HSE study had a broad focus ranging from rail accidents to occupational cancers 
and considering aspects from illness through to blame and responsibility, while the 
Hammitt and Liu (2004b) study had a narrow focus to the extent that the instantaneous 
roads comparison was excluded.  A study which arguably fits between these extremes is 
Cameron et al. (2009), which considers mainly latent diseases (like Hammitt and Liu 
(2004)) but in addition includes the road accident case for comparison (like the HSE 
study).  Using conjoint analysis, the authors find mixed evidence for cancer context 
premia, with some cancers at a premium compared to the base case and some at a 
discount.  The cancers particularly feared are breast, prostate and colon cancers while 
lung and skin cancer generate lower WTP.  This may reflect elements of blame and 
responsibility because lung and skin cancers are often linked to behaviours such as 
smoking and carelessness about UV rays from the sun or sunbeds.  As such, the “dread” 
of cancer appears again to be offset by the ability to blame the cancer on actions of the 
victim.  This mirrors the HSE result as well as the early results in Jones-Lee et al. 
(1985a). 
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2.9.5  Cancer morbidity premium: predictions 
So far, the theoretical discussion has mostly focussed on the label dread of cancer that 
was presented in the definitions in figure 2.4.  That is, the way that the label ‘cancer’ is 
enough to evoke a particular aversion to the risk increase, perhaps because of the 
associated perceptions about responsibility, unfamiliarity, uncontrollability and so on 
that the label engenders.  However, the empirical evidence presented was largely unable 
to distinguish this effect from a more general ‘context premium’ which captures more 
than this label dread.  The other main component which is hypothesised to generate the 
‘context premium’ for cancer is referred to here as the ‘morbidity premium’ which 
captures the effect of the protracted period of pain and suffering prior to eventual 
fatality which characterises the typical cancer case. 
While the morbidity and mortality aspects of cancer fatality are conceptualised 
separately in this literature review, in practice they are almost impossible to separate. 
The suggestion of cancer fatality with no prior morbidity is deemed unrealistic 
(although it has been used in previous studies including Cameron et al. (2009)), a 
consideration which influences the choice of scenarios in the survey design in part II. 
Again, Sunstein (1997) provides a strong hypothesis about the influence of morbidity on 
the VSL based on psychology.  For cancer morbidity, the author suggests that the frame 
‘cancer death’ may induce fears beyond what would be considered reasonable in a VSL 
study “people call to mind especially stressful periods of pain and suffering that are not 
representative, or because those incidents may assume undue salience (dwarfing the 
very fact of death itself)”.  Goddeeris (1983) provides a theoretical exposition on WTP 
for illness ex ante which corresponds to Sunstein’s concerns, stating “aggregate 
willingness to pay ex ante to reduce the probability of illness to zero exceeds the ex post 
consumer surplus gained”.   This review, and indeed this thesis takes the view that 
strong preferences amongst members of the public ought to be reflected in policy, and 
in this respect contradicts Sunstein’s argument in advising that the morbidity preference 
legitimately drives the cancer premium.  However, it is nonetheless the case that if 
excessive salience is placed on the morbidity attribute this might distort the elicited 
relativities.  This will be considered when designing the survey instrument in part II.  In 
any case, Sunstein provides evidence that morbidity is an important driver of the 
preference for avoiding cancer fatality, and he concludes (with caveats that the 
preference ought to be able to “survive a process of reflection”) that “when a death is 
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preceded by a period of pain and suffering, it is appropriate to make special efforts to 
guard against it” (Sunstein, 1997). 
2.9.6  Cancer morbidity: empirical evidence 
Again, the earliest to provide empirical evidence is the Jones-Lee et al. (1985a) study.  
It does not explicitly provide information about illness but recognises the importance of 
the cause of latent fatality.  The results provide evidence that cancer is considered more 
dreadful a way to die than road accidents as discussed above on pg.34.  However, heart 
disease fatality is also shown to generate a higher WTP than road accident fatalities.  As 
such, it is clearly not only the label dread of cancer that distinguishes it from road 
accident fatalities, and morbidity is likely to explain some of the additional preference. 
Magat et al. (1996) put Sunstein’s arguments (outlined on pg.35 above) to an empirical 
test by including morbidity explicitly in their risk-risk trade-off study mentioned 
previously.  The result is striking: of a fatality preceded by morbidity, 58.3% of the 
utility loss from the scenario is shown to be attributable to the illness while only 41.7% 
is attributable to the fatality itself.  This reflects Sunstein’s argument that considerations 
about illness might overshadow the fatality aspect, which leads to the essentially 
unanswerable question about whether the 58.3% value would survive the reflection that 
would be required to make it a legitimate feature for inclusion in a policy VSL.   
Nonetheless, if the present agenda is to understand the factors influencing preferences 
for avoiding cancer risk increases, then this is surely strong evidence that morbidity 
matters. 
A number of more recent studies have included morbidity explicitly in the analysis of 
the cancer VSL, and find it to be significant in driving the preferences over cancer 
fatality risks.  These are DeShazo and Cameron (2004), Chilton et al. (2007) and 
Cameron and DeShazo (2012).  All three find evidence that a longer period of illness 
increases WTP to avoid the latent fatality risk.  However, they each have different 
contributions.  DeShazo and Cameron (2004) illustrate how the lifetime consumption 
model can be adapted for illness.  They introduce the VSI (value of statistical illness) 
and show that the longer the illness, the higher is WTP.  Chilton et al. (2007) use length 
of illness and also find increasing WTP. However, they additionally consider the 
concept of illness severity, which is not the case in the other studies considered.  While 
quality of life is a harder concept to convey than simply length of an illness period (see 
chapter 6 for a full discussion of this issue), arguably severity is at least as relevant as 
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duration when it comes to the effect of illness on the VSL.  As such, this study can be 
seen to make an important contribution.  Finally, the Cameron and DeShazo (2012) 
study is interesting in that while it builds on the framework in the DeSchazo and 
Cameron (2004) study, its findings are slightly different.  While willingness to pay does 
increase with length of illness, the difference in willingness to pay between the zero 
illness, 1 year of illness and 5 years of illness scenarios is insignificant.  This result is 
surprising given the other findings discussed. 
Hammitt and Liu (2004b) provide a possible explanation for this finding:  while 
morbidity itself is perhaps perceived as a ‘bad’, and would therefore be expected to 
increase the willingness to pay to avoid risks of a scenario with long illness, it might be 
the case that an extensive morbidity period is seen as an extension of length of life.  
This is the set-up in Van Houtven et al. (2008) amongst other studies, and the 
implications of this description are that the respondent might perceive the illness to be a 
trade-off between length of life and quality of life.  In addition, even if the illness period 
is not presented as an extension to life, a longer illness period may still be perceived as 
a good thing if it presents a chance to come to terms with the fatality.  Similarly, some 
respondents may value the opportunity to put their lives in order and perhaps to say 
goodbye to loved ones.  This would mean that a longer period of illness might be 
perceived to be a good thing, despite the associated pain and suffering.  These possible 
effects will be considered when designing the survey instrument in part II of this thesis.  
It should be noted that in this study, Hammitt and Liu are unable to test the significance 
of the morbidity because it is held constant (at 2-3 years) for all scenarios, and the 
language is “identical for symptoms and prognosis” for all scenarios that they present. 
Overall, it appears that the majority of evidence suggests that morbidity matters to 
respondents when considering cancer fatality risks.  While some evidence suggests that 
the influence is insignificant, in other studies morbidity was the dominant effect driving 
a preference for avoiding cancer risks.  This suggests that morbidity is an area ripe for 
further empirical investigation which will be performed in part II of this thesis. 
It will be noted that this discussion about morbidity has not touched on the literature 
surrounding the valuation of a QALY.  This is because the current analysis is based 
upon the VSL literature, and considers morbidity as a component of the prospect of 
cancer fatality.  The QALY literature is not rooted in expected utility theory in the same 
way as the VSL literature, and as such an exposition on the methods and evidence 
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surrounding the value of a QALY is considered largely irrelevant for this part of the 
thesis.  In part III, where some aspects of the QALY framework will be used, this 
literature will receive some attention. 
2.9.7  Summary:  dread and morbidity components of the cancer context premium 
While the evidence surveyed so far is not without contradiction, it appears that cancer is 
held at a premium compared to contemporaneous instantaneous fatalities such as road 
accidents, and that the morbidity prior to fatality is a substantial component of this 
preference.  Speaking normatively, as long as these dread and morbidity effects reflect 
genuine well-thought-out preferences of members of the public  and are not the result of 
mistakes or misguided decision heuristics, then arguably both label dread and morbidity 
should be reflected in the VSL for cancer (although the reader is invited to consider the 
work of Mcdaniels et al. (1992), Sunstein (1997) and Savage (1993) for a full 
discussion of the underlying ethical and theoretical issues that surround the inclusion of 
dread and morbidity in the value of preventing  a statistical fatality).  From a more 
practical sense, descriptively the evidence is convincingly in favour of a cancer context 
premium, although its magnitude and underpinnings are less clear. 
A number of observations will be taken forward and will shape both the theoretical 
framework and empirical investigation to follow in this thesis.  These include the range 
of factors that might be expected to influence the dread of cancer (see figure 2.5, pg.35) 
which will be controlled for where possible in the survey design; the potential to 
confound the morbidity period with length of life; the possibility that morbidity 
concerns are exaggerated a priori; and the need for explicit description of morbidity and 
latency periods, not least for the analysis of the results by future researchers.  If the 
context premium can be verified and understood, this will provide a firm basis upon 
which to model the link between the standard roads VSL and the VSL for cancer, and as 
such will provide a platform for empirical analysis in part II. 
2.10  Latency Literature 
2.10.1  Informal intuition about latency 
In figure 2.3 (pg.31), latency was defined as “the time from exposure to the cancer-
causing substance until fatality.  As such, the latency period includes the morbidity 
period within it”.  As such, a longer latency period can be thought of simply as implying 
a more distant fatality, viewed from the present. 
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Initial consideration of the likely effects of latency on the perception of fatality risks in 
general would suggest two main effects.  Firstly, viewed from the present, fatality after 
30 years entails more life and fewer lost life years than fatality after 20 years making 
fatality further in the future preferable to fatality sooner.  Secondly, given that generally 
people prefer good things sooner and bad things later, risk reductions are likely to be 
preferred now and risk increases preferred later.  All of these effects would translate 
into lower willingness to pay for risk reductions in the future, and hence a declining 
VSL with latency. 
2.10.2  Latency formalised in the Life cycle Consumption Model 
These influences can be formalised in the Lifecycle Consumption Model (Cropper and 
Sussman, 1990) as discussed in detail in section 2.10 above.  Equation (17) (pg.25) is 
replicated here for convenience: 
       [      
  ∑ [               
                  ]
 
     ]    
           (17’) 
Where       is the willingness to pay at age   for a risk reduction at age k;     is the 
probability of dying at age   given survival to age  ;   is the rate of time preference; 
      is the instantaneous utility of consumption at time t;    is the marginal utility of 
wealth at age j;    is the market rate of interest on saving and borrowing; and       is 
income at time t less consumption at time t.   
Using this equation, it is clear to see that the later is  , the lower is willingness to pay, 
because there are fewer remaining years of consumption to be evaluated.  In addition, 
later life years are subject to more discounting than life years sooner, as evidenced by 
        .   One caveat, however, is that the sooner the risk reduction is taken, the 
more impact it will have over time because    is the probability of fatality in a given 
year conditional on surviving to that age.  Survival to a given age will be higher if the 
risk reduction is taken earlier.  This is clearly shown in Jones-Lee (1982) and the reader 
is invited to see Nielsen et al. (2010) for a discussion.  This result is the first that has 
indicated that a risk reduction to be taken sooner might be more valuable than a risk 
reduction that would manifest later. 
In addition to the effects considered in the previous section, which were all rooted in the 
Lifetime Consumption Model, there are classes of effect that are likely to influence 
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preferences for the timing of fatality risks.  There are three main classes of effect:  
straightforward delay effects, stage-of-life effects and state-of-the-world effects.  These 
are outlined in the next section with reference to the relevant literature. 
2.10.3  Delay effects: dread, context and discounting 
The dread, context and morbidity effects outlined in section 2.9 above concluded that, 
although not unanimous, there are significant psychological and empirical grounds on 
which to suspect that cancer fatality risks would be considered worse than 
contemporaneous road accident fatality risks.  The implication of this is that if the 
cancer fatality is latent while the road accident is not, then the effect of discounting 
would work to give the dread and morbidity associated with cancer risks less weight, 
and hence generate a decline in the VSLCAN:VSL relativity because the cancer scenario 
would be ameliorated by the delay. 
Typically discount rates are applied to the VSL itself, as opposed to the underlying 
consumption.  This is a simplification when considering the on-going discounting in the 
LCM, but it does provide the basis for tractable models and estimation procedures.  In 
addition, the discounting of the risk change itself allows the dread and morbidity effects 
to be discounted together, which again simplifies the analysis and interpretation.   
However, there is debate in the literature about exactly how to deal with discounting.  
Some key studies considering cancer fatality risk valuation neglect to mention latency 
or discounting at all- these include early studies by Jones-Lee et al. (1985a) and Magat 
et al. (1996), perhaps before the importance of the discounting issue was fully 
recognised but also Chestnut et al. (2012).  The approaches taken in a number of studies 
that do consider latency are provided in table 2.1 in chronological order.  Although 
some of these values are not based on cancer, all are within the health or physical risk 
domains.  Some studies are included despite not eliciting a discount rate, if they 
consider the concept of latency explicitly. 
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Table 2.1:   Discount rates in the existing health literature 
Study Study type Approach Rate  
Viscusi and Moore (1989) Revealed preference Derive a discount rate 11%.   
Horowitz and Carson (1990) Person trade off Derive a discount rate 4.54% 
Cropper et al. (1992) Dichotomous choice  Derive a discount rate 3.8-16.8% 
Ganiats et al. (2000) Dichotomous choice  Derive a discount rate 6.4% 
Gayer et al. (2000) Revealed preference  Assume a discount rate 3% 
Lazaro et al. (2001) Multiple list health 
choices 
Derive a discount rate 14-22% 
Gayer et al. (2002) Revealed preference  Assume a discount rate 3% 
Davis (2004) Revealed preference  Assume a discount rate 3% 
Hammitt and Liu (2004b) Stated preference  Derive a discount rate 1.5% 
Alberini et al. (2006) Contingent valuation Derive a discount rate 1.3-8.6% 
Chilton et al (2007) Ethical discussion 
about treatment of 
future generations 
Do not explicitly derive 
or assume a discount 
rate 
n/a 
Khwaja et al. (2007) Analysis of smoking 
data 
Derive but do not report 
discount rate 
n/a 
Van Houtven (2008) Risk-Risk trade-off  Do not explicitly derive 
or assume a discount 
rate 
n/a 
Cameron et al (2009) Conjoint analysis Assume a discount rate 5% p.a.  
(also1%, 
3%, 8%) 
Hammitt and Haninger 
(2010) 
Contingent valuation Derive a discount rate Insig. diff. 
than zero. 
Alberini and Scasny (2010)  Conjoint analysis  Derive a discount rate 0% 
Alberini and Ščasný (2011) Conjoint analysis  Derive a discount rate 0% 
Adamowicz et al. (2011) Conjoint analysis 
and contingent 
valuation 
Assume a discount rate 5% 
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Reflecting on table 2.1, there appears to be minimal consensus on how to treat latency 
and discounting in stated preference studies.  The majority of the studies considered 
derive a discount rate from responses, but the inferred rates have a very broad range 
both within studies and between them.  A considerable minority of studies assume a 
discount rate, typically 3-5%, and use this to make inferences about other aspects of the 
cancer VSL.  Finally, three studies choose not to report derived discount rates, instead 
including dummy variables for latency periods (van Houtven et al. 2008) or in terms of 
“extra days needed” to offset timing elements (Khwaja et al., 2007) . 
Despite a wealth of evidence in the financial domain that discounting is likely not to be 
constant across time periods and intervals (Frederick et al., 2002), in the existing stated 
preference literature for health alternative discounting models are almost never 
considered.  In some cases exponential rates are elicited but subsequently described as 
reflecting hyperbolic or sub-additive patterns (Khwaja et al 2007).  However, typically 
this is not extended to an investigation of the alternative hypotheses.  This observation 
motivates the research conducted in chapter 7 of this thesis, which dedicated to 
exploring the theoretical and empirical evidence surrounding both the level of the 
discount rate for health but also to the functional form that is most appropriate.  In this 
part, the debate is intentionally simplified by referring only to the exponential discount 
rate.  As such, the assumption taken forward is that some rate of time preference 
underpins the effective discount rate for health, and that on the basis of existing studies, 
this rate is likely to be below 10% p.a on average.   The insight to be taken forward is 
that the elicitation of this rate is not always straightforward from survey data and that 
the literature would benefit from a simple mechanism by which this could be achieved.  
This will be developed in section 2.11.2. 
Aside from discounting, there is another effect that results exclusively from the delay 
until the risk change.  This is what Loewenstein (2006) refers to as ‘anticipatory utility’, 
and encompasses the idea that the knowledge of something impending carries its own 
utility or disutility.  If this is so, then provided an individual is aware of having been 
exposed, then with a longer latency illness they experience the anticipatory disutility of 
premature fatality.  As such, the WTP is not just to avoid the illness, fatality and loss of 
future years of life, but also to avoid the disutility from the anticipation or knowledge of 
the possibility of these losses.  This would be likely to increase WTP, ceteris paribus, 
for the latent illness over the instantaneous illness with no chance for anticipation.   
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Of course, latency is likely to influence the VSL for cancer (VSLCAN) for reasons 
beyond basic delay effects.  Two key channels of the influence of latency are set out in 
the next sections. 
2.10.4  Stage-of-life effects: ambiguous influence of latency on the VSL 
It is commonly acknowledged that the VSL is not constant with age.  While the shape of 
the relationship between VSL and age is not beyond debate (see section 2.4.3 which 
discussed this in more detail) it is typically acknowledged that there might be a peak 
around middle age.  This, as argued in Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) and Jones-Lee 
(1989) can be modelled to reflect patterns of consumption over the life cycle.  In 
addition, Moore and Viscusi (1988) discuss how fewer remaining life years are lost 
such that older people might be expected to have lower is likely to reflect a combination 
of effects including consumption over the life cycle.  As such, WTP for risk reductions 
with different latencies- and which would hence impact at different ages- might be 
expected to vary. 
This variation might be expected to be exaggerated or dampened by other life stage 
effects, for example the likelihood of having dependent children might increase WTP to 
reduce risks at that age, because of the additional negative consequences of fatality for 
the dependents.  Consider an example which illustrates that the interaction of latency 
and age effects might therefore be confounding: 
- Person A is aged 20, and person B is aged 30.  
- Suppose there is additional value of a risk reduction at age 40, perhaps 
because both person A and B expect to have young children at that age.  
- Two risk reductions are offered: one with latency of 20 years, and the other 
with latency of 10 years.  
- Clearly then, ceteris paribus person A would be WTP more than person B 
for the 20 year latent risk reduction (because it would manifest at age 40) 
while ceteris paribus person B would be WTP more than person A for the 10 
year latent risk reduction (because for her this would manifest at age 40).   
- A naïve researcher might infer a negative age effect for the 20 year latent 
risk reduction (because the 20 year old is WTP more for it) and a positive 
age effect for the 10 year risk reduction (because the 30 year old is WTP 
more for it) or perhaps to infer no aggregate effect of age, when in fact we 
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have discussed that the driving force in this scenario is age at the time of the 
risk change itself.   
A second strand of the stage-of-life effect refers to the perceived likelihood of 
succumbing to a risk at different ages.  A risk change when elderly may be perceived to 
be more of a threat than one while young, which might have the effect of increasing 
WTP to avoid latent risks.  Of course, in the VSL framework laid out above, the 
marginal rate of substitution is between subjective fatality risk and wealth, and as such 
the effect of susceptibility to risk ought not to influence the WTP, as long as the 
question scenario properly reflects the individual’s true baseline risk and explains that 
the risk change being valued already takes into account the individual’s frailty, level of 
exposure and so on.  However, it is very conceivable that when risk changes are 
presented as an “n in 10,000” frame, respondents might perceive that their likelihood of 
being one of those n individuals becomes higher with age.  This is a fairly subtle effect 
which requires either careful tailoring of risk scenarios and changes, or at least a strong 
a priori reason to suspect that respondents ‘buy in’ to the baseline risks and risk changes 
presented to them. 
2.10.5  State-of-the-world effects 
The effects here relate, as the name suggests, to the anticipated state of the world at the 
time that the risk would manifest.  This might include anticipated developments in 
technology and productivity such that a risk is either increased, for example with the 
development of more hi-tech solutions to problems which might be seen as carrying 
higher risks of catastrophic or carcinogenic outcomes.  On the other hand, technological 
advancement might be expected to generate risk mitigation such as developments in 
cancer screening and treatment.  As such, the influence of the future state of the world 
on the likely influence of a risk change is very subjective and will be difficult to control 
for in any analysis. 
2.10.6  Future generations  
An extreme interpretation of the state-of-the-world effects is that the world may not in 
fact include the individual making the wealth-risk trade-off.  This requires the 
consideration of intra-generational time preference and discounting.  These arguments 
are fascinating from a normative, ethical perspective but difficult to tackle empirically.  
As such, the majority of the work has been conducted in a theoretical perspective, 
dating back to Ramsey (1928).  The good in question- risks to future generations- does 
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not easily slot into the life cycle consumption frameworks used in section 2.11 and in 
addition will be abstracted away from in the rest of the thesis.  As such, this review will 
not go into any detail, but instead directs the reader to the arguments of Michael 
Spackman in Chilton et al. (2007), Cropper and Portney (1990) and Revesz (1999) 
amongst others. 
2.10.7  Summary: latency and the VSL 
Using straightforward intuition about discounting and the number of life years lost, it 
would seem that a latent fatality risk is unambiguously better than a fatality risk sooner.  
This is formalised in Jones-Lee and Loomes (2010).  Given the potential for 
improvement in life-saving technologies over the coming decades and the typically 
lower VSL estimates empirically based on the wealth-risk trade-offs of people over 60, 
the argument for diminishing of the VSL with latency is fairly comprehensive.  
However, there are a number of reasons that this may not be the case.  Firstly, any 
fatality risk reduction achieved now will improve conditional survival probabilities in 
all later periods, so a risk reduction of a certain magnitude (say, x in 10,000) would give 
a greater overall risk reduction benefit if it is taken now than later.  Secondly, and 
perhaps more informally, it is possible to think about stage-of-life effects such as the 
likelihood of having dependents at a certain age which could make survival seem more 
important at some ages than at others, generating WTP for risk reductions that does not 
diminish monotonically with latency.  In addition, perceptions of increased vulnerability 
to risk changes at old age could lead an individual to prefer an earlier risk reduction to 
one later. 
This discussion leads to the conclusion that while the evidence and theory is in favour 
of a negative relationship between latency and the VSL, there are some factors that may 
drive it in the opposite direction.  As such, like for the positive effect of the cancer 
context on the VSL, it will be necessary to verify the latency-VSL relationship 
empirically before any further theoretical or empirical frameworks can be based upon 
this assumption. 
2.11  Modelling Using these Insights 
As discussed Cropper and Sussman (1990) et al. reduces the utility maximisation 
problem to conditional survival probabilities and the utility of consumption in future 
years.  Two major works have adjusted this framework to account for the kinds of 
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effects considered in this literature review.  Magat et al. (1996) and subsequently Van 
Houtven et al. (2008) show how a multi-period utility framework can capture different 
utilities conditional on different fatalities.  The Van Houtven framework is outlined in 
this section.  
2.11.1  Van Houtven et al. (2008) 
Van Houtven et al. (2008) takes as a starting point Magat et al. (1996) in defining the 
respondent’s problem in considering fatality risks.  As in the Cropper and Sussman 
(1990) model, the respondent is considering lifetime utility from consumption ( ), but 
in this framework the utility depends on the state of the world, which is healthy life, 
death in a road accident or death by cancer.  Each potential lifetime utility stream is 
weighted by the probability of that fatality. 
So, Van Houtven et al. assume that respondents make choices to maximise Expected 
Utility defined as: 
                                          (18) 
where the outcomes are   (die very soon in car crash, with associated utility normalised 
to zero),   (contract cancer which will eventually be fatal) and   (live in normal health, 
which can be thought of as any other health outcome that could occur (including death 
by another cause)).  Both Magat et al. and Van Houtven et al. assume that these are 
mutually exclusive lifetime profiles. 
Differentiating (18) and normalising such that the utility of near-immediate road 
accident fatality is zero (      ), Magat et al. express the relationship between the 
road accident VSL and the VSL for cancer (VSLCAN) as a so-called “mortality 
equivalence ratio” (MER), which expresses the number of avoided cancer fatality risks 
in terms of the number of avoided road accident fatality risks that would leave the 
respondent indifferent.  They show that this is equivalent to the proportional utility loss 
from cancer fatality when starting from full health       : 
    
      
   
 (  
      
      
)      (19)  
A major contribution from Van Houtven et al. is to frame the problem to explicitly 
account for timing.  The mortality equivalence ratio is then indexed on time.  Notice 
that the healthy profile does not depend upon time because there is no set fatality time 
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for that eventuality (time of fatality would depend upon the underlying survival 
function). 
           
         
      
        (20) 
Van Houtven et al. also allow the utility function to have more detail.  The lifetime 
utility function for fatality from cancer at time   is 
            ∑ (  )(  ) 
                
     
   
      (21) 
  
Where: 
-    is the subjective probability of surviving   periods into the future as evaluated 
from the present (   ) 
-    is the time preference factor by which utility in period   is discounted to its 
present value (see part III for a full discussion) 
-    is consumption in period   
-         is the state dependent utility of consumption in period   with     for 
the period of fatality from cancer and      for periods of consumption in full 
health. 
Notice that the cancer is modelled as a single period incorporating both illness and 
fatality.  This assumption neglects the anticipatory utility models discussed in the 
literature review, and might be implausible for long morbidity periods.  The model 
could be adjusted for this by extending the three possible health states to four, with 
       referring to the utility of consumption conditional on being in a state of cancer 
morbidity. Newbold (2011) demonstrates how the Lifetime Consumption Model can be 
adapted to include morbidity prior to fatality, which allows the morbidity to be included 
explicitly and avoids the traditional way that morbidity is handled in VSL studies, 
which Newbold calls “separately and… in an ad hoc fashion”.   
However, returning to the Van Houtven model, similarly to equation (21),  the lifetime 
profile without cancer can be represented by: 
        (∑     
 
   (  ) 
     )      (22) 
As mentioned, this does not depend on any specific time of fatality.  For tractability, the 
survival function   can be truncated if after some j, probability of survival is zero.   
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This framework allows Van Houtven et al to generate some specific predictions for the 
MER (which reflects the relative size of the VSLCAN).  They show that an increase in 
latency usually has a negative effect on MER, so that the preference for avoiding cancer 
risks declines.  In addition, they show that increased survival probability up until the 
time of the cancer fatality time (t) is expected to positively influence the MER. 
This framework allows the theoretical investigation of the likely effects of latency and 
survival probability on the relative value of fatalities at two different times, and as such 
enriches the standard LCM substantially as a basis for the investigation of the VSLCAN.  
However, it relies on the assumption that cancer fatality engenders a different utility 
than road accident fatalities, but does not provide an explicit parameter through which 
this occurs (instead simply implying that      ). Given that this body of work is 
intended to explicitly test whether a premium is placed on contemporaneous cancer 
fatalities compared to road accident fatalities, it would be preferable to model this more 
explicitly through a context parameter. 
In addition, as discussed, it restricts the influence of the dread and morbidity effects 
from cancer to occur only in the final fatality period.  This assumption, as well as the 
additive separability assumption, and many others reported in on pg.26, are problematic.  
For the purposes of this research, it will be enough to assume that latency has a per-
period discounting effect.  This is, as argued in Hammitt (2000), is the state-of-the-art in 
current research: 
“The appropriate procedure to account for latency is to value the risk change 
using the VSL representing the individual’s value when the risk change occurs 
and to adjust for the time-value of money and the chance that the individual will 
die before then. The adjustment is made by discounting the future value of the 
risk reduction back to the time when the expenditure must be incurred” Hammitt 
(2000) 
Having said this, the validity of the discounting assumption will be tested alongside the 
validity of the context premium in the coming analyses. 
2.11.2  The proposed CTRt relationship 
The major insights taken from this literature review are twofold.  These are that there is 
limited consensus in the literature about the effect of context on the VSLCAN, and that 
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there is more, but still not overwhelming, consensus as to the effect of latency on this 
value.  On the basis of current evidence, however, two hypotheses can be made: 
1) Ceteris paribus, there is a preference for avoiding cancer fatality risks as 
compared to road accident fatality risks. 
2) Ceteris paribus, a longer latency period until the manifestation of a risk reduces 
the willingness to pay to reduce that risk. 
These insights lead to a concise yet powerful relationship between the typical cancer 
and road accident VSL.  For a cancer fatality and a road accident fatality which would 
both occur at time  , the relationship can be expressed as: 
                   (A1) 
The VSLCAN with cancer fatality at time   (  ) is assumed to be equivalent to the road 
accident VSL at time   (  ) once it is augmented by       (A1).        is referred 
to as the “context premium” and captures all of the perceived difference in value of 
preventing a risk of cancer fatality compared to road accident fatality at the same time, 
and as such will encompass morbidity (which could be long term), psychological effects 
and dread.  To claim that a time-invariant multiplier is sufficient to capture all context 
effects is of course a strong assumption, which can in theory be relaxed to better reflect 
reality.  However, for the purposes of this exposition it will suffice. 
The effects of latency are captured in assumption (A2).  If latency can be expressed in 
terms of an effective discount rate, which is, for the moment, applied exponentially: 
      
  
      
   {   }         (A2) 
 
Where an outcome    has a value at     equivalent to its value at   (i.e. sooner) 
diminished by the effective discount factor 
 
      
 which captures discounting over the 
interval   at an effective discount rate  . 
 (A1) and (A2) allow the VSLCAN with fatality   years from now to be expressed in 
terms of the standard VSL       as follows 
 
    
       
      
         (23) 
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From this, the relativity between VSLCAN and the VSL for roads     , with cancer 
fatality at time   and road accident fatality at time   (typically    ) can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
 
This CTRt relationship will form the core of much of the analysis throughout this thesis. 
The framework distils the main insights from the literature into a relationship which is 
both comprehensive and simplistic, avoiding the complex assumptions of the lifetime 
consumption model. It has an immediate and obvious counterpart in survey data 
because the relativity between latent cancer and current period road accident values is 
readily available in the literature as a survey output.  Also, as will be shown in chapter 
4, it can be easily used to elicit the parameters for the context premium and effective 
discount rate.   
However, to use the method with confidence will first require the validation of the 
underlying hypotheses.  That is, it will need to be shown that cancer is held at a 
(possibly time-invariant) premium compared to road accidents at the same time.  In 
addition, it will need to be verified that the VSL reacts to latency, in that longer latency 
diminishes the VSL.  If this is so, then it will be possible to have the confidence in the 
framework to use it to elicit the underlying parameters for the context premium and 
effective discount rate.  When this basis is established, then the relationship will be used 
to form the basis of detailed work looking at latency effects on the cancer VSL, reported 
in part II of this thesis. 
2.13  Summary 
This review has set out the theoretical frameworks that underpin the concept of the VSL 
in both a static and a multi-period framework.  It was noted that these models do not 
allow for VSLs that vary across contexts.  However, there is a plethora of evidence to 
suggest that contextual differences in general- and cancer in particular- engender very 
different levels of willingness to pay for risk reductions than for reductions in the risk of 
instantaneous fatality.  Empirical evidence to date appears to suggest that a context 
premium applies, at least for cancer fatalities compared to road accident fatalities at the 
𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑡  
   𝑥 
   𝑟  𝑇 𝑡 (24) 
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same time.  However, this evidence is not unanimous.  Similarly, strong evidence was 
presented in support of a negative relationship between the latency of a risk scenario 
and the VSL.  This evidence again is not without contradiction.  However, from this 
base of theoretical and empirical evidence, two hypotheses can be constructed: 
1) Ceteris paribus, there is a preference for avoiding cancer fatality risks as 
compared to road accident fatality risks. 
2) Ceteris paribus, a longer latency period until the manifestation of a risk reduces 
the willingness to pay to reduce that risk. 
These hypotheses were intrinsic to the work of Van Houtven (2008) whose model was 
used to summarise the key insights of the literature.  However, for the present purposes 
that model is lacking on two fronts:  first, it assumes cancer affects only the final period 
in the lifetime consumption model (precluding long morbidity periods); second, it lacks 
of a specific parameter to capture the context premium. 
This motivated the construction of a new formulation of the relationship between the 
cancer VSL and roads VSL.  This formulation is stripped of any explicit reference to the 
LCM, although it is not incompatible.  This new relationship will form the basis of 
future analysis in this thesis, but for this to be robust the hypotheses need to be verified. 
Part II of this thesis addresses this by verifying these hypotheses, meanwhile allowing 
insights into what other preferences and considerations might be relevant to the 
VSLCAN, through a stated preference R-R trade-off study.  Results from the survey are 
used to demonstrate the potential for the use of the formulation in allowing the 
underlying context premium and effective discount rate to be inferred. 
However, up to this point in the analysis, an exponential discounting function has been 
assumed.  However, as will be discussed in more detail in the review of literature in part 
III, exponential discounting is unlikely to characterise the majority of people’s 
preferences over the timing of outcomes. The CTRt framework will be used in part III to 
elicit and analyse discount rates under different hypotheses.  For this analysis, it is 
arguably useful to have a measure of risk preference elicited in the domain of health.  
part III of this thesis provides such a measure of health risk aversion, clarifying the 
relevant theory and providing a novel estimation technique.  This measure is then taken 
forward into the analysis of discount rates.  part III therefore provides further insight 
into the results from part II as well as contributing theoretical and empirical insights that 
could benefit a range of future VSL and health valuation studies.  
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PART II. 
STUDY 1: VERIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE FOR CANCER AND 
ROAD ACCIDENT FATALITIES 
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Chapter 3.  Background, Methodology and Preliminary Analysis 
3.1  Background 
When considering the value of preventing latent cancer fatalities, it is typically assumed 
that the context of cancer increases the willingness to pay for a fatality risk reduction 
while the length of the latency or delay until the fatality decreases it.  However, these 
hypotheses have not been formally and directly tested in the UK.  In addition, VSL 
studies considering latent fatality risks across contexts would benefit from a simple 
methodology to allow the direct elicitation of the cancer context premium and the 
effective discount rate from survey data.  This would clarify the explanation of the 
findings of different studies. 
This chapter presents a stated preference study
9
 which was commissioned by the UK’s 
Health and Safety Executive to explore the influence of dread and latency on the overall 
cancer premium. Specifically, the study tests hypotheses about the influence of context 
(including illness and dread of cancer) and latency (delay) on the Value of Preventing a 
Statistical Cancer Fatality (VSLCAN).  On the basis of these hypotheses, a simple model 
is developed which links the VSLCAN and the standard (road accidents) VSL, and from 
which key underlying parameters can be elicited. 
3.1.1 Headline results 
Cancer is perceived to be worse than road accidents as a cause of fatality if the fatalities 
were to be at the same time.  Latency (delay) decreases the preference for avoiding a 
fatality, ceteris paribus.  This suggests a relationship by which the VSL for roads is 
inflated to account for the cancer context, but this inflated value is discounted to the 
present.  Using this model and data collected in the study, an effective discount rate of 
7% p.a. and a context premium of 40% are elicited. 
3.1.2  Definitions 
To avoid adding to the lack of clarity typically found in the literature surrounding the 
VSLCAN, this study uses the following definitions.  These relate to the definitions 
initially introduced on pg.31 (figure 2.3), but refer now to the implications of context, 
morbidity, latency and label dread for the strength of preference for avoiding cancer 
fatality risk increases: 
                                                          
9
 The author would like to gratefully acknowledge funding from the HSE and the OND 
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As outlined in the literature review, the evidence regarding the context premium and 
latency effect is not in total agreement.   To that end, the preliminary aim of Study 1 is 
to verify two hypotheses: 
1) Ceteris paribus, there is a preference for avoiding cancer fatality risks as 
compared to road accident fatality risks. 
2) Ceteris paribus, a longer latency period until the manifestation of a risk 
reduces the willingness to pay to reduce that risk. 
If these hypotheses can be verified, this will suggest that the cancer VSL is equivalent 
to the standard roads VSL, inflated for the context premium (which may incorporate 
either or both of morbidity and label dread effects) and then reduced by the latency that 
applies in the cancer case.  This generates the CTRt relationship equation developed in 
section 2.11.2, pg.53, which is replicated here for convenience. 
 
  
  
 
     
        
         (24’) 
- The overall cancer premium:  the premium placed on avoiding a latent cancer 
fatality risk compared to a current period risk of accidental fatality on the roads. 
- Latency effect:  the reducing effect on the value of preventing a latent fatality of 
the delay between exposure to a cancer-causing substance and death from cancer. 
- Context premium:  the premium placed on avoiding a cancer risk increase as 
opposed to a road accident fatality risk increase when the risks would occur at the 
same time. 
The context premium is assumed to account for  
- Morbidity premium:  the premium placed on avoiding the period of illness 
preceding cancer fatality, with symptoms getting increasingly severe until 
death.   
- Label dread:  the preference for avoiding a risk increase in cancer as 
opposed to road accident fatality when the illness and fatality description is 
otherwise identical (i.e. holding both the period and description of 
morbidity constant, with fatality at the same time). 
Figure 3.1: Preference definitions 
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Where    is the VSLCAN at time T,    is the VSL for road accidents at time t,       is 
the context multiplier and   is the effective discount rate10. 
3.1.3  Research questions 
Given this standpoint, the research questions are as follows: 
1) To what extent can the hypotheses be confirmed?  
2) How is the context premium related to labelling dread and morbidity? 
3) Can a method be developed to derive effective discount rates and context premia 
from survey data? 
The rest of this part of the thesis is structured in two chapters.  The rest of this chapter 
describes the choice of methodology and the protocol and survey instrument used to 
validate the hypotheses about context and latency effects.  It also provides a plan for the 
analysis of the resulting data  and discusses the necessary preliminary work including 
presentation of the sample statistics and a brief discussion of how the data will be 
handled. Chapter 4 provides the results of the R-R study in verifying the hypotheses 
from pg.52, initially analysing the context premium, morbidity and labelling dread 
effects, followed by discussion of latency.  Some sensitivity analyses, economic 
consistency checks and face validity checks are reported which in general lend support 
to the robustness of the methodology and to the reliability of the responses and hence 
the results.  This analysis supports the hypotheses presented above (pg.52).  On this 
basis, the methodology for eliciting the effective discount rate and context premium is 
presented and implemented, and then conclusions are drawn. 
3.2  Methodology for Study 1 
As discussed, the preliminary aim of this study is to test the hypotheses from pg.52.  
These hypotheses relate to the way that specific attributes of the typical cancer case will 
influence the VSLCAN.  This influences the design of the Risk-Risk trade-off 
methodology used in the stated preference study, study 1. 
Section 3.2 explains the Risk-Risk methodology in generic terms, beginning with the 
utility theoretic underpinnings, and culminating in a discussion of its merits and 
drawbacks.  A set of ten risk-risk scenario pairs is drawn up.  Next the specifics are 
discussed; firstly with an explanation of the question design and secondly with a 
                                                          
10
 Notice that an exponential functional form is assumed.  See part III of this thesis for 
fuller discussion about the discount rate. 
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discussion about how the protocol more broadly is designed and implemented to 
maximise respondents’ understanding.  There follows a discussion about the way that 
some specific potential issues with this particular survey design have been mitigated. 
3.2.1  Selection of methodology 
Options for this survey were threefold:  conjoint analysis (see for example Alberini and 
Ščasný (2011)), direct willingness to pay (such as in Hammitt and Liu (2004a)) or Risk-
Risk (as in Van Houtven et al. (2008)).     
3.2.1.i  Conjoint analysis 
The conjoint analysis technique was disregarded for this study for two main reasons.  
The first was a resource constraint.  The latency and risk aspects of the study were 
revealed in piloting to need careful explanation and face-to-face training, which ruled 
out any large scale or internet application. Because conjoint analysis involves asking 
one-shot comparisons between options that vary along different dimensions, it does not 
allow for the elicitation of indifference points for each respondent and for each attribute.     
Even without this constraint, however, given the exploratory nature of this study and the 
variety of research questions it intends to address, the more directed and focussed 
approach that the Risk-Risk methodology allows was judged to be more appropriate.  
Finally, given the attribute non-attendance issues (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; 2004), 
(Carlsson et al., 2010b), that relate to the conjoint analysis technique it seems 
inappropriate for this study whose primary aim is to judge the importance of context 
effects (including labelling and morbidity) and of latency, which are of course key 
attributes of the cancer scenario. 
3.2.1.ii  Direct Willingness to Pay 
Direct willingness to pay (WTP) avoids these problems by eliciting a point estimate of 
WTP for each respondent and ensuring that they focus on each of the attributes under 
consideration.  However, during the late 1980s, some serious problems started to be 
observed in responses to the traditional direct WTP questions.  These include problems 
with protests and refusal to respond; for many people the first reaction to the task of 
placing a monetary value on their personal safety seems at best distasteful and at worst 
impossible.  While it is true that anyone who has ever paid for- or perhaps refused to 
pay for- any sort of safety equipment has made an implicit trade-off between wealth and 
safety, this has not always translated well into the survey domain.  The direct WTP 
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approach generates problems in data even from respondents who had apparently been 
willing to engage with the questions.  Direct WTP questions have been shown to 
generate some 40% of respondents offering exactly the same willingness-to-pay value 
for risk reductions of different sizes (see for example Jones-Lee et al. (1985b) and 
Beattie et al. (1998)), a phenomenon referred to as ‘scope insensitivity’.  This has very 
serious issues for application: when aggregated, the implied population VSL figures 
differ substantially
11
.  In addition, it suggests a response mechanism within which 
respondents are largely unwilling or unable to work. 
3.2.1.iii  Risk-Risk trade-off 
The risk-risk trade-off methodology (R-R) was first introduced in Viscusi et al. (1991) 
and was developed in Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995).  Its major advantage is its ability 
to avoid some of the conceptual and other biases that plague the direct WTP approach.  
This is not least because the respondent is not required to juggle the comparison of 
wealth with fatality risks. As such, protest and refusal answers are typically fewer in 
comparison with direct WTP surveys.  In addition the two commodities Risk A and 
Risk B are inherently more comparable than wealth and risk, simply because there are 
many more attributes along which they can be compared.  Given the emotive nature of 
the subject matter and the conceptually challenging issues of latency and future 
morbidity to be addressed in this study, the decision was taken to use the risk-risk 
methodology so as to maximise respondents’ engagement and their ability to 
communicate their underlying values effectively. 
3.2.2  Utility theory underpinnings of the risk-risk methodology 
The problem facing the respondent in a risk-risk trade-off scenario can be captured in a 
utility framework similar to the one used by Viscusi et al. (1991) and Van Houtven et 
al. (2008).   
3.2.2.i  Basic framework 
The framework incorporates three possibilities: some years of life followed by death in 
a fatal car accident    , some years of life followed by illness and death from cancer 
    and years of life with neither a fatal road accident nor cancer    .  Each of these 
                                                          
11
 For example, £50 average WTP for a 1/100,000 risk reduction implies a VSL of 
£5,000,000.  If respondents also state a WTP of £50 for a 2/100,000 risk reduction, the 
implied VSL is just £2,500,000. 
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possibilities has an associated lifetime utility
12
 that depends on the cause of death 
(which can be extended to include the impacts of different timings and of illness as well 
as the context of the fatality: for now these impacts are bundled into an overall prospect 
in each case) and also upon wealth,  .  These lifetime utilities are denoted      , 
       and       .  The lifetime profiles are assumed to be mutually exclusive, and 
will be occur with probabilities     ,    , and           which correspond to road 
accident fatality, cancer fatality, and neither road accident nor cancer fatality.  As such, 
expected lifetime utility as evaluated from the present by the respondent answering the 
survey can be written as 
                                          (25) 
This equation is equivalent to equation (18) from pg.49. 
3.2.2.ii  Introducing differentiated risks 
The respondent is asked to consider a choice between two options:  in option A, the 
probability of the lifetime that culminates in a fatal road accident is   
 , and the 
probability of the lifetime that ends with cancer fatality is   
 ; while in option B these 
probabilities are     
 ,   
 .  As such, option A gives the expected lifetime utility in 
equation (25a), while option B gives the expected lifetime utility in equation (25b). 
         
           
             
    
          (25a)
         
           
             
    
          (25b) 
If an expected utility maximiser indicates indifference between options A and B, this 
suggests that 
  
          
             
    
            
          
        
     
    
                (26) 
 
Rearranging equation (26) allows the lifetime utility in the case with cancer fatality to 
be reduced to the following lottery equivalent between the road accident fatality and the 
lifetime with neither of the specified fatalities: 
                                                          
12
 see section 2.4, pg.23 for a discussion of the lifetime utility models including Cropper 
(1990) that could underpin these utilities 
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                                   (27)
  
where    
  
    
 
  
    
           (28) 
3.2.2.iii  Introducing risk timing 
Up to now, time has been left unspecified in the background of the model, but it can be 
explicitly included in the equation in the manner proposed by Van Houtven et al.  Death 
is assumed to occur at time    for the road accident fatality and at time    for cancer, 
giving: 
             
                
            (29) 
A full discussion of potential lifetime utility models that could underpin            
and            is provided in Van Houtven et al. (2008).   However, for the purposes 
of the Risk-Risk trade-off there is no need to specify the utility function in any detail.  
3.2.2.iv  From model to VSL 
As with most stated preference studies that consider risks to life, the aim of this 
methodology is to give insights into the VSL (value of statistical life).  As such, the 
utility framework developed so far must be recast in terms of the wealth-risk trade-off 
that underpins the VSL.  As discussed fully in part I of this thesis (pg.20) the VSL for 
roads is defined as the aggregate marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of 
fatality in road accidents.  Similarly, for the cancer VSL (VSLCAN) is defined as the 
aggregate marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of cancer fatality.  Notice that 
Van Houtven et al. follow the convention, common in the US, of defining the VSL 
simply as the individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk, with no 
aggregation.  This is only equivalent to the population aggregate if members of the 
population can be assumed to be homogeneous in this respect.  However, given this 
assumption, and by differentiating equation (25) with respect to   ,    , and wealth, 
letting         , van Houtven et al show that the relativity VSLCAN:VSL is 
equivalent to proportion of full-health utility lost given the cancer case. 
 
      
   
   
     
     
          (30) 
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Of course, an individual’s responses do not allow the direct observation of utilities, but 
instead show the relative sizes of the risk changes that generate indifference between the 
two options A and B.  Recalling equation (27) and, with no loss of generality, letting 
         gives 
       (  (
  
    
 
  
    
 ))              (31) 
Rearranging, and in combination with equation (29), 
 
      
   
   
     
     
 
  
    
 
  
    
         (32) 
As such, analysing the relative sizes of    and     that generate indifference between 
options A and B allows the relative size of the value of statistical life for one cause 
compared to another to be established.  If the underlying VSLCAN:VSL is 2, the above 
analysis implies indifference between an increase (decrease) in road accident fatality 
risk that is twice as large as the increase (decrease) in cancer fatality risk.  This is 
intuitively appealing. 
3.2.3  Design of survey in Study 1 
Up to now, the discussion of the methodology has been generic but this section sets out 
the risk scenarios used in the present survey.  The survey is structured to allow each of 
the previously identified key attributes (context- to include morbidity and label dread- 
and latency, refer to figure 3.1 on pg.57 for definitions) to be analysed in isolation and 
in combination.   
3.2.3.i  Notation: explanatory codes for comparisons 
To clarify the exposition both in this section and the results chapter, a notational 
simplification will be used throughout.  Comparisons (or relativities) are denoted by 
CTRt where C stands for cancer fatality and R for road accident fatality.  T and t denote 
the latency for each cause, which is the number of years between the present and the 
fatality.  T refers to the later fatality and t to the sooner fatality.  For example, when 
comparing cancer 15 years from now with road accidents two years from now, the code 
is C15R2.  When morbidity periods differ from standard (i.e. minutes or hours in the road 
accidents and 12 months in the cancer case) they are included in square brackets e.g. 
C10[36m]:C10[6m]. 
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3.2.3.ii  Risk-risk survey questions 
The survey questions are presented in table 3.1.  The table provides the effect under 
examination, the question number, a summary description of the scenarios and the 
explanatory code as discussed above.     
 
In Q1-3 (C10R1, C10R2, C25R2) the questions vary in context but also in timing.  This 
allows the overall cancer premium to be elicited.  In Q4-5 (C2R2 and C10R10) the timing 
was held constant in each question but the context differs, allowing direct observation 
of the effect of context.  Comparison of Q4 to Q5 allows the researcher to identify 
whether and how the context premium changes when it relates to fatalities further into 
Table 3.1: Risk-Risk questions 
Purpose Question Explanation Code 
Overall 
premium* 
 
Q1 Road death in the coming year vs. 
cancer death in 10 years 
C10 :R1 
Q2 Road death the year after next vs. 
cancer death in 10 years 
C10:R2 
Q3 Road death the year after next vs. 
cancer death in 25 years 
C25:R2 
Context Q4 Road death the  year after next vs. 
cancer death year after next 
C2:R2 
Q5 Road death in 10 years vs. 
cancer  death in 10 years 
C10:R10 
Latency Q6 Cancer death year after next vs. 
cancer death in 10 years 
C2:C10 
Q7 Cancer death year after next vs. 
cancer death in 25 years 
C2:C25 
Morbidity Q8 Cancer death in 10 years (6 
months’ illness prior to death) vs. 
Cancer death in 10 years (1 year’s 
illness prior to death) 
C10[12m] :C10[6m] 
Q9 Cancer death in 10 years (6 
months’ illness prior to death) vs. 
Cancer death in  10 years (3 years’ 
illness prior to death) 
C10[36m] :C10[6m] 
Labelling Q10 Road death in 10 years (1-2weeks’ 
illness prior to death)  vs. 
Cancer death in 10 years (1-2 
weeks’ illness prior to death) 
C10[2w] :R10[2w] 
 
*including context/morbidity effects and latency/discounting effects combined in 
people’s preferences. 
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the future.  Q8-10 allow insight into what drives any context premium, because Q10 
(C10[2w]R10[2w]) holds morbidity and timing constant, and as such tests for label dread 
while Q8 (C10[12m]R10[6m]) and Q9 (C10[36m]:R10[6m]) vary the length of the 
morbidity period prior to fatality.  These questions therefore highlight the likely drivers 
of the context premium.  Latency is considered indirectly in Q1-3, but also directly in 
Q6 (C2:C10) and Q7 (C2C25) where the scenarios alter only in terms of the latency 
period. 
Questions 1-3 (C10R1, C10R2 and C25R2) allow a multi-attribute comparison because 
they vary both the cause of death and the time of fatality.  This is designed to avoid the 
focussing problems that can occur when a single attribute is isolated (see section 4.4.3 
pg.101 for a discussion).  The remaining questions isolate a single domain for 
comparison, with respondents focussing on each attribute in turn and explicitly 
expressing preferences over each of these.   In addition, two of each ‘single attribute’ 
question are included (e.g. two latency differentials, two morbidity differentials) in 
order to investigate the functional form of the relationship between the elicited relativity 
and the attribute in question. 
Notice that for this study the morbidity is varied only in terms of the length of time 
spent ill.  While severity and particular symptoms are also likely to influence how 
morbidity is perceived by the individual, these are not easy to communicate objectively.    
There is extensive literature surrounding the likely non-linear relationship between 
duration of illness and disutility, but for the purposes of this exploratory analysis, it was 
important to have an objective measure to indicate whether the morbidity component of 
cancer fatality was an important aspect of the prospect at all.  As such, time spent ill 
provided a simple and easily interpreted measure of illness, and severity issues were 
controlled as far as possible using a generic description of cancer symptoms.  The 
methodology could usefully be extended to investigate the influence of severity and 
particular type of morbidity in future work. 
3.2.4  Predictions 
Using a combination of economic theory, especially prior evidence about cancer dread, 
discounting, and general logic, some prior hypotheses can be drawn about the resulting 
relativities.  For some of the questions, there is a clear prior expectation of whether the 
relativity is greater than one, though for other questions it is less clear because of some 
potentially offsetting effects.  For each question set (‘overall premium’, ‘context’, 
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‘latency’ and ‘morbidity’) the movement in the relativity between questions is 
predicted.   
Any evidence to suggest that the relativities do not behave in the hypothesised way will 
necessarily lead to doubt about the underlying hypotheses about perceptions of context, 
timing and morbidity when considering fatality risks. 
The underlying statements that drive the predicted movements in the relativities are: 
1) Cancer fatality is, ceteris paribus, perceived to be worse than road accident 
fatality. 
2) Delaying the fatality lessens the present disutility from the prospect of an 
increase in the risk of that fatality. 
3) Less morbidity is preferred to more. 
The predicted movement (increase or decrease) of the relativity between questions is 
discussed in detail in each section, but the overall pattern is summarised in table 3.2.  
The prediction, in each case, reflects the three statements above. 
 
This section outlined what question scenarios were compared during the survey.  The 
next section explains how this was carried out within the wider protocol. 
3.2.5  Implementation of Study 1 
Responses were collected face-to-face as opposed to over the internet or by telephone.  
The reasons are twofold: the subject matter of the survey is necessarily somewhat 
difficult and emotive, and the questions themselves are cognitively difficult.  To ensure 
Table 3.2 Relativity movement predictions 
Set Question Code Prediction 
Premium* 
 
Q1 C10R1 Increase 
Q1-Q2 
 
Decrease  
Q2-Q3 
Q2 C10R2 
Q3 C25R2 
Context 
Q4 C2R2 No prior hypothesis 
Q5 C10R10 
Latency 
Q6 C2C10 Increase Q6-Q7 
Q7 C2C25 
Morbidity 
Q8 C10[12]C10[6] IncreaseQ8-Q9 
Q9 C10[36]C10[6] 
Labelling Q10 C10[2w]R10[2w] - 
*including context/morbidity effects and latency/discounting effects combined in  
  people’s preferences. 
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that all respondents paid full attention and had the opportunity to ask questions to 
clarify their understanding during the precursory training rounds (see figure 3.2 and 
section 3.2.6), it was important that the sessions were conducted in-house
13
.  In 
addition, respondents were deemed more likely to have been focussed and engaged 
during the R-R questions than would have been the case if they had answered over the 
internet, because no distractions were present during the session.   
 
The survey was administered to groups of 10 respondents although all questions were 
deliberately designed and implemented such that the responses were private and 
individual.  The groups were held during January and February 2012.  The total sample 
                                                          
13
 The sessions were manned by the principal researcher and at least one additional staff 
member to ensure that respondents had adequate support where necessary 
RISK-RISK SURVEY 
Ten RR trade-off questions to cover 
 Overall Premium 
 Context Premium 
 Latency Effects 
 Morbidity effects 
 Labelling dread 
TRAINING ROUNDS 
What is fatality risk?  Communication of risks 
and risk changes 
How to trade risks- Practice RR question 
Discussion of timing  
Introduction to cancer and road accident 
contexts 
 
  
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
Financial risk aversion elicitation questions 
Health risk aversion elicitation questions 
Discount rate elicitation questions 
Demographic questions 
Figure 3.2:  Structure of the sessions 
68 
 
size was 216, of which 57 formed the pre-pilot and 159 people formed the final sample 
for analysis
14
.  Respondents were recruited by a professional market research firm.   
The next subsections describe in detail the procedures that respondents encountered 
during the survey groups.  This is summarised in the flow diagram in figure 3.2. 
3.2.6  Training rounds 
After respondents were welcomed and informed about the broad aims and the structure 
of the session, they were introduced to some key ideas and concepts that would be 
useful to them throughout the RR survey.  This consisted of a 45 minute preliminary 
session involving practice rounds, explanation and discussion.  The training rounds 
were included because while everybody makes implicit risk-risk trade-offs in day-to-
day life, some of which may even incorporate attributes and features that are the focus 
of the study at hand, it is certainly not a simple task for most people to explicitly 
consider them and to answer these structured R-R trade-off questions about such 
difficult and emotive issues. 
3.2.6.i  Fatality risks, risk increases and RR trade-offs 
Respondents were first asked to consider abstract risks of fatality, simply as a chance of 
dying, as a clean and straightforward introduction to the idea of fatality risk and the 60 
million baseline
15
 that would be used throughout the survey.  It also allowed a 
discussion of the concept of risk exposure, in particular highlighting that an exposed 
individual might or might not be one of the x in 60 million that would die from this 
cause in the specified time period.  The next concept introduced was comparing risks, 
so context was required to allow for comparisons.  Fire in the home and influenza were 
selected as the example causes because they share some of the properties of road 
accident and cancer risks (one being accidental, one being illness-related, one being 
more common for the elderly) while being far enough removed, and with very different 
baseline risks, that the likelihood of anchoring on these responses was minimal.  
Respondents used these contexts to practice a risk-risk trade-off question, providing an 
opportunity to ask questions and to ensure full understanding of the multiple list 
mechanism employed here (for a detailed discussion, see section 3.2.2 on pg.60).   
                                                          
14
 The pilot responses were excluded from the quantitative analysis reported later in this 
part of the thesis to ensure that all responses were from respondents that experienced 
identical stimuli. 
15
 60 million is approximately the population of the United Kingdom 
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3.2.6.ii  Communicating a risk change 
 
At this stage of the sessions, the risk-risk teaching tool was introduced.  This was a pie 
chart with four segments: the risk of dying by the cause selected for the risk increase, 
the risk of dying by the cause they did not select, the risk of dying from some other 
cause, and the chance of none of these fatalities occurring, as shown in figure 3.3
16
.  The 
pie chart was included because in early piloting, respondents appeared to ignore two 
important facts:  firstly that the other risk is not reduced when they take a risk increase 
in their least feared cause; and secondly that taking an increase in their least feared 
cause of dying means reducing their survival probability overall.  The pie chart allowed 
the moderator to show the implications of an increased risk of the least feared cause in a 
non-technical way, by simply showing the ‘pink area’ (least feared cause) getting larger, 
the ‘blue area’ (chance of not dying) getting smaller, and the ‘green area’ (the most 
feared cause) and ‘purple area’ (all other causes) staying the same size. 
3.2.6.iii  Introduction to timing and contexts 
After this, respondents were asked about the way their answers might have differed if 
the timing of the fatality was different.  They were prompted to consider whether and 
how their life would be different in the future and the way that they feel about risks in 
                                                          
16
 Given the small baseline risks, the pie chart was not drawn to scale.  Respondents 
were informed of this and were asked to treat it as an illustration. 
Figure 3.3:  Risk-risk teaching tool 
  
YOUR 
CHOSEN 
CAUSE 
DYING 
FROM 
ANOTHER 
CAUSE 
NOT 
DYING 
THE CAUSE 
YOU DIDN’T 
CHOOSE 
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the future compared to the present.  There were no formal questions at this stage; 
instead this was treated as an ideas initiation exercise. 
 
Finally, the contexts of cancer and road accidents were introduced.  Respondents were 
given the opportunity to bring their own conceptualisation of the two scenarios to the 
forefront of their minds by writing down what they considered to be the most salient 
attributes.  After this, the moderator set some boundaries on the scenarios.  Importantly, 
this included that the road accidents would be driver/passenger car accidents, and would 
exclude pedestrian and cyclist fatalities and death in public transport.  For the cancers, it 
was specified that the cancers were not behaviour-related or exclusively related to 
genetics.  This was to minimise the chance that respondents would conceptualise their 
Symptoms start Death 
Now 
NO SYMPTOMS SYMPTOMS 
TIME 
Figure 3.4:  Cancer and road accident profiles 
 CANCER PROFILE 
Death 
 
BEFORE ACCIDENT 
  
Accident 
TIME 
Now 
ROAD ACCIDENT PROFILE 
Script:  This is now [POINT].  You are currently at risk of being exposed to substances 
that give you a higher chance of developing cancer.  If this happens, there will be a 
period when you will be without any noticeable symptoms.  Then there will be a 
period when the symptoms become increasingly severe and then you will die. 
Script:  Just like for the cancer case, this is now [POINT].  However, nothing 
happens until the time when the accident might occur.  If the accident does 
happen, you would die within minutes or hours.   
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own risk to be lower, because they do not smoke, drink or have family history of cancer.  
In addition, it allows the results to be interpreted as applying to the average member of 
the public, because the baselines presented were, as far as possible, population averages 
(see section 2.3.3 pg.20 for a fuller discussion). Respondents were encouraged to think 
only about how the risk would affect them, not how other people might be impacted.  
Respondents were introduced to the communication tool or ‘profiles’ that would be 
used to describe each cancer and road accident scenario.  See figure 3.4 for an example. 
As a result of this training, respondents had been introduced to the concepts of fatality 
risk, risk trading, latency and timing, cancer and road accident contexts.  They were 
deemed to be better prepared to approach the subsequent risk-risk questions. 
3.2.7  Risk-Risk (R-R) survey  
This section describes the procedures in the R-R survey section of the protocol.  The 
procedure was the same for all ten questions, so the explanation here will be kept 
generic.  For the full list of scenarios compared, the reader can revisit table 3.1 from 
pg.64. 
The main risk-risk questions were designed with the aim of maximising respondents’ 
understanding.  As such, respondents were encouraged to ask the assistant if they 
required any clarification of the response mechanism or the scenarios, and the 
moderator slowly explained the procedure in each question.  The key messages about 
avoiding altruistic concern, about the possible differences in timing, and about the 
implications of taking very high risks of the least feared cause of fatality were reiterated 
in every question, and respondents were guided to their information sheets which 
contained the key pieces of information about the cancer and road accident scenarios. 
3.2.7.i  Initial choice 
In each question, respondents were presented with an initial choice between risk 
increases in the two scenarios under consideration.  In every case, the baseline was 
given as 1000 in 60 million.  This is approximately the baseline risk of road accidents in 
the UK for the average individual
17
, and groups of cancers can be found with the 
described properties such that the baseline for the cancer group is also equal to 1000 in 
60 million.  The equalisation of the baseline was included early in piloting when it 
                                                          
17
 The level for road accident fatalities for car users was 845 in 2010.  Source: Reported 
road casualties Great Britain 2010 
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became apparent that baseline effects would swamp any latency, dread and morbidity 
effects of the kind that are the focus of this study
18.  The respondent’s initial response 
sheet included a table containing the key information (context, timing, baseline risk and 
risk increment), a visual profile to illustrate the cause, and a prompt to circle the risk 
increase they would choose to take, if they had to.  An example initial response sheet is 
given in figure 3.5. 
 
3.2.7.ii  Multiple list table 
After the initial choice, which would be to circle C or D in this example, the respondent 
received the appropriate follow up table.  The table they received had a standard 
multiple list format, with the risk increase they had chosen in the first column, which 
increased down the table, and the alternative, fixed risk increase that they had avoided 
in the second column.  An example is provided in figure 3.6. Alternatively, the 
respondent could indicate indifference by drawing an equals sign between the options 
on the initial response sheet.  In this case, the respondent did not receive a second 
answer sheet. 
                                                          
18
See Chilton et al (2006) for further discussion of baseline effects. 
Figure 3.5:  Initial response sheet 
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Respondents were encouraged to treat each row in the multiple list table as a 
dichotomous choice between the (larger) risk increase in their least feared cause (i.e. 
road accidents in figure 3.6) and the (smaller) risk increase in the most feared cause (i.e. 
cancer in figure 3.6).  The point at which the respondent switches their decision (in this 
example from choosing roads to choosing cancer risk increases) indicates an 
indifference range, and given the relatively small intervals between each row, the mid-
point was assumed to adequately approximate the indifference point.  If the respondent 
was not willing to switch to the smaller risk increase at any point within the table, they 
were prompted to indicate the risk increase that would be just large enough to make 
them switch, and to indicate this in the bottom row of the table in figure 3.6.  This 
mirrors the open ended bid in Willingness to Pay based approaches, and ensures that the 
respondent is not constrained by options selected by the researcher.  This procedure was 
repeated for all ten risk-risk questions.   
 
Figure 3.6: Multiple list table for a respondent that originally chose the increase in 
road accident risks 
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3.2.8  Supplementary information 
Having completed the ten RR questions in the survey, respondents provided information 
about their risk and time preferences.  Risk preferences were captured in the financial 
domain using standard Holt-Laury (H-L) procedures through comparing financial 
lotteries with different probabilities of success (Holt and Laury, 2002).  From the 
decisions made in these questions, the respondents’ relative risk aversion could be 
inferred (Arrow, 1971).  Time preferences in the financial domain were captured using 
‘smaller sooner or larger later’ procedures based on Coller and Williams (1999).  This 
involves comparing a small payoff to be received in the near future with larger amounts 
to be received in seven months’ time.  The choices allow discount rates to be inferred.  
There followed elicitation of health-state risk aversion using the Holt-Laury (H-L) 
procedure adapted to use health states described in terms of the EQ-5D-5L descriptions 
of illness in place of the usual monetary outcomes.
19
  
Finally, standard demographic information was collected, alongside some information 
about the respondents’ familiarity with road accidents and cancer, and their health state 
and perceived road accident risks.  These demographics will be analysed to explore to 
what extent preferences over different fatality risks are driven by demographic 
influences. 
3.2.9  Multiple List or Dichotomous Choice 
When asking R-R questions, there are two main methods for recording responses: the 
multiple list (ML) format and the dichotomous choice (DC) format.  This study uses the 
ML format, because it provides more information per respondent than the DC format.  
However, there are well documented problems with using the ML format, and so this 
section sets out the benefits and drawbacks of both options, and the reasons for 
choosing the multiple list in this study. 
3.2.9.i  Multiple List (ML) 
The multiple list format involves presenting respondents with a table or series of binary 
choice questions where the option or options vary incrementally.  For willingness to pay 
(WTP) studies, this might be a series of potential WTP values, or for risk-risk studies 
like the one reported here, it will be a series of risk profiles that are incrementally 
                                                          
19
 This is discussed in more detail in part III of this thesis, because risk and time 
preferences in health and safety are the main focus of those analyses. 
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improved or worsened (see figure 3.7).  The respondent works their way through the 
series of decisions until they reach their ‘switch-point’, i.e. the decision that makes them 
change their mind from their initially chosen option to the alternative.  This allows the 
researcher to establish where the respondent is indifferent between options A and B, 
within a defined range. 
In figure 3.7, the risk reductions in option B are held constant, while the risk reductions 
in cause X are improved down the table.  This is the simplest form of risk-risk ML 
format because only one column varies.  In this case, the respondent will have made an 
initial choice suggesting a preference for reductions in risk Y over risk X, and this table 
makes the cause X risk reduction more attractive until the respondent feels she would 
choose it even though it is in her less preferred cause.  Should the respondent feel that 
her preferences are not captured within the table, she would be required to state the risk 
reduction in cause X that would be just big enough to be equally good as a 5/1000 
reduction in her risk of cause Y. 
 
In this example, the respondent’s indifference point lies between 10 and 15 in 1000.  
Using the simplifying assumption that the midpoint is an adequate proxy for the point of 
indifference, the respondent would be allocated a value of 12.5/1000, i.e. a relativity of 
2.5:1 reflecting how much worse the risk of cause Y is relative to cause X.  If the 
respondent writes in their own value in the bottom of the table, their stated amount is 
assumed to indicate their exact indifference point. 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Risk-risk multiple list stylised example 
A B 
My  
Choice 
 Is 
 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
X 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
Y 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
X 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
Y 
5/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 B 
10/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 B 
15/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 A 
20/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 A 
25/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 A 
___/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 A 
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3.2.9.ii  Dichotomous Choice (DC) 
The dichotomous choice format involves asking respondents a single binary choice 
question, for example “option A or option B” in a risk comparison exercise. 
 
3.2.9.iii Benefits and drawbacks of the Multiple List format 
The ML format has been evaluated by Andersen et al. (2007) and Andersen et al. 
(2006).  They consider incentivised multiple price list formats, which is slightly 
different to the hypothetical risk formats used here, but they discuss some applicable 
benefits and drawbacks of the ML format generally.  The benefits include ease of 
explanation; ease of implementation; and the inclusion of a simple truth telling 
mechanism (when subjects are told that one row at random will be chosen for payoff).  
While the last is irrelevant to the current hypothetical scenarios, the former two are 
relevant benefits.  In addition, using a multiple list allows the estimation of indifference 
for every individual within the sample as opposed to just the sample average that is 
obtained using dichotomous choice. 
The drawbacks suggested by Andersen et al. (2007) are threefold.  Firstly the technique 
only allows interval estimation of indifference values and although some statistical 
techniques exist to isolate the actual values, this is always based on assumption.  
Secondly, Andersen et al. (2007) suggest that there can be multiple switch-points 
indicating inconsistent valuations, or otherwise a very wide interval value for 
indifference.  Finally, and possibly most importantly, they highlight potential framing 
effects whereby subjects might be drawn to the middle of the table.  In addition, they 
highlight that valuations might be influenced by the answer to previous questions.  
These latter effects fall under the umbrella of framing effects.  Having said this, they 
find in their empirical work that order and framing effects “are not likely to be severe or 
pervasive” (Andersen et al., 2007). 
Figure 3.8: Risk-risk dichotomous choice stylised example 
A B 
My choice is 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
X 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
Y 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
X 
Risk 
reduction 
in cause 
Y 
25/1000 0/1000 0/1000 5/1000 
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3.2.9.iv  Benefits and drawbacks of the Dichotomous format 
Dichotomous choice questions have the major benefit that they will be less susceptible 
to anchoring or framing bias, with the possible exception of the yea-saying tendency 
and starting point bias noted in Holmes and Kramer (1995).  They will be completely 
free of the bias generated when respondents are drawn to the middle of the list of 
values.  However, they provide less information than ML because it is impossible to 
infer each respondent’s indifference point, instead generating sample averages.  This 
means that there is less information for a given sample size, and it precludes any within-
individual analysis. 
On balance, given the sample size constraint under which this study was conducted, and 
given the potential for useful within-individual insights, it was decided to use the ML 
format for the study.  Further steps were taken to mitigate against the specific problems 
that might occur when employing an ML methodology for preference elicitation,  
3.2.10  Design issues with the ML format 
The questions that this study addresses are by their nature complex and difficult, and to 
capture the preferences of all respondents is complicated, especially when these 
preferences may not be well understood by the respondents themselves.  Although 
employing the RR methodology addresses some of the common problems with direct 
WTP approaches (see section 3.2.1 for a discussion), it suffers from some of its own, 
some of which are particularly pertinent to Study 1 and were touched upon in the 
preceding section.  These include anchoring; the influence of lexicographic preferences 
for avoiding certain risks; the impact of the chosen risk increment; and herding.  Some 
of the problems have been suggested to the researcher by independent commentators on 
this study
20
, while others arose organically through piloting.  The potential pitfalls are 
presented in section 3.2.10.  Having said this, mitigating steps have been taken 
throughout the design of this protocol and survey to minimise the likely problems that 
might be expected to arise. Analysis of how pervasive they are in the current study 
postponed until section 4.9.  
3.2.10.i  Anchoring 
Anchoring refers to the tendency for respondents to infer information about the ‘right’ 
answer from the first option that they are shown.  For example, in direct WTP studies, 
                                                          
20
 Particular thanks are due to Professor J Hammitt for his insightful comments. 
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responses tend to be lower when the initial value is low and higher when the initial 
value is higher (see Boyle et al. (1985) for a review of early evidence about anchoring).  
Similarly, when a ML format is used, the range of options in the table might be 
perceived to represent a ‘reasonable’ or even ‘endorsed’ range of values, and this can 
sometimes lead to an artificial spike in the data around the midpoint of the table.  In this 
study, the variations on the ML in figure 3.6 (pg.73) were used to infer indifference.  
The lists were varied between the question sets as outlined in table 3.3.  This was to 
ensure that a single starting point was not reinforced throughout, in order to minimise 
the effect of range-related bias. 
 
In addition, the option to fill in the respondent’s own risk increase was intended to 
signal that there are ‘no right or wrong answers’, a message repeated explicitly 
throughout the protocol.  These measures ought to go some way to mitigate anchoring 
bias, and results of validity checks are reported in section 4.9 (pg.113).   
3.2.10.ii  Risk reductions and lexicographic preferences 
Early iterations of the protocol described risk reductions, with the RR multiple list 
tables offering increasingly small reductions in the risk of the most feared cause, 
compared to constant, fairly substantial reductions in the risk of their least feared cause.  
The utility underpinnings would therefore suggest that the respondent would prefer the 
risk reduction in their most feared cause, given that the risk reductions are the same size 
from the same baseline.  At some point in the table, however, the risk reduction ought to 
be small enough that the respondent would prefer the large reduction in their less feared 
risk.   
However, early piloting revealed that respondents were unwilling to switch, even when 
the risk reduction in their most feared risk became very small.  This suggests an almost 
Table 3.3: Risk increments and initial values 
Questions Initial 
value 
Increment Final value Implicit range 
within table 
1-3 100 +40/60 million 420 1.5:1 to 8:1 
4-5 90 +40/60 million 410 1.4:1 to 7.8:1 
6-7 80 +40/60 million 400 1.3:1 to 7.6:1 
8-9 85 +40/60 million 405 1.35:1 to 7.7:1 
10 90 +40/60 million 410 1.4:1 to 7.8:1 
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lexicographic preference for taking the risk reduction in their most feared cause.  
Discussion with pilot groups led to the conclusion that for some people, the baseline 
risk of their least feared cause (for example, road accidents) was acceptable to them, and 
as such, they did not value a risk reduction in that cause at all.  As such, even minute 
reductions in their most feared cause (for example, cancer) were always preferable, 
because this risk was not deemed to be at an already acceptable level.  This effect has 
been previously noted in the choice experiment literature in environmental economics, 
in which an attribute might be considered so important that the payment attribute does 
not present enough of a cost to generate a trade-off (see Rosenberger et al. (2003) for a 
discussion). 
To counter this, the protocol was redesigned to incorporate risk increases (as opposed to 
risk reductions) as shown in figure 3.6 on pg. 73.   The reasoning is that even an 
acceptable baseline risk will become unacceptable given a large enough increase in that 
risk. 
3.2.10.iii  Increments (the step range of the risk increase) 
In every question, the risk increase step was 40 in 60 million on top of an initial step of 
between 30 and 50 in 60 million (see table 3.3 for details).  It might therefore be the 
case that individuals with a marginal preference for one cause or the other are unable to 
accurately express their preference, because these intervals are fairly large.   
In terms of the very first interval, this would be expected to manifest in one of two 
ways, either; 
a)  Understatement (respondents are unable to indicate less than 1.5:1 so instead 
express indifference in their initial choice) 
b) Overstatement (respondents are unable to indicate less than 1.5:1 so instead 
switch in row 1) 
In addition, respondents were offered a similar range for every question, which could be 
expected to condense the range of responses artificially.  However, to use smaller 
increments would mean reducing the range of switch-points on offer in the table, and 
this would mean losing the ability to capture strong preferences for one cause over the 
other.  The trade-off between range and accuracy was not taken lightly, and piloting 
suggested that the structure used would be the best compromise.  A ‘skew low, skew 
high’ procedure as mentioned in Andersen et al. (2007) could have been employed to 
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allow the responses to be tested for range biases, but given the small sample size it was 
decided that this would be counterproductive. Analysis of the choice patterns is reported 
in section 4.9 
3.2.10.iv  Herding 
If respondents are able to see what decisions were made by others in the group, their 
responses might reflect herding or copying behaviour as opposed to their true 
preferences (see Haley and Fessler (2005) for an interesting experimental approach 
where the presence of stylised impressions of eyes facing the respondents increased pro-
social behaviour in an otherwise anonymous experiment).  It is not feasible that any 
respondent could observe the exact response of another respondent in the session, 
because respondents were well spaced out and working individually.  However, the 
initial decision (e.g. A, B, or Indifference) might be observable.  As such, checks for 
convergence of decisions through the survey are reported in section 4.9. 
In summary, while there are of course issues and imperfections in any survey 
instrument designed to elicit information about respondents’ preferences over complex 
scenarios, the methodology has been carefully developed to minimise the issues.  Where 
these issues are considered likely to have persisted, post-estimation tests and checks are 
run, which allow some reassurance that the results appear robust to these issues.  The 
results of these checks are reported in section 4.9 (pg.113). 
3.3 Proposed Analysis and Preliminary Work 
The methodology has now been explained in some detail, with particular focus on the 
ways in which respondents’ engagement and understanding were maximised.  This 
subsection moves on to explain aspects of the analytical methodology which will be 
employed to generate insights from the data; in section 3.3 the sample characteristics 
and central tendencies are presented.  After this analytical basis has been established, 
chapter 4 will provide the main analysis and results.   
Initially the choice of central tendency measures is considered, because these will 
underpin a substantial proportion of the analysis, rendering the choice of measurement 
important.  Next, the proposed regression analysis techniques are outlined.  The reason 
for including this discussion at this stage is rooted in the broad scope of the research: 
the study aims to consider context, morbidity and latency individually and in 
combination, and as such the analysis of the central tendencies will be repeated on each 
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subset of the data- for latency, morbidity, and context- and giving the explanation up 
front avoids the need to repeat the explanation through the text, which would detract 
from the key messages from the data. 
3.3.1  Central tendencies 
There are four potential measures of central tendency to be considered for use in the 
main analysis.    The relative strengths and weaknesses of each of these measures are 
discussed in this section, particularly in terms of describing the current survey data, and 
in conclusion the geometric mean is found to be the most suitable measure.   
3.3.1.i  Arithmetic mean 
The arithmetic mean is perhaps the easiest to calculate and to interpret, but it is a 
seriously flawed measure for dealing with ratio data.  To illustrate, take the example of 
a two-person society where person A has a relativity for cause X to cause Y of 3:1, 
while person B has a relativity for cause X to cause Y of 1:3.  Logically, any central 
tendency measure should suggest these preferences cancel to provide an average of 1:1.  
However, taking the arithmetic mean suggests otherwise:  the average X:Y relativity is 
1.67.  Perhaps even more strikingly, if the ratio is instead defined as Y:X, the relativity 
for person 1 is now 1/3 and for person 2 is 3/1.  Now, the average Y:X relativity is 1.67.  
Logically, Y:X and X:Y clearly cannot both be 1.67.  This effect will hereafter be 
referred to as ‘numerator bias’ because it automatically over-weights the cause that is 
arbitrarily designated as the numerator.  In addition to this numerator bias, the 
arithmetic mean is always problematic in datasets like this one with high end outliers. 
3.3.1.ii  Median 
The median is the mid-point of the data when ranked from highest to lowest.  It is 
simple to interpret and percentiles can be chosen for use as confidence intervals. By 
definition, the median is free from numerator bias and from the undue influence of high-
end outliers.  However, this measure is insensitive to small variations in response data, 
and often fails to capture some of the more subtle differences that are picked up by 
alternative central tendency measures.  Nevertheless, the median will be included as a 
supplementary central tendency measure where appropriate.  For these analyses the 
quartiles (25% and 75%) are used as a measure of similarity for comparing between 
relativities. 
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3.3.1.iii  Geometric mean 
Taking the geometric mean involves finding the product of the relativities, and then 
taking the n
th
 root.  It is therefore equivalent to the anti-log of the average logged 
relativity.  Taking logs of the relativities is appropriate because it neutralises the 
numerator bias problem discussed above, and as such the geometric mean is usually 
considered the most appropriate measure of central tendencies for ratios.  The geometric 
mean is sensitive to low end outliers and collapses with any zero observations, because 
it involves taking the product of the observations as opposed to the sum.  However, in 
this dataset there are no zero observations, and as such the geometric mean will be used 
as the main central tendency measure throughout the subsequent analysis.  It has 
associated 95% confidence intervals that are easily interpreted. 
3.3.1.iv  Context Indexing 
The context index approach was developed in Chilton et al. (2002) to overcome the 
problem of numerator bias in the analysis of matching data, i.e. relativities.  A value of 
1 is assigned to each respondent’s most feared cause (i.e. the cause in which they 
avoided taking the risk increase).  The appropriate fraction is then assigned to the other 
cause, for example using the two-person society described above, person 1 would have 
a score for cause X of 1/3 and for cause Y of 1.  Person 2 would have an X score of 1 
and a Y score of 1/3.  The arithmetic mean of the scores for each cause is calculated, 
and the ratio between these scores gives the overall central tendency measure for the 
sample.  This collapses to the sum of the scores for each cause as shown:  
        
 
 
∑                
 
 
∑               
  
∑                
∑               
      (33) 
In the current ‘two person society’ example, the resulting context index ratio is 1:1, as 
logic would predict.   
The main benefit is that the context index is, by design, immune to the problem of 
numerator bias.  It is more sensitive than the median, and lacks the sensitivity to zero 
responses which plagues the geometric mean.  In addition, if every member of the 
population placed the same monetary value on a change in their risk of their most feared 
cause, then the context index approach can be shown to give exactly the correct 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) based relativity.  However, this latter strength could also be 
framed as the weakness of the approach: it imposes the assumption that the same weight 
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ought to be placed on the most feared cause for each individual.  While this is arguably 
the most equitable assumption in the lack of better evidence, it is nonetheless one that 
lacks empirical underpinnings. 
A second and probably more practically awkward problem with the context index is the 
lack of associated confidence intervals.  Covey et al. (2010) developed a method for 
calculating pseudo-confidence intervals around the context index.  This method is 
summarised in figure 3.9.  The numerator and denominator of the confidence interval 
formula displayed above both have associated 95% confidence intervals, and these are 
used to form a “worst case” confidence interval.  That is, the ratio of upper limit of the 
confidence interval for the numerator to the lower limit of the confidence interval for 
the denominator is used as the upper bound of the pseudo confidence interval.  
Correspondingly, the lower limit of the numerator confidence interval and the upper 
limit of the denominator confidence interval are used to give the lower bound of the 
pseudo confidence interval.  This generates the broadest combination of values for 
inclusion within the confidence interval, and can account for the extreme case where the 
numerators and denominators display perfect negative correlation.  
 
The geometric mean will be supplemented by the context index as well as the median in 
the discussion of central tendency results in chapter 4. 
3.3.1.v  Summary of central tendency discussion 
To summarise, the arithmetic mean will be disregarded because of its sensitivity to high 
end outliers and also because of its unsuitability for the analysis of ratio data.  The other 
three central tendency measures- the geometric mean, median and context index - will 
be used in combination, allowing the inclusion of high end outliers (within reason, see 
Figure 3.9   Pseudo confidence interval calculation for Q2 
C10R2 
Arithmetic 
mean 
Lower bound 
of 95% C.I 
Upper bound 
of 95% C.I 
C10 index 
number 
0.961 0.916 1.006 
R2 index 
number 
0.190 0.116 0.264 
 
Context index 
= 0.198 
0.115 0.288 
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section 3.3.1.v for a fuller discussion of trimming) without allowing them undue 
influence over the population average. 
As discussed, the central tendency decision will be especially necessary for this chapter 
because, subject to the verification of hypotheses1 and 2 above (pg.52), a substantial 
proportion of the analysis will be based on these central tendencies.  Manipulation of 
the central tendencies of the relativities data from the RR survey will allow the 
elicitation of underlying parameters including the context premium and the discount 
rate.  See section 4.11 for this analysis. 
3.3.2  Planned regression analysis 
Analysis of the central tendency figures can provide a rich set of information about a 
variety of population average effects.  However, it is unable to take account of any 
demographic influences, nor to give a good insight into the strength of preference over 
the different attributes of the scenarios.  As such, regression analysis will be conducted. 
For each attribute in turn, regressions will be run of the relativities for each question on 
the underlying personal characteristics.  In this way, it will be possible to investigate 
whether demographic characteristics are well equipped to explain the relativity in each 
question, and hence to identify whether the response to differences in context, timing 
and morbidity are related to personal characteristics. 
In addition, the data can be pooled and regressions run of all relativities on 
characteristics of the scenarios (difference in timing, context, and illness) and 
characteristics of the respondent.  This pooled regression will provide a final summation 
of the results and will form a holistic analysis of the available information. 
On the basis of these regressions, supplemented by the analysis of central tendency 
movements between questions, the validity of hypotheses 1 and 2 from pg.52 will be 
determined.  However, prior to this, some preliminary work is required to ready the data 
for analysis. 
3.3.3  Preliminary work  
3.3.3.i  Introduction  
Initially the demographic characteristics of the sample are presented and discussed.  
There follows discussion of the information that was collected about experience with 
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and preferences for risky and intertemporal decisions as well as familiarity with cancer 
and road accident risks.  This information, along with the demographics, will form the 
basis of regression models, so a brief discussion is provided about the way that these 
models are built.  Finally attention is turned to the data produced in the R-R survey part 
of the study, including discussion of the most appropriate trimming levels for use.  The 
central tendencies are presented, and this provides the basis for the analysis in chapter 4. 
3.3.3.ii  Sample Statistics 
 
The respondents (n=157) were all between the ages of 30 and 50, resident in the 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne area of the UK.  The demographics for the sample are given in 
table 3.4, with mean and standard deviations provided where appropriate. 
Table 3.4: Demographics 
 Variable Full Sample 
Gender (% female) 
 
52.6% 
Age (mean (s. dev.)) 39 
(5.76) 
Household size (mean (s. dev.)) 3.27 
(1.36) 
No. children in household (mean (s. dev.)) 1.38 
(1.19) 
Child under 18 
 
58.7% 
Child under 6 
 
23.2% 
Rental  (% rent) 
 
39.7% 
Further education (% furthered) 
 
47.7% 
Own  social class based on  ISCO-88 
(mean (s. dev.)) 
6.23 
(6.47) 
Spouse social class based on  ISCO-88 
(mean (s. dev.)) 
4.86 
(3.03) 
Personal income (monthly mean (s. dev.)) £1784.92 
(£1879.01) 
Household income (monthly mean (s. dev.)) £2685.52 
(£2074.88) 
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The sample was recruited by a market research agency.  Although not formally stratified 
to reflect 30-50year olds in the North East, the comparison to census data suggests that 
the sample is reasonably representative.  For example, the ratio of females to males in 
the North East
21
, is 51.1% and in our sample it was 52.6%.  However, there is a higher 
than average proportion of unemployed people (reflected in own class and a peak at 
very low income levels), which may be an artefact of holding some survey group 
sessions during the working week. 
3.3.3.iii  Preference related characteristics 
In addition to the observable demographic characteristics, information was gathered 
about the experience that respondents had with cancer and road accidents, as well as 
their perceived existing levels of health and of road accident risks.  The majority of the 
sample had had experience of road accidents and of cancer, either personal experience 
or having a close friend or family member affected (50.3% for road accidents and 
73.5% for cancer).  The proportion is higher for cancer than for road accidents, which 
could contradict the assertion in the literature review that cancer is dreaded partly 
because it is unknown.  Respondents typically judged their current health to be at or 
slightly above the population average and judged their relative likelihood of dying in a 
road accident as slightly lower than the population average.  
3.3.3.iv  Variable selection for regression analysis 
The demographic information will be used in regression analysis to explore the 
influence of underlying personal characteristics on the relativities elicited in the RR 
survey. 
It will typically be useful to keep the same demographic explanatory variables in each 
regression to facilitate comparison.  As such, and acknowledging the risk of over fitting 
the model, a full set of predictor variables is developed.   Given that this is exploratory 
analysis, there is no clearly defined set of explanatory variables that ought to be 
included.  This is addressed using a combination of variable selection techniques.  
Initially, correlation is assessed with the aim of removing any extremely correlated 
                                                          
21
 Census data release (2013) 
 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-
300560 was used to make comparisons where possible.  Notice that this information 
refers to the whole North East population as opposed to the 30-50 year old 
demographic, so comparisons are not intended to be extremely close. 
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variables.  With the exception of some income variables, high correlation is not found. 
Table B1 in Appendix B gives the correlation coefficients above 0.3 for this dataset.  
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each variable are given in Appendix B, and 
because none is over 10 there is no evidence of serious multicollinearity.  The mean 
VIF is 0.37, which can be considered lower than the threshold for problematic 
collinearity.   
Using previous literature a range of potential explanatory variables was decided upon.  
These included the variables used in Hammitt and Haninger (2010) and Van Houtven et 
al. (2008) because these papers explicitly considered similar issues to those under 
investigation here.  Specifically, the former paper used gender, age, income, education, 
health risk perception and a proxy for risk preferences (insurance).  The latter used 
some of these variables and additionally used health status, household size, having 
experience of cancer and road accidents and subjective road accident risk.  These 
variables formed the basis of the variable set used in studies 1 and 2.  In addition, a 
variable was included to capture having children in the household, because piloting 
suggested that this might influence the perceived optimal time to take a risk increase.  
Where two variables are likely to be picking up the same influence (e.g. having children 
under 18 and having children under 6), the vselect tool for model selection in Lindsey 
and Sheather (2010) is used to choose the variable set that will maximise the fit of the 
model. 
Vselect allows the user to perform stepwise regressions forwards or backwards using 
any of the major information criteria C (Mallow’s Cp), AIC (Akaike’s information 
criteria), AICc (Akaike’s corrected information criteria), BIC (Bayes information 
criteria) and R
2
adj (Adjusted R-squared).  See Lindsey and Sheather (2010) for a 
discussion and Stata software examples.  It also allows the user to perform leap and 
bound selection which is arguably more robust than the stepwise versions.  This 
analysis uses the leap and bound approach, and compares Mallow’s Cp r
2
adj, AIC, AICc 
and BIC to maximise the chance of choosing the right variable set.  In addition to 
selecting specific variables to choose the full analysis model this command is also used 
to select best-fit models for the regressions of relativities on observable characteristics.  
These models are presented as appropriate throughout the analysis. 
The full predictor model is as follows: 
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                                                (34) 
The variables are described in table 3.5.  This variable list incorporates standard 
relevant demographics from the literature, some cancer-specific characteristics, and 
some interacted variables.   
While the vselect tool suggests that rent generates better fit than household income as a 
proxy for income level, in order to run regression with the interaction between age and 
income it is necessary to include household income as a level variable. 
 
Interaction terms are included for variables that could matter in combination.  The 
interaction between gender and having children captures a ‘motherhood’ effect22 which 
was justified by the short written explanations in which women frequently mentioned 
having young children.  The interaction between age and household income captures the 
effects of different levels of wealth over a lifetime.   
Risk and time preferences were also elicited.  These are discussed in more detail in part 
III where the analysis considers the implications of latency on the relativity in more 
detail. 
                                                          
22
 The effect of fatherhood was also tested and found to be insignificant. 
Table 3.5:  Full list of predictor variables 
Variable name Description 
age Age (years) 
age*hhinc log of household income interacted with age 
loghhinc log of household income 
female gender (female =1) 
under6  children under 6 in the household  
mother being female and having children under 6 
educ further education 
canexp Having experience of cancer (self or close friend or family member) 
roadexp experience of road accidents (self or close friend or family member) 
health self-reported health state (1-3 increasing scale of health) 
carrisk perceived road accident risk (1-5 increasing scale of road accident 
risk) 
finRA financial risk aversion 
finTP financial time preference 
healthRA health state risk aversion 
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3.3.3.v  Risk-risk relativities data 
This section describes the preference-based data that was elicited in the RR survey 
section of the protocol, as well as the way that it will be cleaned and organised in 
advance of the analysis which will be reported in chapter 4.  As discussed, in addition to 
the demographic information explored in sections 3.3.3.ii-iii, data was collected for ten 
risk-risk trade-off questions.  The scenarios to be compared were summarised in table 
3.1 on pg.64. 
As discussed in detail in the methodology section, the questions categorise as ‘overall’, 
‘context’, ‘latency’, ‘morbidity’ and ‘labelling’.  The resulting relativities are formed of 
the risk increase in the respondent’s least feared cause that would make them just 
indifferent, and a 50 in 60 million increase in their most feared cause, expressed as a 
ratio between the two risk levels.  As an example, the data for question 2 is the ratio 
between the increase in risk of cancer ten years from now divided by the increase in risk 
of road accidents during the year after next, and this ratio could be greater than or less 
than 1 depending whether the respondent’s initial choice was to take the cancer or the 
road accident risk, because this determines which of the two risks is held at 50 in 60 
million. 
The central tendency measures for these relativities are given in tables 4.1 to 4.3 on 
pg.94-95. 
3.3.3.vi  Extreme outliers and trimming 
Section 3.3.1 on pg. 81 discussed the possible measures of central tendency for use in 
subsequent analysis and concluded that the geometric mean presents the best option, 
supplemented by the median and context index.  One reason for the use of the geometric 
mean is that it allows outliers to be included but does not give them excessive weight, 
especially compared with the arithmetic mean.  Despite this, and despite that the survey 
and preceding teaching sessions were designed to maximise respondents’ 
understanding, given the complexity of the issues and the emotive nature of the issues 
discussed it is perhaps unsurprising that extreme answers were given by a small 
proportion of respondents.  However, there is no failsafe way to know whether a high 
response is a protest, an exaggeration, or a true reflection of a very strong preference.  
As such, dealing with outliers is not straightforward. 
The approach employed here is to clean the data on two levels: 
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- The ‘untrimmed’ sample excludes responses where the respondent refused to 
provide an answer, wrote an answer greater than 60million (which indicates a 
probability greater than 1, an impossibility), or switched backwards and 
forwards between causes multiple times.  All usable responses are retained.   
- The ’30 million level’ excludes any answer greater than or equal to 30 million in 
60 million.  30 million in 60 million indicates indifference between taking a risk 
of fatality in their least feared cause that is essentially the same as the toss of a 
coin, and taking a very small (50 in 60 million) increase in their risk of fatality 
in their most feared cause.  While this could suggest very strong preferences, at 
least some of these respondents are likely to have been indicating protests, or 
failing to fully understand the response mechanism and the implication of their 
answers.  Relativities are restricted to be below 600 000:1.  
 
Trimming on each of these levels generates the per-question sample sizes in table 3.6. 
 
An important distinction to make at this stage is that the trimming applies to the 
responses themselves, and not to the respondent.  That is, if a respondent generates a 
Table 3.6:  Sample sizes by trimming level 
Question Cleaning 
(untrimmed) 
Trimming 
(30million +) 
n n 
1 C10 :R1 146 133 
2 C10:R2 144 128 
3 C25:R2 140 127 
4 C2:R2 136 126 
5 C10:R10 139 129 
6 C2:C10 139 125 
7 C2:C25 133 119 
8 C10[12] :C10[6] 140 133 
9 C10[36] :C10[6] 132 124 
10 C10[2w] :R10[2w] 142 140 
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mixture of relativities across questions, some of which fall above the trim level, then 
their acceptable responses will be retained for the analysis while their outlying 
responses will dropped.  This avoids the loss of apparently usable information, and is in 
the interests of maintaining a reasonable sample size, as well as for the ethical purpose 
of allowing the preferences of respondents as expressed in some questions to be 
included in the overall analysis regardless of the respondent’s performance on other 
questions.  Sample sizes may therefore vary between questions depending on the 
number of responses dropped.  
For the untrimmed sample, per-question sample sizes lie between 132 and 146.  For the 
30 million trim this falls to the range 119 to 140.  Both trim levels are presented for 
reference in tables 4.1-4.2 on pg. 94, although the subsequent analysis will use the 30 
million trim because it is judged to present the optimal trade-off between retaining as 
much information as possible while maintaining the integrity of the data and eliminating 
obvious protests and misunderstandings. 
3.3.1.vii  Summary 
Having dealt with the preliminary issues of the sample size and selection, the structure 
of the available data, variable selection techniques and trimming, the next stage is to 
report the results of study 1.  The verification of hypotheses 1 and 2 from pg.52 lends 
support to the CTRt relationship developed in section 2.11.2, and on this basis the 
relationship is used in conjunction with the relativities data elicited in study 1 to elicit 
estimates of the underlying parameters that define the VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  These 
are the context premium (1+x) and the effective discount rate (r).  However, first the 
results are presented in support of these hypotheses 
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Chapter 4.  Study 1 Analysis and Conclusions 
4.1  Introduction 
As described in detail in chapter 3, the survey in study 1 was designed to elicit 
information on the way in which context, morbidity and timing influence the preference 
for avoiding fatality risk increases.  The questions included these attributes both jointly 
and separately and the analysis will follow a similar philosophy.  Initially, the ‘overall’ 
comparisons are analysed with the conclusion that context and timing both influence the 
overall relativities elicited.  Having established the existence of both context and latency 
effects in the overall questions, the analysis moves on to separately consider the cancer 
context premium; its hypothesised components morbidity and dread of the cancer label; 
and then latency.  Regressions are run to explore what demographics influence the 
relativities in each set of questions.  These find little of significance, which supports the 
assumption that the effects in question (context effects, discounting) are largely intrinsic 
to the individual, and do not arise as a result of personal characteristics. 
Insights from these subsections are combined and supplemented by a final overall 
pooled regression which uses information from all ten questions simultaneously to 
explore the way that context, time and morbidity influence the overall relativities, 
controlling for any influence of demographics.   
On this basis, the hypotheses that the cancer context increases the VSL and that latency 
decreases it, ceteris paribus, are verified. 
After this, sensitivity analysis and some economic consistency checks and tests of face 
validity are presented, whereby evidence is utilised to lend support to- and highlight 
areas of conflict with- the results from the main analysis. 
With the hypotheses validated, the CTRt relationship from section 2.11.2 can be 
assumed to hold, and novel analysis is conducted to elicit the key underlying parameters 
including the context premium and effective discount rate.  Results of this analysis are 
postponed to pg.123. 
The analysis that will be reported is outlined in figure 4.1.   
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4.2  Central Tendencies 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarise the central tendency measures for each trim. More detail 
at the 30 million trim is provided in table 4.3.  
 
 
 
- Overall premium (Q1-Q3, CTRt) 
- Central tendencies: predicted movement and discussion 
- Regression on demographics 
- Context Premium(Q4-Q5, CTRT) 
- Central tendencies: predicted movement and discussion 
- Regression on demographics 
- Morbidity premium and labelling dread(Q8-Q10, CT[m]Xt[m]) 
- Central tendencies: predicted movement and discussion 
- Regression on demographics 
- Latency effects (Q6-Q7, CTCt) 
- Central tendencies: predicted movement and discussion 
- Regression on demographics 
- Pooled analysis (all questions) 
- Regression on scenario attributes only 
- Regression on scenario attributes and demographics 
- Validity and consistency checks 
- Results of methodology tests 
- Regression upon residuals 
- Elicitation of underlying parameters 
- Elicitation of estimates for 𝑟 and 𝑥 from Q1-3 
- Elicitation of estimates for 𝑥 from Q4-5 
- Elicitation of estimates for 𝑚 from various questions 
- Elicitation of estimates for 𝑟 from Q6-7 
Figure 4.1:  Analysis of RR relativities data 
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Table 4.1:  Central tendencies: untrimmed 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
C10R1 C10R2 C25R2 C2R2 C10R10 C2C10 C2C25 C[12m]C[6m] C[36m]C[6m] C[2w]R[2w] 
Arithmetic mean 60703 55843 38147 59042 57311 98817 112861 35239 60899 18597 
Median 1.01 1.00 0.179 9.50 10.0 10.0 20.0 6.10 7.70 1.00 
Geometric mean 1.473 0.698 0.238 14.50 12.28 61.64 94.14 9.919 36.62 1.233 
Context index 1.121 1.013 0.597 2.591 2.452 4.415 5.106 2.440 3.321 1.044 
 
Table 4.2: Central tendencies: 30 million trim 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
C10R1 C10R2 C25R2 C2R2 C10R10 C2C10 C2C25 C[12m]C[6m] C[36m]C[6m] C[2w]R[2w] 
Arithmetic mean 3629 2042 1265 8172 9040 12125 6128 7018 13215 1720 
Median 1.00 1.00 0.179 7.80 7.80 10.0 5.20 6.10 7.70 1.10 
Geometric mean 1.116 0.814 0.280 9.319 9.647 21.235 25.73 8.215 17.05 1.012 
Context index 1.089 1.041 0.595 2.526 2.460 3.995 4.451 2.437 3.103 1.026 
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Table 4.3:  30 million trim central tendencies 
Question Arithmetic Mean 
[confidence interval] 
(standard deviation) 
Median 
(percentiles) 
Geometric mean 
[confidence interval] 
 
Index 
[confidence interval] 
 
1 
(C10R1) 
N=  133 
3629 
[-2340, 9598] 
(34799) 
1 
(25% =   0.111) 
(75% =   7.2) 
1.116 
[0.576, 2.161] 
1.089 
[0.847, 1.406] 
2 
(C10R2) 
N=  128 
2042 
[-1088, 5172] 
(17894) 
1 
(25% =   0.108) 
(75% =   7.2) 
0.814 
[0.429, 1.643] 
1.041 
[0.805, 1.347] 
3 
(C25R2) 
N=  127 
1265 
[-376, 2905] 
(9342) 
0.179 
(25% =   0.05) 
(75% =   4.8) 
0.280 
[0.139, 0.566] 
0.595 
[0.446, 0.7766] 
4 
(C2R2) 
N=  126 
8172.216 
[-232, 16576] 
(47665) 
7.8 
(25% =   1) 
(75% =   40) 
9.319 
[4.821, 18.01] 
2.526 
[1.944, 3.426] 
5 
(C10R10) 
N=  129  
9040.34 
[1000, 17081] 
(46154) 
7.8 
(25% =   1) 
(75% =   40) 
9.647 
[4.841, 19.22] 
2.460 
[1.904, 3.308] 
6 
(C2C10) 
N=  125 
12125.26 
[2537.2, 21713] 
(54159.78) 
10 
(25% =   5.25) 
(75% =   40) 
21.235 
[12.15, 37.12] 
3.995 
[3.060, 5.448] 
7 
(C2C25) 
N=  119 
6127.82 
[1027.69, 11227.95] 
(28095) 
5.2 
(25% =  10) 
(75% =   100) 
25.73 
[14.86, 44.54] 
4.451 
[3.396, 6.298] 
8 
(C10[6]C10[12]) 
N=133 
7018 
[1518, 12519] 
(32069) 
6.1 
(25% =   1.35) 
(75% =   10) 
8.215 
[4.534, 14.89] 
2.437 
[1.961, 3.122] 
9 
(C10[6]C10[36]) 
N=  124 
13215 
[3973, 22456] 
(51990) 
7.7 
(25% =   2.7) 
(75% =   35) 
17.05 
[8.55, 34.00] 
3.103 
[2.419, 4.174] 
10 
(C10[2w]R10[2w]) 
N=  140 
1720 
[-1397, 4838] 
(18657) 
1 
(25% =   1) 
(75% =   1.8) 
1.012 
[0.647, 1.584] 
1.026 
[0.880, 1.197] 
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4.3  Overall Results: Questions 1-3 
This section presents analysis of the relativities which compare latent cancer risks and 
current period road accident risks.  The analysis uses questions 1-3, (C10R1, C10R2 and 
C25R2).  The cancer scenarios include 12 months’ morbidity prior to fatality, and the 
relativities can therefore be interpreted as including the combined impacts of context, 
morbidity and latency.    
4.3.1  Predictions: questions 1-3 
Initially consider Q1-Q2 (C10R2 to C25R2).  Statements 1 and 3 from pg.65 section 3.2.4 
(cancer fatality is, ceteris paribus, perceived to be worse than road accident fatality; and 
less morbidity is preferred to more) suggest that the cancer risk increase will be 
avoided, while statement 2 (that delaying the fatality lessens the present disutility from 
the prospect of an increase in the risk of that fatality) suggests the opposite.  As such, it 
is impossible a priori to predict whether the relativity is greater or less than 1.  
Comparing Q1 to Q2, the road accident is later in Q2 than in Q1 and so better by 
comparison.  Because the cancer case stays the same, the overall relativity (CTRt) is 
expected to increase from Q1-Q2. 
Moving from Q2-Q3 (C10R2 to C25R2) the cancer fatality risk is delayed from 10 to 25 
years from now and hence ameliorated.  This is expected to manifest as a smaller 
overall relativity for Q3 than for Q2. 
The relativity is therefore expected to increase from Q1-Q2 then decrease from Q2-Q3.  
The central tendency results are and discussed below. 
4.3.2  Central tendencies: questions 1-3 
For Q1 (C10R1) and Q2 (C10R2) the relativity is insignificantly different to 1 for the 
context index and for the geometric mean, and the median is equal to 1.  The relativity 
becomes significantly lower than one when the cancer fatality is delayed until 25 years, 
in Q3 (C25R2).   
Although in absolute terms the relativity appears to decrease between Q1 and Q2 as 
opposed to the anticipated increase, in fact the relativities are insignificantly different 
than one another.  This result, which replicates the finding of Meyer (2013) suggests 
that respondents did not perceive a significant difference between the road accident 
during the coming year and during the year after next, which suggests that a strong 
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‘passion for the present’23 does not appear to be driving preferences for road accident 
risks as compared to cancer risks in the future.  Given this insight, the analysis will 
proceed with using Q2 and Q3, because these questions were designed for 
comparability with the later questions in the survey
24
. 
The predicted decline in the relativity from Q2 to Q3 is evident, and the difference is 
significant.  This suggests that respondents were significantly less averse to the prospect 
of cancer fatality risks 25 years from the present than 10 years from the present.  This is 
significant for the geometric mean at the 95% level, and holds for the median and 
context index according to the calculated confidence intervals.   
4.3.3  Regression: questions 1-3 
Section 3.3.3 discussed the choice of models for regression.  The full model is used to 
run regressions of each question in this section in order to explore the influence of 
demographics on the overall cancer:roads relativity.  If demographics are found to be 
insignificant, this suggests that the preferences expressed in the overall relativity are 
largely intrinsic.  Having said this, as discussed in earlier chapters age, income and 
current risk levels might all be expected to influence the perceived benefit of a risk 
reduction, and both age and risk level will be expected to have a different effects for 
latent cancer than for roads risks sooner (and hence to influence the relativity).  A brief 
discussion of the results is provided next. Table 4.4 demonstrates that some 
demographic characteristics are able to explain the relativity for the “overall” questions.  
These are explained in turn. 
4.3.3.i  Age 
Age at the time of the study is negatively correlated with the relativity (Q2). Being older 
at the time of the survey might mean that the respondent is less willing to accept a 
higher roads risk to avoid the cancer risk increase (perhaps the older population feel like 
they would be strongly affected by a risk increase now) or perhaps it reflects that there 
is a smaller chance that the individual would be alive to experience the increased risk of 
the latent cancer fatality.   
                                                          
23
 See Laibson (1997) for discussion of quasi hyperbolic discounting models which 
incorporate these sorts of preferences 
24
 This is because ‘during the year after next’ was deemed to be the earliest plausible 
fatality date for cancer risks (relevant for Q4 (C2R2) Q6 (C2C10) and Q7 (C2C25)). 
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4.3.3.ii  Income 
Two significant explanatory variables in Q1 might proxy for income.  Having had 
further education increases the relativity.  Having a higher monthly household income 
also increases the relativity.  Combined, these suggest that higher income levels might 
be correlated with larger VSLCAN:VSL relativities.  However, neither is significant for 
Q3. 
Table 4.4: Overall relativity regressions 
 
Q1,  
C10R1 
n=99,  
r2=0.1990 
Q2,  
C10R2 
n=94, 
r2=0.2040 
Q3,  
C25R2 
n=92, 
r2=0.3257 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Age 2.92** 
(1.43) 
2.82* 
(1.57) 
2.05 
(1.40) 
log of household income interacted 
with age 
-111.35** 
(55.77) 
-113.49* 
(62.05) 
-85.5 
(55.23) 
log of household income 
 
111.26** 
(55.68) 
113.4* 
(61.86) 
85.14 
(55.99) 
gender (female =1) -0.401 
(0.90) 
-0.67 
(0.89) 
-1.56** 
(0.76) 
children under 6 in the household 1.05 
(1.18) 
1.01 
(1.23) 
0.67 
(1.41) 
being female and having children 
under 6 
-2.93 
(2.09) 
-4.11* 
(2.16) 
-3.78* 
(1.95) 
further education 1.64** 
(0.81) 
1.31 
(0.90) 
1.24 
(0.79) 
experience of cancer (self or close 
friend or family member) 
2.18** 
(0.89) 
1.88 
(1.00) 
1.77* 
(0.99) 
experience of road accidents (self or 
close friend or family member) 
-0.47 
(0.77) 
-1.12 
(0.86) 
-1.89** 
(0.78) 
self-reported health state 0.33 
(0.73) 
0.06 
(0.70) 
-0.87 
(0.63) 
perceived road accident risk -0.28 
(0.40) 
-0.12 
(0.48) 
0.18 
(0.42) 
financial risk aversion -0.03 
(0.53) 
-0.69 
(0.65) 
-0.09 
(0.59) 
financial time preference -0.24 
(1.28) 
1.4 
(1.29) 
2.23* 
(1.33) 
health state risk aversion -0.45* 
(0.23) 
-0.32 
(0.22) 
-0.40** 
(0.18) 
Constant 294.91* 
(149.39) 
305.89* 
(167.79) 
235.87 
(149.28) 
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4.3.3.iii  Experience 
In Q1, experience of cancer is significantly and positively related to the overall 
relativity.   In Q3, experience of road accident risks is significantly and negatively 
related to the overall relativity.  This suggests that familiarity with a certain scenario 
reduces the willingness to accept additional risk of fatality by that cause. 
4.3.3.iv  Motherhood 
In Q2-3, the combined impact of being female and having children is negative, 
suggesting that mothers are more willing to accept increased future cancer risks, 
plausibly so as to be around for their young children. 
4.3.3.v  Time preference 
Financial time preference is significant in Q3, with a higher financial discount rate 
appearing to increase the relativity (i.e. people are willing to take a higher road accident 
risk now to avoid the future cancer if they have previously indicated high levels of 
discounting).  It is unsurprising that time preferences only appear to matter over longer 
time periods, although the sign of the coefficient is counterintuitive.   
4.3.3.vi  Risk preference 
Being risk averse over health states reduces the average respondent’s willingness to 
accept higher road accident risks, resulting in a lower relativity for Q1 and Q3.  Risk 
preferences are discussed in more detail in part III of this thesis. 
4.3.4  Summary: questions 1-3 
Having considered the overall relativities, it appeared that both timing and context 
influenced respondents’ relative valuation of cancer and roads risk increases.  These 
insights can be explored in more detail by analysing the responses to questions 
specifically designed to investigate these attributes.  This is done first by looking at 
context holding timing constant in Q4-5.  Then, to further explore what drives this 
context related preferences, questions that varied in terms of morbidity and in terms of 
the label of the context will be analysed.  After this, attention will turn to the other 
aspect of the comparison: timing of the risk increase. 
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4.4  Context Premium Results: Questions 4-5 
This section discusses the evidence surrounding the relative aversion to risks of cancer 
and road accidents, allowing for one year of morbidity prior to the cancer fatality, but 
when the two fatalities would occur at the same time.  As such, the relativity reflects the 
difference between cancer and road accident fatality risks when controlling for any 
influence of timing.  The relativity captured in this section is the ‘context premium’. 
4.4.1   Predictions: questions 4-5 
In Q4 (C2R2) and Q5 (C10R10) the timing of fatality is the same for both causes in each 
question.  However, the context is different between the options, and the cancer case 
includes 12 months’ morbidity. As such statements 1 and 3 (cancer fatality is, ceteris 
paribus, perceived to be worse than road accident fatality; and less morbidity is 
preferred to more) lead to the prediction that the relativity in both cases is greater than 
1.  Comparing Q5 to Q4, both the cancer and road accident risk increases are 
ameliorated in Q5 by the additional 8 years until the risk would manifest.  Assuming 
that the impact of latency is the same for road and cancer fatality risks
25
, the overall 
relativity is expected to remain the same between Q4-Q5. 
4.4.2  Central tendencies: questions 4-5 
A strong preference for avoiding cancer risk increases compared to road accident risk 
increases can be observed for both questions 4 (C2:R2) and 5 (C10:R10).  The ‘context 
premium’ that this implies is about 9.5 based on the geometric mean while the context 
index approach places the relativity lower, at 2.5:1.  The median is within this range, at 
7.8:1.   
Q4 and 5 are statistically indistinguishable from one another according to the geometric 
mean, and the percentiles overlap for the median.  Similarly, the context index cannot 
distinguish between the relativities.  This accords with the prior hypothesis and adds 
evidence in support of the assumption (pg.52) that risks of both cancer and road 
accident fatality are discounted by the individual at the same rate, and that morbidity 
and death are combined for discounting
26
.  More generally, the results suggest that the 
                                                          
25
 This is a strong assumption which is used here for analytical tractability.  Future 
research into the validity of this assumption would be beneficial. 
26
 This is another assumption that is employed for analytical tractability.  Again, 
dedicated future research could explain whether this is a realistic characterisation of 
preferences. 
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timing of fatality does not appear to affect the relativity between contemporaneous road 
and cancer fatality. 
4.4.3  The focussing illusion 
The 9.5 context premium derived from these questions appears high, especially when 
compared to the premium implied by Q1-3 and by regression on all questions, as will be 
discussed in sections 4.9 and 4.12.  An explanation for this could lie in the fact that 
when a single attribute is isolated, in this case context, respondents find this attribute to 
be excessively, perhaps exaggeratedly important.  This is explained in Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) who coin the term ‘focusing illusion’, which they describe as 
follows:  
“When  a judgment  about an entire object  or category is made with attention focused  
on a subset of that category,  a focusing illusion  is likely to  occur,  whereby the  
attended  subset  is over-weighted  relative  to  the  unattended  subset. ” (Schkade and 
Kahneman, 1998) 
Or, as Kahneman and Thaler (2006) have it, “Nothing matters as much as you think it 
does when you are thinking about it”.  
The prevalence of this effect in the present dataset is supported by the apparently high 
relativities for the latency questions and morbidity questions, in which the single 
attribute focus is a feature as well.  See sections 4.6 and 4.7 for details. 
4.4.4  Regression: questions 4-5 
Fewer variables are able to explain the relativity in Q4-5 than was the case for Q1-3.  
However, the variables which are significant are economically sensible.  The 
demographics explaining the dread question relativities are similar to those important in 
explaining the overall relativity, which suggests that the “overall” and “context” 
questions were approached in a similar manner. 
4.4.4.i  Age 
In Q4 (C2R2), age no longer significantly influences the relativity. 
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4.4.4.ii  Experience 
For both Q4 and Q5 having had experience of cancer significantly increases aversion to 
it.  This mirrors the answers from Q1-3.   
 
 
 
Table 4.5: context relativity regressions  
 
Q4 C2R2 
n=92, 
r2=0.1491 
Q5 C10R10 
n=94, 
r2=0.1266 
 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
age 0.9 
(1.28) 
1.73 
(1.49) 
log of household income interacted 
with age 
-36.17 
(50.22) 
-65.68 
(58.21) 
log of household income 36.25 
(50.19) 
65.66 
(58.10) 
gender (female =1) -1.57* 
(0.89) 
-0.6 
(0.99) 
children under 6 in the household  -1.66 
(1.02) 
-0.23 
(1.47) 
being female and having children 
under 6 
1.82 
(1.71) 
-0.42 
(2.15) 
further education -0.16 
(0.80) 
0.86 
(0.88) 
experience of cancer (self or close 
friend or family member) 
2.02** 
(0.87) 
2.79** 
(1.06) 
experience of road accidents (self or 
close friend or family member) 
0.04 
(0.84) 
-0.57 
(0.95) 
self-reported health state -0.55 
(0.69) 
-0.16 
(0.79) 
perceived road accident risk 0.39 
(0.56) 
0.35 
(0.61) 
financial risk aversion -0.12 
(0.26) 
-0.22 
(0.60) 
financial time preference 0.21 
(1.33) 
0.96 
(1.43) 
health state risk aversion 0.12 
(0.26) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
constant 97.3 
(134.81) 
173.05 
(156.00) 
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4.4.4.iii  Motherhood 
While the motherhood variable is not significant in these regressions, being female is 
significant and negative in Q4.  This may be picking up a similar effect to the 
motherhood variable. 
4.4.5  Summary: questions 4-5 
Age, Time preference, Risk preference and Income, all of which were significant for 
Q1-3, are insignificant in Q4-5.  This might reflect that there is no 25 year latent 
scenario in Q4-5. 
Having found a significant and positive premium for the context of cancer when 
compared to contemporaneous road accidents, it will be interesting to consider what 
drives this preference.  It has been well documented that the cause “cancer” engenders a 
particular dread.  This is tested in our survey using Q10 (C10[2w]R10[2w]), where the 
two fatality causes are given descriptions that are identical in every way except for the 
label: one is referred to as “cancer” and the other as “road accidents”.  An alternative 
explanation for the preference for avoiding cancer risks is that they tend to include a 
period of morbidity prior to the fatality.  This is explored using Q8 (C10[12m]C10[6m]) 
and Q9 (C10[36m]C10[6m]) which vary the scenarios only in terms of the length of time 
that the person would be ill before they died.  Through these three questions, it is 
possible to draw conclusions about the underpinnings of the context premium identified 
in the previous section. 
4.5  Morbidity Results: Questions 8-10 
First, the analysis will consider the effect of illness preceding fatality on the relativity.  
In this study, morbidity has been explored through questions that vary the length of time 
that the person is ill prior to fatality.  For the cancer it is typically one year of illness.  
However, questions 8 and 9 explicitly vary the length of time spent ill with cancer prior 
to fatality, and the lengths of time are 6 months, 12 months or 3 years.  For the road 
accident the illness lasts for “minutes or hours”.  The exception is in question 10, where 
both the road accident and cancer fatalities are described as occurring after “one or two 
weeks’ pain and suffering”.  Of course, as described in section 2.9.6 (pg.39), duration is 
not the only aspect of morbidity that is likely to influence the overall relativities, but 
duration was chosen for simplicity of explanation.  Further research considering 
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severity of illness would allow a more thorough examination of how illness influences 
the VSL. 
4.5.1  Predictions: questions 8-10 
Q8 (C10[12m]C10[6m]) and Q9 (C10[36m]C10[6m]) ask respondents to compare fatal 
cancer risks ten years from now but with differing lengths of time spent ill prior to 
fatality.  The fatality preceded by 6 months of illness, is compared with fatality after 12 
months’ illness in Q8 and fatality after 36 months illness in Q9.  Using statement 3 (less 
morbidity is preferred to more), the relativity will be expected to increase
27
.  In both 
cases, the relativity is hypothesised to be greater than 1. 
The labelling dread question, Q10 (C10[2w]R10[2w]) holds both time and morbidity 
constant, allowing an insight into the influence of label dread, to distinguish it from the 
influence of context in general.  The relativity is predicted to be greater than one if 
statement 1 holds (that is if, ceteris paribus, cancer risks increases are considered to be 
worse than road accident risk increases). 
4.5.2  Central tendencies: questions 8-10 
As anticipated, the relativities for Q8- 9 shows that less illness is preferred to more.  In 
addition, the relativity increases at a decreasing rate as the morbidity differential 
increases.  It is possible to use Q8 and Q9 in conjunction with other questions in the 
survey to obtain more information about morbidity.  Each question is assigned a 
‘morbidity differential’, so for Q8 this is 6 months and for Q9 it is 30 months, but for 
Q4 (C2R2) and Q5 (C10R10) it is 12 months (from no morbidity in roads to a year of 
morbidity in cancer).  If the prediction that the relativity is increasing in morbidity is 
correct, then the relativity should be larger for Q9 than Q4 or 5, and smaller for Q8.  
The geometric mean confirms this, with relativities of 8 (Q8), 9.5 (Q4 and Q5) and 17 
(in Q9).  The pattern is replicated in the context index. 
The premia in Q8 and 9 are significantly different when considering the geometric mean 
and the median.  However, the context index does not significantly differ between the 
two, according to the pseudo confidence intervals.  It certainly seems that the jump from 
no morbidity to some morbidity is considered to be worse than an extension of an 
existing morbidity period.  This may simply be an artefact of the label of cancer, 
                                                          
27
 As described in section 2.8, the morbidity period is included prior to fatality so there 
is no confounding trade-off between length of life and time spent in illness. 
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however, because it was not considered plausible to describe a cancer fatality that did 
not include prior morbidity.    However, the test of label dread, Q10 (C10[2w]R10[2w]), 
found that for every measure of central tendency and at both levels of trimming, the 
ratio is insignificantly different to one.  Taken at face value, this implies that the label 
‘cancer’ is not sufficient to give rise to a context premium.  There is, of course, a 
possibility that respondents recognised the identical description of the scenarios and 
concluded that indifference was the ‘correct’ answer to question 10; a concern which 
justified its inclusion after all of the other questions had been answered.  Regression 
analysis reported below highlights the importance of morbidity in explaining choice. A 
final point to note is the breadth of the confidence intervals. They appear to be very 
wide, suggesting that different people view morbidity quite differently. 
4.5.3  Regression: questions 8-10 
To explore morbidity in more detail, regression is run on the full predictor model.  The 
results for each of questions 8, 9 and 10 are presented in table 4.6 and followed by a 
discussion. 
In comparison with the earlier regressions (Q1-5) the demographics are much less 
significant.  The income proxy, rental, is significant and negative but only for Q8.  
Otherwise, none of the previously significant variables matters in explaining the 
morbidity or label dread preferences. 
4.5.4  Summary: questions 8-10 
Taken together, these results suggest that morbidity preferences as well as specific 
context labelling preferences are intrinsic and not influenced by demographics.  The 
puzzle here is that some aspects of the demographic model were significant when 
considering the context premium Q4-5.  The analysis of central tendencies, as well as 
the prior hypotheses, suggested that a preference for avoiding cancer over 
contemporaneous road accidents would be driven by one or both of a preference for 
avoiding morbidity and the dread that comes from the label of cancer.  If this was the 
case, then the same pattern of significance ought to be observed for the regression of 
dread as for the regressions of the labelling and/or morbidity questions, but this is 
clearly not the case.  As such, it appears that there may be some additional effect that is 
unaccounted for in the framework used here. 
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Having established that a context premium exists- and having made the somewhat 
surprising discovery that for this sample it appears to be driven by the morbidity prior to 
fatality as opposed to any particular dread of cancer per se- this analysis turns to the 
second part of the relationship:  the effects of latency.  This effect is modelled as 
offsetting the context premium in the ‘overall’ comparisons between latent cancer and 
current period road accidents (see the CTRt relationship presented in section 2.11.2) and 
this section provides the empirical evidence in support of the hypothesised relationship. 
 
Q8 
C_12C_6 
n=95, 
r2=0.1337 
Q9 
 C_36C_6 
n=88, 
r2=0.1430 
Q10  
C2wR2w 
n=101, 
r2=0.1226 
 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
age -1.79 
(1.20) 
-0.48 
(1.40) 
0.83 
(0.96) 
log of household income interacted 
with age 
72.08 
(46.76) 
19.68 
(54.22) 
-33.27 
(37.77) 
Log of household income -72.02 
(46.71) 
-19.99 
(54.08) 
33.39 
(37.70) 
gender (female =1) 0.27 
(0.80) 
1.41 
(0.97) 
-0.54 
(0.68) 
children under 6 in the household 0.41 
(1.18) 
0.99 
(1.78) 
-0.27 
(0.74) 
being female and having children 
under 6 
-0.66 
(1.40) 
-1.86 
(2.07) 
0.59 
(1.02) 
further education 0.71 
(0.68) 
0.11 
(0.84) 
-0.64 
(0.51) 
experience of cancer (self or close 
friend or family member) 
0.16 
(0.85) 
0.31 
(1.05) 
0.99 
(0.80) 
experience of road accidents (self or 
close friend or family member) 
1.00 
(0.74) 
0.31 
(0.89) 
0.00 
(0.55) 
self-reported health state -0.01 
(0.64) 
0.44 
(0.85) 
-0.46 
(0.55) 
perceived road accident risk -0.14 
(0.36) 
-0.42 
(0.45) 
-0.29 
(0.29) 
financial risk aversion 0.60 
(0.51) 
0.67 
(0.59) 
-0.43 
(0.37) 
financial time preference -1.28 
(1.22) 
-1.3 
(1.59) 
1.5 
(1.00) 
health state risk aversion -0.02 
(0.19) 
0.30 
(0.26) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
constant -192.29 
(124.7) 
-50.36 
(144.46) 
89.44 
(100.76) 
 
Table 4.6: Morbidity regressions 
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4.6  Latency Results: Questions 6-7 
The concepts of latency and discounting are distinct but related: latency is a descriptive 
concept reflecting the timing of the risks under consideration, and discounting is one 
way of formalising the effect that this latency has on valuations and hence on the 
VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  This distinction is important to bear in mind throughout this 
section.   
In this study, latency can be addressed only through a limited array of questions, and the 
timing of fatality is restricted to 2 years, 10 years and 25 years.  As such, while this 
section allows preliminary insight into the effects of timing and allows estimation of 
possible discount rates, for a fuller investigation of timing on the relativity, extended 
analysis has been performed on an in depth follow-up study (study 2) reported in part III 
of this thesis.  Nonetheless, this section demonstrates how even in a survey constrained 
to be relatively short, inferences can be made about latency and discounting that 
illuminate aspects of the effect of timing on the relativity. 
Five questions are relevant for this analysis: Q1-3 (CTRt) where the latent cancer fatality 
is compared to a road accident fatality sooner and Q6-7 (CTCt) where the latent cancer 
fatality is compared to short latency cancer fatality during the year after next.  
Morbidity is assumed to last for 12 months prior to fatality every cancer case. While the 
time of symptom onset and time of fatality differed between the scenarios and the 
questions, the time of exposure was always described as during the coming year. 
4.6.1  Predictions: questions 6-7 
The predictions for Q1-3 (CTRt) were discussed in detail on pg.97 and for these 
questions latency did appear to reduce the relativity between cancer and road accident 
risks.  However, Q6-7 explicitly address the issue of latency by holding the context and 
morbidity constant and so arguably providing a clearer account of the influence of 
latency.  Invoking statement 2 (that risk increases later are, ceteris paribus, preferred to 
risk increases sooner), the sooner cancer is expected to be considered worse than the 
later, and so the relativity is expected to be greater than one for both Q6-7.  Q7 (C2C25) 
is identical to Q6 (C2C10) except that the later fatality is delayed until 25 years from 
now.  This leads to the prediction that the relativity will increase from Q6-Q7 because 
the longer latency option is ameliorated. 
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4.6.2  Central tendencies: questions 6-7 
The relativities are both large, with C2:C10 at 21.24, and C2:C25 at 25.73.  This suggests 
that cancer sooner is over twenty times as bad as cancer after 10 years’ delay, and over 
twenty five times as bad as the 25 year latent cancer.  These high values may again be a 
result of the focusing illusion referred to in section 4.4.3. 
The two relativities are insignificantly different for the geometric mean and context 
index, although the medians fall just outside the 25
th
-75
th
 percentile range of one 
another.  This insignificant difference is unexpected, and contradicts both the prior 
hypothesis and the evidence from Q2 and 3.  Like in Q2-Q3, the only difference 
between Q6 and Q7 is the timing of the latent cancer fatality, and so it would be 
expected that the difference observed should be similar, but this is not the case.  The 
two question pairs differ only in the context of the near-term fatality: in Q2-3 it is road 
accidents and in Q6-7 it is cancer.   
Speculatively, the puzzling result might be because of the particular dread of cancer that 
is assumed to hold.  If cancer is considered much worse than road accidents (and Q4-5 
suggest that this is the case) then perhaps the near-term cancer risk increase is 
considered particularly abhorrent.  If so, respondents may have focussed on this near 
term case to the detriment of consideration of the impact on their future cancer, 
resulting in the observed apparent indifference between the 10 and 25 year latent case.  
This relates to the argument in chapter 3 which discussed lexicographic preferences in 
the RR framework.  It could also be helpful to consider the insights of some alternative 
discounting models such as those outlined in Frederick (2003).  For example, Frederick 
et al discuss combining different psychology insights in explaining intertemporal 
choice, mentioning models such as reference dependence (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991).  If cancer is viewed as a loss compared to the road accident risk reference point, 
it could receive higher weight than road accidents in decision making.  
4.6.3  Regression: questions 6-7 
Three effects in the demographics are significant in explaining preferences for the later 
cancer risk increases as compared to earlier ones in Q6 - Q7, but the significance is only 
significant at the 10% level.  This implies that the preference for avoiding fatality risks 
at different times is largely exogenous.  This contrasts with the result for both the 
context and the overall relativity regressions, both of which generated significance for 
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some of the explanatory variables, but coincides with the result for label dread and 
morbidity where demographics were unable to explain the relativities.  The variables of 
significance are as follows: being female, having better self-reported health and having 
greater aversion to health risks all increase the relativity, indicating higher discounting 
or a greater aversion to taking the risk increase the year after next. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Latency regressions 
 
Q6 
 C2C10 
n=94, 
r2=0.1476 
Q7 
 C2C25 
n=87, 
r2=0.1686 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
Coef. 
(Robust 
Standard 
Error) 
age -1.43 
(1.03) 
-0.43 
(1.07) 
log of household income interacted 
with age 
58.71 
(40.08) 
19.03 
(41.51) 
Log of household income -59.21 
(40.02) 
-19.37 
(41.64) 
gender (female =1) 1.31* 
(0.71) 
1.54* 
(0.82) 
children under 6 in the household  0.15 
(1.41) 
-0.84 
(0.97) 
being female and having children 
under 6 
0.41 
(1.56) 
0.96 
(1.50) 
further education -0.8 
(0.65) 
-0.25 
(0.66) 
experience of cancer (self or close 
friend or family member) 
-0.57 
(0.61) 
-0.09 
(0.68) 
experience of road accidents (self or 
close friend or family member) 
0.82 
(0.71) 
0.8 
(0.67) 
self-reported health state 1.04* 
(0.51) 
0.71 
(0.68) 
perceived road accident risk -0.14 
(0.34) 
0.26 
(0.30) 
financial risk aversion 0.59 
(0.60) 
0.22 
(0.55) 
financial time preference -0.62 
(0.99) 
-1.17 
(1.13) 
health state risk aversion 0.29* 
(0.16) 
0.31 
(0.21) 
constant -154.96 
(107.05) 
-50.67 
(109.62) 
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4.7  Interim Summary Of Results 
So far, the analysis has considered the ‘overall’ relativities, concluding that there 
appeared to be a preference for avoiding cancer fatality, but that this preference (or 
‘context premium’) is offset to some degree by latency.  The ‘context premium’ 
questions 4-5 verified that there is a significant preference for avoiding cancer 
compared to contemporaneous road accident risks.  The analysis of Q8-10 explored 
what drives this preference, with the conclusion that morbidity, as opposed to label 
dread, is the main driver of the preference for avoiding cancer risks compared to road 
accident risks.  This is a novel result, although perhaps unsurprising.  The analysis then 
moved on to consider latency.  Latency was shown to reduce the VSLCAN 
However, so far the analysis has not addressed how the different attributes affect the 
overall relativity.  That is, how do the relativities depend on the objective aspects of the 
scenarios (i.e. the context of the comparison, morbidity prior to fatality and the timing 
of the fatality risks)?  This is addressed in the subsequent pooled regression analysis. 
4.8  Pooled Analysis: All Questions 
The insights from the central tendency analysis and the regression on demographics can 
be verified using a single regression, which takes all of the information from each 
question in the survey and pooling all of the relativities.  The effects of context, latency, 
and morbidity are included as explanatory variables by generating variables for the 
differential along these dimensions, so for example C10R2 has a context differential 
(dummy) of 1, a latency differential of 8 years and a morbidity differential of 12 
months.  The results for five regression models are included in table 4.8.  The 
regressions include information from each respondent to multiple questions, so the 
standard errors are clustered on the individual. 
4.8.1  Regression of relativities on attributes and demographics 
Model (1) displays the regression of the relativity on all three attributes of the scenarios 
to assess their overall impacts without controlling for the influence of demographics and 
other characteristics.  Models (2) and (3) are included to allow comparison between 
context and morbidity in explaining the relativities.  Finally, models (4) and (5) include 
respondent characteristics, initially using the best fit with observable demographics 
(model 4) and then using the full predictor list (model 5). 
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In model (1), latency and morbidity appear to be the main drivers of the relativity, 
because the cancer context dummy is insignificant, although it is positive as would be 
expected.  The central tendency analysis in section 4.5 suggested that morbidity 
Table 4.8:  Regression of relativities on attributes and demographics 
log ratio Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
N=1410 N=1410 N=1410 N=988 N=945 
R2= 0.1826 R2=0.1377 R2= 0.1815 R2=0.2708 R2= 0.2881 
Cancer context (dummy 
1= cancer:roads) 
0.299 
(0.321) 
0.407 
(0.323) 
- 0.34 
(0.31) 
0.47 
(0.29) 
Latency 
(differential in years) 
-0.158*** 
(0.015) 
-0.184*** 
(0.016) 
-0.159*** 
(0.014) 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
-0.17*** 
(0.02) 
Morbidity 
(differential in months) 
0.112*** 
(0.013) 
- 0.113*** 
(0.013) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
Age - 
 
- - 0.90 
(0.57) 
1.04* 
(0.58) 
Log of household 
income 
- - - 36.35 
(22.29) 
41.63* 
(22.84) 
Log of hh income 
interacted with age 
- - - -36.32 
(22.34) 
-41.57* 
(22.88) 
Female - - - -0.67** 
(0.33) 
-0.63* 
(0.33) 
Child under 6 - - - 0.23 
(0.50) 
0.27 
(0.49) 
Mother to child under 6 - - - -1.20 
(0.81) 
-1.19 
(0.82) 
Having had further 
education 
- - - 0.63** 
(0.31) 
0.59* 
(0.31) 
Cancer experience - - - 1.20*** 
(0.43) 
1.35*** 
(0.44) 
Road accident 
experience 
- - - -0.51 
(0.31) 
-0.43 
(0.34) 
Self-reported health 
state 
- - - -0.41 
(0.27) 
-0.32 
(0.24) 
Health risk aversion - - - -0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.16* 
(0.09) 
Self-reported road 
accident risk 
- - - - -0.06 
(0.20) 
Financial risk 
preference 
- - - - -0.12 
(0.21) 
Financial time 
preference 
- - - - 0.50 
(0.57) 
Constant -0.099 
(0.200) 
1.102*** 
(0.205) 
0.086 
(0.153) 
98.18 
(60.07) 
111.32* 
(61.60) 
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explains the majority of the dread of cancer, so including both context and morbidity 
could be over-fitting the data.  As such, regressions 2 and 3 are run, each to include only 
one of these.  The fit of the model with context included and morbidity excluded (model 
2) is lower than the fit with morbidity included and context excluded (model 3), perhaps 
simply reflecting the dummy nature of the data for the context variable, but perhaps also 
suggesting that the morbidity is driving the overall relativities.  Whichever case holds, it 
appears that one additional year of latency between the options compared in a questions 
will reduce the relativity by 15 to 20%.  Model (2) suggests that for questions that 
compare roads to cancer risk increases across, the relativities are 40% larger than for the 
within-cancer comparisons, ceteris paribus.  This links well to the 1.4 context premium 
that will be derived in section 4.11.2 from the relativities for questions 2-3.  Model (3) 
considers the influence of an additional month of morbidity difference separating the 
two scenarios, which tends to increase the relativity by 10 to 15%. 
To test the robustness of these conclusions, models (4) and (5) include demographic and 
preference-based characteristics.  Model (4) includes only the best fit predictors while 
model (5) uses the full set of predictors. In these models, the coefficients on the 
demographics are interpreted as picking up the factors underlying the respondents’ 
willingness to accept larger risks in their least feared cause generally, i.e. their 
willingness to move down the multiple list.  There are a number of significant 
coefficients in the models, with being older, being on higher income and having further 
education all reducing willingness to accept higher risks of the second cause
28
.  
Similarly those who display aversion to health state risks and those with experience of 
cancer are less willing to accept a larger risk increase in the second cause.  Being female 
appears to increase the willingness to accept risk increases in the second cause, 
however.  While the results are interesting from a methodological perspective, for the 
current analysis it is sufficient to state that regression on demographics improves the fit 
of the model, and that it allows a cleaner interpretation of the latency and morbidity 
attribute coefficients.  In terms of the stability of the coefficients on the attributes, 
including these additional predictors does not destabilise the coefficients: it is still the 
case that an additional year of latency will decrease the relativity by 15 to 20 per cent, 
and an additional month of morbidity will increase the relativity by 10 to 12 per cent. 
 
                                                          
28
 The “second cause” forms the dominator of the relativity.  It is Rt in CTRt, Ct in CTCt 
and CT[xm] in CT[6m]CT[xm]. 
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4.8.2  Confidence intervals 
It is possible to construct confidence intervals around the relativity by predicting the 
relativity as a function of some variable of interest, and plotting it with associated 95% 
confidence intervals.  Using model (1) to predict the relativity and plotting against 
latency, it is possible to observe a relativity that decreases with the length of the latency 
delay, as in figure 4.2. The context dummy is switched on, and the morbidity period is 
set equal to 12 months.  This will be given more treatment in part IV which considers 
the policy implications of this research. 
 
However, this analysis is based only on information about latency differentials of 0, 8, 
9, and 23 years and as such there is a lot of uncertainty about latency periods between 
these points:  more information on more data is provided in study 2b reported in part III 
of this thesis.   
In summary, this analysis suggests that the relativity decreases with the length of the 
latency differential, verifying the assumption that latency decreases the VSL; and that 
with no latency, the average VSLCAN:VSL relativity is between 1:1 and 2:1, verifying 
the assumption that some context premium exists.  The assumption of 1:1 for the overall 
relativity is valid for latency differentials between around 7 and 14 years. 
4.9  Economic Consistency and Face Validity 
This section is included to add robustness to the results.  The first necessary condition 
for the reliability of the results is that the methodology is robust, with respondents able 
to respond well to the mechanism.  This is explored below in two ways: initially, the 
results of the validity checks for the methodology are reported. 
Figure 4.2:  Re-constructed relativity as a function of latency 
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The next condition is that the results themselves are consistent in economic terms.  
Throughout the results section, the correspondence between the results and the 
predictions was shown to be strong in most cases.  This suggests that the results are 
interpretable in an economic sense.  In addition on pg.120 regression upon some proxies 
for the strength of preference displayed over the attributes context, latency and 
morbidity are conducted.  The significance of these parameters in explaining the 
preferences for the overall comparisons are as anticipated a priori, and as such the 
results are given an extra degree of credibility. 
4.9.1  Results of validity checks for the methodology  
In order to be confident in using the results above in validating hypotheses 1 and 2 from 
pg. 52, and hence in supporting the simple modelled relationship between the VSL for 
cancer and for road accidents, it is necessary to establish the robustness of the elicitation 
procedures.  
As set out in section 3.2.10 (pg.77), a number of checks can be made on the data to 
explore whether there are obvious problems with anchoring or framing.  The data used 
here simply capture the row in which the respondents switched between their initial 
choice and the other option.  Potentially problematic signs include a peak in the centre 
of the data (suggesting respondents anchored on the range provided to generate their 
response), and a peak at indifference or in row 1 (suggesting respondents were 
constrained by the fairly large initial step interval). 
Bias towards the middle of the table would manifest itself as a cluster of responses 
around the middle of the distribution.  However, looking at the frequency distribution 
by row this does not appear to be the case.  The distribution of answers within the table 
is given in figure 4.3 
If respondents felt constrained by the jump from 50 to 100 (or 85, 90, etc. for the later 
questions) they might have been obliged to choose row 1 when they really would have 
preferred to switch slightly earlier.  If so, responses would be clustered in row 1.  Again, 
this does not appear to be the case, with only 7% of within-table switching occurring in 
row 1.  Disentangling understatement is a little more complex.  If respondents were 
artificially indicating indifference because the initial step is too big for them, this would 
manifest as a higher than expected proportion of indifference indicated in the first place.  
However, given that indifference is both a protest mechanism and also the response of 
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anyone for whom context and timing do not affect preferences over risk changes, a 
higher proportion of people might be expected to indicate indifference than to switch in 
other rows even without any bias resulting from the steps in the risk options. 
 
A high proportion of responses indicate indifference, at 10% of all responses (see figure 
4.4) but as discussed, it is difficult to interpret whether this is genuine preference, 
protest, or understatement bias. 
The final source of bias discussed relates to the signal, from the setup of the multiple 
list, that the start and end points are somehow legitimate bounds for the decision.  This 
appears not to be the case for the majority of respondents, since in fact 56% of 
switching happened below the lowest suggested point on the table (see figure 4.4).   
4.10.1.i  Switching below the table 
The high proportion switching below the table is an interesting result in itself.  In many 
ways, the result is heartening because respondents do not seem to have felt constrained 
by the table bounds.  However, it would be preferable if the survey instrument captured 
indifference within the table for most respondents.  Considering the balance between the 
desire for detail within the table (which would suggest having small intervals) against 
the desire to capture the indifference points of the majority of the sample (which would 
suggest having large intervals, or more of them) the levels selected were judged to 
provide the best compromise.  Transferring the RR survey section onto computers and 
employing an iterative mechanism would allow this issue to be addressed in future 
versions of this survey and protocol.  Nonetheless, in the author’s opinion, this survey 
Figure 4.3: Overall switching points: within table 
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design presents the best compromise given the resource constraints under which the 
study was conducted.  
 
 
In summary, while not without its problems, the multiple list format with the range of 
risk levels employed in this study was shown to deliver reasonably reliable responses.   
There is no strong evidence that respondents were constrained by the values in the table, 
because a majority actually chose to state values larger than were offered in the table.  
In addition, there is limited evidence that respondents were pushed towards stating 
indifference or switching in row one, (a concern raised as a result of the fairly large 
jump in values between 50 to 100 in questions 1-3). 
Figure 4.4: Overall switching points 1 
Figure 4.5: Overall switching points 2 
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4.9.1.ii  Herding 
As discussed in section 3.2.10 it is possible that a respondent could observe or infer the 
initial choice of others in the group because the individuals were interviewed in groups 
of 10 using paper answer sheets.   
There is only a very limited chance that a respondent would know which of the two 
options (e.g. A or B) had been chosen by anyone else because the answer sheets that the 
respondents received were all but identical in either case and ‘option As’ and ‘option 
Bs’ were deliberately not handed out separately.  In addition, questions were all 
answered on an individual basis, and respondents were spaced apart in the room.  The 
data suggest that this procedure was sufficient: when examining responses to Q1-3, in 
only one group (there were 21 groups in total), and only in question 1, did every 
respondent make the same initial choice.  In the other 20 groups (and hence in the other 
62 questions) there was at least one different selection, and in 17 groups at least 2 
people contradicted the majority on the initial choices for Q1-3.  This suggests that 
people did not feel constrained to follow the crowd and choose along with the majority, 
probably in part because the decisions of others were not clearly apparent. 
However, it would be noticeable to the observant respondent when someone had 
indicated indifference, because they would not receive the second answer sheet.  As 
such, it is appropriate to check whether this appears to have influenced subsequent 
decisions. 
Firstly, notice that indifference was indicated by a minority of respondents.  For 
questions 1-9 (where there is a potential to influence the following question), 
indifference was recorded in only 7.14% of decisions.  For the final question, 
C10[2w]R10[2w], there is a much higher indifference response rate (70 out of 157), 
which is likely to be because the respondents felt genuine indifference between the two 
risk increases on offer (after all the scenarios were deliberately explained using identical 
language, except for the context label). 
While 7.14% is a small proportion of the sample, it is possible that respondents were 
influenced by the indifference displayed by others in previous questions.  If this is so, an 
increasing (or decreasing) rate of indifference responses would be observed along the 10 
questions.  Taking into account the order in which different respondents faced the 
different questions, the pattern in figure 4.6 emerges. 
118 
 
 
It does not appear that the frequency of indifference responses increased or decreased 
through the course of the survey, which indicates that these sorts of potential public or 
social pressures do not appear to have caused much trouble here.   
 
Of course, there may be some underlying unwillingness to state indifference but this 
would be revealed by people making early switches in the table.  However, for Q1-3 
there were 5, 2 and 4 people respectively out of 157 that chose to switch in the first row.  
This is between 1.2% and 3.2% of the sample. 
Figure 4.6: Switching points by question order 
Figure 4.7: Frequency of people who switch immediately 
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In summary, there is potential for respondents to have noticed when others indicated 
indifference between two risk scenarios because those respondents would not receive 
the follow-up, multiple list answer sheet.  As such, checks were run on the number of 
‘indifference’ answers per question, and no evidence was found that the number or 
proportion of ‘indifference’ responses increased or decreased as the survey progressed.  
Checks were also run for a peak at the first row of switching which could indicate 
reluctance to publicly admit indifference between the two risks.  This was not the case.  
There was a small minority of indifference responses, and for Q1-9 they made up just 
7.14% of the total responses. 
4.9.2  Consistency within the survey: regression upon residuals 
This section aims to investigate whether respondents approached the RR questions in a 
consistent manner.  For example, if an individual expressed a high relativity in the 
context questions then they would be expected to express a high relativity in the overall 
premium questions.  Similarly, if they expressed a strong preference for avoiding the 
sooner illness in the latency questions then a lower overall relativity would be 
anticipated because they would be expected to discount the latent cancer.  These can be 
verified using ‘regression upon residuals’.  Regressions are run of each of the overall 
relativities (Q2 (C10R2) and Q3 (C25R2)) on proxies for the strength of preference over 
the attributes of context, latency and morbidity from the later questions (3-10).   
The strength of preference proxies used in this analysis are the residuals from the 
regressions of each of the later question relativities on a best fit model of observable 
characteristics.  These residuals therefore capture the strength of preference that an 
individual has over the attribute in question, above that predicted by demographics.  
Formally, they capture the difference between the actual strength of preference 
expressed in Q4-10 and the level predicted by the demographics. 
The reason for choosing regression upon residuals, as opposed to simple correlation 
analysis, is because the correlation analysis would be influenced by any demographic 
characteristics which would act to drive both the overall and the explanatory relativities 
in a particular direction.  As a hypothetical example, if being female always tends to 
result in a larger relativity, then this would manifest in the explanatory relativities from 
Q4-10 as well as in the overall relativities from Q2-3.  As such, simple correlation 
would potentially result in an overestimation of the relationship.  Regression on 
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residuals provides a more robust test of the relationship between preferences expressed 
over the individual attributes of context, latency and morbidity and the overall relativity. 
4.9.2.i  Hypotheses: regression upon residuals 
The coefficient on the latency residuals is expected to be negative, and the coefficients 
on the context-related residuals (morbidity, dread and labelling) are expected to be 
positive. 
4.9.2.ii  Results: regression upon residuals 
 
Table 4.9:  Regression on residuals 
 
Q2 residuals C10R2 
n=74 
r2=0.4585 
Q3 residuals C25R2 
n=70 
r2=0.3300 
 
Coef. 
(Robust standard 
error) 
Coef. 
(Robust standard error) 
Context residuals (C10R10) 0.59*** 
(0.09) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
Latency residuals (C2C25) -0.35** 
(0.15) 
-0.67*** 
(0.21) 
Morbidity residuals 
(C[36]C[6]) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
Labelling residuals 
(C[2w]R[2w]) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
Experience of cancer (self 
or close friend or family 
member) 
0.16 
(0.70) 
0.95 
(0.84) 
Experience of road 
accidents (self or close 
friend or family member) 
-1.14* 
(0.66) 
-0.92 
(0.87) 
Self-reported health state -0.13 
(0.56) 
-0.50 
(0.70) 
Financial risk aversion 0.08 
(0.38) 
-0.12 
(0.53) 
Financial time preference -0.30 
(1.25) 
0.93 
(1.45) 
Health state risk aversion -0.04 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.28) 
Perceived road accident risk 0.22 
(0.36) 
0.38 
(0.40) 
Constant 0.47 
(1.56) 
-0.70 
(2.12) 
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Initially a stylised regression upon dread, latency, morbidity and labelling residuals and 
all the preference related characteristics is reported in table 4.9.  This ensures that the 
effects of each of the later questions can be compared, although it does risk over fitting 
the model. 
The results suggest that high relativities expressed in the context premium and latency 
questions are related in the anticipated way to the overall relativity.  Morbidity and 
labelling are less clearly significant.  This may be due to the fact that the context 
coefficient is already picking up the influence of these variables.  In addition, there is 
limited variation in the ‘labelling’ relativity with a large proportion of respondents 
indicating no preference, which would reduce the ability for it to explain the overall 
relativities.  The preference related characteristics are largely insignificant. 
This model may have over fit the data, so regressions are run on the best fit, again using 
the vselect command in Stata (see pg.86 for an explanation) to guide the variable 
selection.  The best fit regressions, for each of Q2 and Q3, are reported in tables 4.14 
and 4.15. 
 
Table 4.10:  Best fit (for Q2) regression on residuals 
 
Q2 residuals C10R2 
n=91 r2=0.2972 
Q3 residuals C25R2 
n=90 r2=0.1912 
Coef. 
(robust standard error) 
Coef. 
(robust standard error) 
Context residuals (C10R10) 0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.29** 
(0.14) 
Latency residuals (C2C25) -0.38** 
(0.15) 
-0.55*** 
(0.16) 
Labelling residuals 
(C[2w]R[2w]) 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
experience of road accidents 
(self or close friend or 
family member) 
-0.74 
(0.62) 
-0.32 
(0.68) 
constant 0.41 
(0.42) 
0.30 
(0.41) 
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The model in table 4.10 has best goodness of fit, but the model in table 4.11 shows 
higher significance of the residuals of the dread and latency questions, which matter 
significantly in all models. 
In summary, the coefficients on the context and latency residuals have the sign and 
significance that would be expected in explaining the ‘overall’ relativities.  It appears 
that those with high levels of aversion to cancer risks generally tend to produce higher 
‘overall’ relativities, and those who discount the future substantially have lower 
‘overall’ relativities.  The coefficients on labelling and morbidity are not significant, but 
this is likely due to the role of the context residuals which are picking up the same 
influences. 
At this stage, the results have been analysed to explore whether the respondents 
appeared to understand, to check for typical signs of anchoring and framing effects, and 
to explore whether the results accord with what would be expected a priori in terms of 
the underlying psychology of the tasks.  In all dimensions, the data supports the overall 
conclusion that the survey instrument was reasonably well understood, and that 
respondents appeared to approach it in a consistent way.  
4.9.3  Summary of validity tests 
The tests and checks reported in section 4.9 are all designed to explore whether the 
methodological design and implementation were able to generate results which reflect 
well thought out preferences of the respondents, free from extreme levels of bias.  This 
Table 4.11:  Best fit (for Q3) regression on residuals 
 
Q2 residuals C10R2 
n=99 r2=0.2550 
Q3 residuals C25R2 
n=96 r2=0.1401 
 Coef. 
(robust standard error) 
Coef. 
(robust standard error) 
Context residuals (C10R10) 0.53*** 
(0.10) 
0.32** 
(0.13) 
Latency residuals (C2C25) -0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.47*** 
(0.16) 
constant 0.14 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.32) 
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was confirmed to a large extent as the tests demonstrate the consistency of the responses 
within the survey, and an absence of some typical symptoms of potential 
methodological problems.  In summary, the methodology and results appear to suggest 
that the survey and its implementation were successful. 
4.10  Discussion of RR results 
A Risk-Risk stated preference study was designed and implemented to investigate the 
influence of context and latency on the relativity between increases in latent cancer 
fatality risks and in current period road accident fatality risks.  In doing so, it provides 
the first dedicated UK evidence into these effects and adds to the stock of evidence in 
the debate about the appropriate level for a policy-based cancer premium.  While the 
policy implications of this research will be considered in part IV, chapter 9, the key 
empirical results of this study have been reported here. 
The analysis shows that there is a context premium for cancer ceteris paribus and that 
the effect of latency is to decrease the VSLCAN.  These results verify the hypotheses 
from pg.52. 
A second result relates to what drives the context premium.  The key driver of the 
context premium appears to be the morbidity period typically assumed to apply prior to 
fatality from cancer, as opposed to any dread of the label “cancer” per se.   
The methodology and results are subject to scrutiny throughout this part of the thesis, 
with a dedicated section (pg.113) which specifically considers the reliability of the 
methods and results.  The results of these supplementary analyses are encouraging, 
suggesting that the respondents were able and willing to provide thoughtful answers 
which can largely be interpreted in an economically intuitive manner.  
As such, the analysis reported in this chapter so far appears to support the CTRt model 
proposed in section 2.11.2 (pg.51).  The usefulness of the CTRt relationship in eliciting 
underlying parameters relevant to the VSL for cancer will be established through the 
subsequent analysis in section 4.11. 
4.11 Eliciting Underlying Parameters: a New Methodology 
As discussed in the literature review and motivation, studies investigating the VSLCAN 
have typically been unable to disentangle the effects of context (including label dread 
and morbidity) and latency.  This has been addressed in study 1, which addresses this 
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directly.  As discussed, the preliminary evidence suggests that there is aversion to 
cancer ceteris paribus, but that this context premium appears to be offset by latency.  
This is in line with existing empirical evidence. This evidence can be made useful in 
future VSL studies, because it allows confidence in the model proposed in chapter 2 
which links the VSLCAN to the standard VSL.  This relationship is powerful because it 
allows the elicitation of values for the context premium, effective discount rate and 
morbidity premium.  This can be achieved on the sample or individual level using 
combinations of relativities.  The procedure is explained in full in the next section. 
4.11.1  Elicitation procedure 
The procedure for eliciting   and  , using Q2 and Q3 to exemplify, is as follows: 
Recall the simplified model introduced in part I of this thesis (pg.53) 
                   (A1’) 
Equation (A1) implies that cancer risks are equivalent to contemporaneous road 
accident risks, augmented by      , an overview parameter which captures the 
combined effects of labelling dread and morbidity, and which is referred to as the 
context premium (see figure 2.3 in part I (pg.31) where these terms were defined). 
      
  
      
   {   }            (A2’) 
Equation (A2) implies that any cause   in a time period after a delay   is discounted 
exponentially at a constant effective discount rate  , where   captures the effects of 
diminishing remaining life expectancy and diminishing survival probability in addition 
to the pure rate of time preference. 
4.11.1.i  To elicit the effective discount rate,  : 
From (A1) and (A2), using Q2 (C10R2): 
     
       
      
         (35) 
 
   
  
 
     
      
         (36) 
From Q3 (C25:R2): 
     
       
       
         (37) 
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         (38) 
Q2 implies 
 
   
  
 
     
      
                                (39) 
Rearranging,  
                 
        (40) 
Q3 implies  
 
   
  
 
     
       
              (41) 
Rearranging, 
                 
         (42) 
(40) and (42) imply 
                 
            
      (43) 
Solving, 
 
     
     
 
       
      
         (44) 
 
     
     
                (45) 
So from the ratio of results of two questions, the effective discount rate can be inferred.  
The results will be provided on pg.130. 
4.11.1.ii  To elicit the context premium, x. 
To find  ,   is simply substituted into (36) or (38).  The results will be provided on 
pg.129. 
This section has outlined the novel approach that will be taken using the central 
tendency measures and a limited number of assumptions about the relationship between 
the cancer VSL and roads VSL, to elicit underlying preference parameters for the 
respondents in the study.  This technique will be repeated for different question pairs, 
with the results provided as appropriate throughout section 4.11. 
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4.11.2  Inferred r and x values: questions 1-3 
Using the sample geometric means for Q2 and Q3 to derive values for   and   gives: 
                   (46)
                  (47) 
The implied effective discount rate is 7.37% per year and the context premium is 1.43, 
implying that cancer fatality risk increases are perceived to be 1.43 times as bad as road 
accident risk increases which occur at the same time.  It should be noted that these 
parameters are elicited based on the assumptions in the CTRt relationship, and are 
interdependent.  That is, because the estimate of the effective discount rate is elicited 
alongside the context premium, they ought to be applied together.  This is an idea which 
will be returned to in part IV where the policy implications of these results are explored. 
4.11.3  Inferred x values: questions 2-5 
Again, using the simultaneous equation method described in section 4.11.1 or the 
simple comparisons in Q4-5, the context premia can be elicited for a range of questions.  
The resulting values for       are summarised in table 4.12.   
Clearly, the resulting estimates using Q4-5 (CTRT) are much higher than those obtained 
from Q2-3 (CTRt).   As discussed on pg.101, the excessive salience and possible 
focussing illusion apparent in Q4 and Q5 cast some doubt upon the context premium 
implied by these questions.  On this basis, the 1.44 implied by questions 2 and 3 is 
perhaps the more solid foundation on which to base the context premium.  This result is 
given support by the context coefficient of 0.407 from the pooled regression analysis 
results reported in section 4.8. 
 
Table 4.12: Summary of implicit context premia 
 Measure Symbol Question(s) Timescale Level 
Context premium (1+x) 2 n/a 1.434 
Context premium (1+x) 3 n/a 1.437 
Context premium (1+x) 4 n/a 9.319 
Context premium (1+x) 5 n/a 9.647 
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4.11.4  Inferred m values (morbidity premium): questions 4-5 & 8-9 
As discussed, morbidity appears to be a significant driver of the preference for avoiding 
cancer risks as opposed to road accident risks, ceteris paribus, especially since the 
relativity in Q10 (C10[2w]:R10[2w]) is indistinguishable from unity.  As such, better 
understanding of morbidity preferences will be beneficial to evaluating the overall 
relativity.  It is possible to infer the impact of an additional month of morbidity using 
questions 8 and 9, and a procedure similar to that employed for the elicitation of the 
context premium   and the effective discount rate   as described above.   The 
assumption made in the derivation is that each month of morbidity has equal weight, 
although as this analysis will show, this may not reflect reality. 
Initially the assumption (A1) above is adapted to account for the length of time spent in 
illness: 
                    (A1*) 
  again captures dread and morbidity effects, but is now a multiplier on , which is 
illness in months. 
From Q4: 
                     (48) 
From Q5: 
     
         
      
        (49) 
From Q8: 
    [ ]  
        
      
        (50) 
    [  ]  
         
      
        (51) 
From Q9: 
    [  ]  
         
      
        (52) 
From Q4: 
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                  (53) 
From Q5: 
 
   
   
 
         
      ⁄
  
      ⁄
                   (54) 
From Q8: 
 
   [  ]
   [ ]
 
         
      
        
      
   
       
      
     [  ]   [ ]    (55) 
From Q9: 
 
   [  ]
   [ ]
 
         
      
        
      
   
       
      
     [  ]   [ ]    (56) 
which can easily be simplified to an expression for .  The results are provided in table 
4.13.  
The premium for avoiding an additional month of illness is much larger using 
information from Q4 and Q5 (the context premium questions) than from Q8 and Q9 (the 
morbidity premium questions).  Intuitively, this might be because the difference 
between no morbidity (in the roads scenario in Q4-5) and morbidity (in the cancer 
scenario in Q4-5) is larger than the difference between an existing six months’ illness 
and a longer illness period (in the comparisons in questions 8 and 9).  It might indicate 
some “dread of morbidity” per se, and in fact that the length of time spent ill is not the 
most important aspect of the prospect of morbidity.  This explanation appears to be 
supported by the data, because there is no context premium when there is no morbidity 
differential, a large premium for the difference between no morbidity and some 
morbidity (with roads compared to cancer) and a barely significant difference between 
the premium for the 12 and 30 months differential from a 6 month baseline (i.e. Q8 and 
Q9).  The exception is that the relativities for Q8 and Q9 are both large, but this might 
again be attributable to the focusing illusion discussed above in relation to the 
discounting function.  This interpretation, by necessity, has been speculative, and as 
such should be considered alongside the insights from regression analysis for morbidity 
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reported on pg.108, which ultimately provides more substantive conclusions 
surrounding morbidity.   
 The one-month morbidity premium can be displayed as a function of the morbidity 
differential that elicits it, and a stylised version of this is given in figure 4.8. 
 
4.11.5  Inferred r values: questions 2-4 & 6-7 
The effective discount rates discussed here are derived from responses to the risk-risk 
trade questions and as such ought to be treated as descriptive, not normative.  A 
normative discussion of the implications of different discount rate choices in 
policymaking is provided in the policy implications section in part IV.   
As with the context premium, there is more than one way to calculate the effective 
discount rate from these data.  The implied rates differ substantially depending on the 
choice of questions.  As highlighted previously, the highest estimates occur when the 
questions used considered risks of contexts that differed along a single dimension and 
Table 4.13:  Summary of implicit morbidity premia. 
 Measure Symbol Question(s) Timescale Level 
Morbidity premium 
(month) 
m 4 n/a 0.69 
Morbidity premium 
(month) 
m 5 n/a 0.72 
Morbidity premium 
(month) 
m 8,9 n/a 0.097 
 
12 
Premium 
for 
avoiding 
36 6 
Time spent ill (months) 
Figure 4.8:  Morbidity 
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more modest estimates exist for the multi-dimensional Q2 and Q3, again perhaps 
because of the potential focusing illusion.  The range of estimates is from 1.25% p.a. for 
data between the 10 and 25 year time periods, up to 46.6% p.a. for Q6 which compares 
2 and 10 years.  The rate from questions Q2-3, which incorporates all three time points, 
is within this range, at 7.37% p.a.   
 
Jones-Lee and Loomes (2010) note that an effective discount rate applied to fatality 
risks will incorporate more than simply pure time preference.  They highlight the effects 
of the diminishing VSL
29
 with age and the chance of not surviving until the risk 
increase as additional effects, and the current study has picked up some additional 
effects that might have a role to play.  Jones-Lee and Loomes (2010) estimate the 
combined effects of the diminishing life expectancy and diminishing survival 
probability (excluding pure time preference) to be in the range of 2 - 3% for a 15 year 
time frame, based on epidemiological evidence and some standard assumptions about 
the utility of remaining life expectancy function.  This implies that the observed 7.37% 
effective discount rate from the analysis of Q2 and Q3 might imply a pure time 
preference rate in the region of 4-5%.  This range aligns well with the rates presented in 
table 2.1 (pg. 44) which summarised existing estimates for the discount rate in the 
health and safety literature. 
The effective discount rates can be plotted against the length of delay, as shown in 
figure 4.9. 
                                                          
29
 Value of Preventing a Statistical Fatality- see section 2.2 
Table 4.14:  Summary of implicit effective discount rates 
 Measure Symbol Question(s) Timescale Level 
Effective discount rate r 2, 3 25:10:2 years 7.37% p.a. 
Effective discount rate r 6 10:2 years 46.6% p.a. 
Effective discount rate r 2,4 10:2 years 28% p.a. 
Effective discount rate r 7 25:2 years 15.1% p.a. 
Effective discount rate r 3,4 25:2 years 15.5% p.a. 
Effective discount rate r 6,7 25:10 years 1.25%p.a. 
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4.11.6  Summary of elicited parameters 
The context premium from Q2-3 is estimated to be 1.4, which implies that cancer 
fatality risk increases are considered to be 40% worse than road accident risk increases 
that would occur at the same time.  The effective discount rate, estimated in conjunction 
with the context premium, is 7.37% per year under the assumption of exponential 
discounting.  The overall conclusion is that  the effects offset to generate a premium in 
the region of 1:1 or less for latency periods of 10 years or more. 
4.12  Conclusions from Study 1 
Study 1 provided evidence to support the hypotheses that the context of cancer increases 
WTP for risk reductions (and hence increases the VSL) while latency or delay reduces 
WTP.  The evidence from the RR study therefore supports a model linking the cancer 
and roads VSLs according to a context premium (1+x) and an effective discount rate (r).  
This was further validated using robustness checks.  The second part of the analysis 
used this relationship along with survey relativities data to elicit some underlying 
parameters including the effective discount rate and the context premium. 
As such, this new methodology appears to be a simple, practical approach that could 
help to clarify the output of future VSL studies involving different contexts and risks. 
4.12.1  Policy implications from Study 1 
The results have some implications for policy making.  For example, the effective 
discount rate of 7.37% is shown to be enough to offset the context premium for latency 
periods of ten years or more, implying an overall relativity for a ten year latent cancer 
compared to a road accident now that is insignificantly different than 1:1.  When the 
Discount 
rate 
23 8 
Time (years) 
Figure 4.9:  Discounting 
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latency is increased, this overall relativity falls to be less than one.  In addition, that the 
context premium appears to be driven largely by morbidity is a novel result which 
would benefit from dedicated research in the future, particularly to establish what 
besides duration of morbidity influences the premium.  The policy implications of this 
study are considered in much more detail alongside the implications from study 2 in 
part IV. 
4.12.2  Further research requirements 
This study has provided insight into a broad range of factors influencing the relative 
size of the VSLCAN and the standard roads VSL.  However, there are unanswered 
questions that arise from it.  The study was able to provide some initial insight into the 
importance of latency in influencing the cancer VSL, but a lack of data-points means 
that estimating the functional form of the relationship is beyond the scope of study 1.  A 
related feature of latent fatality risk is the influence of risk preferences, which are 
intrinsically important to the valuation of any delayed outcome but particularly pertinent 
in a survey design which employs risk trading as its elicitation mechanism.   As such, 
these two areas- risk preference and latency- are explored further in this thesis through a 
dedicated follow up study.  This is reported in part III of the thesis.  Beyond this, 
dedicated investigation of the drivers of the morbidity premium would be recommended 
for further investigation. 
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PART III. 
STUDY 2: ON THE INFLUENCE OF LATENCY 
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Chapter 5: Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology 
5.1  Background 
The analysis of Study 1 reported in Part II of this thesis allowed insight into the 
influence of context, morbidity, labelling and timing on the VSLCAN and the 
VSLCAN:VSL relativities.  Given this broad scope, it was successful in providing a 
comprehensive overview of the preferences underpinning the main relativities.  It also 
demonstrated the tractability of the ‘latent cancer to current roads’ comparisons in the 
Risk-Risk framework, especially given the extensive training and learning session that 
preceded the main survey.  Arguably its main contribution was the formulation of the 
simple CTRt relationship which is based on two assumptions: first that the context of 
cancer (incorporating morbidity and label dread effects) acts to increase the VSLCAN, 
and second that longer latency reduces the VSLCAN.  These insights were both verified 
in the R-R study, and the relationship was used alongside survey data to infer both the 
context premium and discount rate from the survey data in relativities form. 
It is the latter assumption, that latency reduces willingness to pay to avoid cancer risks 
that provides the motivation for the studies reported in this Part.  The drawback of 
Study 1 was that it allowed only a limited investigation of the influence of timing.  This 
is because in order to cover all of the research areas (examining dread, morbidity and 
latency), it was possible to vary the timing of outcomes in only a subset of the 
questions.  Because the aim of the latency Section in Study 1 was simply to verify that 
longer delays prior to a risk outcome reduce the VSL, the survey was not designed with 
enough time intervals to reliably allow the inference of the functional form of the 
discount rate for the sample in aggregate, let alone on an individual level, so for 
simplicity an exponential discount function was assumed throughout.  However, it is 
well established in the literature that exponential discounting is a poor predictor of 
behaviour in a range of domains.  The Study reported in the following Sections will 
address this by allowing assumptions about the functional form for discounting to be 
varied and tested. 
However, before any analysis of discount rates can be accomplished, the extent of risk 
aversion for members of the sample must be established.  Any latent outcome is 
inherently risky, and to fully understand the choices and preferences made over latent 
outcomes requires controlling for the effects of risk preference.  This insight motivates 
the analysis, reported in Chapter 6, which formalises the theoretical link between risk 
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preference elicitation in finance and in health, and then provides and implements a 
novel mechanism for the elicitation of risk preferences in the health domain. 
These risk preference measures are taken forward into the analysis in Chapter 7 which 
aims to establish to what extent exponential discounting can characterise responses to 
R-R questions that compare fatalities with different latency periods, and to establish the 
likely alternative discount functions and rates that apply for this sample. 
The rest of Part III of this thesis is structured as follows.  First, some key works in the 
discounting literature are presented and discussed, with a particular focus on studies that 
have explored discounting in the domains of health and physical risk, and discount rate 
elicitation.  Next, attention is given to the link between risk and time preferences, and to 
the extent to which risk preferences can be expected to vary between finance and health.  
From this basis, the research questions for Part III are set out, and then the methodology 
is outlined.  The analysis follows.  Risk preferences in health are elicited in Study 2a, 
reported in Chapter 6 and are taken forward to Chapter 7, which reports Study 2b and 
resolves some of the issues that motivated this Part of the thesis, focussing in particular 
on discounting. 
5.2  Introduction to Literature Review 
This literature review will first outline the key papers in the discounting literature, 
discussing discounting as a concept and its origins in economics and psychology 
literature.  A brief summary of the development of classic discounting models is 
presented.  The evidence is presented surrounding whether discounting is likely to differ 
by domain.  The link is then made to the specific focus of this thesis: latent fatality 
risks.  This motivates a re-cap of the evidence surrounding the discount rate in the 
domain of health and physical risk which was previously discussed in Chapter 2.  
Finally, the link is drawn between time and risk preferences, along with a brief 
discussion of the evidence for risk preferences that differ by domain.  The review 
culminates in a series of research questions which, when addressed, will add to the state 
of understanding about the implications of latency on the VSL as well as to the toolkit 
available to the researcher exploring these questions. 
5.3  Time Preference and Discounting 
To start, consider the general intuition behind the concept of discounting latent 
outcomes.  As discussed in Section 2.10, when an outcome occurs in the future, it is 
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assumed to receive less weight than an otherwise identical outcome that occurs in the 
present.  This observation has been made across a wide range of sub-disciplines in 
economics and psychology, and is generally considered to be a key element 
characterising the preferences of economic agents.  Indeed, in the extreme, it can be 
argued that without a preference for present gratification of wants and needs over future 
gratification of future wants and needs, there would be infinite deferral of action (in 
order to take advantage of increased productivity of resources in the future). See 
Frederick et al. (2002) for a brief discussion.  This general intuition has been formalised 
in an extensive body of literature since the 19
th
 century. 
5.3.1  Early insight 
Early thought- defined here as publications up to 1930- on the trade-off between present 
and future consumption focussed on psychological motivations for preferring immediate 
consumption including disutility from having to wait and the animal desire for present 
over future outcomes.  The interested reader should consult Frederick et al. (2002) for a 
general review of early thought on time preference.  The comprehensiveness of that 
analysis renders extensive discussion of the origins of discounting theory redundant in 
this review, although the most significant contributions will be outlined for 
completeness. 
Key contributions include those from Rae (1834), Jevons (1888) Jevons (1905) and 
Senior (1836). The work of these early thinkers focused almost exclusively on present 
emotions, with some reference to the bequest motive for the accumulation of resources 
for future consumption.  The first clear consideration of time preference as a trade-off 
decision between present and future consumption is presented in the work of von 
Böhm-Bawerk (1890), which highlighted a systematic tendency to underestimate future 
wants. These early insights were formalised with reference to a marginal rate of time 
preference by  Fisher (1930).  The problem was formalised diagrammatically, with the 
marginal rate of time preference dependent upon both time preference and diminishing 
marginal utility. Fisher summarises thought up to that point, and elucidates his 
contribution of the concept of time preference as follows: 
“Time preference, or impatience, plays a central role in the theory of interest. It 
is essentially what Rae calls the "effective desire for accumulation," and what 
Böhm-Bawerk calls the "perspective undervaluation of the future." It is the 
(percentage) excess of the present marginal want for one more unit of present 
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goods over the present marginal want for one more unit of future goods. Thus 
the rate of time preference, or degree of impatience, for present over future 
goods of like kind is readily derived from the marginal desirabilities of, or wants 
for, those present and future goods respectively” Fisher (1930) 
So the Fisher model substantially developed understanding about the relative 
importance of present and future, and developed a tractable framework for its 
consideration.  However, the Fisher model only gives insight into two periods, now and 
later, whereas in reality a future stream of income and consumption will influence 
utility.  This was recognised by Samuelson (1937), whose Discounted Utility model 
(DU) was developed as a tractable model of preferences over multiple future periods. 
5.3.2  Discounted Utility (DU) Samuelson (1937) 
Samuelson’s DU model is based on an additive multi-period utility model (equation 
(57)) with present value of lifetime utility      defined as the sum of instantaneous 
utility      which is dependent on consumption     in each period, discounted 
exponentially as described in equation (58).  The discount factor      captures the 
previously described psychological influences in a single parameter,  . 
             ∑            
   
        (57) 
      (
 
   
)
 
        (58) 
The DU model, as in the Cropper (1990) model presented in Chapter 2, assumes that 
utility in each period is independent of utility in any other period.  In addition, it 
assumes that the instantaneous utility function      and the discount rate   are both 
time-invariant.  Finally,   is assumed constant for all domains.  These assumptions are 
not, and were not, intended to reflect reality and are retained for analytical tractability.  
However, the DU model was long held to be the best available reflection of time 
preference. 
5.3.3  Non-standard discounting evidence 
However, there has been a plethora of evidence to suggest that the standard discounting 
models are not well equipped to describe the choices that people make in reality.  
Indeed, as stated, the standard DU model was never intended to reflect the reality of 
intertemporal decision making.  Many of the alternative theories and models are 
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grounded in the observation that decisions over time often reveal inconsistent 
preferences.  That is, when considering future outcomes from the standpoint of the 
present some course of action or decision maximises the present value of the future 
utility, but upon reaching the future point the agent will act differently.  This is 
commonly and accessibly illustrated with examples of self-control and planning, such 
as the intention to attend an exercise class in a week’s time never becoming a reality.  
Further, costly commitment devices, from formal devices such as pre-paid gym 
memberships to informal actions like moving the alarm clock out of arm’s reach, would 
not persist if people’s preferences were consistent over time. 
5.3.4  Common discounting assumptions 
This Section outlines the motivation and evidence surrounding five common alternative 
discounting assumptions.  The technicalities underpinning the models are presented 
very briefly here, with full treatment being provided in the text of Study 2b in Chapter 
7.  Instead this review aims to highlight what is already known about these models, 
what motivated them, and which if any is expected a priori to explain the discounting 
behaviour in the VSL for cancer. 
5.3.4.i  Exponential discounting 
The exponential discounting models are perhaps the most simple and tractable models 
that account for positive rates of time preference.  They are based on the assumptions of 
the DU model, and impose a constant rate of time preference.  Of course, this means 
that they are susceptible to the criticisms of the DU model especially in terms of the 
realism of the assumptions.  Nonetheless they are the most commonly used in studies 
where the issue of time preference is important but not the sole focus, just like study 1 
reported in Part II of this thesis. 
The algebraic formulation of the discount factor is  
 
   
  (for continuous discounting) or 
 
      
 (for discrete discounting).    is the discount rate and   is the delay until the outcome. 
5.3.4.ii  Hyperbolic discounting 
Hyperbolic discounting is an alternative discounting model which accounts for the 
observation in much of the available evidence that the rate of time preference   is not 
constant, but declines over the time horizon.  Evidence for this can be found in Cropper 
et al. (1994) amongst others.  An early, specific study testing for this effect is reported 
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in Thaler (1981).  ‘Smaller payoff sooner’ versus ‘Larger payoff later’ (hereafter 
‘smaller-sooner, larger-later’) studies were conducted, with the result that implicit 
annual discount rates declined from 345% when the outcomes were delayed by one 
month to just 19% when they were delayed by 10 years.  This result has been replicated 
in other studies, for example in Ainslie and Herrnstein (1981).  In addition, Frederick 
(2003) describes a cross-study comparison which finds that the implied discount rates 
decline with the length of time involved in the underlying comparisons.   
Having said this, Cameron and Gerdes (2003) conduct a study to distinguish between 
exponential and hyperbolic models in fitting their large dataset.  They find it impossible 
to distinguish which is more appropriate.  As such, although the evidence in support of 
it is strong, the superiority of the hyperbolic function compared to the exponential is not 
confirmed beyond doubt. 
The algebraic formulation of the discount factor is either generalised as 
 
         
 or 
simplified (assuming    ) to  
 
      
 where   is the discount rate and   is the delay 
until the outcome, and   captures how far the function differs from standard exponential 
discounting. 
5.3.4.iii  Quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
An alternative formulation to the hyperbolic discount model has been provided by 
Laibson (1997).  It combines the qualitative findings of the hyperbolic model (a 
‘passion for the present’ and declining discount rates) with the analytical tractability of 
the exponential discounting model.  As such, this model is arguably the most tractable 
yet descriptively realistic of those commonly cited in the literature.   
The algebraic formulation for the discount factor is   (
 
   
) where         for     
and     for     .  This means that the period 0 (the present) receives higher weight 
than future time periods, and these future periods are discounted exponentially, hence 
retaining analytical tractability in the model. 
However, there are many reasons for a ‘right now’ bias, and these may not be to do with 
intrinsic time preference.  For example, transaction costs and uncertainty effects both 
appear as soon as an outcome is non-immediate.  This might have the effect of placing a 
premium on the present which is not due to any underlying psychological ‘passion for 
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the present’.  This confounds the existing evidence into the appropriateness of the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model. 
5.3.4.iv  Sub-additive discounting 
An alternative explanation to the evidence supporting hyperbolic discounting models is 
the concept of sub-additive discounting.  This theory, introduced in the finance 
literature by Rambaud and Ventre (1998) and in psychology by Read (2001), suggests 
that the discount rate might decline with the length of interval between two outcomes, 
rather than with the delay from the present.  Read cites Rubinstein (2003) and Leland 
(2002) in suggesting that discounting “diminishes as a function of the judged similarity 
of the time-points marking the beginning and the end of an interval.”  As such, for any 
given interval, if it is subdivided, the overall discount rates will be lower than if it was 
not, suggesting that the discount factor (and hence present value of the outcome) will be 
higher for a more subdivided interval.  Rambaud and Torrecillas (2010) provide the 
example that “the discounting function for one year will be greater than the product of 
the corresponding discounting function values for each month.”  A review of the 
literature and underlying theory of the delay versus interval concept is provided in 
Rambaud and Torrecillas (2010). 
It is not possible to provide an algebraic formulation of the discount factor for sub-
additive discounting because it relies inherently on a comparison between outcomes at 
different times. 
5.3.5  Other anomalies 
Other time-related anomalies have been documented in the literature.  Some of these 
anomalies have sparked potential alternative utility models while others are, to date, 
curiosities that require further explanation.  It is beyond the scope of this research to 
analyse the majority of the anomalies, and the reader is again invited to consult the 
review by Frederick et al. (2002) in which these models are given substantial treatment.  
However, these effects may be able to explain particular observed preferences regarding 
the latent cancer VSL, and where this is the case it will be worth keeping these 
discounting models in mind.  As such, the anomalies are briefly outlined in Sections 
9.3.5.i-v, along with discussion of how the anomaly might influence a latent VSL. 
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5.3.5.i  The magnitude effect (Thaler, 1981)  
Small outcomes are shown to be discounted more than large ones, with illustration from 
Thaler (1981) for money amounts.  If this is a persistent effect, it is evidence against the 
application of a constant discount rate across all domains.  In terms of VSL studies, this 
effect could mean that different risk changes are discounted differently, which has 
implications for the interpretation of the risk-risk relativities, with potential 
overestimation of the VSL based on the (incorrect) assumption that  disutility increases 
linearly with the size of the risk increase. 
5.3.5.ii  The sign effect (Thaler, 1981)  
Thaler (1981) finds that gains are discounted at a higher rate than losses.  This relates to 
the willingness to accept/willingness to pay disparity
30
 and could be explained by 
reference point theories that have been proposed in behavioural economics, for example 
the classic prospect theory developed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  If a loss is 
given more weight than a gain, then it will appear not to receive as high a discount rate 
if the elicitation does not account for the difference in weighting.  In terms of the VSL 
framework, the elicited discount rates might differ between studies employing risk 
increases from the status quo and those employing risk reductions. 
5.3.5.iii  Preference for improving sequences (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991) 
This anomaly might reflect a preference for ‘getting the bad part out of the way’, or 
perhaps a recognition of the fact that the later years will be experienced with the 
preceding years as a reference point:  if the best outcome is latest, then it will not suffer 
by comparison to the periods that went before.  This observation and tentative 
explanation link to another common anomaly:  violations of independence  
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).  They show, through a very accessible thought 
experiment about choosing when to enjoy a sequence of fancy dinners, that their 
respondents have a preference for spreading consumption over time.  Specifically, most 
people would choose to have a delicious meal last out of a selection of meals if it is the 
only chance to have it, but first if there is more than one occasion on which to have the 
dinner.  This contradicts the standard discounting model’s assumption that the different 
periods’ utility ought to be independent.  In terms of the VSL, this might result in a 
                                                          
30
 Although this anomaly is not irrefutable, see for example Chilton et al. (2012) 
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preference for taking a risk increase sooner rather than later, which contradicts the 
assumptions made about latency decreasing the VSL. 
5.3.5.iv  ‘Date vs. delay’ framing effect (Read et al., 2005) 
Most discounting theories predict no difference in the discount rate between outcomes 
described as being “four weeks from now” or “on the 15th April”, as long as the delay is 
the same in each case.  However, the framing of the scenario is shown in the work of 
Read et al. (2005) to be systematically and significantly related to the discount rate, 
with a strong positive effect on the elicited discount rate when the date is used as 
opposed to the delay.  In addition, the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting is shown 
to be much less evident where the date is used than when delay is described.  Read et al. 
provide psychological explanations involving focusing effects and different salient 
aspects of the two types of framing.  Sensitivity to framing is a common feature of 
stated preference studies, even when the incentives are made real. In terms of the VSL, 
this has implications for the way in which the latent outcome is described. 
5.3.5.v  Summary of discounting anomalies 
To summarise, there are many accounts of anomalies in discounting behaviour that do 
not fit with the traditional DU model.  However, the model was not intended to be a 
descriptive model of preferences, and the hyperbolic discounting model is able to cater 
for at least some of the effects described.  The reference point model will account for 
some of the others.  A range of additional discounting anomalies has been discussed 
with particular focus on the way that they might be expected to influence a latent VSL 
study.  While it is beyond the scope of this research to explicitly address them all, they 
will be borne in mind for the design and implementation of the VSL study.  
5.4  Discounting and Health 
There is a range of evidence connecting time preferences and discounting to health 
outcomes, for example the well-established link between smoking and time preference.  
A survey of the recent evidence (since 2002) was conducted by Lawless et al. (2013) 
while a more general investigation of time preference and lifetime outcomes is 
presented by Golsteyn et al. (2013).  Links are made between time preference, self-
control and inconsistent preferences, especially in explaining apparently irrational 
health behaviours that are suboptimal, such as drug abuse or engaging in risky sexual 
behaviours.  Chapman (2005) presents a meta-analysis which highlights a link between 
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‘hot’ behaviours like these and the discount rate but no link between time preference 
and ‘cold’ health behaviours like taking medicines and preventative health care.  This 
might suggest that impulsivity has more to do with the link than pure time preference, 
although this is not confirmed. 
However, while this literature is interesting and relevant to policymakers that wish to 
understand and then alter health behaviours with intertemporal consequences, it is not 
the main concern of this analysis.  Instead of investigating the link between the 
(typically financial) time preference rate and health behaviours or outcomes, the present 
thesis is more interested in a more technical question.  That is, is it appropriate to use 
the same discount rate for finance as for the domains of health and physical risk? The 
appropriateness of applying or assuming a constant discount rate across domains is a 
matter of debate in the literature both from a normative, policy perspective and from an 
individual perspective.  The traditional view is that a single rate should be used, and 
these arguments are set out first.  Criticism of this perspective is summarised 
afterwards, followed by empirical evidence. 
5.4.1  Normative arguments for constant discounting in policymaking  
In effect, health policy evaluation weighs financial costs against health benefits.  Either 
or both costs or benefits could occur in the future, and as such, decisions need to be 
made about the suitable rate at which to discount them.  The costs are clearly to be 
discounted at a financial discount rate, but for the benefits it is less clear.   Traditional 
arguments suggest that the same rate ought to be used, because this ensures consistency 
of decision making over time.  The consistency argument suggests that it should make 
no difference to overall allocation whether the future benefit is discounted to its present 
value, or a present cost is inflated to its future cost.  This can only be the case when 
benefits are discounted at the same rate as costs, as shown in Weinstein and Stason 
(1977).  An additional and commonly cited argument in favour of constant discount 
rates across domains is the Keeler and Cretin (1983) paradox of infinite deferral.  This 
captures that for a set ‘cost per unit’ of health benefit (e.g. £1m per 10 lives saved) and 
for a given interest rate (e.g. 10%p.a.) then investing a health budget for financial return 
today will allow more lives saved in the future (in the present example, the value of 
£1m invested today will be £1.1m in one year’s time, allowing 11 lives to be saved as 
opposed to 10).  This generates an incentive for society to postpone health spending 
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indefinitely.  On the basis of these two arguments, policymakers have increasingly ruled 
for the use of a constant discount rate for costs and benefits. 
5.4.2  Normative arguments for constant discounting in private decision-making 
Private decision making, according to the life cycle consumption models with 
discounted utility at their heart (see (Cropper and Sussman (1990); Cropper and Portney 
(1990)) and Alberini and Chiabai (2007b)) also suggests a domain-independent discount 
rate, which will be equivalent to the consumption discount rate in the case of perfect 
capital markets, or perhaps higher if there is imperfect access to capital markets.  
Standard economic theory suggests that the discount rate for all production and 
consumption decisions is intrinsically related to the financial interest rate, and relates to 
the ability to smooth consumption optimally over the lifetime.  Personal, subjective time 
preference has been shown to drive positive real rates of interest, at least in theory, and 
in the majority of the theoretical literature a single value is assumed to hold no matter 
the good or service under consideration. 
5.4.3  Critiques of the normative assumptions of domain-independent discounting 
The challenges to the domain independence hypothesis are twofold: theoretical and 
empirical.  The theoretical support for applying a constant discount rate across policy 
domains has been criticised because the proofs offered (the consistency argument and 
the Keeler and Cretin paradox of infinite deferral) have at their heart a fundamental and 
problematic assumption.  To take this assumption directly from Weinstein and Stason 
(the proponents of the consistency argument), 
“It is the discounting of dollar costs, and the assumed steady-state relationship 
between dollars and health benefits, that mandates the discounting of health 
benefits as well as costs” (Weinstein and Stason, 1977, p. 720) p720 
This assumption of a steady-state relationship between monetary costs and health 
benefits is a problematic assumption:  quite plausibly the value of health might increase 
over time.  The debate is summarised in Cairns (1992), and  Van Hout (1998) gives the 
debate surrounding domain independence full treatment in his paper arguing for a 
reconsideration of the standard approach of using a single rate.  He clarifies that 
“costs need to be discounted on the basis of the expected increase in income and 
the marginal utility of consumption, and that effects need to be discounted on 
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the basis of the expected increase in health and the marginal utility of health” 
(Van Hout, 1998) 
and demonstrates that this only requires a constant discount rate across the domains 
under the “heroic” assumption that growth rates are generated by a social utility 
function with perfect market function.  The paradox of infinite deferral is shown to hold 
only for benefits that are single period, which is unrealistic.  The consistency argument 
is shown to hold only when a growth equilibrium is assumed.  This is again a theoretical 
construct which may not hold in reality.  As such, Van Hout argues strongly in favour 
of differentiated approaches to discounting across domains. If the value of health over 
time can be expected to grow, then the discount rate that ought to be applied should be 
lower than that over finance. 
Despite this, the arguments are ongoing in the literature, with a real-world example 
being the decision of the UK’s NICE (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence) ruling to adopt constant discount rates for costs and benefits as recently as 
2005
31
, prompting responses to the contrary from Brouwer et al. (2005) and Gravelle et 
al. (2007).   
As with the social arguments, the private arguments for discount rates that differ across 
domains rest on the inability to trade wealth for money at a constant rate over time.  
This is not necessarily a valid assumption due to changing wealth over the lifetime, and 
due to the lack of direct transferability from wealth to health on an individual level (it is 
of course an easier assumption on a societal level). 
As such, it appears on a theoretical level that while there are  normative and ethical 
reasons to prefer a single rate of discounting across all domains, particularly costs and 
benefits, further scrutiny of these assumptions and application to the real world makes 
these less attractive.  On an individual level, the argument for domain-independent 
discount rates appears even less convincing.  Nonetheless, the debate is ongoing in the 
literature. 
Whether or not a single discount rate across domains is normatively superior to a 
differential rate, it will nonetheless be important to discover whether these rates differ in 
                                                          
31
 The debate is on-going, as can be seen at 
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/HowShouldNICEAssessFutureCostsAndHe
althBenefits.jsp 
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reality.  That is, do people apply different discount rates when considering future health 
or physical risk outcomes compared to future financial outcomes?  If this can be 
resolved, it will add substance to one or other of the sides of the normative argument. 
Substantial empirical work has already been carried out to infer discount rates in 
different domains, with some emerging consensus but also with some emerging points 
of controversy.  The key evidence comparing discounting in health (and sometimes 
physical risk) and discounting in finance will be presented in the next Section (9.4.4) 
with the conclusion the domains engender different discounting behaviour, but that 
there is no clear signal that one domain is more highly discounted than another. 
5.4.4  Empirical evidence on discounting across domains 
As discussed, there is strong evidence to suggest that discount rates differ by domain 
(see Frederick et al. (2002) and Lawless et al. (2013)) and even within the health 
domain across specific health contexts (Ganiats et al., 2000).  Typically, environmental 
and financial discount rates are shown to be similar, with the conclusion that financial 
discount rates are reasonable proxies for environmental time preference (Hardisty and 
Weber, 2009).  However, the case for health is not so clear cut.  This may of course 
relate to the difficulty in transferring between health and money. 
Studies which appear to support the (admittedly controversial) theoretical prediction 
that health is likely to be discounted at a lower rate than money are not uncommon.  An 
early example is the Cairns (1992)  study which explicitly considers this issue.  
However, it is a small (n=27) pilot study based on students’ preferences and as such it 
cannot be assumed to be generalizable to the population. Alberini and Chiabai (2007a) 
conduct a much larger (n=801) and more representative study in Italy and find that the 
discount rate for fatality risk is significantly lower than for money.  However, given that 
their investigation involves fatality risks as opposed to health per se, it is not directly 
comparable to the health studies considered here.  Finally, Meerding et al. (2010) 
conducted a study aimed directly at comparing health and money discount rates.  They 
again find rates for health discounting that are lower than for finance, and in addition 
confirm the received wisdom that financial and environmental discounting behaviour is 
similar.  This lends further confidence in their conclusions.  However, the study 
exclusively considers a social decision frame as opposed to private discounting. 
As such, none of the presented studies provides robust evidence on the comparison 
between private discount rates over health compared to finance, although all of them 
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support that the health (or fatality risk) domain generates lower rates of time preference 
than financial.  However, there are two key studies by Lazaro (Lazaro et al., 2001; 
Lazaro et al., 2002) that contradict this finding. 
Both of these studies explicitly estimate health and financial discount rates and both 
find that health is discounted more than money.  The first of the studies is essentially a 
pilot on a student sample, which could of course be used to explain the apparently 
anomalous result, but it is replicated in the second which used a representative sample.  
The set up and design is careful, with EQ-5D descriptions of health and controls for 
private as compared to social frames.  The result is, nonetheless, surprising and cannot 
easily be explained. 
Given this mixed evidence, it is perhaps unsurprising that there are a variety of studies 
in which it is unclear which of health and financial discount rates are the highest.  Both 
Chapman (1996) and Khwaja et al. (2007) find that domain independence is violated in 
their studies, but neither clearly shows one domain generating higher discount rates than 
the other. 
As such, the evidence is clearly mixed about how the sign of the difference between 
time preference estimates in money and in health, but it appears to be true, empirically 
at least, that the two domains generate discount rates that differ from one another.  On 
this basis, and taking into account arguments from Cubitt and Read (2007) which 
caution against experimentally elicited financial discount rates being applied to real 
decisions, it is deemed necessary to elicit and examine preferences over health and 
physical risk, particularly when health outcomes such as cancer fatality are of interest to 
the researcher as is the case in this thesis. 
5.4.5  The functional form of the health discount rate 
Having concluded that discounting behaviour is likely to differ between domains, the 
question is then what functional form can be expected to apply in the case of health and 
physical risk discount rates.  Section 5.3.4 discussed the different discounting 
hypotheses in some detail, but the majority of the studies considered were developed 
with financial scenarios in mind and tested in experiments over financial outcomes.   
There is limited evidence regarding whether discounting in health is exponential, 
hyperbolic or sub-additive.  This may be because until the techniques for elicitation 
have been refined in finance, it might be considered overly ambitious to attempt to infer 
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this information in other domains.  Similarly, it might be because the methods for 
directly eliciting discounting in health are underdeveloped.  Nonetheless, the 
implications of different discounting functions for policy decisions are considerable (see 
Part IV for a discussion) and as such this thesis will not attempt to sidestep the issue as 
others have typically done. 
Two key studies that explicitly consider the functional form for discounting in health 
are Chapman (1996) and Khwaja et al. (2007).  Both studies find evidence for 
hyperbolic discounting.  Two further studies are of note in eliciting discount rates 
outside of the financial domain, but both are environmental in focus.  Each of the 
studies finds evidence in support of positive discounting of the environment but the 
discounting functional form conclusions are different.  Viscusi et al. (2008) find 
evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a stated preference study which considers 
water quality over time.  In contrast, Meyer (2013) finds no evidence to dismiss 
exponential discounting when the scenario is the clean-up of a lake.  The two studies are 
comparable in context, although the Meyer study is arguably more robust in controlling 
for potential confounds in the elicitation of the discount rate.  Nonetheless, it is an 
interesting and somewhat surprising result that such different conclusions have been 
drawn from studies in a similar area.  This cautions against placing a firm emphasis on 
the hyperbolic result in the two health studies considered above. 
This discussion has outlined the studies that elicit the functional form of discounting 
outside of finance.  Clearly no firm consensus has been found and further evidence 
would be valuable in this area.  Given the disparity of findings between studies and 
domains, there is a chance that the discount rate and functional form might differ even 
within an individual and within domains.  This suggests a gap in the researchers’ toolkit 
which needs to be filled with a method for eliciting information about discounting from 
survey responses to questions in the specific area of interest.  This motivates the Study 
2b in Chapter 7 which aims to demonstrate just such a method. 
5.5  The Confound of Risk and Time Preferences 
However, before time preference elicitation can be considered, it will be important to 
recognise an often neglected confound: the link between risk and time preferences.  A 
future outcome is inherently more risky than an outcome at the present, because of the 
probability of non-survival until the date at which the future outcome would occur and 
also because of the uncertainty about the existence or delivery of the outcome.  
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Intuitively, it is clear that this uncertainty could render the prospect of the latent 
outcome less valuable.  This has motivated substantial discussion in the financial 
literature, where methods have been developed to jointly elicit risk and time preferences 
(Andersen et al., 2008).  Andersen et al. note that this confound biases the estimate for 
time preference because the typical discounting elicitation procedures (for example the 
Coller and Williams (1999) technique) simply discount the money value, not the utility 
derived from the money value. Their method corrects for this by assuming a utility 
function for the money amount and applying the discount function to this utility.   An 
example of jointly estimated (financial) risk and time preferences applied to health 
behaviours is Ida and Goto (2009).  An alternative approach in the financial literature 
which controls for the risk and time preference confound is in the recent study by Laury 
et al. (2012) which elicits discount rates from risky outcomes thereby side-stepping the 
risk preference issue. 
Happily, in the method of discount rate elicitation used in Study 1 (Section 4.11) which 
will be used again in Chapter 7, the risk and time preference confound is not 
problematic.  This is because the discount rate is inferred from the relativities between 
(unspecified) VSL values.  These values already incorporate the effect of utility 
function curvature, and because no explicit value needs to be placed on the VSL or the 
VSLCAN in the elicitation of the discounting parameter, risk preferences are effectively 
dealt with in an implicit fashion.  As such, the elicited discount rates are free from the 
confound of risk preferences. 
However, this is not to say that risk preferences are irrelevant in the analysis of Risk-
Risk relativities.  In fact, quite the opposite is true.  The underlying VSL estimates 
depend on the rate of substitution between wealth and risk, and the Risk-Risk 
methodology- which was used in Study 1 and will be used again in Study 2b- employs 
risk increases as the currency for expressing preference.  As such, an understanding of 
risk preferences as they relate to health outcomes will be vital to the analysis presented 
here and also to VSL studies more broadly.  This is the focus of Section 6.1. 
There is debate as to whether risk preferences derived over financial outcomes are 
adequate proxies for health related risk preferences.  If so, then the use of financially 
derived risk aversion coefficients (see Section 6.2 in Chapter 6) is likely to suffice to 
control for the risk preference effect.  If not, then a reliable method for eliciting these 
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preferences needs to be developed.  This latter issue is the focus of Chapter 6, and as 
such will not be addressed here.  However, the former deserves some treatment. 
5.6  Financial and Health Risk Preferences? 
Risk preferences derived over financial lottery choices are commonly used in explaining 
behaviour in a variety of contexts, especially those that are intrinsically risky such as 
decisions over physical risk or intertemporal choice decisions.  However, there is little 
consensus over the relevance of risk preferences derived over financial decisions 
(hereafter ‘financial risk preferences’) to situations where the risk is related to health or 
to physical risk.  While it may be the case that preference for risk and its avoidance per 
se is similar across domains, there is no reason a priori to suppose that the underlying 
utility function displays the same concavity across domains.   
Empirical evidence regarding this domain dependence of risk preferences is mixed.  
Weber et al. (2002)  use stated risk attitudes and find low correlation between risk 
attitude across domains, while Einav et al. (2010) use insurance scenarios and find that 
domain-generality is present, to varying extents.  Anderson and Mellor (2008) compare 
experimentally-elicited financial risk aversion coefficients with risky behaviours like 
smoking and drinking to excess, and find significant correlation.  The confusion is 
compounded in Soane and Chmiel (2005) who take a psychological perspective and 
find that the degree of domain dependence of risk preference actually varies between 
people , such that while some individuals display a high degree of consistency in risk 
attitudes, others display large variation.  In summary, the evidence is mixed.  This may, 
in part, be due to the heterogeneity in the ways that health risk aversion is defined in 
these studies, be it stated risk attitude, risk attitude inferred from behaviours like 
smoking, or psychological definitions of risk attitude. 
Contrast to this the financial domain.  The seminal work of Holt and Laury (2002) has 
given economists a tool for eliciting financial risk aversion (specifically the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion (CRRA)) through a simple experimental procedure.  By 
contrast, the standard approach of researchers wishing to control for risk aversion in 
health typically use stated risky behaviours such as seatbelt non-use or smoking.  This is 
validated by the finding in Anderson and Mellor (2008) that the correlation between 
these and other risk preference measures is high, but nonetheless these behavioural 
measures are not as informative nor as comparable as the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) in financial decisions.   
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However, attempts to measure risk aversion more thoroughly in the domains of health 
and physical risk have been relatively few, and in these attempts only minimal attention 
has been paid to understanding what exactly is being captured or measured.  This is a 
clear gap in the literature.  The analysis in Chapter 6 addresses these issues first by 
formalising the theoretical framework for considering risk aversion in the domain of 
health, then by developing a method, firmly grounded in utility theory, for eliciting a 
proxy for risk aversion in health. 
5.7  Summary 
This review has considered time preference in general terms and in the domain of 
health.  Different discounting assumptions were considered, and the lack of consensus 
was highlighted on two fronts.  First, whether health and financial discount rates are 
good proxies for one another, and second what the likely functional form for 
discounting in the domain of physical risks might be. On this basis, there is a 
considerable role for developing a methodology to reliably elicit discount rates from 
choices related to physical risk. 
The elicitation of time preferences is closely linked to risk and risk preference, and as 
such the review turned to consider risk preferences in health.  Relatively little work to 
date has explored the elicitation of coefficients of risk aversion in the domain of health 
and this was highlighted as an area ripe for further exploration. 
Study 2 will address both of these issues.  Chapter 6 will report Study 2a which 
considers the health risk aversion issue and Chapter 7 will report Study 2b which 
considers the time preference issue.  Both Study 2a and Study 2b are based on the same 
survey, however.  The methodology is presented in the next Sections. 
5.8  Methodology for Study 2 
The protocol for Study 2 closely follows that of Study 1, which was reported in detail in 
Section 3.2 in Part II.  The preliminary learning rounds are identical, and the reader is 
directed to the discussion in Section 3.2.6 for details.  The R-R survey follows the same 
structure as for Study 1, with the elicitation mechanism and explanations unchanged.  
Q1-3 are identical in studies 1 and 2.  However, the scenarios in Q4-9 are slightly 
different.  The supplementary questions are the same as in Study 1.  It should be noted 
that while the R-R questions are outlined here, their analysis will not be conducted until 
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Chapter 7, because Chapter 6 deals with the preliminary issue of eliciting risk 
preferences in the domain of health. 
5.8.1  Risk-Risk (R-R) Questions 
All ten questions compare cancer risks (with one year of morbidity prior to fatality) 
with road accident risks.  Question 10 replicates a “context” question from Study 1, in 
that both fatalities would be ten years from now.  Questions 1-9 all compare a latent 
cancer risks with road accident risks sooner.  The range of timing and questions is 
provided in Table 5.1. 
 
The questions are designed to elicit preferences over a range of delays from the present 
to the time of the risk, and latency intervals between the cancer and road accident risks.  
This will allow sub-additive and hyperbolic discounting to be considered. 
Subsequent to the ten R-R trade questions respondents were asked to make a series of 
additional choices.  These allowed the elicitation of risk and time preferences in the 
domains of health and physical risk.   
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Latency differentials and delays 
Question Code 
 
Cancer 
 
Roads 
Latency 
differential 
(years) 
Average 
Delay 
(years) 
1 C10R1 10 1 9 5.5 
2 C10R2 10 2 8 6 
3 C25R2 25 2 23 13.5 
4 C5R2 5 2 3 3.5 
5 C7R2 7 2 5 4.5 
6 C15R2 15 2 13 8.5 
7 C10R5 10 5 5 7.5 
8 C10R7 10 7 3 8.5 
9 C25R10 25 10 15 17.5 
10 C10R10 10 10 0 10 
 
153 
 
5.8.2  Financial risk preference elicitation 
The first set of choices implemented a financial Holt and Laury (H-L) style experiment 
where respondents chose between lotteries with changing probabilities of the good 
outcome.  The decision table is presented in Table 5.2.   
 
The money amounts stay the same down the table but differ between the choices A and 
B.  Option A represents the ‘safe’ lottery because the spread between the prizes is low.   
Option B presents the ‘risky’ lottery because the spread is much higher- there is a 
chance of a very high payoff (£12) but also a chance of a very low payoff (£1).  The 
probability of “winning” increases down the table, making the ‘risky’ option B more 
attractive.  See Chapter 6 for more detail about the utility theory underpinning the HL 
elicitation procedure.  The payoffs were deliberately hypothetical to facilitate 
comparison with the health related risk aversion coefficients, which were necessarily 
hypothetical. 
Table 5.2: Holt-Laury style financial lottery comparisons 
Decision 
number A  B 
Your 
choice 
1 
10% chance of £6 
90% chance of £5 
OR 
10% chance of £12 
90% chance of £1 
 
2 
20% chance of £6 
80% chance of £5 
OR 20% chance of £12 
80% chance of £1 
 
3 
30% chance of £6 
70% chance of £5 
OR 30% chance of £12 
70% chance of £1 
 
4 
40% chance of £6 
60% chance of £5 
OR 40% chance of £12 
60% chance of £1 
 
5 
50% chance of £6 
50% chance of £5 
OR 50% chance of £12 
50% chance of £1 
 
6 
60% chance of £6 
40% chance of £5 
OR 60% chance of £12 
40% chance of £1 
 
7 
70% chance of £6 
30% chance of £5 
OR 70% chance of £12 
30% chance of £1 
 
8 
80% chance of £6 
20% chance of £5 
OR 80% chance of £12 
20% chance of £1 
 
9 
90% chance of £6 
10% chance of £5 
OR 90% chance of £12 
10% chance of £1 
 
10 
100% chance of £6 
 
OR 100% chance of £12 
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5.8.3  Health risk preference elicitation 
Respondents also completed a variation of the H-L procedure adapted for health states.  
This is a novel empirical device developed in this thesis.  Its explanation and description 
are the focus of Chapter 6 and as such the procedure will not be described here. 
5.8.4  Financial time preference elicitation 
The penultimate task consisted of “larger later or smaller sooner” choices between 
financial outcomes in order to generate financial time preference parameters.  The 
methodology is based on the work of Coller and Williams (1999) which is widely 
applied in the literature, for example by Andersen et al. (2008).   Respondents filled in a 
decision table as shown in Table 5.3, choosing (hypothetically) between £350 to be 
received in one month’s time and some larger amount to be received in seven months’ 
time.   
The 1 month delay is included before the earlier outcome would be received.  This front 
end delay (FED) avoids the potentially confounding influence of an immediate 
outcome, because preference for this might reflect reduced transaction costs as opposed 
to pure time preference, and may artificially inflate the perceived discount rate over the 
very short term.  In addition, given that one year is the shortest delay for a risk outcome 
in the main questions, it was decided to avoid having immediacy in the financial time 
preference questions in order to maximise the comparability of the discount rates 
elicited in finance and in the domain of physical risks. 
The choices were hypothetical, mirroring the main questions and the risk preference 
questions.  Frederick et al (2002) summarise this issue and conclude that there is no 
strong evidence base to suggest that hypothetical and real outcomes are discounted 
differently.  However, a second and possibly more fundamental criticism of the 
elicitation of discount rates from these sorts of questions is addressed by Krupka and 
Stephens (2013).  They reference an earlier debate ((Fuchs, 1982); (Loewenstein, 1987); 
(Pender, 1996)) about whether the responses to these questions reveal personal discount 
rates, or whether they simply reflect market interest rates faced by respondents.  If 
respondents have access to perfect capital markets, in theory they can use these markets 
in such a way as to arbitrage the choices presented to them.  Krupka and Stephens 
(2013) test this idea and find that the results are significantly related to the degree of 
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access to capital markets, concluding that the elicited discount rates capture more than 
simply personal time preference rates.   
 
However, given that the main questions relate to fatality risk in which arbitrage is not a 
possibility, and given that the “smaller-sooner or larger-later” methodology is the 
prevalent method in the literature for estimating time preference, it was used in spite of 
the potential problems discussed.  The problems provide further motivation for eliciting 
domain-specific discount rates from survey data.  This is conducted in Chapter 7. 
5.8.5  Final procedures 
The final task was to complete a questionnaire about standard personal demographics as 
well as basic questions to elicit familiarity of cancer and road accidents (specifically 
whether the respondent or a close friend had experienced cancer or a serious road 
Table 5.3:   Time preference elicitation 
Decision 
number 
Option A 
Sooner:  Receive the 
money 1 month from 
today 
Option B 
Later: Receive the 
money 7 months 
from today 
Your 
choice 
 
1 £350 sooner £354 later  
2 £350 sooner £359 later  
3 £350 sooner £363 later  
4 £350 sooner £368 later  
5 £350 sooner £372 later  
6 £350 sooner £377 later  
7 £350 sooner £381 later  
8 £350 sooner £386 later  
9 £350 sooner £390 later  
10 £350 sooner £395 later  
11 £350 sooner £404 later  
12 £350 sooner £414 later  
13 £350 sooner £423 later  
14 £350 sooner £433 later  
15 £350 sooner £443 later  
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accident).  These will be used to explain the observed preferences where appropriate 
through the analysis. 
5.8.6  Implementation 
Implementation procedures follow those in Study 1 reported in Part II. 
5.8.7  Sample statistics 
The sample size is 112, and all respondents are aged between 18 and 25, enrolled as 
undergraduate and postgraduate students at Newcastle University in the UK.  The 
demographics for this sample are provided in Table 5.4.  Given the demographic 
differences between this group and the older sample from Study 1, the insights from this 
Part will not necessarily generalise to the overall population.  However, this Study 
provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions with respect to the 
elicitation of risk and time preferences, and acts as a pilot for further investigation using 
a more representative sample.   
 
Table 5.4: Sample statistics 
Variable Average 
Gender (% female) 
 
44.5% 
Age (mean (s. dev.)) 20.72 
(1.82) 
Household size (mean (s. dev.)) 4.41 
(1.74) 
Rental  (% rent) 
 
75.2% 
Personal income (monthly mean (s. dev.)) £616.76 
(495.96) 
Household income (monthly mean (s. dev.)) £3234.31 
(2844.58) 
Cancer personal experience (%) 
 
69.4% 
Road accident experience (%) 
 
48.2% 
 
Self-reported car accident risk 1.04 
(1.09) 
Self-reported health status 1.48 
(0.57) 
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The sample has a mean age of almost 21 as would be expected for a sample dominated 
by undergraduates.  Unsurprisingly, personal income is low and the proportion renting 
is high.  However, household income is high at £3000 per month which is likely to 
reflect high parental incomes.  Females are underrepresented compared to the general 
population, at 45%.  In terms of characteristics likely to relate to the preference for 
cancer and road accident risk avoidance, experience of cancer and road accidents is 
similar to that reported in Study 1 (69% and 48% in Study 2 compared to 75% and 64% 
for Study 1).  Respondents tended to report “better than average” health, and “lower 
than average” car accident risks, although the variance in the latter is high.  
5.8.8  Summary 
This Section has set out the methodology for Study 2, focusing on the way that it differs 
from Study 1 and presenting the main methods for the elicitation of risk and time 
preferences in finance, because these will be key comparators to the risk and time 
preferences to be elicited over health in the coming Chapters.  Study 2 will be analysed 
in two ways.  Chapter 6 will refer to Study 2a, which will consider the implications for 
risk preference.  Chapter 7, which reports Study 2b, will use the insights from Study 2a 
and generate time preference estimates and functional form inferences. 
 
158 
 
CHAPTER 6.  Towards a Measure of Risk Preference in Health 
 
6.1  Introduction and Motivation 
Estimating the absolute or relative value of statistical life is inextricably linked to the 
concepts of risk and risk attitude because, as defined in Chapter 2 on pg.20, the VSL is 
estimated by aggregating willingness to pay for marginal changes in fatality risk.   
There are two channels through which risk preference can be expected to influence the 
VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  These effects work in opposing directions, and so their 
combined influence is essentially an empirical question. 
Firstly, considering the Risk-Risk methodology set out in Chapter 3 (pg.56), high levels 
of risk aversion will tend to reduce the overall level of risk that is acceptable to a 
respondent, which is likely to reduce the observed relativity from risk-risk trade-offs 
through this ‘size of overall risk’ channel. 
Additionally, any latent outcome is inherently risky (see Gafni and Torrance (1984)) 
and as such, higher levels of risk aversion will, increase aversion to a more delayed 
outcome through this second ‘latency of risk’ channel.  In the empirical work in Study 
2, reported in this Part of the thesis, the delayed outcome is always cancer
32
.  This 
means that higher levels of risk aversion would tend to increase the overall 
VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  Given that this Part of the thesis is intended to explore the 
effects of latency on the VSL for cancer, understanding and controlling for this risk 
preference effect assumes additional importance. 
So, this Chapter takes as its starting point this observation that risk preferences are 
likely to influence the relativities elicited and reported in Studies 1 and 2, but the 
direction of this effect is ambiguous because of the offsetting ‘size of overall risk’ and 
‘latency of risk’ channels through which risk aversion can be expected to influence the 
VSLCAN:VSL relativities reported in the R-R framework.   Typically, researchers 
control for risk preference effects using measures of risk aversion defined over financial 
outcomes.  However, it was discussed in the literature review that this might not be the 
most appropriate approach to take, because risk preferences in different domains have 
been shown to vary.  As such, a measure of risk aversion defined over health outcomes 
                                                          
32
 The exception is Q10 where the fatality would occur at the same time. 
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might be better suited to explain the role of risk preferences in generating the 
VSLCAN:VSL  relativity. 
The elicitation of risk preferences over finance is well established.  The seminal work of 
Pratt (1964) and of Arrow (1971) formalised the framework for thinking about risk 
aversion in terms of a single parameter (the coefficient of relative risk aversion, CRRA) 
and the work of Holt and Laury (2002) is still dominant amongst methods of eliciting 
this parameter in experimental settings.  However, the elicitation of risk preferences in 
health is less well established.  Harrison et al. (2005) provide a systematic review of 
existing options for controlling for risk preferences using the literature from psychology 
and medical decision making.  These options mostly consist of self-rating on Likert 
scales and as such are not grounded in economic choice theory.  To fill this gap, the 
requirements for reliably estimating health risk aversion are twofold:  initially, to lay 
out the theoretical underpinnings; then to establish a framework for the empirical 
estimation.  This Chapter addresses both the theoretical and empirical concerns. 
The structure of this Chapter is first to set out the existing theoretical framework which 
underpins the standard Holt-Laury (HL) elicitation procedure for risk aversion in the 
financial domain.  The aim of the present chapter is then to adapt this framework to 
consider the utility over health instead of the utility over financial outcomes.  This new 
framework formalises the basis of a novel elicitation procedure in which the Holt-Laury 
empirical procedure is also adapted for the health domain.  From this basis, preliminary 
empirical estimates for health risk aversion are generated using the question as 
described on pg.167.  These values will be taken forward to Chapter 7 and used as 
explanatory variables in explaining both discounting behaviour and the overall Risk-
Risk relativities in Study 2b. 
In this Chapter, the new contributions to knowledge are: 
1) The adaptation of the utility theory underpinning Holt-Laury risk aversion 
elicitation to the domain of health. 
2) The adaptation of the Holt-Laury empirical estimation procedure to allow the 
elicitation of health risk aversion. 
3) Preliminary evidence about the values of the health risk aversion coefficients. 
The insights generated are therefore relevant to this thesis, but also to VSL research 
more generally.  The theoretical and methodological developments presented have the 
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potential to benefit a wide range of future work including, but not limited to, VSL 
elicitation and health valuation exercises. 
6.2  Theory Underlying the Elicitation of Risk Preferences for Financial Outcomes 
6.2.1  Utility of wealth 
As a baseline case, consider the risk aversion over financial outcomes.  Individual utility 
functions (under the assumptions of Expected Utility Theory
33
) incorporate risk 
preference.  Typically this is assumed to be risk aversion, and so the utility function is 
assumed to be increasing and concave as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 6.2.2  Certainty equivalence levels of wealth 
Under Expected Utility Theory, concavity of the utility function implies risk aversion 
because it implies that an amount, x, to be received for certain gives higher utility than 
the expected utility of a gamble with expected value equal to x.  Similarly, a risk averse 
individual will be indifferent between a gamble with expected value y and some 
amount, to be received for certain, and which is less than y.  This amount is referred to 
as the ‘certainty equivalent’ level of wealth (wCE).  Consider a highly risk-averse 
individual: the level of wCE will be lower than for the average person, because they 
receive less expected utility from a gamble, due to their aversion to risk.  Conversely, an 
individual who is only slightly risk averse will have a value for wCE that is only slightly 
                                                          
33
  Justification for using the EUT assumption in this thesis despite its limitations was 
provided in Section 2.2 
Figure 6.1: Utility of wealth incorporating risk aversion 
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below the expected value of the gamble. The certainty equivalent level of wealth can 
therefore be interpreted as an inverse measure of risk aversion.    
 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the concept of the certainty equivalent level of wealth for a risk 
averse individual considering 50:50 gamble between receiving amount wL and amount 
wH.  The gamble has an expected value (EV) which is the midpoint between wL and wH, 
but the gamble generates a lower expected utility (EU) than the utility of the expected 
value (U(EV)), because of the individual’s aversion to risk.  Reading across from the 
EU allows the specific level of wealth wCE to be established, i.e. the level of wealth 
which when received with certainty leaves the individual just indifferent between taking 
it and taking the gamble. 
6.2.3  The Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion 
Risk aversion is captured by the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (Pratt (1964) 
andArrow (1971)).  The formula is: 
      
       
     
        (59) 
Given a utility of wealth function such as 
      
    
     
         (60) 
the Pratt-Arrow CRRA defined in equation (59) simplifies to  .  This specific form of 
the utility of wealth function rests on a simplifying assumption, used here for analytical 
Figure 6.2:  Demonstrating risk aversion over finance: 50:50 chance of receiving wL and wH 
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tractability.  The analysis could be repeated for different utility of wealth functions but 
the interpretation of the risk aversion coefficient is less straightforward. 
6.2.4  Holt-Laury risk preference elicitation 
The Holt-Laury procedure (Holt and Laury, 2002) has become the established method 
for eliciting individuals’ degrees of risk aversion.  It was used in Study 1 (reported in 
Part II) to elicit financial risk aversion measures for inclusion in the regression analyses 
in Sections 4.3 to 4.9.  The procedure for capturing the parameter   is to elicit the 
indifference point in a list of binary lottery choices where the outcomes are constant but 
the probability of receiving the outcomes changes.  In this Study, the outcomes were £5 
and £6 for the safe option, option A; and £1 and £12 for the risky option, option B.  
Respondents filled in the table as shown in Table 6.1, which was introduced as Table 
5.2 on pg.153. 
 
Table 6.1: Holt-Laury style financial lottery comparisons 
Decision 
number A  B 
Your 
choice 
Minimum 𝛼 
if switch in 
this row 
1 
10% chance of £6 
90% chance of £5 
OR 
10% chance of £12 
90% chance of £1 
 No 
minimum 
2 
20% chance of £6 
80% chance of £5 
OR 20% chance of £12 
80% chance of £1 
 -1.69 
3 
30% chance of £6 
70% chance of £5 
OR 30% chance of £12 
70% chance of £1 
 -0.88 
4 
40% chance of £6 
60% chance of £5 
OR 40% chance of £12 
60% chance of £1 
 -0.38 
5 
50% chance of £6 
50% chance of £5 
OR 50% chance of £12 
50% chance of £1 
 0 
6 
60% chance of £6 
40% chance of £5 
OR 60% chance of £12 
40% chance of £1 
 0.34 
7 
70% chance of £6 
30% chance of £5 
OR 70% chance of £12 
30% chance of £1 
 0.67 
8 
80% chance of £6 
20% chance of £5 
OR 80% chance of £12 
20% chance of £1 
 1.01 
9 
90% chance of £6 
10% chance of £5 
OR 90% chance of £12 
10% chance of £1 
 1.40 
10 
100% chance of £6 
 
OR 100% chance of £12 
 
 1.96 
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The switch-point, which is the first row in which the probability of winning is enough 
that the respondent is willing to take the risky option, gives a lower bound on the risk 
aversion coefficient.  This is because, assuming that an individual is acting to maximise 
her expected utility, she can have a risk aversion coefficient no greater than    to have 
taken the risky gamble in that row.  The lower bound coefficient for each row is given 
in the righthand column in Table 6.1 for reference, but of course this column was 
omitted from the response sheets that the respondents received.  A diagrammatic 
representation of indifference for a respondent with       is given in Figure 6.3.  
6.2.5 The utility maximisation problem in the Holt-Laury procedure 
Figure 6.3 is equivalent to Figure 6.2, except that the respondent in question is 
simultaneously considering two gambles, a “risky” gamble between 1 and 12, and a 
“safe” gamble between 5 and 6.  At the point marked, the respondent is indifferent 
between the two because the expected utility is the same for both gambles, at 2.35. 
The utility maximisation problem is given in equation (61).  The respondent is 
indifferent between options A and B where 
                                     (61) 
That is, where  
                                            (62) 
5 6 
EVA 
=5.55 
Utility 
Wealth 1 12 
EVB 
=7.04 
 
EU 
=2.35 
  
Figure 6.3:  Indifference between options A and B in the Holt-Laury style financial lottery 
table for an individual with 𝛼     . 
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As such, there is a unique value of   for every row of the table, with its corresponding 
value for   such that the individual is indifferent in that row. 
She will choose the safe option A as long as  
                                            (63) 
6.3  A Note on Types of Risk Aversion 
Two types of risk aversion are identified in Robinson et al (2001).  As originally 
suggested by Dyer and Sarin (1982), lottery choices indicating aversion to risk are 
likely to be reflecting two separate effects, firstly diminishing marginal utility of wealth 
(which is reflected in the concavity of the utility function) and secondly aversion to 
gambles per se (which would give added reason to choose the safe option instead of the 
risky one).  As argued by Dyer and Sarin (1982) and neatly summarised in Bleichrodt 
(2002) and in Robinson et al. (2001), where values are elicited under conditions of 
certainty, the implied value function      reflects the diminishing marginal return on the 
good being valued (for example, an individual’s valuation of six apples is likely to be 
less than 120% of their valuation of 5 apples, purely as a result of diminishing marginal 
utility in apples).  The utility function      on the other hand, by definition reflects the 
utility gained from outcomes under conditions of uncertainty.  It will, therefore, 
incorporate not only diminishing marginal utility but also aversion to gambles.  This is 
an important distinction that will be of relevance later in this analysis.  HL risk aversion 
elicitation (Holt and Laury, 2002) generates coefficients under uncertainty, so 
encapsulates the full definition of risk aversion. 
6.4  Health State Risk Aversion  
So far, this analysis has set out the existing framework, which is designed to elicit 
financial risk aversion.  However, as discussed in the literature review (Section 5.6), 
there is evidence to suggest that risk aversion differs across domains.  That is, the 
inclusion of measures of financial risk aversion may be inappropriate when the effect 
under consideration is the risk aversion over health states.   
The aim of this Chapter is to provide an alternative measure of risk aversion defined 
over health states.  This requires two things: firstly to formalise the translation of the 
financial utility framework into a framework for utility over health (which is carried out 
in this Chapter and presented in Section 6.4.1) and then to develop the elicitation 
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procedure to capture health risk aversion.  The approach taken is to adapt the HL 
elicitation procedure described above on pg.153, substituting health states instead of 
monetary amounts.  The theory and practice is outlined in the coming Sections.  
6.4.1  Utility over health states 
As described on pg.162, the elicitation procedure developed by Holt and Laury for 
eliciting financial risk aversion is underpinned by a utility over wealth function as 
displayed in Figure 6.3.  To convert this to the health domain, it necessary to assume 
that utility can be defined directly over health.  This is not the first analysis that allows 
health to enter directly as an argument in the utility function, for example see Torrance 
et al. (1996), although it contrasts with the common convention of applying health to 
the utility framework either as a ‘lump sum’ change in utility (i.e. a parallel shift of the 
utility over wealth function) or as a parameter altering the marginal utility of wealth (i.e. 
altering the slope of the utility of wealth function).   
The underlying assumption is that it is conceivable to have a ratio scale upon which to 
measure health (i.e. a cardinal scale with a set zero), and that utility over health is 
monotonically increasing in the health level.  As with the utility of wealth function, the 
utility of health function is assumed to be smooth and continuously differentiable. 
6.4.2  Health risk aversion coefficient 
Figure 6.4 replicates Figure 6.2, except that the x axis measures the level of health as 
opposed to wealth. From this point, just as for the financial gambles, assuming some 
underlying risk aversion coefficient in the utility of health function, and given the 
degree of risk aversion, an individual will be indifferent between some health state hCE a 
lottery between two health states hG and hL with expected value- insofar as this is 
meaningful in the domain of health- greater than the level of health hCE.   
For simplicity, and in the absence of any better indication, the same functional form is 
assumed to hold for utility of health as for the utility of wealth function, but for clarity 
the coefficient of health risk aversion is labelled  . 
      
      
     
         (64) 
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Given these assumptions, two pairs of health states can be used instead of two pairs of 
money amounts and in all other respects the setup is identical to that underpinning the 
financial Holt-Laury trades.  
6.4.3  Holt-Laury risk preference elicitation in health  
Examples of health lotteries are presented in Table 6.2.   For now, it is sufficient to 
assume that h1 is unambiguously worse than h2, which in turn is worse than h3 and then 
h4.  As in the financial case, even the most risk averse of individuals would be expected 
to choose the ‘risky’ option in row 10, because it is guaranteed to give them the minor 
illness h4.  The further down the table a respondent goes without switching, the lower 
the risk of the severe illness h1 has to be before the respondent will take the chance of 
getting only h4.  As such, the interpretation that the individual will switch later down the 
table the more risk averse she is holds just as well intuitively for the health scenarios as 
for the financial scenarios. 
 
Low 
health 
state hL 
Expected 
health 
level 
hCE 
U(hL) 
U(h
G
) 
U(EV) 
EU 
Utility 
Health Good 
health 
state hG 
Figure 6.4:  Demonstrating risk aversion over health 
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6.4.4  The utility maximisation problem in the Holt-Laury procedure for health states 
The interpretation of Figure 6.5 is identical to that for Figure 6.3.  The individual is 
considering a risky gamble (between h1 and h4) and a safe gamble (between h2 and h3).  
The situation depicted in Figure 6.5 implies that the probabilities of success are such 
that the individual is indifferent between the safe and risky options, because the 
expected utility is the same in both cases. 
 
Decision 
number A  B Your choice 
1 
10% chance of h3 
90% chance of h2 
OR 
10% chance of  h4  
90% chance of h1 
 
2 
20% chance of   h3 
80% chance of   h2 
OR 20% chance of  h4 
80% chance of   h1 
 
3 
30% chance of   h3 
70% chance of   h2 
OR 30% chance of  h4 
70% chance of   h1 
 
4 
40% chance of   h3 
60% chance of   h2 
OR 40% chance of   h4 
60% chance of   h1 
 
5 
50% chance of   h3 
50% chance of   h2 
OR 50% chance of   h4 
50% chance of   h1 
 
6 
60% chance of   h3 
40% chance of   h2 
OR 60% chance of   h4 
40% chance of   h1 
 
7 
70% chance of   h3 
30% chance of   h2 
OR 70% chance of   h4 
30% chance of   h1 
 
8 
80% chance of   h3 
20% chance of   h2 
OR 80% chance of   h4 
20% chance of   h1 
 
9 
90% chance of   h3 
10% chance of   h2 
OR 90% chance of   h4 
10% chance of   h1 
 
10 
100% chance of   h3 OR 100% chance of   h4 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Holt-Laury style health lottery comparisons 
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The utility maximisation problem is given in equation (65).  This mirrors equation (61) 
on pg.163, except that the outcomes are health which enters directly into the utility 
function.  The respondent is indifferent between options A and B where  
                                       (65) 
That is, where  
    
             
         
             
     
   (66) 
As such, there is a unique value of   for every row of the table, with its corresponding 
value for   such that the individual is indifferent in that row. 
She will choose the safe option A as long as  
    
             
         
             
     
   (67) 
To summarise, the utility theoretic underpinnings of the financial Holt-Laury procedure 
have been shown to translate well into the health domain, if the researcher is willing to 
accept that utility can be defined directly over health states, and that a similar utility 
function is appropriate in health as in finance.  In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, this analysis will proceed under the assumptions and use this as a basis for 
setting up a framework for eliciting risk aversion over health states. 
Utility 
Health h1 
EU 
  
h2 
safe 
risky 
h
3
 h
4
 
Figure 6.5:  Indifference between risky and safe options in the Holt-Laury style health 
lottery table 
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6.5  Implementation: Communicating Health States (h) 
Moving from the abstract framework set out in the Sections above to implementation in 
practice is not straightforward.  This is because interpretation of the switch points will 
differ depending on which measure of health is used as an input.  To clarify, recall that 
the measure of health ideally has to be comparable with the money amounts to be 
entered into the financial calculations.  That is, they have to be objective amounts that 
reflect the intrinsic amount of health in each scenario measurable on a ratio scale (i.e. a 
cardinal scale with a clear origin).  This metric does not appear to exist in any well-
defined way at present.  Put simply, there is no obvious health-state equivalent of £5.50.  
There is significant debate in the health economics literature about what is meant by 
‘health’, and the concept of a health measure that does not incorporate subjective 
valuation could be difficult to crystallise, and as such it will be necessary at least at 
present to work with some existing proxy for increasing health severity.   
The author can conceive of three potential alternative ways to communicate increasing 
health increments, although each comes with its own caveats and problems.  These are 
to use the Person Trade-Off (PTO) approach, the Time Spent Ill (TSI) approach, or the 
EQ-5D descriptors.  See Appendix C for examples of how each could be implemented 
in practice in the Holt and Laury framework.  The choice of input health measure is 
subjective, and the method outlined in the preceding Section would be tractable for any 
of the three.  However, the researcher opting to use one of these alternative approaches 
must recognise the costs that they are incurring in the interpretation of the outcomes. 
6.5.1  Health state descriptions 
Person Trade Off (PTO) uses the number of people to be affected by the illness as the 
measure of the severity of the health problem, so that more people would be affected in 
h1 than in h2, h3 and h4.  This is a measure of objectively increasing severity, but 
because the respondents are required to consider people other than themselves, there is a 
chance that elements of altruism or warm glow might be influencing responses.  Time 
Spent Ill (TSI) sidesteps this problem because h1 – h4 would now describe how long 
they would be ill, and as such the scenario relates only to the individual.  However, the 
decision would be subject to the influence of time preference.  For example, an 
individual who discounts at a high rate might not perceive the prospect of 20 days of 
illness as twice as bad as ten days of illness, because the additional ten days would be 
subject to discounting.  For this individual, the spread in the risky scenario would 
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effectively be less wide than the researcher assumes, and as such the person’s risk 
aversion would likely be underestimated
34
.  Finally, even without these problems, in 
both cases the health measure, and the resulting coefficient of risk aversion, would be 
specific to the illness described with no way of knowing whether the insights would 
generalize.   For these reasons, both PTO and TSI are disregarded as tools for 
communicating the concept of a scale of health outcomes.   
Instead, the EQ-5D-5L system is used, because it is well established in the literature, 
will generalise across health states, and allows a direct and unambiguously increasing 
level of health state severity.  Of course, this measure is not without flaws, and these are 
discussed in Section 6.7.1 (pg.173).  However, it is chosen as the most appropriate 
option currently available in the absence of a direct measure of health, h. 
6.5.2  EQ-5D 
The EQ-5D framework was developed in order to generate a measure of health 
outcomes that will generalise over different illnesses and life expectancies, to facilitate 
comparison of health interventions.  The basic premise is to combine a health-state 
utility score with the length of time to be spent ill, which provides a ‘healthy years 
equivalent’ value for the health outcome.  This unit of measurement is called a Quality 
Adjusted Life Year, or QALY.  For example, if treatment for a lung complaint was 
estimated to give a quality of life that was 50% of full health, and would last for two 
years, it would have a QALY score of 1.  This would be judged equivalent to an 
intervention giving five years of life expectancy but with a quality of life that was 20% 
of full health. 
For the purposes of this methodology, it is the measure of quality of life or severity that 
is of interest. The EQ-5D-5L
35
 system allows a generic description of any illness in 
terms of a profile in which the illness receives a score from 1 (no problems) to 5 
(extreme problems) on each of five general attributes of illness (mobility, ability to 
perform self-care, ability to carry out usual activities, pain and suffering, and anxiety 
and depression).  As such, it is possible to describe illnesses in a generic, 
                                                          
34
 Consider an individual who, if discount rates were zero, would switch when the 
probabilities were 50:50.  This implies 0.5U(6days)+0.5U(8 days) ≈ 0.5U(2 
days)+0.5U(20 days).  If, with time preference, 20 days were reduced to the equivalent 
of just 17 days in utility terms, then 0.5U(6days)+0.5U(8 days) < 0.5U(2 days)+0.5U(20 
days discounted), and so the respondent would switch further up the table. 
35
 The 5L refers to the 5 levels of severity on which each attribute can place.  This 
method is more detailed than its alternative (EQ-5D-3L). 
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unambiguously increasing or decreasing sequence of severity.  The respondent is 
therefore directly comparing severity of health states and, given their assessment of the 
severity of the health states, engaging in a Holt-Laury procedure that most directly 
matches the theoretical framework described in Figure 6.5. 
As such, the procedure directly and unambiguously matches the Holt-Laury procedure 
in so far as the respondent’s answers to the questions, and in terms of the way that the 
respondent compares the alternatives.  It is, in this respect, a very clean basis for 
comparison of risk preferences across domains. 
6.6  Estimates of the EQ-5D-described Health States 
In the preceding Section, the generic EQ-5D illness descriptions were chosen as the 
method for communicating the health states h1 to h4, although as discussed the 
framework would support other measures of health state if necessary.  The next task is 
to decide what values are appropriate to substitute in for these health states in the 
analysis.  Recalling the financial Holt-Laury, it was simply a case of inputting the 
money amounts (£1, £5, £6, £12, see pg.162) directly to the utility maximisation 
equation and to solve on an individual or sample level.  However, it is not possible to 
simply substitute the EQ-5D descriptions into the maximisation problem, because they 
are qualitative and descriptive. 
Efforts to establish values for the EQ-5D descriptions have generated a number of 
methodological options, two of which are considered here.  These are the Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) approach, where respondents rate their perceptions of the 
severity of the health state described to them on a simple sliding scale; and Time-Trade-
Off (TTO) or Standard Gamble (SG) approaches which use more complex choice tasks 
to evaluate the severity of the health problem.  Typically, the (VAS) approach has been 
used in conjunction with TTO or SG elicitation procedures. See Carthy et al. (1999) for 
a full description and see Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997), Robinson et al. (2001), 
Bleichrodt (2002) and others for a comparison of the VAS, SG and TTO methods in 
evaluating the EQ-5D scores.   
The options considered here are personalised VAS scores elicited for individuals 
participating in this Study; and the most comprehensive ‘off the shelf’ set of population 
utility scores derived using TTO methods by the EuroQol group (Dolan et al., 1996).  
These options are explained and evaluated in the next Sections. 
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6.6.1  Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
The VAS method involves respondents being presented with a line either on a computer 
screen or on paper.  This line has two anchor points:  full (or sometimes normal) health 
and “as bad as death”.  The respondent then marks on the scale where they think the 
health state described by the EQ-5D description would place them.  The proportional 
distance from full health indicates the proportional loss from full or normal health as 
perceived by the individual.  The health state is described with certainty, and as such the 
response can be considered to show the value (    ) of the health state.  See Section 6.3 
on pg.164 for a discussion about the difference between utility values      and values 
    . 
6.6.2  EuroQol Utility Scores 
In 2013, EuroQol published a country-specific set of utility scores for EQ-5D profiles.  
The utility scores are derived using a time trade-off (TTO) approach (Dolan et al., 
1996).  The TTO approach relates the quality of life to the specified remaining life 
expectancy in a linear fashion.  Respondents are asked to consider problems of the 
form: 
“Imagine you have ten years left to live in health state A (described using the 
EQ-5D scale).  How much time alive in full health, followed by death, would 
you consider to be about as bad as living for ten years in health state A?” 
This simplifies to a comparison between 10 years in health state A and x years in full 
health.  The respondent specifies a level of x (number of years) and this is interpreted 
very simply as follows:  x/10 is the proportional quality of life, compared to full health, 
in which health state A would place the respondent.  A person in health state A is 
typically described as having a utility level x/10 of that of a person in full health. 
Using either the VAS scores or the TTO-derived scores allows an assessment of the 
quality loss compared to full health that results from an illness with the generic profile 
in question.  As such, using either value to identify the health state on the x axis of the 
utility over health function (see figure 6.4 pg.166) fulfils the requirement that the x axis 
is an increasing measure of severity.  In both cases, the scale can be normalised from 
zero (as bad as death) to one (full health).  Arguably, the measure therefore provides an 
increasing ratio scale for health that is comparable to money.   
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6.7  Interpretation of VAS and TTO based EQ-5D Values 
There are two issues with the use of TTO and VAS scores as the measure of h1-h4.  The 
first relates to time preference and its role in determining the EuroQol scores.  This, as 
will be shown in Section 6.7.1, is relatively straightforward to correct for using a fix 
that will be developed and explained in what follows.  The second relates to the nature 
of the measure as a value v(h) of the health state, as opposed to the health state itself (h).  
This is less easy to correct for, and alters the interpretation of the coefficient of risk 
aversion elicited through the technique described.  It should be noted at this stage that if 
a direct measure of h was developed, both the theory and empirics presented here would 
generate relative risk aversion coefficients in health that are the exact counterpart of the 
financial CRRA.  As such, the drawbacks presented next are more of a data issue than a 
conceptual one.  Nonetheless, they are discussed in Sections 6.7.1 and 6.7.2. 
6.7.1  Issue 1: time preference and the TTO 
The QALY index derived from TTO questions in the EuroQol project is typically 
interpreted as a “utility score”.  This makes the implicit assumption that the respondent 
has a utility function that is linear in remaining life expectancy.  That is, their utility 
over remaining life can be described as 
                   (68) 
Where k is a quality of life parameter (1 in full health, 0 in a health state as bad as death 
and linearly increasing with severity) and T is the number of years remaining life 
expectancy. 
In TTO studies, the level of k is elicited by comparing the number of years (  )in full 
health that are considered equivalent to ten years in health state   as follows, with the k 
value for full health set  equal to 1 with no loss of generality. 
                 (69) 
   
  
  
          (69a ) 
However, it is quite conceivable that in fact the utility of remaining life expectancy is 
not linear in time, and this would be likely due to two factors: the first is diminishing 
marginal utility of remaining life years, and the second is time preference (a year of life 
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10 years from now might have lower present value than a year of life two years from 
now, ceteris paribus).   
                        (70) 
where    is the number of remaining life years adjusted for the diminishing marginal 
utility of survival time and for time discounting. 
If it is possible to consider that the true preference for the severity of the illness is 
translated via a concave utility of remaining life expectancy function into the observed 
time trade off, then it ought to be possible to translate them back again, as long as the 
average curvature is known.  The effects of diminishing marginal utility and of 
discounting are confounded in this case but for the present purposes it is not necessary 
to separate them.   Through analysis of the way that the value of preventing a statistical 
fatality (VSL) typically reacts to age, Jones-Lee et al. (2007) derived a functional form 
for the typical individual’s utility over remaining life expectancy function that is   
                     (70a) 
where the 0.8 captures both the diminishing marginal utility and the time preference 
effect, where the timescale considered is at least ten years.  This is dependent on a 
number of assumptions about the relationship between the VSL and the value of an 
additional year of life expectancy, and the value of a life year (assumed to be roughly 
£30,000 based on work by Chilton et al. (2004) for Defra in the UK and Desaigues et 
al. (2007) for the EU-15 area).  There is a rich literature that investigates these 
assumptions and relationships, but its exploration is beyond the scope of this research.  
Further investigation has been conducted into the need to correct for time preference by 
Attema and Brouwer (2013) who estimate correction factors for a range of EQ-5D 
profiles for the Dutch population.  These authors find that the correction factor ought to 
alter with the severity of the illness, but this advice would be relatively complicated to 
transfer to the present Study without further empirical work.  Therefore, at this stage the 
0.8 estimate will be used.  This is an area for development in future research.   
The approach taken in the present adaptation of the HL procedure will be to re-inflate 
the TTO-based utility scores published by EuroQol using the 0.8 assumption.  
‘Adjusted’ coefficients of relative health risk aversion will be calculated on this basis. 
   (
 
  
)
   
         (71) 
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As such, the   values in this case would be raised to the power of     in order to control 
for the effects of time preference and diminishing marginal utility in remaining survival 
time.  This is a potentially important methodological contribution, whose applications 
can feasibly stretch beyond this risk preference elicitation and into any application 
where the EQ-5D values need to be adjusted for the influence of time preference and 
diminishing marginal utility of survival time. 
6.7.2  Issue 2: the interpretation of      as   
Through the previous discussion, in the methodology (see Figure 6.5) and in the 
elicitation Table 6.2, it was assumed that the health states h could be quantified and 
entered into the calculation of the coefficient of relative health risk aversion ( ) as in 
equation (67) on pg. 168, providing a direct counterpart to the financial coefficient of 
relative risk aversion,  .  However, using either the VAS or the TTO-based EuroQol 
scores, the available measure is      as opposed to h itself.  This has implications for 
the way that the switch-point in the adapted HL elicitation table and the calculated 
coefficient of health risk aversion (HRA) can be interpreted. 
Given that the elicited TTO estimates and VAS scores measure individuals’ perceptions 
of the quality of life (and duration of illness in the TTO method) the elicited value for   
is in fact representative of the individual’s riskless valuation for the health state.  As 
such,   will still incorporate the diminishing marginal utility of health state 
improvement and should be interpreted as drawing from an individual’s Dyer and Sarin 
riskless ‘value function’,     , defined over health states, as opposed to an objective 
ratio-scale measure of the individual’s ‘level of health’. In the argument that follows, k 
will therefore be treated as being conceptually equivalent to     .   
So, for the TTO approach,            , with       , so that: 
                       (72) 
Substituting the values          as a measure of   is likely to distort the true health 
levels by overestimating the figures for the lower health states relative to those for the 
higher states as a result of the diminishing marginal utility of health state 
improvement
36
. Figure 6.6 displays the value function in relation to the 45 degree line, 
                                                          
36
 Nonetheless, if using the TTO EuroQol estimates, the extent of the distortion will be 
less when adjusting for time preference than would be the case if simply using the 
unadjusted TTO scores.   
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and demonstrates how the inferred values hj’ relate to the true underlying health 
amounts hj.  Specifically, at the lower end of the health scale the values are overstated 
relative to the values at the higher end of the scale, because of the relationship    
      which is captured in the concave value function. 
 
The concave function reflects diminishing marginal utility of health
37
. Taking    as an 
example, when health state    is described, the value placed on that health state by a 
respondent is       as shown on the diagram.        is the observed value elicited 
through TTO or VAS in response to the description of symptoms relating to health state  
(  ), because    itself cannot be directly observed.  However, if the researcher does not 
recognise this curvature, in effect assuming that the observed       (i.e.   
 ) is 
equivalent to the underlying unobservable   , then the researcher will overestimate the 
underlying health state by   
    .  Similarly, if the researcher assumes       is 
equivalent to the underlying (unobservable) h4, then h4 would be underestimated by 
  
    . 
                                                          
37
 The curvature in Figure 6.6 is deliberately exaggerated for illustrative purposes. 
h2’ h1’ h3’ h4’ 
Value v(h) 
Health 
v(h4) 
  
h1 h2 h3 h4 
v(h
3
) 
  v(h
2
) 
  
v(h
1
) 
  
Figure 6.6:  Distortion of the value function demonstrating under- and over-estimation  
of h1-h4 
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 Of course, in the field or laboratory, the observed switch-point is still characterised by 
the probabilities that make the respondent indifferent between the true, unobserved 
values of h such that 
    
             
         
             
     
   (73) 
In equation (73), all the values are the true underlying values relating to the utility of 
health function depicted in Figure 6.6.  However, the imposition of value function 
estimates as opposed to the true health level values means that the values that the 
researcher inputs to the calculation are distorted estimates of the true levels of health as 
shown in Figure 6.6.   
As such, the elicited   parameters in equation (74) may not be equivalent to   
parameters in equation (66), with the discrepancy dependent upon the degree of 
distortion of the input values, i.e. the degree of curvature of the value function. 
    
              
          
              
         (74) 
Given that the probability figures are correct for equation (74), that they hold by 
definition for equation (66), and that   
    
     
 with   reflecting the extent of 
diminishing marginal utility of health in the value function, the relationship becomes 
   
       (  
     )
     
   
     
      (75) 
and as such 
   
             
     
       (75a) 
which implies 
                 (75b) 
hence 
   
   
   
 
           
     
       (75c) 
That is to say,   reflects the additional curvature of the utility function (captured by the 
parameter  ) above the curvature of the value function (captured by  ).  That is,   
captures
 
 gambling risk aversion as suggested by Dyer and Sarin (1982).  This is 
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demonstrated in Figure 6.7 where   determines the curvature of the schedule in the 
lower panel. 
 
In summary, the theory and elicitation procedure are designed to allow the elicitation of 
the coefficient of relative health risk aversion ( ), and if an appropriate quantitative 
measure of health states was available, then this is exactly what would be obtained. 
However, at the time of writing no such measure is available.  This means that the 
choice of input values for health states has significant consequences for the 
interpretation of the health risk aversion estimates.  Existing measures of health levels 
such as TTO-based EuroQol scores and VAS scores are typically values from the value 
function     .  This means that the output measure,  , captures the aversion to health 
gambles as opposed to full risk aversion.   
u(h)v(
h) 
Health 
 
h1 h2 h3 h4 
u(h) 
v(h) 
v(h4) v(h
3
) v(h
2
) v(h
1
) 
 
v(health) 
U(h) 
controlling 
for v(h) 
Figure 6.7: Comparison of utility and value functions 
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While this renders it not directly comparable to the financial measure,  , or the 
underlying health coefficient of relative risk aversion,  , the method is robust in 
generating parameters that can be interpreted without ambiguity.  This procedure 
arguably provides the most sophisticated health risk preference measure available at 
present, not least because its limitation- which is its ability to capture only gambling 
aversion- is fully accounted for.  In addition, if a direct quantification of health state 
were to be developed the methodology outlined here would allow the elicitation of full 
relative risk preference ( ). 
As an extension to this analysis, Appendix D provides a theoretical analysis of the case 
where the input scores are full utility measures.  Essentially, the elicited parameter 
becomes risk aversion relative to the average member of the population, a potentially 
useful outcome for future survey work. 
6.8  Implementation of the Adapted Holt and Laury Procedure 
Having established a theoretical and empirical framework for converting the financial 
Holt-Laury procedure to allow the elicitation of health state values for risk aversion, the 
next stage is to demonstrate the procedure.  To do so, the HL elicitation procedures 
described above, both for health and financial domains, were embedded within a wider 
survey protocol, referred to as Study 2.  The analysis of the R-R relativities will be 
presented in Chapter 7 and will not be the focus here.  Instead, the next Section sets out 
the implementation of the Holt and Laury Risk Preference Elicitation protocol adapted 
for health states which is the focus of this Chapter.  There follows a presentation and 
brief discussion of the resulting estimates of the risk aversion coefficients for health. 
Initially, the four health states to be compared were described to respondents using EQ-
5D
 
descriptions, for the reasons discussed in Section 6.5.2 (pg.170).  The illnesses 
described ranged from minor to severe (to reflect h4 to h1 from the generic survey 
design), as shown in Figure 6.8.  Their features as they relate to the EQ-5D scoring 
system are given in Table 6.3.   
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The particular illnesses were chosen to cover a range of utility scores based on the EQ-
5D value sets as reported in the right-hand column of Table 6.3.  The illnesses are 
unambiguously increasing in severity as they descend the table: every attribute is set at 
a level at least as severe as it was in the illness above.  As such, there is a built-in 
rationality check that can be applied when considering respondents’ VAS scores.  Also 
at least at a within- individual level, switching further down the Holt-Laury table is 
evidence of higher risk aversion.  The four illnesses were all described as persisting for 
ten days and then going away without the need for treatment.  This avoids any issues of 
time preference, because the timescale does not vary between options.  The short 
timescale is intended to approximate a single period change in health. 
Figure 6.8:  EQ-5D descriptions 
Minor illness 
- You would have no problems moving about 
- You would have no problems with self-care 
- You would have no problems carrying out your usual activities 
- You would experience slight pain and discomfort  
- You would experience no anxiety and depression 
Moderate illness 
- You would have no problems moving about 
- You would have slight problems with self-care 
- You would have slight problems carrying out your usual activities 
- You would experience moderate pain and discomfort  
- You would experience no anxiety and depression 
Moderately severe illness 
- You would have no problems moving about 
- You would have slight problems with self-care 
- You would have moderate problems carrying out your usual activities 
- You would experience severe pain and discomfort  
- You would experience moderate anxiety and depression 
Severe illness 
- You would have slight problems moving about 
- You would have slight problems with self-care 
- You would have severe problems carrying out your usual activities 
- You would experience severe pain and discomfort  
- You would experience moderate anxiety and depression 
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Each respondent marked where they perceived each illness to place them on a Visual 
Analogue Scale, which as described in Section 6.5.1 (pg.169) involved expressing 
where they felt the illness would fall on a scale from ‘full health’ to ‘as bad as death’ or 
even lower.  This process provides a per-individual input into the severity of each 
illness and in addition allows the individual to focus on each illness in detail prior to 
completing the lottery questions.  After this, each respondent filled in their answers to 
the lottery questions as shown in table 6.2 (pg.167).  Respondents had previously 
completed ten R-R questions and a financial Holt-Laury exercise.  They would go on to 
answer a selection of demographic questions as shown in the protocol in Appendix A. 
6.9  Summary 
This Section discussed the theory underlying the financial HL risk aversion elicitation 
procedure, and proposed a novel way to apply the same concept in the domain of health 
risks.  The discussion considered the different potential inputs to the health risk 
calculations, and concluded that despite its drawbacks, the EQ-5D inputs most closely 
match the desired properties of the underlying health level variable.  It discussed how 
the EQ-5D descriptors can be quantified using either the EuroQol TTO (time trade-off) 
scores that are available on the population level, or the VAS (visual analogue scale) 
scores that are available on the level of the individual.  Both have their benefits and 
drawbacks and as such both will be used and compared.   
 
Table 6.3: Illness descriptions and EQ-5D scores 
 Mobility Self-
care 
Usual 
Activity 
Pain and 
suffering 
Anxiety 
and 
deprssion 
EQ-5D 
score 
Adj EQ-
5D 
score 
(k
0.8
) 
EQ-5D 
score 
based on 
VAS 
mean 
EQ-5D 
score 
based 
on 
VAS 
median 
Minor 
 
1 1 1 2 1 0.837 0.867 0.900 0.91 
Moderate 
 
1 2 2 3 1 0.795 0.832 0.723 0.73 
Moderate
-ly severe 
1 2 3 4 3 0.617 0.680 0.537 0.50 
Severe 
 
2 2 4 4 3 0.263 0.344 0.371 0.32 
1= “no”  2= “slight”  3= “moderate”  4= “severe”  5= “unable” 
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6.10  Analysis 
6.10.1  Introduction to analysis 
The structure of the subsequent Sections is as follows.  First, the input values are 
discussed.  The central tendencies (mean and median) of these measures for describing 
h1-h4 are presented and discussed.  Then the financial and health related risk aversion 
coefficients elicited from the financial and adapted HL elicitation procedures are 
discussed.  Comparisons are drawn between the results using the financial and health 
domains, and between the alternative health inputs. 
6.10.2  Analysis: assigning values to h1-h4 
The information available to the researcher on the basis of the Study includes a 
population-average utility score for each of the four illness profiles based on TTO 
analysis conducted previously (Dolan, 1997); an individual VAS score for each of the 
four illness profiles for each respondent; and the row of the table (with associated 
probabilities for each of the four illness profiles) in which each respondent switched 
from the ‘safe’ to the ‘risky’ health gamble.  On this basis, there are multiple ways to 
calculate and assign coefficients of health-related risk aversion (hereafter HRA) for 
each respondent. 
This analysis will therefore use five different procedures, which will be compared in the 
results Section.  These are summarised in Table 6.4 and discussed in the following 
Sections. 
6.10.2.i  Financial amounts 
The standard approach in economics for controlling for risk preference in surveys is to 
elicit CRRA estimates over financial gambles.  This generates financial risk aversion 
measures.  This approach is simple, well established and easy to interpret, and it 
captures full risk aversion.  However, as discussed in the literature review it is not clear 
that financial risk preference is an adequate proxy for risk preferences over health.  As 
such, this method will be used as a benchmark for comparison only. 
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6.10.2.ii  EQ-5D population average scores(unadjusted) 
As discussed in Section 6.5.2, the EQ-5D scores are available for the full population 
based on previous work using TTO methods to generate utility scores for the EQ-5D 
Table 6.4: Risk aversion inputs 
Input Symbol Benefits Drawbacks 
Money 
amounts 
£ Objective cardinal ratio 
scale.  Shows the full risk 
aversion (gambling aversion 
and diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth).  
Comparable to other 
estimates in the literature. 
Not a physical risk. 
EQ-5D 
unadjusted 
𝑘 Large representative sample, 
well understood in the 
literature, easy to use (single 
input value), physical risk 
measure. 
Possible confound of time 
preference and diminishing 
marginal utility of remaining 
life expectancy. 
Assumes can generalise 
from population to this 
sample. 
EQ-5D 
adjusted 
𝑘  All the benefits of k, 
resolving the TTO problem 
of diminishing marginal 
utility and time preference. 
The 0.8 value requires 
empirical verification. 
Assumes can generalise 
from population to this 
sample. 
VAS average 
over sample 
   Based on individual values 
in this sample, easy to 
implement, no need for the 
readjustment in the EQ-5D. 
VAS measure has been 
shown to be susceptible to 
biases in estimation. Sample 
average of VAS scores 
removes some information 
on the individual level.   
VAS 
individual-
specific 
 𝑖 Individual-specific values, 
personalised risk 
coefficients, sensitive to 
value of health as well as 
row of table. 
More room for individual 
error in completing VAS 
form to influence the 
inferred coefficient.   
Time-intensive and 
cumbersome. 
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profiles.  In the EuroQol project, values were generated for a subset of possible EQ-5D 
profiles and then extrapolated to provide scores for all potential combinations.  The 
values were generated on a country-specific level using representative samples of the 
population.  As such, they are representative of the full UK population but not 
necessarily representative of the sample of 18-25 year olds used in Study 2.  In addition, 
the values can be criticised in that they assume constant marginal utility of life 
expectancy.  See Section 6.7.2 for a discussion. 
6.10.2.iii  EQ-5D population average scores (adjusted)  
As stated, the TTO method which generates the EQ-5D scores can be criticised if 
discounting and diminishing marginal utility apply to future life expectancy.  Using the 
admittedly strong assumption that the specification in Jones-Lee et al. (2007) is 
appropriate on average in the population, the EQ-5D scores can be deflated for this 
effect as discussed in Section 6.7.1 by raising to the power of 0.8, acknowledging that 
this figure requires refinement using further experimentation.  The same problems with 
generalising to the present sample apply as for the unadjusted EQ-5D scores. 
6.10.2.iv  Individual-specific VAS scores 
The VAS scores are based on individual value functions of members of the sample and 
as such there is no issue with applying a population value to individual decisions.  In 
addition, they are not subject to the issues of time discounting and diminishing marginal 
utility over life expectancy which complicate the EQ-5D approach.  However, they are 
subject to potential biases in framing as documented above and they are not based on 
choices so the link to underlying utility theory is not straightforward.  As such, they are 
not to be solely relied upon instead being reported alongside the TTO-based measures. 
6..10.2.v  Sample average VAS scores 
Using individual-specific values for the VAS for every individual is cumbersome, and 
any individual error or exaggeration in responding to the VAS will generate HRA 
coefficients that are strongly influenced by this error.  As such, it was decided to 
aggregate the VAS scores for this sample and use the sample average VAS scores for 
each of the four input health states.  These are combined with individual switch-points 
to generate the coefficient of HRA for each individual. 
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As such, there are five categories of inputs for the “x variable” of the calculation of risk 
aversion in this Study.  These are the money amounts (£1, £5, £6 and £8) and the scores 
for h1-h4.  These health scores are summarised in Table 6.5.  Input values for the 
individual-specific VAS scores are not aggregated and so they are omitted from this 
Table.   
 
Reassuringly, the increasing pattern expected from h1-h4 can be observed in the VAS 
average scores.  Further, the sample VAS scores appear to match the adjusted TTO-
based EQ-5D values more closely than the unadjusted values, providing tentative 
support to the practice of adjusting the EQ-5D scores for time effects.  In addition, the 
adjusted value for h4 is just included in the confidence interval around the sample VAS 
score.  However, both the adjusted and unadjusted values for h1-h3 lie within the VAS 
confidence intervals so the process of adjusting appears not to make a very dramatic 
difference to the input values. 
6.10.3  Calculating the coefficient of health risk aversion 
Individual-specific risk aversion coefficients are generated for each individual for each 
of the input measures.  The process for the financial inputs is simple, and was described 
in Section 6.2.3 above.  For the health state input measures the basic procedure is the 
same, with the switching row probabilities and inputs assumed to solve equation (74) 
originally introduced on pg.177. 
    
              
          
              
         (74’) 
Table 6.5:  Health state input scores 
 h1 h2 h3 h4 
EQ-5D TTO 
unadjusted 
0.261 0.390 0.681 0.837 
EQ-5D TTO 
adjusted 
0.341 0.471 0.735 0.867 
Sample VAS 
scores 
(median) 
0.32 
[25%=0.19, 
75%=0.52] 
0.50 
[25%=0.38, 
75%=0.67] 
0.73 
[25%=0.63, 
75%=0.83] 
0.91 
[25%=0.87, 
75%=0.95] 
186 
 
However, there is no analytical solution to the equation and as such the coefficients of 
risk aversion are found by simulation.  This involves a procedure of iteration from a 
possible value for   to the    value that solves the equation, supplemented by graphical 
analysis where multiple solutions are possible. 
6.10.4  Data cleaning 
The calculation process usually generates a clear unique solution for  , but in two cases 
the solutions for the individual VAS scores based on    were implausible
 
in that the 
only valid solutions were exactly 1, which is an algebraically valid solution for all 
cases, but which is uninformative in economic terms.  In sixteen further cases it was 
found that all   coefficients greater than or equal to some level    would class as 
solutions.  This is difficult to interpret, because if indifference holds for a row of the 
table given a certain level of risk aversion, by design a more risk averse respondent 
ought not to be indifferent in that row.  A trade-off therefore needs to be made between 
using these ‘threshold’ solutions in the interests of maintaining the already small sample 
size, or discarding these in the interests of maintaining the integrity of the interpretation 
of the data.  There is no clearly superior option here, and as such both ‘cleaned’ and 
‘uncleaned’ versions will be reported. 
Responses based on the individual VAS scores for two further respondents are dropped 
because they suggest extremely low health risk aversion coefficients
38
.  Both of these 
individuals indicated health state values on the VAS questions at 90% or more for the 
three least severe health complaints.  This suggests that the variation in    was too 
limited to reliably generate the coefficient of HRA for these individuals.  Taking the 
HRA coefficients at face value would suggest extreme preference in favour of taking 
gambles in health, which does not appear to be consistent with the majority of the 
sample or with these respondents’ risk preferences characterised over finance (slight 
risk lovingness and risk neutrality, respectively).   
In total, six variables are defined, each providing a measure of risk aversion for each 
individual (Table 6.6).  
 
                                                          
38
 The threshold was to delete responses implying coefficients of HRA of less than -10 
(-12.066 and -18.310) 
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 6.10.5  Central tendencies 
To provide an overview of all of the risk aversion measures, Table 6.7 presents the 
central tendencies for the sample.  The mean coefficients are all positive (although the 
medians cannot be distinguished from zero, implying risk-neutrality to gambling in 
health and in finance).  They are all within a similar range although the uncleaned 
individual coefficients appear to be quite high.  This supports the use of the cleaned 
sample which excludes the ‘threshold’ cases, despite the detriment to the sample size.  
 
Table 6.6: Risk aversion variables 
 Variable Captures Inputs to calculation 
Financial relative risk 
aversion 
Financial risk aversion Money inputs, £ 
Population unadjusted 
health risk aversion 
Health gambling aversion and 
preferences over remaining life 
expectancy 
EQ-5D unadjusted, 𝑘 
Population adjusted 
health risk aversion 
Health gambling aversion EQ-5D raised to the 
power of 0.8, 𝑘  
Sample average VAS 
health risk aversion 
Health gambling aversion Average VAS scores for 
this sample    
Individual health risk 
aversion uncleaned 
Health gambling aversion Personal VAS scores  𝑖 
untrimmed 
Individual health risk 
aversion cleaned 
Health gambling aversion Personal VAS scores  𝑖 
deleting ‘threshold’ cases 
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6.10.6  Risk aversion over financial gambles 
Recall that the HL lottery comparisons were between £5 and £6 in the ‘safe’ option and 
between £1 and £12 in the ‘risky’ option.  The probability of the high outcome in each 
option increased down the table, so a higher switching row indicates higher levels of 
risk aversion (and a higher financial CRRA). 
The modal choice of switching row, row 5, implies risk neutrality over these financial 
stakes, with the coefficient ( ) equal to zero.  The mean coefficient is 0.168, and the 
median is 0.340, which suggests that the mean is influenced by a substantial number of 
low end values which imply risk seeking behaviour over these small stakes.  The mean 
is significantly higher than zero implying that the sample as a whole is characterised by 
Table 6.7:  Central tendencies for risk aversion estimates by input option 
  MEAN 
(S.D.) 
[CI] 
MEDIAN 
[25%, 75%] 
Financial relative 
risk aversion 
n=107 
0.168 
(0.588) 
[0.055, 0.280] 
0.340 
[-0.387, 0.665] 
Population 
unadjusted health 
risk aversion 
n=111 
 
0.402 
(0.814) 
[0.249,0.555] 
0.223 
[-0.253, 0.697] 
Population adjusted 
health risk aversion 
n=111 
 
0.252 
(1.018) 
[0.061, 0.444] 
0.029 
[-0.566, 0.621] 
Sample average 
VAS health risk 
aversion n=111 
 
0.214 
(0.991) 
[0.028, 0.401] 
0.001 
[-0.582, 0.577] 
Individual health 
risk aversion 
uncleaned n=98 
 
0.943 
(2.695) 
[0.403, 1.483] 
0.698 
[-0.119, 2.768] 
Individual health 
risk aversion 
cleaned n=82 
 
 
0.225 
(2.249) 
[-0.269, 0.719] 
0.429 
[-0.535, 1.453] 
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risk aversion but based on the medians it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of risk 
neutrality over financial gambles. 
The magnitude of these estimates is comparable with existing estimates in the literature. 
The original Holt-Laury experiments found CRRA coefficients in the region of 0.3-0.5 
(Holt and Laury, 2002), which includes the median from this sample.  However, the 
estimates fromAndersen et al. (2008) are higher, at 0.74. 
Next the HRA coefficients are presented.  The distribution is considered first, and then 
the central tendencies are presented and analysed.  This is done first for the coefficients 
based on aggregated h1-h4 scores.  That is, for the EQ-5D adjusted and unadjusted 
measures on the population level, and for the sample average VAS scores.  After this, 
the individual-specific VAS scores are considered, both with and without trimming of 
the ‘threshold responses’ introduced on pg.186 above. 
6.10.7  Risk aversion over health gambles based on sample and population averages 
6.10.7.i  Distribution of switching rows 
 
The modal switching row (7) implies HRA coefficients of 0.697 in the unadjusted TTO 
EQ-5D case, 0.621 in the adjusted TTO EQ-5D case, and 0.577 in the VAS average 
case.  This suggests that the average respondent is risk averse over health risks.  These 
figures are higher than for the financial case, which is something of a surprise given that 
Figure 6.9: Health risk aversion based on the population/sample averages.  
Histogram applies for all three values. 
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they do not include the curvature from the value function, instead only the additional 
curvature from gambling aversion.  This suggests that even if respondents had linear 
value functions for health (i.e.   
  is equivalent to the true   ), there is more risk aversion 
over health than finance.  However, so far this analysis rests only on the modal row, and 
the diagram shows that an almost equal number of respondents switch in rows 6 and 5 
as in row 7, and rows 6 and 5 suggest less risk aversion.  Section 6.10.7.ii considers the 
central tendencies, which will provide more insight. 
6.10.7.ii  Central tendencies and spread 
Having considered the distribution, this analysis turns to consider the central tendency 
and spread measures for the coefficients of health risk aversion in this sample.   
 
The coefficients of HRA are smaller using the population adjusted EQ-5D TTO scores 
than the unadjusted scores, which is because, as argued above, the unadjusted scores 
underestimate the lower health state levels relative to the higher levels and thereby 
result in an ‘overstatement’ of the curvature of the utility function. The adjustment 
process effectively rectifies this overstatement. As such, the curvature picked up by the 
adjusted measure is less pronounced.  However, the difference in the mean inferred 
HRA coefficients is not significant.  Nonetheless, the coefficients as derived from the 
adjusted values may be more reliable in absolute terms.  This latter statement is 
supported to an extent by the comparison with the coefficients implied when using the 
Table 6.8: population average HRA coefficients central tendencies 
 MEAN 
S.D 
[CI] 
MEDIAN 
[25%, 75%] 
Population 
unadjusted health 
risk aversion 
n=111 
0.402 
(0.814) 
[0.249,0.555] 
0.223 
[-0.253, 0.697] 
Population adjusted 
health risk aversion 
n=111 
 
 
0.252 
(1.018) 
[0.061, 0.444] 
0.029 
[-0.566, 0.621] 
Sample average 
VAS health risk 
aversion n=111 
 
 
0.214 
(0.991) 
[0.028, 0.401] 
0.001 
[-0.582, 0.577] 
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VAS sample averages.  The adjusted EQ-5D TTO scores give a closer match with the 
VAS averages than the unadjusted ones. 
The coefficients of health risk aversion defined over sample or population average 
health scores are low. The difference from zero using the mean scores is just significant, 
implying risk aversion.  However, the median values are much lower at 0.029 and 0.001 
(using the EQ-5D adjusted and average VAS respectively). This contradicts the 
evidence from the modal score, which suggested that the health risk aversion was higher 
in health than in finance, but this might be because the difference between the modal 
row and the frequency in other rows is small. 
Based on the central tendencies it appears that the sample is slightly averse to gambles 
in health.  Of course, this does not preclude stronger risk aversion as defined by the 
curvature of the value function (    ).   
  6.10.8  Risk aversion over health gambles based on individual VAS scores 
6.10.8.i  Distribution of health risk aversion coefficients based on individual VAS 
 
Unlike the sample or population average coefficients, the individual-specific based 
coefficients of HRA the coefficient might be different for individuals switching in the 
same row, because they report different VAS scores for h1-h4.  The underlying input 
values and the switch-point combine to provide a unique coefficient for each respondent 
Figure 6.10: Health risk aversion based on individual VAS scores 
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and Figure 6.10 gives the histograms for the uncleaned individual-specific HRA 
coefficients.  The modal HRA coefficient is between 0 and 1 again implying slight risk 
aversion.  This is within the range from the financial literature as discussed in Part I. 
6.10.8.ii  Central tendencies and spread 
Turning to the central tendency measures, the coefficients implied are much larger than 
for the population average based coefficients reported in Table 6.8 and the confidence 
intervals are wide.  The untrimmed values imply fairly extreme HRA, at least using the 
mean, and the 95% confidence interval around the mean excludes all estimates based on 
the sample or population average values from Table 6.8.  The median is more inclusive, 
allowing neutrality or even a preference for health risks inside the 25-75 percentile 
range, but this range is very wide and the median itself is high.  Removing the 
‘threshold’ case coefficients gives the cleaned values and these align much better with 
the sample average, and give more intuitively sensible results than the uncleaned 
version.  This supports the earlier conclusion from pg.186 that trimming the VAS-based 
scores is appropriate due to the possible compounding of error with an individual’s 
responses.  These results, similarly to the population average results, suggest some 
health risk aversion on average, but do not exclude the possibility of risk neutrality or 
even risk lovingness in the sample, bearing in mind that this risk aversion refers 
exclusively to gambles over health states. 
 
6.10.9  The influence of demographic characteristics on risk attitude 
Regressions were run of each of the risk aversion coefficients upon demographic 
characteristics.  The regression output for the full models is reported in Table 6.10.  As 
Table 6.9: Individual specific coefficients central tendencies 
 MEAN 
S.D 
[CI] 
MEDIAN 
[25%, 75%] 
Individual RA 
uncleaned n=98 
 
 
0.943 
(2.695) 
[0.403, 1.483] 
0.698 
[-0.119, 2.768] 
Individual RA 
cleaned n=82 
 
0.225 
(2.249) 
[-0.269, 0.719] 
0.429 
[-0.535, 1.453] 
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in Part I of this thesis, the vselect tool in Stata is used to determine the explanatory 
variables for the best-fit regressions, which are reported in Appendix E. 
 
The literature (see Hartog et al. (2002), Binswanger (1980) and Donkers et al. (2001) 
for example) suggests that gender is positively correlated with risk aversion and that 
income and education are negatively correlated with risk aversion.  The income effect is 
replicated for the financial CRRA, which lends support to the validity of the findings.  
Table 6.10:  Regression of health risk preferences on demographics 
 
Population 
average  
EQ-5D 
(adjusted) 
RA 
coeff 
n=87 
r2=0.097 
Sample 
average  
VAS score 
RA 
coeff 
n=87 
r2=0.097 
Individual  
VAS score 
(untrim) 
RA coeff 
n=76 
r2=0.038 
Individua
l 
VAS 
score 
(trim) 
RA coeff 
n=64 
r2=0.094 
Financial 
(money 
amounts) 
RA 
coeff 
n=83 
r2=0.178 
 Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Log of household 
income 
0.005 
(0.13) 
0.004 
(0.13) 
0.121 
(0.36) 
0.314 
(0.33) 
-0.144** 
(0.07) 
Female 0.033 
(0.24) 
0.035 
(0.24) 
0.782 
(0.66) 
0.243 
(0.59) 
0.194 
(0.15) 
Age 0.098 
(0.06) 
0.096 
(0.06) 
0.182 
(0.34) 
-0.175 
(0.308) 
-0.037 
(0.038) 
Size of household 0.002 
(0.06) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.080 
(0.23) 
0.178 
(0.20) 
0.053 
(0.03) 
Renting one’s 
home 
0.362 
(0.34) 
0.352 
(0.34) 
-0.081 
(0.87) 
0.400 
(0.66) 
-0.016 
(0.18) 
Experience of 
cancer (self or 
close friend or 
family member) 
0.298 
(0.27) 
0.292 
(0.26) 
0.304 
(0.88) 
-0.423 
(0.90) 
0.260 
(0.18) 
Experience of 
road accidents 
(self or close 
friend or family 
member) 
-0.195 
(0.25) 
-0.191 
(0.25) 
-0.022 
(0.77) 
-0.032 
(0.73) 
-0.006 
(0.14) 
Self-reported 
health state 
-0.019 
(0.22) 
-0.019 
(0.21) 
-0.447 
(0.78) 
-0.730 
(0.72) 
0.121 
(0.11) 
Self-reported 
roads risk 
0.197 
(0.14) 
0.191 
(0.14) 
0.046 
(0.44) 
0.491 
(0.42) 
0.098 
(0.07) 
Constant -2.147 
(1.78) 
-2.123 
(1.73) 
-4.392 
(7.99) 
0.916 
(7.49) 
1.507 
(1.04) 
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The education effect is not testable in this analysis because the respondents all had the 
same educational attainment, but the lack of gender effect is interesting because of its 
persistence in the literature (see Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey of evidence 
specific to gender and risk).  One explanation could lie in the youth and homogeneity of 
this sample in other respects, if gender differences come in to effect when occupational 
or lifestyle gender roles have been established. 
Clearly, for this sample, demographics are largely unable to explain HRA coefficients, 
with the exception of a marginally significant positive coefficient on perceived road 
accident risks when using a best fit regression and when using population or sample 
average inputs to the coefficients of HRA.  The general lack of significance may be 
because of the lack of variation in the characteristics of the sample used in Study 2.  
Alternatively, it suggests that risk preferences over health states are exogenous as is 
typically assumed in the theoretical literature. 
6.10.10  Comparing risk  preferences in health and finance 
The analysis in Section 6.10.7 observed that risk preferences defined over health 
appeared to be lower (based on population or sample average health state scores) than 
financial risk aversion coefficients.  However, it is impossible to know whether the full 
risk aversion would have been higher in the domain of health or finance based on this 
comparison. This is because the health coefficients measure gambling aversion as 
opposed to full risk aversion, and so simple direct comparison of the financial and 
health risk aversion coefficients is not meaningful in absolute terms.    
However, correlation of switching rows (which arguably reflect the true risk aversion 
because no values have been imposed) will provide an idea of the correlation between 
financial and health risk aversion.   
The correlation coefficient for switching rows in the domains of health and finance is 
0.191, and a simple regression of health risk preferences on financial risk preferences 
generates significance (P statistic 0.045).  However, Figure 6.11 shows that while 
financial risk preferences are positively correlated with health risk preferences based on 
switching row, the correlation is low by any practical standards.  Ranking individuals by 
their switch row in each domain generates even lower correlation, at 0.15.  This 
generates support for the argument that the HRA measure generated in this Chapter is 
likely to be a better proxy for the true health risk aversion despite its limitations because 
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the support for using financial as a proxy for health choices appears to be low.  This 
also provides evidence in support of the wider argument that domain independence of 
risk preferences is not a realistic assumption. 
 
6.10.11 Summary of results analysis 
The analysis Section began by presenting and discussing the central tendencies of the 
risk aversion proxies.  The magnitude of the risk aversion coefficients for both finance 
and health appeared to be reasonable.  It was demonstrated that demographic 
characteristics are poorly able to explain the risk preference proxies, especially those 
defined over health states.  This suggests that the methodology provides a useful 
measure of person-specific risk preference, which appears to be exogenous in terms of 
demographics.  The usefulness of the HRA measure was given further support by the 
result that correlation between the financial and health risk aversion domains is low. 
6.11  Conclusions 
Study 2a had two principle aims: to reconcile the theory underpinning financial and 
health domain risk aversion elicitation; and to develop a methodology to elicit risk 
aversion in health.  
The theoretical development has been successful. With some assumptions, the financial 
framework for thinking about risk aversion is shown to be readily transferable into the 
health domain.  The empirical methodology takes as its basis the classic elicitation 
procedure from Holt and Laury (2002), and converts it to the health domain.  This 
Figure 6.11: Correlation between financial and health risk aversion switching 
rows 
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framework allows the elicitation of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) in 
the domain of health.   
A key contribution in this Chapter is the formalisation of the theory underpinning 
exactly what is elicited using this methodology.  The health states in this Study are 
described using the EQ-5D description system
39
.  Because there currently exists no 
direct way to quantify these health states to input to the risk aversion calculations, value 
inputs are used instead (either the TTO-based values from the EuroQol study or the 
VAS scores collected during this survey).   It was shown that the interpretation of the 
coefficient should be as a measure of preferences over gambling in health, instead of the 
full curvature of the von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function over health. While this 
is a restriction, the clarification of this issue provides a good basis for analysis and 
future investigation. 
As a proxy for risk aversion in the domain of health, this measure may be more 
appropriate than the financial coefficient of relative risk aversion, despite its limitations, 
because risk preferences have been shown to be domain-dependent.  Arguably, a 
measure of gambling aversion in health is more useful to health-related valuation than a 
measure of full risk aversion in finance.  In addition, if a ratio scale measure of 
increasing health severity can be developed in the future, this methodological 
framework is ready and able to generate a full measure of risk preference over health. 
As such, the aims of the Chapter have been met, and the proxies for health risk aversion 
have been developed for inclusion in the analysis of the Risk-Risk questions in Study 
2b, which will be conducted in Chapter 7. 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Respondents proved capable of sensibly answering the risk trade questions in the 
health domain and the methodology appears to be tractable in a survey setting.    
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Chapter 7.  Latency, Discounting and the Value of Preventing a 
Statistical Cancer Fatality: Eliciting Effective Discount Rates from 
Survey Data 
7.1  Introduction 
As hypothesised in Part I of this thesis and verified in Part II, a key driver of the 
VSLCAN is the period of latency that typically precedes the fatality.  As such, an 
individual’s rate of time preference is likely to influence their relative value of changes 
in their risk of fatality which occur at different future time periods, and so developing 
insights about time preferences will be important in understanding the VSLCAN. 
As discussed in the second literature review (Chapter 5), studies have typically 
controlled for time preferences using financially derived estimates of the discount rate, 
for example employing the procedure from Coller and Williams (1999) in which the 
respondent compares (hypothetical or real) financial payoffs at different times.  
However, the evidence discussed in the review (pg.144) suggests that the discount rate 
defined over finance is not ideally suited as a proxy for time preference over health and 
physical risk outcomes.  In addition, there is no firm consensus about the best method of 
eliciting time preferences in the domains of health and physical risk, and (perhaps as a 
result of this) there is limited evidence about the likely functional form that 
characterises discounting in this domain.   
If typical discounting behaviour can be reliably established, this will not only answer 
these academic questions, but will also allow more robust policy analysis of a wide 
range of fatality risks.  This is because in the absence of alternative evidence, the 
government discounts health benefits using a constant rate.  The implications of this are 
explored in the policy implications Section on pg.248. 
Study 2b, reported in this Chapter, adapts the methodology of the Risk-Risk survey 
from Study 1 (see Part II of this thesis) in order to allow inference of discounting 
functions as applied to decisions surrounding latent fatality risks.  The survey was 
designed to incorporate a range of time profiles for the latent fatality risk, so the 
discount functions can be explored in more detail than was possible in Study 1.  This 
allows estimation of the proportion of the sample whose decisions are compatible with 
standard exponential discounting function.  The following analysis will allow inference 
of the appropriate discounting function for those respondents whose preferences were 
198 
 
not well characterised by the exponential discounting assumption, providing a basis for 
future research on more representative samples. 
The literature review and the results from Study 1 in Part II have led to two research 
questions: 
1. What is the functional form of discounting in the domain of fatality risk? 
2. What discount rate best reflects risk-trading behaviour under each discounting 
assumption in the domain of fatality risk? 
Normative arguments about what rates and functional forms ought to be used are on-
going.  However, their treatment is postponed to Part IV which considers the 
implications for policy.  The analysis and results are simply descriptive, exploring the 
way that respondents appeared to be discounting in reality.  
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows.  First, the alternative discounting 
hypotheses are outlined, building upon the discussion in the literature review on pg.138.  
Next, the methodology is briefly recapped, and an overview of the results is provided.  
The analysis has three main Sections:  initially the overall relativities between latent 
cancers and road accidents are examined in terms of their behaviour with respect to 
elements of the timing of the risk scenarios.  Then exponential rates are derived and 
analysed on the sample and the individual level.  This allows respondents to be 
categorised into discounting types, with the conclusion that nonstandard discounting 
appears to categorise the sample in aggregate as well as the majority of individuals.  
Probit analysis is used to examine whether personal characteristics are related to the 
form of the discounting function.   Finally, the discount rates are re-estimated to account 
for differences in discounting type, and conclusions are drawn as to the most 
descriptively accurate rate and functional form for VSL calculations in this sample. 
7.2  Discounting Hypotheses 
The literature review identified three main testable classes of discount function with 
different properties which distinguish them.  The literature review provided the basis 
upon which each model was developed and outlined the empirical evidence for each.  
This Section re-states the basic principles but focuses on the application to the VSL 
literature and the VSLCAN:VSL relativities (see pg.53 in Part I for an explanation of the 
CTRt relationship).  The three models are presented below, and summarised in Table 
7.1. 
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7.2.1  Standard exponential discounting 
Exponential discount functions characterise early thought on time discounting, for 
example see Samuelson (1937).  The first formal models of time preference used the 
exponential discounting function, although it should be noted that their proponents, for 
example Koopmans (1960) who provided axiomatisation, did not intend the models to 
be taken as descriptive of real behaviour.  For a fuller account of the history of the 
exponential discounting assumption, and indeed of all the major discounting discoveries 
up to 2002, see Frederick et al. (2002). 
Standard exponential discounting involves a discount function of the form: 
    
  
   
          (75) 
The proportional decline from, say, 2-5 years is the same as the decline from 12-15 
years, which generates the time consistency property that makes the exponential 
discounting function normatively appealing.  
In terms of the future cancer to current roads relativities, assuming a constant context 
premium of       (see pg.53 for a discussion), we can show that the      relativity is 
defined as  
      
     
       
         (76) 
7.2.2  Hyperbolic discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
As discussed in the literature review and in the comprehensive review by Frederick et 
al. (2002), exponential discounting is often shown to fare badly in predicting 
intertemporal choice behaviour.  Short delays tend to imply higher discount rates than 
longer delays.  This observation prompted the formulation of hyperbolic discounting 
models.  There are various formulations in the literature, three of which are presented 
below. 
7.2.2.i  Generalised hyperbolic discounting Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) 
The generalised model has the functional form: 
    
  
         
         (77) 
200 
 
  refers to the difference between this and the simple exponential model.    reflects the 
individual’s time perception, which refers to how quickly they perceive a unit of time to 
pass.  The present value clearly depends on the temporal distance between now and the 
fatality.  Again the present value declines with delay.  This time, however, the decline is 
steeper over the near term and shallower over the longer term.  This is formalised in the 
declining relativity with T.  This can generate inconsistent preferences over time, which 
is descriptively accurate but normatively unappealing.  See the policy implications 
Section (particularly Section 8.4.2) for a discussion. 
In terms of the VSLCAN:VSL relativities, assuming a constant context premium of 
     , this discounting function implies 
            (
      
      
)
   
      (78) 
7.2.2.ii  Simple hyperbolic discounting 
The generalised model can be simplified by assuming that    . This makes the model 
more analytically tractable and is a common specification in the applied discounting 
literature. 
With this assumption, the discount function becomes 
    
  
      
          (79) 
The VSLCAN:VSL relativity is 
      
           
      
        (80) 
7.2.2.iii  Quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as first proposed and formalised for intrapersonal 
discounting by Laibson (1997) combines some of the qualitative features of hyperbolic 
discounting (i.e. strong preference for the immediate future, lower rates with long 
delays) with the analytical tractability of the exponential discounting model.  In settings 
where there is no immediate option, quasi-hyperbolic discounting does not generate 
inconsistency.  While it is gaining popularity in the literature, it is impossible to 
distinguish using the data available in this Study.  However, for completeness the 
functional form of the discount factor is presented here: 
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For a person that lives T periods, the present value at time T of utility of future 
consumption is defined as  
                         ∑  
        
   
              (81) 
So the   mimics the qualitative properties of the hyperbolic discount function, while the 
remaining years are hyperbolic. 
To place it in a utility-free present-value sense, this becomes 
      (
  
   
)                                   (82) 
 
7.2.3  Sub-additive discounting 
Sub-additive discounting does not have its basis in a discounting function, instead being 
a qualitative fit to the anomaly that longer intervals between outcomes tend to be 
discounted at a lower rate than shorter intervals.  The qualitative predictions are largely 
similar to those of hyperbolic discounting and as such the difference is somewhat harder 
to define.  However, the model can be summarised using the relativity between latent 
and sooner outcomes.  By definition, there is no discount function or discount factor to 
be applied to a single future outcome, because the phenomenon of sub-additive 
discounting requires comparison.  Sub-additive discounting can take as its base either 
hyperbolic or exponential functions. 
7.2.3.i  Hyperbolic based sub-additive discounting 
The VSLCAN:VSL relativity is 
      
     
           
        (83) 
where s is a parameter, typically between 0 and 1, which captures non-linearity of 
preferences over time. 
7.2.3.ii  Exponential based sub-additive discounting 
The VSLCAN:VSL relativity is 
            
             (84). 
The different discounting assumptions are summarised in Table 7.1. 
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7.3  Summary: What is the Scope of this Research? 
It is clear from Table 7.1 that the discounting assumptions have different distinguishing 
features.  It is possible to infer the discount rate using the exponential assumption in the 
domain of physical risk using the methodology introduced in Part II and demonstrated 
on pg.129.  The resultant discount rates can then be analysed using regression on timing 
Table 7.1:  Discount functions 
 Standard 
exponential 
Hyperbolic Sub-additive 
Discount function 
𝑋𝜏  
𝑋 
𝑒𝛿𝜏
 
𝑋𝜏  
𝑋 
   𝛿𝜏 𝛾 𝛿
 
𝑋𝜏  
𝑋 
   𝛿𝜏 
 
GENERALISED: 
SIMPLE  𝛾  𝛿 : 
N/A qualitative 
descriptive model 
Instantaneous 
discount rate at time 
𝜏, defined as 
𝑓  𝜏 
𝑓 𝜏 
, 
𝑓 𝜏  being the 
discount function 
𝛿 
 
 
 
𝛾
   𝛿𝜏 
 
 
   𝛿𝜏 
 
GENERALISED: 
SIMPLE  𝛾  𝛿 : 
N/A qualitative 
descriptive model 
Relativity between 
outcome at time T 
and identical 
outcome at time t 
(with T>t) 
𝑒 𝛿 𝑇 𝑡  
(
   𝛿𝑡 
   𝛿𝑇 
)
𝛾 𝛿
 
  𝛿𝑡
  𝛿𝑇
 
GENERALISED: 
SIMPLE  𝛾  𝛿 : 
 
 
  𝛿 𝑇  𝑡 𝑠
 
𝛿 𝑇 𝑡 
𝑠
 
HYPERBOLIC 
BASE: 
EXPONENTIAL 
BASE: 
Distinguishing 
features 
Discount rate is 
constant over time 
and unaffected by 
intervals.  That is, 
present value 
declines at a 
constant rate w.r.t. 
time delay. 
Discount rate is 
negatively related to 
the delay between 
the present and the 
future outcome.  That 
is, present value 
declines at a 
decreasing rate w.r.t. 
time delay. 
Discount rate is 
negatively related to 
the interval between 
the two outcomes, 
and in the hyperbolic 
case also to the delay 
between the present 
and the future 
outcome. 
Relativity 
 
Decreases with T 
and with (T-t) at 
the same rate 
Decreases with T and 
with (T-t) 
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elements to identify these distinguishing features.  This means that survey data like the 
R-R data from Study 2 is sufficient to infer discount rates and discount functions, 
motivating the analysis in this Chapter.  The analysis will consider whether simple 
hyperbolic, exponential or sub-additive discounting is the most appropriate assumption 
for the majority of the sample, as well as eliciting rates of time preference under each 
assumption.  This will then provide empirical evidence about the appropriateness of the 
process used in typical studies and in government policy, which is to enter latency 
linearly into calculations considering outcomes at different times.  
7.4  Study 2b Methodology and Plan for Analysis 
The methodology for Study 2 was outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.8.  It formed the 
basis for the risk preference analysis in Chapter 6 and will again be analysed here, but 
with a focus on time preferences and latency.  The main features of the methodology are 
re-capped in this section.   
 
In order to analyse time preference in the context of health and physical risk, a series of 
R-R trades with different underlying time scales were presented to respondents.  
Respondents answered ten risk-risk trade questions with cancer and road accident 
timings as shown in Table 7.2.  In every question, respondents compared cancer fatality 
risks in the future (between 5 and 25 years from now) to road accident risks sooner 
(between 1 and 10 years from now).   
Table 7.2: Latency differentials and average delays 
Question Code 
 
Cancer 
 
Roads 
Latency 
differential 
(years) 
Average 
Delay 
(years) 
1 C10R1 10 1 9 5.5 
2 C10R2 10 2 8 6 
3 C25R2 25 2 23 13.5 
4 C5R2 5 2 3 3.5 
5 C7R2 7 2 5 4.5 
6 C15R2 15 2 13 8.5 
7 C10R5 10 5 5 7.5 
8 C10R7 10 7 3 8.5 
9 C25R10 25 10 15 17.5 
10 C10R10 10 10 0 10 
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Respondents also provided information about their risk preferences in the domains of 
finance and health (see Chapter 6 for a full discussion) and then completed a financial 
time preference elicitation exercise, which involved “larger later or smaller sooner” 
choices between money amounts (Coller and Williams, 1999). See the methodology 
Section for more details. 
So far this Chapter has discussed the three main alternative discounting hypotheses- 
exponential, hyperbolic and sub-additive- and has recapped the methodology employed 
to elicit the Risk-Risk trade-off data that will form the basis for the coming analysis.  
The following Sections will discuss the sample and the results in overview, then analyse 
the data to ascertain likely discounting functions and rates for this sample. 
The results analysis will take the following structure:  Initially the information about 
financial time preferences will be discussed, in order to allow comparison of this sample 
with estimates from the literature.  Next, a preliminary discussion of the relativities and 
latency will be provided.  This takes the same structure as the analysis of latency in 
Study 1, reported in Chapter 2, and confirms that latency matters in determining the 
VSL for this sample, mirroring the result from Study 1. 
Building upon this basis, the analysis takes account of the different latency periods in 
more detail.  The behaviour of the overall relativities (CTRt) in response to the 
underlying timing of the scenarios will be presented.  Following this, discount rates will 
be derived under the assumption of exponential discounting, and will be analysed both 
at the aggregate level and at the level of the individual.  This latter analysis will result in 
the classification of individuals as either standard or non-standard discounters, and 
within this will provide the basis for a Probit analysis to examine whether the 
discounting classification can be predicted by personal characteristics.   Finally, for each 
discounting assumption, rates will be estimated and discussed.  The sample statistics 
were provided in Chapter 5 and so will not be discussed here. 
7.5  Results 
7.5.1  Financial time preference 
As explained in the Methodology Section, financial time preferences are elicited for 
each individual using a “smaller sooner or larger later” framework, similar to that 
proposed by Coller and Williams (1999) and used in Andersen et al. (2008).  Of course, 
budget constraints and hypothetical biases may have had a role to play in determining 
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the choice of switching row, but the switching rows are assumed to provide a reasonable 
proxy for the respondents’ preferences over timings of outcomes.  This information is 
converted into an exponential discount rate, under the assumption that the individual 
would always choose the option with the largest present value. The resulting 
distribution is presented in Figure 7.1. 
The distribution of the elicited financial discount rates is fairly even across options, 
although it appears to decline after the 30%p.a. mark.  There is no clearly discernible 
peak.  It ought to be noted that the design allows only positive discount rates and the 
highest possible discount rate to be inferred is below 0.5.  However, if this was a 
constraint for respondents, it would be expected that there would be peaks at the upper 
and lower ends of the distribution, and this is not the case. 
 
The mean financial exponential discount rate is 18.5% p.a. (s.d. 10.7%) and the median 
is 17%.  This is comparable to estimates in much of the literature.  Coller and Williams 
(1999) cite a range in the literature from 1% to over 1000%, while their own procedure 
(which is replicated in this Study) generates estimates between 17.5% and 20%.  
Andersen et al. (2008), who elicit discount rates with and without controlling for risk 
preferences, find a discount rate of 25.2% in the case without controlling for risk 
preference, which drops to 10.1% when they do control for risk aversion.  This suggests 
that the estimate from Study 2b is not dissimilar to estimates from the literature. 
 
Figure 7.1:  Exponential discount rate from financial comparisons 
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7.5.2  Risk-Risk relativities data 
Having discussed the financial time preferences of this sample, the analysis will turn to 
focus on the responses to the ten Risk-Risk trade-off questions that formed the main 
body of the experiment.  This will provide the basis for subsequent elicitation of the 
discount rate.  As described, the ten R-R questions elicited the relative strength of 
preference for avoiding risks of cancer   years in the future compared to risks of road 
accidents        years into the future. 
7.5.2.i  Trimming 
 
Similarly to the main sample, some respondents gave answers to the R-R questions that 
were above the a priori defined cut off level of 30million in 60 million.  That is, they 
gave relativities above 600,000:1. Trimming the sample to remove these responses 
resulted in less proportional loss than in Study 1.  Details are provided in Table 7.3.  
The high deletion rate for Q10 is likely to be due to a combination of two things.  It was 
always the last question to be answered so there may have been effects of fatigue.  In 
addition, it was the only question in which the scenarios differed along just one 
Table7.3:  Deletions 
Question Cleaning 
(untrimmed) 
Trimming 
(30million +) 
n n 
1 C10 :R1 106 104 
2 C10:R2 105 104 
3 C25:R2 106 105 
4 C5:R2 106 105 
5 C7:R2 105 105 
6 C15:R2 107 106 
7 C10:R5 106 106 
8 C10:R7 104 104 
9 C25:R10 108 107 
10 C10:R10 98 96 
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attribute, in this case context.  The discussion of Study 1 showed that single attribute 
questions tended to produce more extreme and potentially exaggerated results.  For 
these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising to observe a higher mean response for Q10 
compared to the earlier 9 questions. 
7.5.2.ii  Central tendencies 
 
Question Arithmetic 
Mean 
[confidence 
interval] 
(standard 
deviation) 
Median 
(percentiles) 
Geometric 
mean 
[confidence 
interval] 
 
Index 
[confidence 
interval] 
 
1 
(C10R1) 
 
 
(N=104) 
1162 
[-1126, 3451] 
(11766) 
0.67 
(25% = 0.25) 
(75% = 4.40) 
0.97 
[0.59, 1.60] 
0.93 
[0.73, 1.19] 
2 
(C10R2) 
(N=105) 8.65 
[2.58, 14.72] 
(31.20) 
0.67 
(25% = 0.19) 
(75% = 4.00) 
0.72 
[0.42, 1.23] 
0.89 
[0.70, 1.14] 
3 
(C25R2) 
 
(N=105) 61.14 
[-52.14, 
174.41] 
(585.33) 
0.25 
(25% = 0.14) 
(75% = 2.40) 
0.35 
[0.21, 0.59] 
0.57 
[0.43, 0.73] 
4 (C5R2) 
 
(N= 
105) 
12.68 
[4.81, 20.55] 
4.047) 
2.2 
(25% =0.35) 
(75% = 6.80) 
1.67 
[1.08, 2.58] 
1.29 
[1.02, 1.65] 
5 (C7R2) 
 
(N= 
105) 
10.34 
[3.68, 17.01] 
(34.46) 
1.5 
(25% = 0.26) 
(75% = 5.40) 
1.16 
[0.71, 1.89] 
1.13 
[0.89, 1.45] 
6 
(C15R2) 
 
(N= 
106) 
11.91 
[-0.07, 23.88] 
(61.88) 
0.36 
(25% = 0.19) 
(75% = 3.8) 
0.61 
[0.37, 1.01] 
0.74 
[0.58, 0.95] 
7 
(C10R5) 
 
(N= 
105) 
959.73 
[-928.74, 
2848.20] 
(9758.31) 
1.3 
(25% = 0.28) 
(75% = 4.40) 
1.02 
[0.59, 1.77] 
1.05 
[0.83, 1.34] 
8 
(C10R7) 
 
(N= 
104) 
1356.56 
[-1313.03, 
4026.15] 
(13727.14) 
2.5 
(25% = 0.48) 
(75% = 6.10) 
1.67 
[1.00, 2.80] 
1.35 
[1.07, 0.71] 
9 
(C25R10) 
 
(N= 
107) 
7.964 
[1.07, 14.86] 
(35.81) 
0.38 
(25% = 0.19) 
(75% = 2.80) 
0.49 
[0.29, 0.83] 
0.71 
[0.55, 0.89] 
10 
(C10R10) 
(N=98) 17.24 
[8.29, 26.19] 
(44.17) 
4.60 
(25% = 1.40) 
(75% = 8.10) 
3.58 
[2.37, 5.41] 
2.18 
[1.73, 2.83] 
 
Table 7.4:  30 million trim central tendencies 
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The analysis will be performed on the responses trimmed to the 30million level.  None 
of the central tendency measures are significantly different between the 30 million and 
the untrimmed levels with the exception of the arithmetic mean which, as discussed, 
extensively in Section 3.3.1, is sensitive to high outliers.  As previously, this analysis 
will use the geometric mean as the predominant central tendency measure. 
7.5.3  Basic insights about latency and the R-R relativities 
Initially, a general overview of the responses to the Risk-Risk questions is presented, 
highlighting patterns that will be explored throughout the rest of this Chapter. The 
analysis mirrors Sections 4.7 and 4.9 in treating latency as an explanatory variable with 
a constant effect.  The explanatory variables chosen are those providing best fit from the 
full model used throughout the analysis of study 1. 
 
The respondents in the student sample answered ten cancer-later or roads-sooner risk-
risk questions as discussed above.  The central tendencies, at the 30million trim level, 
Table7.5: Study 2b basic regression 
Log of relativities Model (1) 
student 
Model (2) 
student 
Model (3) 
student 
N=1022 N=993 N=814 
R
2
= 0.064 R
2
= 0.110 R
2
=0.155 
Latency 
(differential in years) 
-0.084*** 
(0.009) 
-0.085*** 
(0.009) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
Self-Reported road 
accident risk 
- -0.420** 
(0.174) 
-0.464** 
(0.188) 
Experience of cancer 
 
- 0.609 
(0.379) 
0.706* 
(0.421) 
Health state  - 
 
- 0.420 
(0.286) 
Health risk aversion - 
 
- -0.132 
(0.128) 
Financial time preference  - 
 
- -1.067 
(1.423) 
Female - 
 
- -0.130 
(0.390) 
Financial risk preference - 
 
- -0.287 
(0.396) 
Constant 0.837*** 
(0.178) 
1.145*** 
(0.411) 
1.766* 
(0.950) 
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are provided in Table 7.4.  As would be expected, the larger the interval between cancer 
and road accidents, the smaller the VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  While the ‘context’ 
question, Q10, provided a relativity significantly greater than 1 indicating a preference 
for avoiding cancer risk increases ceteris paribus, the central tendencies for most of the 
questions are less than one.  This suggests that for this sample, latency offsets dread 
over the time intervals considered.  This mirrors the main insights from Study 1.  
A basic multiple regression of the relativities on attributes is presented in Table7.5.  In 
this regression, latency is entered linearly.  Clearly, timing as defined by the difference 
in latency periods between the two fatality risk scenarios was very important 
(significant at the 1% level in all specifications) in determining the overall 
VSLCAN:VSL relativity.  This regression is the counterpart of the summary regression in 
Chapter 2, although contains fewer attribute variables because there is no variation in 
context and morbidity between the questions in Study 2. 
Following the procedure in the analysis of Study 1 in Chapter 2, the regression analysis 
reported in Table7.5 enters latency linearly into the regression, with an additional year 
of latency prior to the cancer fatality assumed to have a constant effect on the logged 
relativity, holding the timing of the road accident constant.  This serves as a benchmark 
against which the more sophisticated analysis provided in the rest of this Chapter can be 
compared.   
This survey was designed to allow much richer analysis of time preferences by 
incorporating a range of latency differentials, which can be plotted and compared in a 
variety of ways to attempt to infer the nature of discounting in this sample, and hence 
eliminating the need to assume the relationship.  The plan for the analysis is presented 
next. 
7.5.4  Discounting analysis roadmap 
In the coming sections, the data will be analysed to fully explore the impact of timing 
and discounting in this Study.  Initially, the effect of the latency periods on the 
relativities for Study 2 is analysed is detail.  The relativities display a decreasing pattern 
with the increase in interval, as expected.  The relativities are regressed against various 
timing elements of the scenarios, including the timing of the latest risk increase, the 
average delay and the latency differential.  This analysis is conducted using the 
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relativities on an individual level, to maximise the sample size and allow the inclusion 
of demographics in explaining the relativities. 
Subsequently, underlying discount rates are elicited under the assumption of 
exponential discounting. The ten questions are paired into 45 combinations and 
simultaneous equation techniques as set out in Section 4.11 in Chapter 2 are used to 
generate up to 45 discount rates per individual.  The rates are analysed to explore their 
sensitivity to the latency differential and the delay incorporated in the scenarios that 
underpin them.  Both the latency differential and the average delay are statistically 
significant in explaining the discount rates, which suggests that exponential discounting 
may not be an appropriate assumption for the sample.  
Finally, the individuals themselves are categorised as being exponential or non-standard 
discounters.  Probit analysis is unable to explain the difference, with the exception that a 
higher coefficient of health risk aversion (HRA) reduces the likelihood that the 
individual is classified as an exponential discounter.  The discount rates are re-estimated 
under the assumption of non-exponential discounting using first hyperbolic and then 
sub-additive discounting assumptions.  These rates are analysed with the conclusion that 
a sub-additive assumption best reflects the preferences of the majority of non-standard 
discounters. 
7.5.5  How does the relativity behave as a function of timing? 
As described, the data is first analysed in aggregate, using sample geometric mean 
relativities for each question.  The first stage in estimating the functional form of the 
relationship between the VSLCAN:VSL relativity and latency is to plot the sample 
average relativities against the latency differential underpinning them.  Here, the latency 
differential is defined as the number of additional years of latency in the cancer case 
compared to the road accident case. 
Table 7.6 with question numbers, codes, latency differentials and central tendencies is 
provided for reference.  The geometric mean, along with the upper and lower 
confidence intervals, can be plotted in a simple line graph, as shown in Figure 7.2.   
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This places no parametric restrictions on the data and allows an initial investigation of 
the responses to be conducted by eye.  
The plot shows a declining pattern as would be expected, because the further into the 
future the cancer risk is compared to the road accident risk, the weight it will have in the 
comparison with a road accident sooner.   The latency differential appears to reduce the 
relativity, ceteris paribus.  It is not immediately clear what functional form can best fit 
this data, although the decline appears to be more pronounced over shorter latency 
differentials.    
 
Table 7.6: Latency differentials, average delays and corresponding relativities 
Question Code Latency 
differential 
(years) 
Average 
Delay 
(years) 
Geometric 
mean 
(30mill trim) 
95% confidence 
interval 
1 C10R1 9 5.5 0.97 [0.59, 1.60] 
2 C10R2 8 6 0.72 [0.42, 1.23] 
3 C25R2 23 13.5 0.35 [0.21, 0.59] 
4 C5R2 3 3.5 1.67 [1.08, 2.58] 
5 C7R2 5 4.5 1.16 [0.71, 1.89] 
6 C15R2 13 8.5 0.61 [0.37, 1.01] 
7 C10R5 5 7.5 1.02 [0.59, 1.77] 
8 C10R7 3 8.5 1.67 [1.00, 2.80] 
9 C25R10 15 17.5 0.49 [0.29, 0.83] 
10 C10R10 0 10 3.58 [2.37, 5.41] 
 
Figure 7.2:  Relativities as a function of latency differential 
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7.5.5.i  Nonparametric and semi-parametric estimation 
Nonparametric estimation allows the models to be estimated without pre-specifying a 
linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  The Lowess 
(locally weighted scatterplot smoother) command in Stata conducts a local polynomial 
regression technique in order to plot a smooth curve through the data-points.  At regular 
points along the x axis, so in this case for every latency period, the data-points within a 
pre-defined bandwidth around the x value are weighted according to their distance from 
the focal point, and a best fit line is generated for them.  This is repeated for each x, 
generating a smoothed function for the data.  The resulting graphs are given in Figures 
7.3 and 7.4, with the former representing the relativities themselves and the latter 
illustrating the 95% confidence intervals around the Lowess line, and using logged 
relativities. 
 
Figure 7.3: Relativities as a function of latency differential, Lowess smoothing 
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7.5.5.ii  Individual-level analysis 
The preceding analysis simply used the sample average relativities and as such relied on 
ten data-points, but data are generated on the level of the individual.  Plotting this 
pooled data allows a larger sample size and in addition allows the analysis of 
demographics.  As a first step, each of the 1042 individual relativities are pooled and 
plotted as a function of the latency differential.  Again, Stata’s Lowess command is 
used to allow the data to speak without imposing any functional form onto the 
relationship.  
 
Figure 7.4: Log of relativities as a function of latency differential, Lowess 
smoothing with 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 7.5: Log of relativities as a function of latency differential, individual level 
relativities 
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Again a downward trend emerges in the logged relativity as a function of latency, which 
suggests that the effective discount rate is positive. 
The previous basic regressions for this sample, reported in Table 7.5, suggested that 
cancer experience and self-reported road accident risks are also important in 
determining the relativity.  As such, and given the dummy nature of these explanatory 
variables, a semi-parametric model is likely to be useful in determining the influence of 
latency on the relativity.  As such, the following two models will be estimated: 
                                            (Model2a/3a) 
                                                             
                                                   
         (Model 2b/3b) 
 
The logged relativity is assumed to be linearly related to road accident risks, cancer 
experience, and in model b also to current health state, health risk aversion, financial 
time preference, gender and financial risk aversion, which is the ‘full’ regression model 
reported in Table7.5 (pg.208).  The relationship with the timing differences is left 
unparameterized.   
Table 7.7:  Semi-parametric regressions 
Logged relativity Model (2a) Model (3a) Model (2b) Model (3b) 
N=992 N=843 N=992 N=857 
Adj-R
2
= 
0.0004 
Adj-R
2
= 
0.0514 
Adj-R
2
= 
0.0006 
Adj-R
2
= 
0.0351 
Latency 
(differential in years) 
V=8.786 
(P>|V|= 
0.000) 
V=8.097 
(P>|V|= 
0.000) 
- - 
Delay 
(average in years) 
- - V=4.812 
(P>|V|= 
0.000) 
V=3.233 
(P>|V|= 
0.001) 
Self-Reported road accident 
risk 
0.541 
(0.338) 
-0.547* 
(0.330) 
0.469 
(0.333) 
-0.577* 
(0.332) 
Experience of cancer 
 
-0.688 
(0.510) 
1.230*** 
(0.478) 
-0.748 
(0.506) 
0.922* 
(0.483) 
Health state  - 
 
0.331 
(0.293) 
- 0.366 
(0.296) 
Health risk aversion - 
 
-0.351*** 
(0.126) 
- -0.313** 
(0.127) 
Financial time preference  - 
 
-2.969*** 
(1.019) 
- -2.862*** 
(1.030) 
Female - 
 
-0.401* 
(0.237) 
- -0.423* 
(0.239) 
Financial risk preference - 
 
-0.292* 
(0.175) 
- -0.274 
(0.178) 
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Time is included in two ways, first as the latency differential between the scenarios 
under comparison, and second as the average delay until the outcomes.  As discussed in 
the theory section, the relativities and discount rates are likely to behave differently as a 
function of the latency differential compared to the average delay.   
Assuming additive separability of the partial and non-partial effects, that the timing 
function is a smooth and single-valued function with bounded first derivative, and that 
the error term is independently and identically distributed, the differencing procedure 
described in Lokshin (2006) can be performed using the Stata command plreg
40
. 
The adjusted R
2
 of model (2a) is low, at 0.0004, but the influence of latency is estimated 
to be significant at the 1% level, with a p-value of <0.0001.  Neither road accident risk 
or cancer experience is significant in this specification.  However, the inclusion of other 
demographics in model (3a) generates significant coefficients for self-reported road 
accident risk and experience of cancer in the expected direction.  In addition, risk 
aversion over health states and finance, and having higher financial discount rates and 
being female all appear to significantly reduce the logged relativity.  The difference 
between the two models suggests some instability of the coefficients, although the main 
effects of interest, latency differential and delay, are significant in both models. 
To complement the analysis in table 7.7A, four further regressions are run.  This time, a 
different approach to the non-parametric inclusion of delay and of interval is taken, with 
the different delays and intervals are included as dummy variables.  This allows better 
interpretation of significance than the previous non-parametric results.  The choice of 
bandwidth is determined by the survey design- breaking the intervals and delays down 
would result in empty intervals, while including fewer dummy variables would mean 
losing detail. As such, the existing delays and intervals are used.  The reference 
categories omitted from the regressions are zero differential and 3.5 year delay.  The 
sign and significance of the coefficients on these dummy variables allows the 
importance of the delay and differential to be established.  The results are in table 7.7A. 
The dummies for the delay and for the differentials are significant which supports the 
previous results in suggesting that timing significantly influences the ratio between the 
latent cancer and the sooner road accident.  R
2
 is slightly higher for the differential cases 
than the delay cases.  The demographic variables are stable across each model. 
                                                          
40
 The regression model uses Yatchew’s weighting matrix to estimate the impacts of 
latency on the logged relativity.   
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Table 7.7A:  Regressions using dummy variables for timing aspects 
Logged relativity Model (2a) Model (3a) Model (2b) Model (3b) 
N=1013 N=858 N=1013 N=858 
R
2
= 0.0840 R
2
= 0.1408 R
2
= 0.0770 R
2
= 0.1292 
Differential = 3 
 
-0.766*** 
(0.164) 
-0.690*** 
(0.176) 
- - 
Differential = 5 
 
-1.160*** 
(0.181) 
-1.045*** 
(0.180) 
- - 
Differential = 8 
 
-1.603*** 
(0.220) 
-1.448*** 
(0.203) 
- - 
Differential = 9 
 
-1.297*** 
(0.216) 
-1.375*** 
(0.203) 
- - 
Differential = 13 
 
-1.760*** 
(0.206) 
-1.820*** 
(0.239) 
- - 
Differential = 15 
 
-2.012*** 
(0.234) 
-1.980*** 
(0.223) 
- - 
Differential = 23 
 
-2.340*** 
(0.233) 
-2.396*** 
(0.261) 
- - 
Delay = 3.5 
 
- -   
Delay = 4.5 
 
- - -0.354*** 
(0.112) 
-0.249*** 
(0.071) 
Delay = 5.5 
 
- - -0.524*** 
(0.183) 
-0.578*** 
(0.156) 
Delay = 6 
 
- - -0.830*** 
(0.176) 
-0.651*** 
(0.130) 
Delay = 7.5 
 
- - -0.419* 
(0.236) 
-0.247 
(0.232) 
Delay = 8.5 
 
- - -0.491*** 
(0.116) 
-0.414*** 
(0.111) 
Delay = 10 
 
- - 0.773*** 
(0.154) 
0.797*** 
(0.172) 
Delay = 13.5 
 
- - -1.567*** 
(0.178) 
-1.599*** 
(0.199) 
Delay = 17.5 
 
- - -1.239*** 
(0.233) 
-1.183*** 
(0.231) 
Self-Reported road 
accident risk 
-0.360* 
(0197) 
-0.402* 
(0.207) 
-0.360* 
(0.197) 
-0.402* 
(0.208) 
Experience of cancer 
 
0.650 
(0.440) 
0.672 
(0.428) 
0.651 
(0.440) 
0.672 
(0.428) 
Health state  - 
 
0.562* 
(0.309) 
- 0.561* 
(0.309) 
Health risk aversion - 
 
-0.104 
(0.210) 
- -0.104 
(0.211) 
Financial time 
preference  
- 
 
-2.530 
(2.054) 
- -2.541 
(2.057) 
Female - 
 
-0.383 
(0.465) 
- -0.383 
(0.466) 
Financial risk 
preference 
- 
 
-0.387 
(0.366) 
- -0.384 
(0.367) 
Constant 0.722** 
(0.343) 
1.070* 
(0.593) 
-0.052 
(0.368) 
0.274 
(0.625) 
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The significance of the demographic variables is not the same as for the semi parametric 
cases.  Subjective risk of road accident fatality becomes negative and significant in the 
dummy models while current health state is positive and significant.  The semi-
parametric model looks very different.  Having said this, estimates of significance are 
more reliable using a parametric model (the dummy variable models in this case) than 
when using semi-parametric analysis.  
7.5.5.iii  Testing delay versus differentials in explaining the discount function 
As described, there are two distinct concepts to do with timing: delay and differential.  
The former refers to the delay from the present until the time of the future outcome.  
Given that the relativities incorporate two time periods (one for roads and one for 
cancer) either the average delay or the cancer delay could be used to capture this effect.  
The second concept, the latency differential, captures the length of time between the 
two outcomes under comparison, i.e. the time between the road accident fatality date 
and the cancer fatality date.  These definitions are summarised and exemplified in 
Figure 7.6. 
 
Delay is the more relevant concept for testing for hyperbolic discounting, as argued in 
Read (2001) and discussed in Section 7.2.3.  Any evidence of the impact of the latency 
differential on the relativity is indicative of sub-additive discounting as opposed to 
hyperbolic discounting, unless declining discount rates with delay can also be found. 
In this regression, latency differential and delay are both significant and both reduce the 
relativity.  However, as discussed, the differential and delay are confounded because a 
Figure 7.6: Definition of latency differential and average delay 
DEFINITIONS: 
Differential:   the difference between the time of the fatality from cancer and 
the time of the fatality in a road accident 
Average delay:  the mean of the time until the fatality from cancer and the time 
until the fatality in a road accident 
EXAMPLE:  Cancer in 10 years and road accident in 2 years (C10R2) 
Differential:    10 – 2 = 8 years 
 
Average delay:  (10+2)/2 = 6 years 
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long differential between cancer and car implies a long delay for the cancer risk.  When 
both differential and average delay change, the effects are difficult to disentangle.  As 
such, first the central tendencies will be revisited, and then further regressions run. 
 
There is no significant difference between the central tendencies of the relativities for 
the questions where the intervals are the same, but delay until the road accident risk is 
different.  This might suggest that the interval, not the delay, is the most important 
feature of the timing of the response.  These results are drawn from Table 7.8. 
To further explore this, four further regressions are run to investigate delay at face 
value.  Regression on delay is run for questions where road accident risks occur in 2 
years (Q2-6).  Next the regression is repeated for those questions where cancer risks 
occur in 10 years (Q1-2,Q7-8,and Q10).  Both regressions capture the differential effect.  
Finally, regression is run for those questions where the differential is 3 years (Q4 and 
Q8) and where it is 5 years (Q5 and Q7) in order to explore the ‘pure’ delay effect 
because the latency differential is held constant. The results are presented in Table 7.9. 
 
Table 7.8: Same latency differential different delay central tendency comparison 
Latency 
differential Roads the year after next 
Roads later (5 or 7 years 
from now) 
3 years C5R2 C10R7 
 1.67 1.67 
 [1.08, 2.58] [1.00, 2.80] 
5 years C7R2 C10R5 
 1.16 1.02 
 [0.71, 1.89] [1.00, 2.80] 
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7.5.5.iv  Summary of the analysis of relativities 
The analysis of latency’s impact on the relativity suggests a declining pattern of 
relativities with the interval between cancer and road accidents.  This is apparent in 
regression, both parametric and non-parametric, and additionally in the patterns when 
the relativities are plotted against latency intervals.  Demographic characteristics 
generally have limited influence on the relativity, but experience of cancer and self-
reported road accident risks appear to have a significant effect.  In addition, risk 
preferences over health are significant.  The declining relativity with latency is 
unsurprising from a theoretical perspective: the more distant the bad outcome
41
 the less 
bad it appears to be.  
                                                          
41
 Cancer can be shown to be considered the “bad outcome” through observing the high 
relativity in question 10, C10R10. 
Table 7.9: Semi-parametric regressions on specific question sets 
log ratio Model (4) 
Road 
accidents in 2 
years 
Model (5) 
Cancer in 10 
years 
Model (6) 
Differential 
of  
3 years 
Model (7) 
Differential of  
5 years 
 N=425 N=416 N=168 N=169 
 Adj-R
2
= 
0.0658 
Adj-R
2
= 
0.0143 
Adj-R
2
= -
0.0177 
Adj-R
2
= -0.0178 
Delay 
(average in 
years) 
V=2.031** 
(P>|V|= 0.021) 
V=2.797*** 
(P>|V|= 0.003) 
V=0.527 
(P>|V|= 0.299) 
V=-0.103 
(P>|V|= 0.514) 
Self-Reported 
road accident 
risk 
-0.634 
(0.403) 
-0.698* 
(0.378) 
-0.906 
(0.710) 
-0.785 
(0.755) 
Experience of 
cancer 
1.684*** 
(0.567) 
0.289 
(0.531) 
0.328 
(0.862) 
0.293 
(0.915) 
Health state 0.153 
(0.342) 
0.529 
(0.326) 
0.311 
(0.512) 
0.422 
(0.227) 
Health risk 
aversion 
-0.545*** 
(0.144) 
-0.192 
(0.135) 
-0.087 
(0.214) 
-1.672 
(0.227) 
Financial time 
preference 
-0.531 
(0.932) 
-0.930 
(0.890) 
-1.054 
(1.382) 
-1.245 
(1.463) 
Female -0.078 
(0.278) 
-0.141 
(0.261) 
-0.012 
(0.407) 
-0.112 
(0.433) 
Financial risk 
preference 
-0.083 
(0.208) 
-0.020 
(0.198) 
0.219 
(0.316) 
0.028 
(0.0329) 
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In terms of the discounting function likely to characterise this sample, two main 
observations can be made so far.  First, the declining pattern of the relativity with 
latency would suggest that discount rates above zero characterise the majority of the 
sample.  Second, the central tendency measures are indistinguishable for the questions 
with the same latency differential (3 years and 5 years in Q4 and 7 and in Q5 and 6 
respectively) but which differ in terms of whether the soonest risk is now or in the 
future.  This could be seen as evidence for exponential discounting or for sub-additive 
discounting, and against hyperbolic discounting.  Although the wide confidence 
intervals would preclude using this alone as grounds to dismiss hyperbolic discounting, 
regression analysis of the relevant questions on delay suggested that delay is 
insignificant except as a proxy for the differential. 
As such, there is some evidence for non-standard discounting but also some evidence 
against it, and further investigation of the effective discount rates implied by the data 
will be necessary to give a clear understanding of whether exponential or non-standard 
discounting assumptions are better suited for these data.  To this end, the underlying 
exponential discount rates themselves will be elicited and analysed in Sections 7.5.6 to 
7.5.8. 
7.5.6  Eliciting exponential discount rates 
Typically, the literature assumes that either exponential or hyperbolic discounting 
applies in the judgements of members of the public.  However, there is rarely any 
attempt made to distinguish which of these models best reflects the actual preferences of 
the sample.  Traditionally, a constant exponential discount rate is assumed.  Following 
this precedent, Chapter 2 specified the relationship in two equations:  
                   (A1) 
      
  
      
   {   }         (A2) 
the second of which demonstrates the exponential discounting assumption. 
For this Section, assumption (A1) is retained.  Assumption (A2) will be replaced with 
an alternative specification (assumption (A3)) which allows for more straight forward 
elicitation, and applies a continuous discounting assumption.  
         
      {   }        (A3) 
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The exponential discount rates can be elicited on a sample and a per-person level, and 
the patterns studied to determine whether exponential discounting appears to be a 
reasonable approximation for this Study. 
7.5.6.i  Exponential discount rates- sample averages 
Equations (A2) and (A3) are applied to the CTRt VSL framework, and give equation 
(85).   
            
               (85) 
To solve for  , combining two relativities CTRt and CT’Rt’ , and letting 
    
      
   gives: 
      (
      (     ))
       (86) 
where the only unknown is  . 
Solving for   generates a mean discount rate of 11.0% (s.d. 9.15%) and a median of 
10.1%.  These rates are lower than the discount rates elicited over finance (18% p.a., 
pg.204), but the difference is not significant.  The elicited rates are all positive except 
where Q1 and Q2 are combined.  This anomaly reflects the increase in relativity from 
Q1 to Q2 which is likely due to a perceived increase in baseline road accident risks 
upon graduation, as discussed in more detail in the upcoming Section 7.5.7.  The 
discount rates are within sensible bounds in comparison to the literature (see the 
discount rate table in the earlier literature review, Chapter 2, pg.44), although there is 
substantial variation between question combinations.  The general picture supports the 
theoretical prediction, largely supported in the literature, that health (and perhaps 
fatality risk) is discounted at a lower rate than money.  See the literature review for 
more detail on this argument. 
Each relativity combination, , and hence each elicited discount rate, comes with an 
associated average latency differential (for example the rate calculated from C25R10 and 
C5R2 has an average interval of (15+3)/2 = 9 years) and with an average associated 
delay (for the same example, ((25+10)+(5+2))/4 = 21 years).  Information is available 
on the timing of each of the risks faced in each of the four scenarios that combined to 
generate the discount rate, so it is also possible to control for the pairs where at least one 
of the risks occurred during the coming year or the year after next, and where neither 
risk occurs until much later.  
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The discount rates in Table 7.10 are calculated using the sample average relativities, and 
as such there are just 43 rates for the analysis.  Therefore regression analysis on this 
level would not be particularly robust.  However, it is insightful to consider the 
population average exponential discount rates diagrammatically.  The discount rate is 
plotted against the latency differential and against the average delay for the two 
questions used to elicit them.  Initially, this is done for every point estimate (Figures 7.7 
and 7.8), then repeated averaging the rates for each question (1-10) in order to decrease 
the influence of any outlier question pairs and to provide a smoother curve for 
interpretation in Figures 7.9 and 7.10.  Finally, the Lowess smoothed plot is used to give 
a simplified idea of the pattern while not imposing any parametric assumptions (Figures 
7.11 and 7.12). 
Table 7.10: Matrix of elicited effective discount rates- exponential assumption 
Cause 
A C10R1 C10R2 C25R2 C5R2 C7R2 C15R2 C10R5 C10R7 C25R10 C10R10 
Cause 
B 0.97 0.72 0.35 1.67 1.16 0.61 1.02 1.67 0.49 3.58 
C10R1 . . . . . . . . . . 
C10R2 -0.29 . . . . . . . . . 
C25R2 0.07 0.05 . . . . . . . . 
C5R2 0.09 0.17 0.08 . . . . . . . 
C7R2 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.18 . . . . . . 
C15R2 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.08 . . . . . 
C10R5 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.25 . 0.06 . . . . 
C10R7 0.09 0.17 0.08 . 0.18 0.10 0.25 . . . 
C25R10 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.10 . . 
C10R10 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.25 0.13 . 
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Figure 7.7 appears to display a downward trend, so it appears that the latency 
differential has a negative effect on the exponential discount rate.  This could be 
symptomatic of sub-additive discounting.  Figure 7.8 is harder to interpret because of 
the clear outlier apparent in the delay specification at 5.5 years, which relates to the 
combination of Q1-Q2.  This can be smoothed out somewhat by using the question 
average data as follows: 
Figure 7.7: All point estimates against latency differential 
Figure 7.8: All point estimates against average delay 
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Again, peculiar behaviour can be seen around the 9 year differential mark which 
indicates behaviour in Q1 that is anomalous compared to the rest of the sample.  The 
plots are re-run without Q1 and also without Q1 or Q10 in order to remove the influence 
of both questions over which concerns had been raised (see Section 7.5.2.i).  The plots 
are provided in Appendix G.  This smooths the graph over the latency differential, but 
not over average delay.  This might suggest that there is something fundamentally non-
linear about the way that the discount rate behaves with respect to delay, which is not 
related to anomalous answers.  To explore how the data appears when smoothed, 
Lowess regressions are run, and reported in Figures 7.11 and 7.12. 
Figure 7.9: Question average exponential discount rates against latency differential 
Figure 7.10: Question average exponential discount rates against average delay 
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As expected, the function for the latency differential is smooth and decreasing while the 
function for the average delay is not monotonically decreasing.  However, in all it does 
appear that the exponential discount rate declines both with the average delay and with 
the latency differential. 
7.5.6.ii  Exponential discount rates- individual level 
In exactly the same way as for the sample average relativities, exponential discount 
rates are elicited on an individual level.  The mean discount rate is 12.0% (s.d. 42.0%) 
and the median is 6.0%.  Again, this falls within the range in Table 2.1 (Chapter 2) 
which outlined existing estimates in the literature. 
Figure 7.11: Lowess smoothing sample average exponential discount rates against 
latency differential 
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Figure 7.12: Lowess smoothing sample average exponential discount rates against 
average delay 
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The discount rates can be represented as a histogram, as shown in Figure 7.13.  
Observations that fall outside the bounds + or -1 are excluded, in order to ‘zoom in’ and 
display the shape of the distribution of discount rates.  There is a peak at zero or low 
discounting and the majority of observations are positive, but with some exceptions.  
The data have long tails in both directions. 
 
Eliciting  the exponential discount rates on the per-person level generates a sample 
incorporating up to 43 rates per person, so regressions can be run on this (pooled) 
sample with some degree of confidence. 
7.5.7  Regression on attributes 
Initially, regressions are run on variables that capture aspects of the timing of the 
scenarios.  If the exponential discounting function is appropriate, regression of the 
discount rate on the latency differential or on the average delay should generate an 
insignificant coefficient on the timing variable.  The same can be said for the timing of 
the soonest risk and of the latest.  Significance of any of these coefficients indicates 
non-standard discounting.  However, the simple plots on the sample level did suggest a 
negative relationship in both the average delay and the latency differential 
specifications, and as such it would be unsurprising to find significance.   
Figure 7.13:  Exponential discount rate from fatality risk relativities (Zoomed in to between -
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The results are clustered on the individual as opposed to on the question
42
.  Robust 
standard errors are estimated.  The results are presented in Table7.11. 
Model (1) picks up the influence of the timing of the earliest and latest risks and as 
predicted by non-standard discounting the sooner the soonest risk, the higher the 
discount rate.  The rates decline over time as the latest risks are postponed.  A dummy 
variable for C10R10 is included because of the potentially anomalous behaviour seen in 
response to this question as discussed above.   Comparisons including the C10R10 
question tend to elicit significantly higher discount rates, the reason for which is 
unclear.  Although the dummy for C10R1 is significant, its sign is negative suggesting 
that the average discount rate is lower when one of the four scenarios is road accidents 
in the very near future.  This is opposite to the quasi-hyperbolic prediction but can be 
explained by the fact, recorded qualitatively by some respondents, that while they are 
                                                          
42
 It was considered that individual-specific homogeneity in answering the questions 
would be more important than question-specific homogeneity because of the wide range 
of between-individual heterogeneity in answering and the relative stability of responses 
within individuals across questions.  Also attributes of the questions are investigated 
using the dummy variables for timing. 
Table 7.11: Exponential, per-individual discount rate: regressions on scenario attributes 
Discount rate Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
N=4345 N=4345 N=4345 N=4345 N=4345 
R
2
=0.014 R
2
= 0.017 R
2
= 0.004 R
2
=0.017 R
2
= 0.001 
latency 
differential 
- -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
- -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
Average delay - - -0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
Delay until 
soonest road 
accident risk 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
- - - - 
Delay until latest 
cancer risk 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
- - - - 
C10R1dum -0.035** 
(0.014) 
- - - -0.023** 
(0.011) 
C10R10dum 0.050* 
(0.027) 
- - - 0.028 
(0.030) 
Constant 0.208*** 
(0.044) 
0.229*** 
(0.028) 
0.207*** 
(0.039) 
0.213*** 
(0.039) 
0.223*** 
(0.042) 
 
228 
 
students they rarely drive but during the year after next they will have graduated and 
hence be in cars more often.  However, further tests (not reported here) suggest that 
including these variables does not appear to destabilise the coefficients on the other 
significant parameters. 
Models (2)-(5) explore latency differentials and delay as explanations for the discount 
rate.  Model (2) includes the latency differential, whose coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  That is, the outcomes where the latency differential is larger 
are discounted less than those where the outcomes are closer together.  This provides 
support for the theory of sub-additive discounting.  Model (3) repeats this analysis using 
delay as the timing variable and finds a similar result: the longer the average delay 
involved in the generation of the discount rate, the lower the rate is likely to be.  This is 
in line with the theory of hyperbolic discounting but not incompatible with sub-additive 
discounting.   
Model (4) addresses the problem that the delay parameter might simply be acting as a 
proxy for the interval between the two outcomes.  As such, both are included and the 
coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of one timing variable when controlling for 
the other.  This time, delay is insignificant even at the 10% level, while the significance 
of the latency differential is maintained and the coefficient appears to be stable.  Model 
(5) extends model (3) to control for the influence of the ‘outlier’ questions C10R1 and 
C10R10.  The pattern of sign and significance is robust to their inclusion.  
Taken together, these results suggest a declining pattern of discount rates with latency 
differential, indicating elements of non-standard discounting.  While the delay 
parameter is negative and significant, it is not robust because the inclusion of the 
latency differential removes the significance of delay. It is likely that the negative 
coefficient on delay simply reflects its role as a proxy for the latency differential. 
It is not possible to reliably test for quasi-hyperbolic discounting with these data.  The 
discussion above of the significant negative coefficient on the dummy for C10R1 
suggests that the dummy for road accident risks now might be picking up more of a 
baseline risk effect than a discounting effect, and therefore it cannot be claimed that the 
result provides any reliable insight into the presence or absence of quasi-hyperbolic 
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discounting in the traditional sense.  The analysis will therefore consider only 
exponential, simple hyperbolic
43
 and sub-additive discounting. 
7.5.8  Regression on attributes and demographics  
A great advantage of using information at the level of the individual is that demographic 
and preference-related characteristics can be controlled for.  As discussed, information 
is available on basic demographics, on exposure and experience with the risks in 
question, and also on preferences over time in the financial domain.  The models are 
threefold: model (1) incorporates preference related characteristics, model (2) 
observable demographics, and model (3) incorporates all of these explanatory variables. 
 
                                                          
43
 In principle the methodology could be extended to capture quasi-hyperbolic effects if 
personalised baseline risks could be presented and controlled for. 
Table 7.12: Exponential, per-individual discount rate: regressions on scenario 
attributes and demographics 
 Discount rate Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
N=3606 N=3770 N=3065 
R
2
= 0.010 R
2
= 0.001 R
2
= 0.019 
Self-Reported road accident risk -0.019 
(0.017) 
- -0.022 
(0.017) 
Experience of cancer 
 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
- -0.042** 
(0.018) 
Health state  -0.008 
(0.022) 
- -0.008 
(0.018) 
Health risk aversion 0.029 
(0.018) 
- 0.033* 
(0.018) 
Financial time preference  0.097 
(0.173) 
- -0.036 
 (0.131) 
Financial risk preference -0.015 
(0.027) 
-  0.006 
(0.016) 
Road accident experience 0.044 
(0.027) 
- 0.076*** 
(0.024) 
Female - 0.021 
(0.021) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
Age (years) - 0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Household  income - -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant  0.084 
(0.024) 
0.100 
(0.117) 
0.091 
(0.119) 
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Exponential financial discount rates as inferred from the financial intertemporal trade-
off questions (see pg.204 for a discussion) are insignificant in explaining the size of the 
discount rate.   In fact, no demographics or preference related characteristics are able to 
explain the discount rate when either observable (in model (1)) or preference-related (in 
model (2)) characteristics are considered separately.  This includes the risk preferences 
defined over health as elicited in Chapter 6, but also the financial risk preference 
proxies.  In Study 1, it was shown that preferences over latency were intrinsic and 
unrelated to demographics.  This result appears to have been replicated here, because 
preferences over time are not dependent upon characteristics or experience.  However 
(in model (3)), which pools models (1) and (2), the parameters on cancer experience, 
road accident experience and risk aversion in health all become significant.  The reason 
for this is unclear. 
In summary, the discount rate seems mostly intrinsic to the individual and is largely 
unrelated to personal characteristics.  The wide spread of discount rate values suggests a 
substantial heterogeneity in discounting preferences in this sample.  This might imply 
heterogeneity in terms of whether exponential discounting or non-standard discounting 
best reflects their preferences for intertemporal outcomes.  The following Section looks 
in more detail at this issue, categorising individuals into their most appropriate 
discounting ‘types’. 
7.5.9  Classification of individuals 
First, the method for classifying individuals into discounting types is explained.  Then 
individuals are classified as exponential or non-standard, and Probit analysis is 
presented which aims to explain the difference in terms of demographics.  The next 
stage is to identify likely hyperbolic and sub-additive discounters amongst those who 
are non-standard in their discounting behaviour.  Further Probit analysis is used to 
explain this categorisation.  The following Section considers how to elicit discount rates 
for these individuals. 
7.5.9.i  Method 
The two indicators of non-exponential discounting used in this analysis are that the 
discount rate declines with increasing length of the latency differential (sub-additive 
discounting) and that the discount rate declines with the delay when controlling for the 
differential (hyperbolic discounting).  As such, for every individual (n-112), OLS 
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regression of their own inferred exponential discount rates on the latency differential 
and delay is conducted, and the label ‘non-exponential’ is assigned to any individual 
whose coefficient on one or both of the latency variables significantly differs from zero.  
Subsequently, for the non-exponential discounters, the significance and sign of the 
coefficient(s) is examined to categorise them as ‘hyperbolic’, ‘sub-additive’, ‘both’ or 
‘other’.  The   for each of the 104 regressions is usually 43, reflecting the maximum 
combinations of questions into pairs for the elicitation procedure (see pg.220) although 
for 8 individuals   is 34 (because the respondent did not answer one of the 10 
questions).  Four further respondents had between 14 and 27 elicited exponential 
discount rates.  8 individuals were dropped because they did not answer enough 
questions to elicit the coefficient (the   for the regressions would be ten or below). 
7.5.9.ii  Exponential versus non-standard discounting 
Any respondent with significant coefficients on one or both of the latency differential 
and delay parameters is classed as a non-standard discounter.  Out of the usable sample 
of 104, 36 respondents can be classed as likely exponential discounters, and 68 as non-
standard discounters.  That is, one third of respondents appear to apply constant 
discount rates across all time periods, regardless of the delay or the latency interval 
under consideration.  It should be noted that any respondent that consistently displayed 
zero discount rates would classify as an exponential discounter by these criteria. 
 
Table 7.13: Probit analysis on risk and time 
PROBIT: Exponential n=87 
LL= -52.25, 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0546 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Financial time preference  1.551 
(1.315) 
Time preference estimate (physical risk) 
(Q2-3 exponential) 
0.703 
(1.426) 
Financial risk preference 0.378 
(0.252) 
Health risk preference -0.286* 
(0.156) 
Constant  -0.805*** 
(0.290) 
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Probit analysis of the likelihood of being an exponential discounter does not generate 
any significant coefficients, either for the preference-related parameters, risk 
preferences or financial time preferences.  This suggests again that discounting is an 
intrinsic personal characteristic and cannot be explained by demographics or other 
preferences.  The variable selection tool vselect in Stata suggests that the most 
influential factors are financial time preference, financial risk preference and health 
state risk aversion.  A regression on only (health and finance versions of) risk and time 
preference generates significance on the coefficient on the health-state risk aversion.  
The more risk averse a person is over health states, the more likely they are to display 
non-standard discounting, with a preference for avoiding risk increases sooner.  The full 
Probit results are provided in Appendix J, but the model on risk and time preferences is 
provided in Table7.13. 
7.5.9.iii  Non-standard discounting: hyperbolic, sub-additive, both or other? 
Having established that exponential discounting can only account for around 35% of the 
sample, it is interesting to examine how the remaining 65% behave.  Recall, those 
categorised as ‘sub-additive’ have discount rates that decline with the interval between 
the outcomes, and those categorised as ‘hyperbolic’ have discount rates that decline 
with the delay from the present until the outcome.  The two classifications are not 
mutually exclusive, unlike exponential versus non-standard.  Alternatively, individuals 
may have discount rates that increase with one or both of the time variables, although 
there is no discounting theory to explain this in the health and physical risk domains
44
. 
‘Tight’ and ‘weak’ levels of each of sub-additive and hyperbolic discounting can be 
defined.  Tight classifications are where the coefficient on the relevant parameter is 
negative and significant, and the coefficient on the other parameter is insignificant.  
Weak classifications allow the coefficient on the other time variable to be positive and 
significant.  The classifications are summarised in Table 7.14. 
                                                          
44
 In financial theory, “liquidity preference theory” explains the observation that interest 
rates are sometimes higher for securities held over longer periods of time, which is 
analogous to the observed positive relationship between interval or delay and the 
discount rate.   However, the financial theory is based on price risk and the costliness of 
extending shorter investments, and as such appears not to translate well intuitively into 
the health domain. 
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As discussed, 35% of the sample classify as exponential discounters because the 
discount rate does not depend on the delay or on the interval between the outcomes 
under consideration.  Of the remaining 65%, 40 respondents belong to the ‘tight’ 
specifications of the ‘hyperbolic’, ‘sub-additive’, ‘both’ or ‘other’ categories.  Table 
7.14 clarifies the distinction.  That is, 38% of the sample can be unambiguously 
classified within the different definitions of non-standard discounting.   
The majority of non-standard discounters can be characterised by a sub-additive 
discounting function, and these individuals comprise 24% of the sample.  Those best 
categorised by a hyperbolic discount function comprise just 11.5% of the sample.  One 
individual had positive and significant coefficients on both time variables, suggesting a 
discount rate that increases with both delay and interval.  Two had negative and 
significant coefficients on both, suggesting that a hyperbolic-based sub-additive 
discount function best applies.   
27% of the sample does not class as exponential or unambiguously as hyperbolic, sub-
additive, both or other.  This is because of the restriction in the ‘tight’ specification that 
the alternative coefficient must be insignificant.  In fact, four respondents had negative 
and significant parameters on delay (so were weakly hyperbolic) but positive and 
significant coefficients on the interval.  A more substantial subset, comprising 18 
respondents, had a negative significant coefficient on the interval (so were weakly sub-
additive) but a positive coefficient on delay.  Extending to this broader definition, 
Table 7.14: Classifications 
Classification Coefficient on Delay Coefficient on Interval N (% of usable 
sample of 104) 
Tight exponential insignificant insignificant 36 (34.6%) 
Tight hyperbolic negative significant insignificant 12 (11.5%) 
Tight subadditive insignificant negative significant 25 (24.0%) 
Tight both negative significant negative significant 2 (1.9%) 
Tight other positive significant positive significant 1 (1.0%) 
Weak hyperbolic negative significant unspecified 16 (15.4%) 
Weak subadditive unspecified negative significant 43 (41.4%) 
Weak both Unspecified but 
significant 
Unspecified but 
significant 
21 (20.2%) 
Weak nonstandard Significant (at least 
one coefficient) 
Significant (at least one 
coefficient) 
68 (65.4%) 
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hyperbolic discounting categorises 15% of the sample while sub-additive discounting 
categorises 41%.  This is further evidence that sub-additive discounting better mirrors 
the majority of the sample.  
Even using the ‘weak’ definition, the sample sizes are very small for Probit analysis.  
However, it is conducted for completeness and the results are reported in Table 7.15.  
No demographics or preference related characteristics are significant in explaining the 
likelihood of being a sub-additive discounter according to the full model.  However, 
having experience of road accidents appears to reduce the likelihood that the individual 
classifies as a hyperbolic discounter, the reason for which is unclear.  The vselect tool 
suggests that the optimal fit model for the hyperbolic case is simply to use the road 
accident risk as the single explanatory variable.  The sub-additive case, however, 
suggests that risk preference variables are important.  As such, and for comparison with 
the exponential case in Table 7.13 above, Probit analysis is repeated based on risk and 
time preference information. 
This Probit on risk and time preference fails to find any significant parameters for the 
hyperbolic case. Previously, the significant variable was road accident experience, 
which was shown to reduce the likelihood that the discount rate declines with delay.  
Arguably, having had road accident experience could be related to an increased dread of 
risks that are sooner, which would go some way to explain the negative coefficient.  
However, the health related risk and time preferences are much more effective in 
explaining the discounting classification for the sub-additive case.  High health-related 
risk aversion and low (physical) discount rates appear to increase the likelihood that the 
elicited exponential discount rate declines with the interval between the two fatality 
risks.  This suggests that the factors taken into consideration by the hyperbolic and sub-
additive discounters might be quite different.  The Probit results are reported in Table 
7.15. 
The health risk aversion coefficient reduces the likelihood of being either exponential or 
sub-additive, which might suggest that it increases the likelihood of hyperbolic 
discounting.  While this is insignificant in Table 7.15, this may of course be an artefact 
of the small sample of hyperbolic discounters.  Interestingly, it appears that time 
preference elicited from the risk-risk survey (defined exponentially and treated as a 
proxy) helps to explain the likelihood of sub-additive discounting, but not the likelihood 
of exponential discounting.  It is unclear why this is the case. 
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In all, it appears that risk and time preferences have some role to play in determining 
whether an individual’s discount rate is sensitive to timing or not.  The insignificance of 
other demographics further reinforces the continuing theme that demographics are 
poorly equipped to explain aspects of preferences that have, in the literature, typically 
been assumed exogenous.  This is reassuring for the continuation of this assumption, 
although it appears that controlling for risk and time preferences may be important. 
7.5.10  Summary of basic relativities and exponential discounting analysis 
So far, this analysis has considered how the responses depend upon the time frames of 
the scenarios in the main risk-risk questions from which they are elicited.  The result 
from Study 1 is replicated here: that the relativity declines significantly with the 
differential between the latency periods under consideration.   
However, the design of the survey allows a much more in depth investigation of time 
preferences than was possible in Study 1.  As such, the assumption made in Study 1 and 
in much of the existing literature- that latency can be entered linearly into the 
regressions explaining the relativities- could be examined.  To do this, (up to) 43 
individual discount rates were elicited per respondent, and 43 rates were elicited on the 
sample level, assuming an exponential functional form.  These elicited exponential 
discount rates were analysed to test for any influence of the timing of the risk increase 
Table 7.15:  Probit analysis: classification of non-standard discounting 
PROBIT Weak hyperbolic 
n=87 
LL= -36.47, 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0060 
Weak sub-additive 
n=87 
LL= -55.35, 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0671 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Financial time preference  -0.127 
(1.605) 
-0.289 
(1.291) 
Time preference estimate 
(physical risk) (Q2-3 
exponential) 
0.380 
(1.820) 
-3.431* 
(1.760) 
Financial risk preference -0.171 
(0.283) 
-0.249 
(0.250) 
Health risk preference 0.056 
(0.167) 
0.298** 
(0.151) 
Constant  -1.017*** 
(0.337) 
0.042 
(0.281) 
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scenarios, because if so, this is evidence against the exponential discounting hypothesis.  
Timing was considered in two ways: the average delay from the present until the risk 
increases and the interval between the two risk increases.  Sensitivity to these timing 
elements indicates hyperbolic and sub-additive discounting, respectively.  Regression 
analysis showed that the discount rates are sensitive to the latency interval, and that they 
show some sensitivity to delay.  As such, the assumption of exponential discounting 
does not appear to hold for the sample as a whole. 
To evaluate what proportion of the sample appears to be characterised by which 
discounting assumption, regressions were run of the individual elicited discount rates on 
latency interval and delay, and on this basis respondents were categorised by their most 
suitable discounting type.  It appears that sub-additive discounting characterises the 
majority of respondents, with exponential discounting the second most common and 
hyperbolic third.  A minority of respondents gave answers that could not be easily 
characterised by hyperbolic, sub-additive or exponential discounting functions.  Probit 
models had low goodness of fit in explaining the categorisation, suggesting that 
discounting functions, similarly to the discount rates themselves, are largely unrelated to 
respondents’ characteristics.  The exceptions to this include health risk preferences 
which appear to be significant in explaining some of the categorisation. 
Because the analysis so far has found that for the majority of respondents the standard 
exponential assumption appears to be unsuitable, discount rates will be elicited on an 
individual and sample level using the hyperbolic and sub-additive assumptions.  This 
allows a menu of discounting options that could categorise the sample. 
7.5.11  Eliciting hyperbolic and sub-additive discount rates 
Given that a large proportion of the sample cannot be classified as exponential 
discounters, discounting parameters need to be elicited under the alternative 
assumptions of hyperbolic and sub-additive discounting.  The elicitation procedure is 
similar to that for the exponential rates, described in Section 4.11 in Part II.  Again, 
simultaneous equations can be used to elicit the parameters in question. However, the 
equations to be solved are different.   
This Section sets out the discounting assumptions and then provides the results of this 
estimation procedure.  The full derivation for each assumption is provided in Appendix 
F. 
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7.5.11.i  Generalised hyperbolic 
Recall that the CTRt relationship is  
            (
      
      
)
   
      (87) 
To solve for  , combining two relativities CTRt and CT’Rt’ , and letting 
    
      
   gives: 
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      (88) 
Clearly this is a single equation in two unknowns (  and  ) and as such cannot be 
solved as simply as the exponential equation.  Commonly it is simplified in the 
literature using the assumption that   =  .   
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)       (89) 
While this is one equation in one unknown, it is not always possible to find a solution 
without resorting to complex numbers.  This is likely due to the functional form 
assumed. 
7.5.11.ii  Sub-additive (exponential base) 
For the sub-additive exponential (SAE) case, the CTRt relationship is 
            
             (90) 
where s is a parameter, typically between 0 and 1, which captures non-linearity of 
preferences over time. 
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    (92) 
The estimation of the parameters     is not straightforward, especially given the way 
that they enter into the equation.  Assuming s=0.5 allows some simplification of the 
estimation procedure, with the equation for solution being 
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7.5.11.iii  sub-additive (hyperbolic base) 
Finally, for the sub-additive hyperbolic (SAH) case, the CTRt relationship is 
      
     
           
        (94) 
As such, in this case  
   (
            
          
)        (95) 
As with the generalised hyperbolic discounting model, the estimation of the parameters 
    is not straightforward.  Again assuming s=0.5 allows some simplification of the 
estimation procedure, with the equation for solution being 
   (
   
  √      √       
)       (96) 
From these equations, the parameters can be elicited on an individual level or for the 
sample in aggregate.  The geometric mean and median values for the individual 
discount rates are provided in Table 7.16 with the exponential case for comparison, 
alongside the maximum likelihood estimates for each discounting functional form 
assumption. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the discount rates under each assumption are 
calculated using all of the data with the exception of cases where the individual had not 
switched by 1000 in 60 million.  This is to allow the estimation tool to find a starting 
range of values, without which the estimation procedure fails.   
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The arithmetic mean can be discarded because it is affected by extreme outliers to such 
an extent that the resulting values are implausible for both hyperbolic and sub-additive 
exponential rates.  Using the median, negative rates are found on average for both the 
hyperbolic and the sub-additive hyperbolic cases.  This does not agree with the finding 
throughout this Chapter that positive discount rates are applied (for example, see the 
diagram on pg.211 which depicts the relativities declining with latency).  As such, the 
maximum likelihood estimates can be considered to be the most informative.  The 
values and their implications are discussed in Section 7.6. 
7.5.12  Summary 
The analysis first confirmed that the cancer to roads relativities decline with the latency 
period under consideration.  As such, the analysis was quickly able to verify that the 
appropriate effective discount rates for the sample in aggregate are positive.  This 
corresponds to the majority of the existing literature on discounting in the domains of 
health and physical risk (see Table 2.4). 
Table 7.16: Discounting parameter summary 
 Arithmetic mean 
and 95% CI 
Median and 
25:75 percentiles 
Maximum 
likelihood 
estimate and 
standard error 
Exponential 0.119 
[0.106,0.133] 
0.064 
[0.00,0.190] 
0.0169 
(0.005) 
Hyperbolic 2.31*e^11  
[-1.1*e^11, 
1.51*e^12] 
-0.011 
[-0.197, 0.073] 
0.0205 
(0.007) 
Sub-additive 
exponential 
1.14*e^13 
[-9.3*e^12, 
3.22*e^13] 
0.719 
[0.41, 1.00] 
0.8708 
(0.032) 
Sub-additive 
hyperbolic 
14.703 
[-12.20, 41.61] 
-0.191 
[-0.58, 0.20] 
0.0672 
(0.019) 
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However, this Study was designed to allow a much more detailed investigation of the 
effects of latency and the effective discount rates underpinning the choices made in the 
survey.  The Chapter sets out three main hypotheses about the discount function.  These 
are: 
1) Exponential discounting: implying discount rates that are constant over time 
2) Hyperbolic discounting: implying discount rates that decline with the delay until 
the outcome 
3) Sub-additive discounting: implying discount rates that decline with the interval 
between the outcomes 
These discounting hypotheses were tested using a two-stage procedure.  First, discount 
rates were elicited for each of the 43 combinations of questions.  This resulted in a 
sample of 43 exponential discount rates, each with associated underlying timing 
indicators.  Second, simple OLS regressions were run on these 43 discount rates, with 
the explanatory variables being the average delay until fatality and the interval between 
the times of the two fatalities.  The significance and sign of the coefficients on these 
variables were used to infer which discounting assumption best suited the respondents’ 
choices. This two-step procedure was carried out on the sample level (using discount 
rates inferred from the sample average relativities) but also for each individual 
separately (using the discount rates based on their own relativities).  This allows 
analysis on both the individual-specific and sample levels.   
The conclusion on a sample level was that sub-additive discounting behaviour best 
reflects the sample in aggregate, because the latency differential was more robustly 
significant than the delay in explaining the elicited discount rates.  For the elicitation on 
the individual level, sub-additive discounting is the most common category, followed by 
exponential discounting and then hyperbolic discounting.  This lends support to the 
work of Read (2005), although the evidence comes from a different domain.   
Given that the majority of the sample displayed non-standard discounting, effective 
discount rates were then elicited under both of the alternative discounting assumptions.  
In total, four different discount rates were elicited for each individual and at the sample 
level, one for each discounting functional form assumption.  These were given in Table 
7.16. 
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7.6  Discussion 
Exponential discounting is often argued to be the most suitable or normatively 
appealing discounting function, because it does not result in inconsistent preferences 
and decisions over time.  However, the empirical evidence provided in Study 2 suggests 
that the exponential discounting assumption does not fully reflect the preferences of 
individuals in this sample.  As such, imposing constant discounting might result in 
intertemporal allocations of resources that are sub-optimal from the perspective of the 
present. 
The implications of the four different discounting assumptions can be demonstrated 
using Table 7.17 which shows the decline in value of a hypothetical outcome over a 
period of time.  Each of the discount rates (maximum likelihood estimates) and discount 
functions combine to generate the present value of an outcome with immediate value 
10, but which would occur at 5, 10, 20 or 40 years from now.   
 
The outcome loses its value more quickly over the shorter time periods under the sub-
additive assumptions than under the exponential and the hyperbolic, but its value then 
declines only very slowly.  The exponential and hyperbolic assumptions both result in a 
loss of value which is much more pronounced.  The classic pattern of a higher initial 
drop with but lower loss over longer time frames can be observed for the hyperbolic 
function, as compared with the exponential. 
Table 7.17: Decline in value in alternative discounting frameworks 
Delay 
from 
the 
present 
Exponential Hyperbolic 
Sub-
additive 
exponential 
Sub-
additive 
hyperbolic 
0 10 10 10 10 
5 9.19 9.07 8.50 8.69 
10 8.45 8.30 8.40 8.25 
20 7.13 7.09 8.30 7.69 
40 5.09 5.49 8.19 7.02 
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Clearly, the very slight loss in value over the 20 year time frame for the sub-additive 
cases contradicts the direct finding in the result for Q3 (C25R2) where the relativity was 
significantly lower than in Q2 (C10R2), as a result of the cancer being postponed for 15 
years.  This result warrants further empirical investigation. 
This Chapter has provided a framework for eliciting time preferences from survey data 
over physical risks, and has established that that a large proportion of the sample 
appears to use non-standard discounting functions.  This suggests that the standard 
procedure of assuming constant discounting over time is likely to be an over-
simplification.  Whether this simplification is justified by the normative aspects of the 
exponential discounting framework is a question for policy.  This question is considered 
in Part IV, which provides policy insights and conclusions. 
 
  
Figure 7.14:  Discounting a value of 10 under each discounting assumption 
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PART IV:  DISCUSSION, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
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Chapter 8.  Discussion, Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
8.1  Summary 
This thesis aimed to disentangle the effects of context and latency on the relativity 
between the Value of Preventing a Statistical Cancer Fatality (VSLCAN) and the VSL for 
road accident fatalities.  Achieving this aim would facilitate policy analysis where the 
risk of latent cancer fatalities is likely to change.  In addition, it would add to the 
growing international literature on the VSLCAN.  To fully understand the VSLCAN 
requires exploring and quantifying two main effects.  These are the context effect, 
which includes the effect of additional morbidity prior to fatality as well as any dread of 
the cause ‘cancer’; and the latency effect which incorporates time preferences and risk 
preferences. 
To this end, two stated preference studies were conducted.  Study 1 addressed the full 
VSLCAN :VSL comparison.  Its main aim was to verify the hypotheses that the context 
of cancer increases the VSL and that latency decreases it.  In doing so, it addressed 
questions about morbidity and label dread.  Verification of these hypotheses allowed the 
VSLCAN:VSL relationship to be distilled into a simple relationship, referred to as CTRt.  
This reduces the comparison between the standard roads VSL and the cancer VSL to a 
simple relationship whereby VSLCAN is assumed equivalent to the roads VSL inflated 
for context effects by the context premium (1+x) and then discounted at an effective 
discount rate r back to its present value.  This relationship allows the elicitation of the 
underlying r and x parameters using simple algebra and relativities data. 
However, the treatment of latency in study 1 was necessarily limited to a subset of 
questions to allow dread, morbidity and context to be considered as well.  This 
limitation motivated study 2 which specifically focussed on the implications of latency 
on the VSL.  Because delayed outcomes are inherently risky, the exploration of latent 
outcomes would not be complete without controlling for risk preferences.  A gap was 
seen in the current literature in that the theoretical and empirical frameworks for 
eliciting risk aversion coefficients in the domain of health have not been fully 
developed.  This was addressed in study 2a in chapter 6.  With the proxy for health risk 
aversion developed, the analysis turned to considering the appropriate rate and 
functional form at which latent cancers are discounted.  The CTRt relationship 
developed and verified in study 1 was adapted to allow for different discounting 
hypotheses, and analysis was performed a the sample level and at the level of the 
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individual which aimed to discover what functional forms and rates are the most 
appropriate in characterising choice behaviour in the RR questions in study 2b. 
Through these studies, some important empirical findings emerged.  In addition, 
methodological and theoretical contributions were made which have the potential to 
enhance future research into VSL questions as well as wider studies involving latent or 
risky health and safety outcomes.  These contributions are outlined in the next section.  
Finally, the implications for policy
45
 are outlined in section 8.4 and future research 
questions are presented in section 8.5. 
8.2  Findings and Contributions 
8.2.1  Study 1 findings 
Study 1 provided insight into the preferences of members of the public over the 
VSLCAN:VSL relativity, and in the process it provided evidence about the significance 
and magnitude of context, morbidity, label dread and latency effects in explaining this 
relativity.   
The main empirical contribution was that the VSLCAN:VSL relativity, including 10 
years of latency, is indistinguishable from 1:1.  For longer latency periods this was 
shown to fall to a value significantly below 1:1.  This result is also the main policy 
implication for the chapter and will be re-iterated in the policy implications section.  
However, in establishing the 1:1 relativity, three additional insights about the 
underlying effects were generated. 
First, it was confirmed that when controlling for time, a cancer fatality (incorporating 
illness) was held at a 40% premium compared to road accident fatality.  Second, the 
somewhat surprising result was made that this context premium was not generated by a 
particular dread of the label ‘cancer’ per se, instead being driven by the aversion to the 
period of morbidity prior to fatality.  Finally, the effective discount rate at which the 
VSLCAN is discounted was found to be 7.37% p.a under the exponential assumption.  
This is sufficient to offset the context premium for latency periods of 10 years or more.  
These three results confirm the prior hypotheses about the direction of the effects of 
                                                          
45
 It is acknowledged that in practice, any changes on the basis of the policy 
implications provided here would rely on the replication of these results on a large scale 
representative sample of the population. 
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morbidity and latency, but provide a new and thought-provoking conclusion that the 
‘label dread’ of cancer seems not to apply. 
The main contributions in this chapter outlined above were empirical, because the 
survey instrument was carefully designed to elicit strength of preference estimates.  
However, the chapter also made a methodological contribution through the 
establishment of the CTRt relationship (pg.53) and the procedure by which the 
underlying parameters r (effective discount rate) and (1+x) (context premium) were 
elicited.  This relationship was shown to elicit reasonable parameters in study 1, and 
additionally proved useful in study 2 where it was demonstrated to be effective in the 
context of hyperbolic and sub-additive discounting. 
8.2.2  Study 2a: risk aversion findings 
While the main contributions from study 1 were empirical, in the risk aversion chapter 
in study 2 the main contributions were theoretical and methodological.  The major 
methodological contribution of this chapter was to provide the framework for eliciting 
the risk aversion coefficient for health states.  This not only involved adapting the 
elicitation procedure from the financial domain to the health domain and selecting a 
communication tool for health states, but also selecting the health state input values.  
The theoretical contributions are twofold.  Initially, the theoretical framework was 
established for eliciting parameters for health risk aversion.  This involved adapting the 
work of Holt and Laury (2002) to the domain of health.  The second theoretical 
conclusion was rooted in the observation that the health measures available reflect the 
value of health states as opposed to directly quantifying the health state.  The underlying 
utility functions were reconsidered in light of this, clarifying the interpretation of the 
elicited risk aversion parameter.   
The empirical results were almost of secondary concern in this chapter, whose aim was 
to develop the theoretical and methodological frameworks for eliciting risk aversion 
proxies in health.  Nonetheless, the chapter provided further evidence that risk 
preference in health is not well approximated by risk preference defined over financial 
outcomes, and tentatively supports the conclusion that risk aversion in health is lower 
than in finance.  This adds to the domain-dependence debate, and provides support for 
the use of alternative methods like the one developed here. 
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8.2.3  Study 2b: time preference findings 
The contributions from study 2b are mostly empirical although some theoretical and 
methodological output was also generated.  The theoretical clarification of the way that 
the VSLCAN:VSL relativity would behave under each discounting assumption, and 
particularly of the way that the discount rate can be elicited under each assumption, will 
be valuable in future R-R studies involving latent outcomes.  In addition, the method for 
categorising individuals by discounting type has not, to the author’s knowledge, been 
used before.  However, the empirical results are arguably more generally interesting. 
The main result confirms the general finding in the literature that time discounting is not 
typically exponential.  The novel procedure of eliciting discounting types on an 
individual level allows the confirmation that while exponential discounting holds for a 
large minority (35%) of the population, there is more support for the non-standard 
discounting assumptions.  The findings in support of sub-additive discounting as 
opposed to hyperbolic are important, because the design of study 2 is unusual in 
allowing both delay and interval to be considered in the domain of fatality risks.  The 
range of values for the exponential discount rate is (1-20%).  A lot of variation in both 
the rates and the discounting functions is apparent from these results. 
8.3  Comparison of Studies 1 and 2  
However, before the implications for policy can be drawn it is necessary to consider to 
what extent the responses from study 2 can be assumed to apply to the population more 
generally.  study 2 was conducted with a student sample while study 1 surveyed 30-50 
year olds.  To consider how generalizable the results are, the comparable responses 
from the two samples are set out and analysed in appendix L.  This is kept brief, 
because the results are intended to be illustrative.  
The samples are different in terms of demographics and sample size, and their 
preferences are more homogeneous.  However, the two samples are very close on the 
central tendencies of comparable questions and the size of the elicited effective discount 
rate and context premium are comparable as well.  In all, the student preferences do not 
appear to be dramatically different than the 30 to 50 year olds, so policy implications 
can be based on a combination of insights from both studies 1 and 2, albeit tentatively.   
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8.4  Policy Implications 
The policy implications arising from this thesis can be summarised in two main 
categories.  The first covers the ‘policy numbers’, which include the elicited overall 
cancer premium (or more accurately the lack of overall premium) and the values of 1.4 
for the context multiplier and 7.37% for the effective discount rate.  The second is less 
concrete, and relates to the appropriateness of reflecting public opinion over 
intertemporal choices in policy decisions.  These two angles are discussed in sections 
8.4.1 to 8.4.3.   
8.4.1  Policy implications:  ‘policy numbers’ 
The main implication from study 1 is that the current practice in the UK guidance of 
applying a multiplier of 2 to cancer fatality risk reductions is unjustifiable based on 
these results.  Instead, a value of 1:1 is recommended, declining below this level for 
long latency cancers.  This is best shown using the fitted values for the CTRt relativity 
from study 1 with associated confidence intervals. 
 
As explained on pg.113, the relativity is predicted as a function of latency, and plotted 
with 95% confidence intervals.  The context dummy is set to 1 (implying a cancer to 
roads comparison), and the morbidity period is assumed to be 12 months.  The relativity 
for this typical cancer as a function of latency is shown in figure 8.1.  The lower 
horizontal line indicates the recommended 1:1 relativity (it is at zero because the 
diagram plots the predicted log of the ratio, and ln(1)=0).  This is shown to be valid in a 
range from about 7 to 14 years of latency.  For longer latency periods, a lower relativity 
Figure 8.1:  Reconstructed CTRt relativity for t=2 as a function of T 
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would be more appropriate.  The upper horizontal line indicates the 2:1 relativity 
currently used in policy.  This is too high for latency periods of around 8 years or more.  
This provides the basis for the 1:1 recommendation in this study.  See Appendix K for 
some additional sensitivity analysis which supports the 1:1 recommendation. 
As an alternative to applying a single value for the VSLCAN, policymakers could decide 
to use a value based on the length of latency involved in the cancer.  This would require 
the use of a context premium to adjust for the context of cancer (and the associated 
morbidity).  Then this value would be discounted to the present at the appropriate rate.  
Study 1 provided estimates for both of these values, elicited in conjunction with one 
another.  These are a context premium (based on 12 months of morbidity prior to 
fatality) of 1.4 and a discount rate of 7.37%p.a. 
Of course, in policy the treatment of discounting is an important issue.  The magnitude 
of the discount rate greatly exceeds the social rate of time preference (STPR) 
recommended in policy, which is 1.5%.  However, caution must be taken when using 
the context premium and applying a different discounting rate.  Because x and r were 
elicited in conjunction, to use the x value but in combination with a different r value 
would necessarily imply overriding the overall relativity that best reflects the 
preferences of members of the public.  As such, the rates should be used in conjunction 
with one another. 
8.4.2  Normative policy concerns: focus on discounting 
The x and r values were elicited assuming an exponential discount rate, and the results 
of study 2b suggest that this is not the most accurate assumption for describing the time 
preferences of members of the public.  As discussed, the sub-additive approach appears 
to be more descriptively accurate for the respondents studied.  Figure 8.2 shows the 
implications over a 30 year horizon of employing the four different discounting 
assumptions to a context premium of 1.4, assuming that the road accident occurs 2 years 
from now.  The hyperbolic and exponential versions are similar, while the sub-additive 
versions have a more dramatic decline in relativity over the short run but then level off 
after around 15 years.  The fairly extreme patterns with sub-additive discounting mean 
that perhaps more evidence is required before this discounting assumption can be 
adopted.  On the other hand, exponential discounting gives a very different pattern of 
relativities and as such if sub-additive discounting does hold in aggregate, the 
implications for the distortion of allocative decision making are relatively serious. 
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However, the result is of course descriptive and not normative.  It is appropriate for the 
policymaker to make a decision between respecting the preferences of the public despite 
the lack of normative appeal that non-standard discounting implies, or to override the 
preferences of the public essentially in the best interests of society, in order to generate 
time consistent decisions.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore this issue, 
although it ought to be noted that for intertemporal allocative decisions that will not 
affect future generations, the arguments for overriding the preferences of the public are 
not convincing.  As such, the decision about which discounting function to employ may 
be dependent on the specific context. 
8.4.3  Overall messages for policy 
The guiding principle behind the WTP literature is that good allocative policymaking 
ought to reflect the preferences of members of the public.  As such, the plethora of 
evidence regarding public valuation of non-market goods like fatality risks reflects this 
intention.  However, respecting preferences is not as simple as just eliciting a value 
(VSLCAN), particularly when the good in question is as heterogeneous and complex as 
cancer.  Rushton et al.(2010) discuss the extreme variation in cancer latency and 
morbidity periods, and the work presented in this thesis has verified that these 
characteristics influence the relative value of cancer risk changes.  Put simply, different 
morbidity and latency characteristics result in different WTP-based VSLs.   
Figure 8.2:  Discounting a 1.4 context premium under different assumptions 
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However, given the resource intensity of eliciting VSL estimates, and the vast range of 
latency-morbidity combinations that could characterise cancer scenarios, it is not 
feasible to re-estimate the VSL for every case that comes under policy scrutiny.  As 
such, there are two options for policy.  One is to use a value based on the “typical” 
cancer case, and in that case these results would suggest that no premium ought to be in 
place, if 10 years’ latency and 1 year of morbidity could be considered average for a 
cancer.  Alternatively, some benefits transfer activity could be employed, to adapt the 
VSL to the specific circumstances to account for the latency and morbidity periods 
involved.  This could be extended to consider cancers with different levels of risk 
change and different baseline risks.  If this is adopted, the results of study 2 need to be 
respected.   
Study 2a demonstrated domain dependence in risk aversion.  That is, risk preference 
was not directly transferable between the financial and health domains.  Study 2b found 
similar results for time preference.  As such, different levels of risk aversion and varied 
time preferences can be found across individuals and even within individuals across 
contexts.  It is ultimately a question for policy whether to respect non-standard 
discounting, to control for attributes of the cancer scenario and to respect differences in 
risk attitude, and the arguments surrounding this debate are far from clear-cut.  
Nonetheless, the author hopes that the quality of this debate will be enhanced by the 
findings of this thesis and by future studies that use the tools developed here. 
8.5  Questions for Further Research 
A number of avenues for future research have been uncovered in this thesis.  Of course, 
the policy implications would be strengthened by conducting this survey on a large, 
representative sample of the population.  However, four additional areas that the author 
considers ripe for investigation are outlined in this section.  Some of these address 
shortcomings in the present state of understanding, while others would simply provide 
additional validity to the conclusions drawn in this thesis.   
- The somewhat surprising finding was made in study 1 that the context premium 
for cancer is driven almost exclusively by aversion to the morbidity period 
preceding it, as opposed to the ‘label dread’ that cancer is typically assumed to 
engender.  However, the analysis was exploratory and morbidity was tested 
exclusively by the length of time spent ill.  As such, further investigation into 
the way that morbidity drives the context premium would allow more flexibility 
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to the application of the study’s findings across different types of cancer with 
different lengths and severities of illness prior to fatality. 
- Study 2 highlighted an important gap in the present data.  The health risk 
aversion elicitation procedure assumed that health could be measured on a 
cardinal scale comparable to money.  However, no direct measure currently 
exists to quantify health states as described by the EQ-5D system.  The 
development of such a measure would require a multi-disciplinary approach and 
its conceptual basis needs to be established as well as its empirical foundation.  
However, the existence of such a scale would have benefits beyond this study, 
for example allowing any economics experiments or surveys that have 
traditionally been defined over cash outcomes to be translated into the domain of 
health.  The possible implications for experimental and behavioural health 
economics are vast. 
- A more niche problem with the risk aversion elicitation, and perhaps one more 
easily addressed, was noted on pg.173 and relates to the time preference effect 
that distorts the TTO-based values for the EQ-5D health states.  The approach 
taken in this study was to raise the TTO scores to the power of 0.8, reflecting 
discounting effects as estimated by Jones-Lee (2007).  However, this value 
requires validation and possible refinement. Attema and Brouwer (2013) 
demonstrate a method for eliciting correction factors, and this procedure could 
be replicated with UK data to improve upon the 0.8 assumption used in this 
thesis. 
- Finally, and again in the risk preference analysis (chapter 6, reporting study 2a) 
it was assumed that the utility over health function could be modelled like the 
utility of wealth function.  However, the basis for this assumption is not well 
established.  Theoretical and/or empirical work to validate the appropriateness of 
assuming a concave utility of health function would allow more confidence to be 
placed in the risk preference elicitation procedure developed in study 2a.  
These areas for future research demonstrate that this thesis has the potential to be 
validated and extended in the future.  
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Appendix A.  Survey Protocol for Study 1 
FINAL VERSION 18/12/2011  [SLIDES = OVERHEADS (C)] 
INTRODUCTION/WELCOME 
 
[click: SLIDE 1: WELCOME THE RESPONDENTS. - THANK THEM FOR COMING -  
INTRODUCE YOURSELVES] 
 
I will give you a brief background to the study but will be happy to answer any further 
questions you might have after the session has finished.   
 
The study is funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), as part of on-going 
research into safety and decision making.  The HSE wish to take account of what the 
public think, to help them to advise policy makers.  Essentially, safety costs money and 
policy makers have to choose which areas to prioritise.  They want to know whether 
their choices reflect our choices and, if not, how they differ. 
 
While the way we ask the questions might seem slightly strange, we will combine your 
answers to some tables we will ask you to fill in with the things you write down, so we 
can answer the specific questions that the policymakers ask us. 
     
When answering, you should concentrate solely on your own opinions and the choices 
you would make for yourself.  Please try not to think about other people or what they 
would choose. This study will eventually take place in various locations across the 
country and by asking a broad range of people we will get a very good idea of what 
other people would choose. So please just think about yourself.  
 
There will be an introductory section first, with a chance for questions and discussions.  
Then there will be ten main questions, and three follow up questions.  The whole 
process should take about ninety minutes. 
 
We will go into quite a lot of detail before we ask some of the questions.  This is meant 
to help you to think carefully about your answers, since your answers will be reported 
through to decision makers and may influence government policy. 
 
I would also like to make it clear from the beginning that what is the right answer for you 
[PICK SOMEONE] might be the wrong answer for you [PICK SOMEONE ELSE] and so 
on. All of your answers will remain anonymous. 
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[PART 1: LEARNING] 
 
[INTRODUCTORY IDEA 1:  INDIFFERENCE] 
 
Every day, we make lots of choices between options.  Sometimes the choices are easy, 
because one option is clearly better suited to us.  But sometimes they’re harder, 
because we aren’t sure which one suits us best.  Sometimes, we really don’t mind 
between the two options, because we see them as equally good.  This is what we are 
interested in for today’s session. In a few minutes, we will be choosing between risk 
increases. 
 
[INTRODUCTORY IDEA 2: RISKS]  
 
So first, let’s think about what we mean by risk.  A risk is the chance of something bad 
happening.  Every day you make decisions where you are, in some way, choosing 
between risks: for example, if you have ever taken a medicine with possible side 
effects, you have chosen to take the risk of getting the side effects to avoid a higher risk 
of the illness itself, and if you have ever crossed a road without using a pedestrian 
crossing to save time, you have made a decision to take a higher risk of being hurt 
crossing the road to reduce the risk of being late. 
 
So choosing between risks is not so unusual, even though we don’t usually think about 
it in so much detail!  In this study, we are interested in risks to your life.  
 
You will be asked to think about risks like this one [click: SLIDE 2]: 
 
RISK OF DYING 
200 in 60 million 
 
So for this example, your current risk of dying by some cause is 200 in 60 million.  60 
million is approximately the population of the UK.  This means that we would expect 
around two hundred people in the UK to die from this unnamed cause, during the 
coming year.  Because you live here, you could be one of those 200 people (although 
of course you might not be!).  So these are risks to yourself, and we need you to think 
about the increase in your own risk of dying, not anybody else’s risk of dying.  Does 
anyone have any questions? 
 
[INTRODUCTORY IDEA 3: CHOOSING BETWEEN RISK INCREASES]  
 
Policy makers implement policies that affect risks. However, their budget is limited.  
Sometimes, money has to be saved: policymakers need to make decisions about which 
spending reductions to implement, and therefore certain risks will increase.  Because 
they want their decisions to reflect what you would choose (as much as possible), we 
will ask you to select which of your personal risks of dying you would choose to have 
increased, if you had to. 
 
 
Just as an aside, we tend to ask about risk increases simply because we’ve found that 
people find it easier to think about them than about risk decreases.  But we can use the 
information in your answers to help with decisions where the policymakers are 
implementing risk reductions too, for example when budgets are increased. 
 
 
[PRACTICE QUESTION 1:  INFLUENZA AND FIRE EPIDEMIC TRADEOFF] 
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We’ll do a practice, to let you think about risks and also get used to the methods we’ll 
be using later. 
 
We will still be thinking about risks, but now we will name the context of the risks.  
Some people find that context changes the way they feel about risk increases.  Others 
find that it doesn’t matter much to them.  Your answers might all be different, and that’s 
fine; just consider how you feel. 
 
So, let’s say the causes of death were dying in an influenza epidemic, and dying in a 
fire in your home.  [click: SLIDE 3] 
 
Which cause seems worst to you?  Who thinks fire’s worst?  [SHOW OF HANDS]  
Why? And what is it about the influenza epidemic that didn’t seem so bad?  And who 
thinks flu’s worst? [SHOW OF HANDS].  Why? And what was it about fire that didn’t 
scare you so much?  Did anyone think they’d be equally bad? 
 
[click: SLIDE 4]  If money had to be saved in one area of the safety budget or the other, 
this would mean an increase in your risk of dying by one of the causes. 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 1]  
 
Your answer sheet shows that the current risk of dying is about 200 in 60 million for 
each of the causes. Would you choose to increase your risk of dying in an influenza 
epidemic by 10 in 60 million, or to increase your risk of dying in a fire in your home by 
10 in 60 million, if you had to? 
 
Please write your initials and the date on the top left hand corner. 
 
[MODERATOR GO THROUGH TABLE] 
 
 
 
 
Your current risk of dying by each cause is 200 in 60 million. 
Which would you choose, if you had to: 
Y Z 
 
An increase in your risk of dying 
in an influenza epidemic 
of 10 in 60 million 
 
 
 
An increase in your risk of dying 
in a fire in your home 
of 10 in 60 million 
 
 
 
Those of you who would choose Y, please circle ‘dying in an influenza epidemic’ like 
this [CLICK].  If you would choose Z, circle ‘dying in fire in your home’ instead [CLICK].  
If you really can’t choose, put an ‘equals’ sign between them [CLICK], which means you 
would be happy to let a policy maker decide for you which risk increase would happen.  
 
Remember that one of the risk increases would eventually be chosen, and your opinion 
is important in helping to decide which one. 
 
As this is a practice, I just need to check we haven’t confused you:  If you were more 
scared of fire, did you choose to increase the flu risk?  And if you were more scared of 
flu you chose the fire risk?  Remember, we’re asking you to choose a risk increase, so 
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we’d expect you to increase the risk of the one you’re least scared of.  This will be 
important in future questions. 
 
[THEY MIGHT SAY THAT THEY CHOSE THE ONE THEY FEAR MORE.  THIS IS OK 
IF THEIR REASONING HOLDS (e.g. PERCEIVE THEIR RISK TO BE DIFFERENT 
FROM THAT PRESENTED), BUT NOT IF THEY MISUNDERSTAND (e.g. THOUGHT 
WE MEANT RISK DECREASE)] 
 
 
Now let’s practice filling in a table to record the choices you would make if the risk 
increases were different sizes.  We’ll be using this method a lot today, so we need to 
make sure everyone can do it, but don’t worry, I’ll talk you through it step by step.  
Please ask questions as we go along- this is only a practice. 
 
Here is a new answer sheet [ASSISTANT HAND OUT IAS1A and IAS1B].   
You should see a second table, a bit like this one… 
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[click: SLIDE 5: INFLUENZA]  
 
For those that chose Y; the left hand column on your sheet has Y for flu and the middle 
column has Z for fire.  Your risk increase for flu (in the first column) gets larger as you 
go down the table.  The risk increase for fire stays the same.   
 
 
[click: SLIDE 6: FIRE] – skip if all chose flu increase 
 
If you chose Z, your table’s exactly the same, except it has fire in the first column (with 
risk increases that get bigger) and flu in the second column (with risk increases that 
stay the same) 
 
Does everyone have the correct sheet? 
 
 
The first row’s choice column is filled in for you, depending on the choice you made just 
before  [FLICK BACK AND FORWARD BETWEEN PREVIOUS SLIDE TO SHOW “Y” 
AND “Z”].  I’ll tell you what to do with the rest of the table in a minute.  But first, let’s 
think about what taking a bigger increase in your risk of dying really means. 
 
[click SLIDE 7: PIE CHART] 
This picture shows the risks you are facing now.  This is not to scale.  If we did draw in 
the 10 in 60 million increases the right size, they would be so tiny you wouldn’t see 
them!  So we’ve had to make the picture bigger.  All it’s meant to do is to help you 
understand the effect of a risk increase on your chance of dying.  There is a small risk 
of dying in an influenza epidemic (pink), and an equal sized risk of dying in a fire in your 
home (green), this year. 
There is a bigger section: this is the risk of dying from some other cause this year 
(purple). 
The rest of the chart, which is much bigger, is your chance of not dying this year (blue). 
Y 
INFLUENZA 
 
RISK INCREASE 
 Z 
FIRE 
 
RISK INCREASE CHOICE 
10 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million Y 
20 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million  
...  ...  
100 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million  
 OR 10 in 60 million  
Z 
FIRE 
 
RISK INCREASE 
 Y 
INFLUENZA 
 
RISK INCREASE CHOICE 
10 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million Z 
20 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million  
...  ...  
100 in 60 million OR 10 in 60 million  
 OR 10 in 60 million  
skip if all 
chose flu 
increase 
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If you choose to increase your risk of dying from flu, [click: SLIDE 8] that means you 
are making your overall risk of dying bigger (in other words, reducing the blue area, 
which represents your chance of not dying during the year)!  Notice that the other 2 
areas, fire and all other causes, stay the same.   
In the first column of the table: the risk increase you decided to circle gets bigger and 
bigger.  If we let your flu risk increase get bigger [CLICK, CLICK], your chance of not 
dying gets smaller and smaller.  In the extreme, if you continued to increase your risk 
so much that there is no more blue [CLICK]- you would die for definite!   
The same goes for fire [click: SLIDE 9:   CLICK CLICK CLICK]  So if you accept a 
bigger increase in your risk of dying in a fire, you are increasing your overall risk of 
dying during this period!  
Let’s look at the pie charts again in terms of the decision table.  In the table, you are 
choosing between risk increases in the cause you chose originally, or a fixed increase 
in your risk of dying by the other cause.  Let’s see what that means... 
[click: SLIDE 10: Flu vs Fire] 
If you originally chose to increase your flu risk:  You are comparing the risk increase in 
flu, which gets bigger and bigger [CLICK CLICK], with the fixed, small increase in your 
risk of dying in a fire in your home [INDICATE OTHER PIE CHART].  
So the alternative to the bigger risk increase is to switch to the small increase in your 
risk of dying in a fire, at any row of the table. 
[click: SLIDE 11:  Fire vs Flu] 
If you originally chose to increase your fire risk, this is the case for you:  [CLICK 
CLICK].  So the alternative to the bigger fire risk increase is to switch to the small 
increase in your risk of dying from flu, in the right hand pie chart. 
Does anyone have any questions? 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT INTRO_PIE] 
So, let’s go back to the table and fill in our choices together. 
[click: SLIDE 12] 
Like we said, your answer sheet already has the letter for the choice you made when 
the risk increases were equal filled in in the first row. 
Now look at the second row.  This time your chosen risk increase is larger, at 20 in 60 
million.  The one for the other cause is still 10 in 60 million.   
Remember about the pie chart- taking 20 in 60 million means moving around your pie 
chart like in the little picture in column 1.  You need to decide if 20 in 60 million is too 
 
skip if all chose 
flu increase 
skip if all chose 
flu increase 
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big an increase in your risk of dying, or not.  Please fill in your choice, Y or Z.  
[MODERATOR PAUSE WHILE THEY CHOOSE] 
 
Work your way down the table, writing in your choice in each row, given the risk levels.  
Going down the table is like going round the pie chart, increasing your overall risk of 
dying (you can see a reminder in the top of the first column), The other risk, which is 
fixed, is shown in the pie chart in the top of the right hand column.   
[WAIT UNTIL THEY HAVE DONE]. 
If you reach the bottom row and you still haven’t switched to the other cause, 
then write the increase in your risk of dying that WOULD be bad enough to make 
you switch:  in other words, where the overall risk of dying would be too high. 
[Ask a couple of people- where did they switch?  Point out to them: 
Anyone who switched at 30, 40, 50 or above, your answer tells us that you would 
accept a higher overall risk of dying, compared to the 10 in 60 million increase you 
could have had by switching. [SHOW PIE CHARTS AGAIN?]  That’s fine, as long as 
you feel strongly enough about the cause of death to justify accepting this higher 
overall risk of dying. 
At the same time, do notice: while these numbers might seem small to some of you, for 
some people at least a change of 10 in 60 million seems very different to 100 in 60 
million.  How you view this information is really up to you- remember there are no right 
or wrong answers. 
Does anyone have any questions about that? 
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[DISCUSSION QUESTION 2:  TIMING TRADEOFF] 
 
[click: SLIDE 13] 
Now, think back to your answer to the previous decision. 
But now let’s think: what if both of the risk increases were postponed for 15 years?  
Would you change your mind?  
Now let’s think, what if only ONE of the risk increases was in the future? 
What if it was fire in 15 years’ time, and flu now?   
 [click: SLIDE 14: FIRE IN 15 YEARS or FLU NOW?] 
Or what if it was the other way round: flu in 15 years’ time, and fire now?   
[click: SLIDE 15:  FLU IN 15 YEARS or FIRE NOW?] 
[DISCUSS THE FOLLOWING USING DIRECTED QUESTIONS DEPENDING WHAT 
THEY ANSWER] 
Did you think about: 
 
 Not getting there?  
 Whether the future matters to you as much as the present? 
 How your life in general would be different? 
It will be important to keep in mind how you feel about the timing of death as well as the 
cause of death, because both will feature in the questions you answer later today. 
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Practice Question 2:  Car and cancer- discussion 
Now let’s introduce a new pair of causes. 
We still want to think about risks of dying. This time, though, we are interested in the 
risk of dying in a car accident, and the risk of dying from cancer.  These will be the risks 
we think about for the rest of this session, so we’re going to take a bit of time to think 
about them now before we get on to the main questions. 
These topics are, by their nature, quite difficult and emotional.  And, as I mentioned 
right at the start, the way we ask the questions might seem a bit detached and abstract, 
but we combine your number answers with the thoughts that you write down, so we are 
able to provide answers to the specific questions that the HSE asks us. I can give you 
some examples after the session is finished, if you like. 
[click: SLIDE 16] 
Some people might find some of the questions a bit upsetting.  If at any point you feel 
too distressed, do let one of the assistants know, who will take you outside of the room 
for privacy and see what we can do to help.  We would much prefer for you to tell us, 
than to keep quiet.  Having said that, lots of people have done these questions before 
you and most people have found them OK even though they are difficult.  Your answers 
to the questions are very important and we do feed them through to decision makers. 
Suppose the government had to choose between saving money in two areas of the 
safety budget.  This would result in either an increase in your risk of dying from cancer; 
or an increase in your risk of dying in a car accident.  The same amount of money 
would be saved from either budget, and the resulting risk increases would be the same 
size for either cause. Think about which you would choose, if you had to.  Don’t say 
anything, though.  We’ll give you an answer sheet for you to write it down. 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 2] 
Write your initials and date on this answer sheet, and then tick whether you would 
increase your risk of dying from cancer or your risk of dying in a car accident, if you had 
to choose.   
Once you’ve decided, please take a minute to write down some of the issues that came 
to mind when you thought about these two causes of death. 
So, these issues make people think about lots of different things (we’d expect the 
things you’ve written down to be quite different from one another’s).  We are going to 
narrow down what we mean by cancer and by car accidents so we can be more 
precise.   
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[ASSISTANT PASS OUT CANCER INFO SHEET] 
 
First let’s think about cancer.  [click: SLIDE 17: APPEARING AS WE TALK]  We are 
interested in those cancers that are caused by exposure to harmful substances that you 
come across on a day-to-day basis, for example at work or from near to where you live 
[CLICK].  They are NOT caused by lifestyle choices like smoking or drinking to excess, 
or solely by genetics.  Please notice that this distinction means that your personal risk 
level is unlikely to differ much from the average risk [CLICK]. 
 
Another important point is that we are talking about cancers where the chance of 
survival is extremely small and we shall treat them as terminal.  [CLICK]  Please be 
aware that although cures for some types of cancer might be developed over time, it is 
extremely unlikely that a cure would be found for all of the cancers we are thinking 
about. 
 
Also, there are a wide variety of cancers and they all have different characteristics.  We 
can’t ask about every cancer separately, so instead we’ll try to cover as many as we 
can using groups of cancers with similar characteristics.   
 
[CLICK: SLIDE 18] 
 
Doctors can group cancers together into ‘types’ according to the length of time that it 
takes between when you get exposed to the cancer and the onset of symptoms.  They 
can also use the average length of time that the person is ill before they die.   
 
The cancer groups can be described in the form of pictures, like the one on the 
overhead. [click: SLIDE 19] 
 
 
 
This is now [point].  You are currently at risk of being exposed to substances that give 
you a higher chance of developing cancer.  If this happens, there will be a period when 
you will be without any noticeable symptoms.  Then there will be a period when the 
symptoms become increasingly severe and then you will die. We will vary the times 
when these things happen in the questions that follow: 
 
[CLICK- SYMPTOMS] 
 
For the cancers we are concerned with, the symptoms might include unexplained 
weight loss, having fevers and feeling generally unwell, and also having less energy 
than before.  You will have some pain and might need to be treated using drugs that 
make you sick.   
 
You would go through stages of illness, each one a bit more severe than the one before 
it. It is hard to be precise about how bad the symptoms would be, but usually they get 
worse as time passes.  A longer time with symptoms means you would be in each 
stage of the illness for a bit longer. 
Symptoms start Death Now 
NO SYMPTOMS SYMPTOMS 
TIME 
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These are the symptoms of a typical cancer case, and you should imagine that this is 
what it would be like for you.  
 
So the key things that characterise cancer are the time that symptoms start, the 
symptoms themselves, and the time of death.  
 
Does that all seem clear? 
 
We will be thinking about risks out of 60 million.  If the risk is 1000 in 60 million, we 
mean that on average, each year, 1000 people in the UK will die from that group of 
cancers.  You might be one of those people, and we need you to think of changes to 
the cancer risks in terms of how they affect your risk of dying, not other people’s risk of 
dying. 
 
The information sheet that you received before summarises what we mean when we 
ask you about cancers. 
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 [ASSISTANT PASS OUT CAR INFO SHEET] 
 
For car accidents, [click: SLIDE 20: APPEARING AS WE TALK] we mean accidents 
where you die within minutes or hours of the accident, so there is no lengthy period of 
illness [CLICK].  We also only consider cases where you are the driver or passenger 
[CLICK]. 
 
We’re going to give you less general information about car accidents than we did for 
cancer.  This is just because most people are a bit more familiar with what car 
accidents would be like.   
 
Like for cancer, you can think of it using the profile, although it looks a bit simpler.   
 
[click: SLIDE 21] 
 
Just like for the cancer case, this [POINT] is now.  However, nothing happens until the 
time when the accident might occur.  If the accident does happen, you would die within 
minutes or hours.   
 
 
 
Again we will be thinking about risks out of 60 million.  So a risk of 1000 in 60 million 
means that on average, each year, 1000 people in the UK die in car accidents either as 
the driver or passenger. 
 
The car accident information is on your information sheet. 
 
Does anyone have any questions? 
 
 
 
 
 
For the cancers, we explained that your risk probably does not vary much compared to 
the average, because these cancers are caused by day-to-day things, and are largely 
out of your control (remember we aren’t talking about cancers caused by smoking or 
drinking, or by genetics alone).  However, your risk of dying in a car accident as a driver 
or passenger might differ a lot from the average.  We would like you to indicate where 
you think you are on this scale:  
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT AS3.  Click: SLIDE 22]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now Death Accident 
BEFORE ACCIDENT 
TIME 
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Please put your initials and the date on your answer sheet. 
 
How likely do you think you are to die in a car accident, as the driver or passenger, 
compared to the average person: 
 
Much more likely than the average person  
 
A bit more likely than the average person  
 
The same as the average person   
 
A bit less likely than the average person  
 
Much less likely than the average person  
 
Please put all of your sheets so far into your folder, except for your information sheets. 
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INTRO TO MAIN RISK-RISK SECTION 
 
We have finished with the learning part of the session. From now on your answers will 
be passed on to decision makers and might be used in policy decisions. I would like to 
reiterate that what’s the right choice for you might be the wrong choice for someone 
else, and it is most important that you think carefully about your answers. All of your 
answers will remain anonymous. 
 
There are ten questions in this section. In each question, you will need to choose 
between increases in your risk of dying by one of two causes.  The necessary decrease 
in expenditure would be implemented during the coming year. 
 
As we said before, these are annual risks and they’re all out of 60 million.  
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1 
 
PREMIUM QUESTIONS 
 
In the next three questions there will be car accident risks during the coming year or in 
the year after next, and cancer risks in the future, either 10 or 25 years from now.   
 
[click: SLIDE 23] 
 
In each question you will... 
1. Choose between risk increases of the same size.  Then 
2. Choose again, when the risk increases are different sizes. 
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Question 1 
HSE: cars 1 and cancer 10 years 
 [click: SLIDE 24] 
 
[READ FROM THE SLIDE: DESCRIBE OPTIONS then…]  
 
Let’s think of it in terms of the profile pictures... 
 
If you were one of the unlucky 1050 people who die in car accidents, the accident 
would happen during the coming year, and death would happen within minutes or hours 
of the accident.  If you were one of the unlucky 1050 who die from this group of 
cancers, you would be exposed to the cancer-causing substance now, and then after 
there would be some time with no symptoms.  You would be ill for about a year before 
you die, which would be during the tenth year from now.   
 
Remember, you could die from something else during this period [INDICATE ON 
A] or this period [INDICATE ON B]. 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 1] 
 
Please write your initials and the date on the answer sheet. 
 
Circle the one you would choose, or put an equals sign if you find it hard to choose 
(remember, the increase would still happen, but a policy maker would decide for you 
which one). 
 
A B 
 
 An increase in your risk of  
dying in a car accident  
during the coming year  
(2012) 
of 50 in 60 million 
 
An increase in your risk of  
dying from cancer  
ten years from now 
 
of 50 in 60 million 
Here is another answer sheet.  Please write your initials and the date on the answer 
sheet. 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 1A AND 1B] 
 
The left hand column on your sheet has the cause you circled.  Does everyone have 
the correct sheet? 
 
Notice the first column has risk increases which get larger as you go down the table.  
Fill in the table as before- remembering that the pie chart handout explains the 
implications of taking the bigger risk (in the 1st column) compared to the fixed risk (2nd 
column). 
 
[ASSISTANT CHECK THAT ANYONE WHO REACHES THE BOTTOM ROW WRITES 
IN A NUMBER] 
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[AS1A] 
 
A 
Dying in a car accident 
during the coming year 
1000 in 60 million  
RISK INCREASE:  
 B 
Dying from cancer ten years 
from now  
1000 in 60 million  
RISK INCREASE:  
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million A 
...  ... ... 
           etc. 
 
[AS1B]  
 
B 
Dying from cancer ten 
years from now  
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE: 
 A 
Dying in a car accident during 
the coming year 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE: 
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million B 
...  ... ... 
           etc. 
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Question 2 
 
HSE:  cars 2 and cancer 10 years 
 [click: SLIDE 25]  
 
[READ FROM THE SLIDE: DESCRIBE OPTIONS ] 
 
Let’s think of it in terms of the profile pictures... 
 
If you were one of the unlucky 1050 people who die in car accidents, the accident 
would happen during the year after next, and death would happen within minutes or 
hours of the accident. If you were one of the unlucky 1050 who die from this group of 
cancers, you would be exposed to the cancer-causing substance now, and then there 
would be some time with no symptoms.  You would be ill for about a year before you 
die, which would be during the tenth year from now.  
 
Remember, you could die from something else during this period [INDICATE ON 
C] or this period [INDICATE ON D]. 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 2] 
Please write your initials and the date on the answer sheet. 
 
Circle the one you would choose, or put an equals sign if you find it hard to choose 
(remember, the increase would still happen, but a policy maker would decide for you 
which one). 
 
C D 
 
An increase in your risk of  
dying in a car accident  
during the year after next 
(2014) 
of 50 in 60 million 
 
An increase in your risk of  
dying from cancer  
ten years from now 
 
of 50 in 60 million 
 
Here is a new answer sheet. Please write your initials and the date on the answer 
sheet. 
   
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 2A AND 2B] 
 
The left hand column on your sheet has the cause you circled.  Does everyone have 
the correct sheet? 
 
Fill in the table as before- remembering that the pie chart handout explains the 
implications of taking the bigger risk (in the 1st column) compared to the fixed risk (2nd 
column). 
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[AS2A] 
 
C 
Dying in a car accident 
during the year after next  
1000 in 60 million  
RISK INCREASE: 
 D 
Dying from cancer  
ten years from now  
1000 in 60 million  
RISK INCREASE: 
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million C 
...  ... ... 
           etc. 
 
[AS2B] 
 
D 
Dying in a car accident 
during the year after next 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE:  
 C 
Dying from cancer  
ten years from now  
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE: 
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million D 
...  ... ... 
           etc. 
 
[ASSISTANT CHECK THAT ANYONE WHO REACHES THE BOTTOM ROW WRITES 
IN A NUMBER] 
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Questions 3-9 follow this format but with the scenarios as follows: 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A1. Questions 3-9 in study 1 
Set Question Code Description 
Context 
Q4 C2R2 Cancer the year after next compared to 
road accidents the year after next 
Q5 C10R10 Cancer in 10 years compared to road 
accidents in 10 years 
Latency 
Q6 C2C10 Cancer the year after next compared to 
cancer in 10 years 
Q7 C2C25 Cancer the year after next compared to 
cancer in 25 years 
Morbidity 
Q8 C10[12]C10[6] Cancer in 10 years (12 months illness) 
compared to cancer in 10 years (6 months 
illness) 
Q9 C10[36]C10[6] Cancer in 10 years (36 months illness) 
compared to cancer in 10 years (6 months 
illness) 
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Question 10 
Morbidity:  cancer and car 10 years, 2 weeks morbidity 
 
This is the last question in the main bit of today’s session.  We’re back to comparing 
cancer and car accidents.  [click: SLIDE 39] 
 
This time both risk increases would be ten years from now.  In either case you would 
endure pain and suffering for 1 or 2 weeks prior to your death.   
 
READ FROM THE SLIDE: DESCRIBE OPTIONS  
Let’s think of it in terms of the profile pictures... 
For S, if you were in the unlucky 1050, the car accident would happen during the tenth 
year from now, and death would happen after 1 or 2 weeks of deteriorating symptoms.  
For T, if you were in the unlucky 1050, you would be exposed to the cancer-causing 
substance now, and there would be some time with no symptoms.  You would be ill for 
1 or 2 weeks before you die, which would be sometime during the 10th year from now. 
 
Remember, you could die from something else during this period [INDICATE ON 
S] or this period [INDICATE ON T]. 
 [ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 10]  Please write your initials and the date 
on the answer sheet. 
Circle the one you would choose, or put an equals sign if you find it hard to choose 
(remember, the increase would still happen, but a policy maker would decide for you 
which one). 
 
S T 
An increase in your risk of  
dying in a car accident   
ten years from now  
including 1 or 2 weeks’ pain and 
suffering. 
of 50 in 60 million 
An increase in your risk of 
dying from cancer  
ten years from now  
including 1 or 2 weeks’ pain and 
suffering. 
of 50 in 60 million 
 
 [ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 10A AND 10B] 
 
Please write your initials and the date on this answer sheet. 
The left hand column on your sheet has the cause you circled.  Does everyone have 
the correct sheet? 
 
Fill in the table as before- remembering that the pie chart handout explains the 
implications of taking the bigger risk (in the 1st column) compared to the fixed risk (2nd 
column). 
 
 [AS10A] 
 
S 
Dying in a car accident 
including  
1 or 2 weeks’  
pain and suffering 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE:  
 T 
Dying from cancer  
including  
1 or 2 weeks’  
pain and suffering 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE:  
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million S 
...  ... ... 
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           etc. 
[AS10B] 
 
T 
Dying from cancer  
including  
1 or 2 weeks’  
pain and suffering 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE: 
 S 
Dying in a car accident  
including  
1 or 2 weeks’  
pain and suffering 
1000 in 60 million 
RISK INCREASE: 
Choice 
50 in 60 million OR 50 in 60 million T 
...  ... ... 
           etc. 
[ASSISTANT CHECK THAT ANYONE WHO REACHES THE BOTTOM ROW WRITES 
IN A NUMBER] 
When you have finished, please put all of your sheets into your folder. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your concentration so far.  
[click: SLIDE 40]  
We have now finished asking you the questions that compare risks of dying.  
 
We would like to ask you to do three more questions for us before we finish. These 
questions can help us to understand your answers to the questions you have already 
completed. 
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Risk and Time Preferences. 
 
FINANCIAL RISK AVERSION 
 
You will now be asked to make some choices, each one between two lotteries. By 
lotteries, we mean a pair of outcomes, only one of which actually happens in the end.   
The chance of each of the outcomes happening will be given as a percentage.  For 
example [SLIDE 41], if this lottery were played out, you would have a 10% chance of 
winning £4 or a 90% chance of winning £10.  This would make winning £10 more likely 
(which is nice!).   
 
We can picture it like this. [SLIDE 42 (SQUARES)]. There are 90 green squares, and 
10 white ones. If you picked a square at random, and it was green, you’d get £10.  But 
if it was white, you’d get £4. 
Does anyone have any questions? 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT INFORMATION SHEET 1]  
This information sheet is to help you think about the probabilities as we go along. 
 It shows you the probability grids for: 
 10% and 90% 
 30% and 70% 
 50-50 
...And so on down to… 
 100% (and 0%) 
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On your answer sheet, which you will receive in a minute, you’ll find a table like this one 
[SLIDE 43].  
 You will need to choose between the two lotteries in each row, by writing either A (if 
you’d like to have A played out) or B (if you’d like to have B played out) in the right hand 
column. You can only choose one option in each row.  If you say you find it hard to 
choose, I will toss a coin to decide whether you write A or B. 
I’ll explain the table before you fill it in. 
Going down the table, we alter the chances of winning in each of the decisions, but not 
the amount that can be won.  So option A is always between £6 and £5, and option B is 
always between £12 and £1. But going down the table, the chances of winning change. 
   
Decision 
number 
Option A 
 
   Option B Your choice 
 
1 10% chance of £6 
90% chance of £5 
OR 
     10% chance of £12 
     90% chance of £1 
 
2 20% chance of £6 
80% chance of £5 
OR 
     20% chance of £12 
     80% chance of £1 
 
3 30% chance of £6 
70% chance of £5 
OR 
     30% chance of £12 
     70% chance of £1 
 
4 40% chance of £6 
60% chance of £5 
OR 
     40% chance of £12 
     60% chance of £1 
 
5 50% chance of £6 
50% chance of £5 
OR 
     50% chance of £12 
     50% chance of £1 
 
6 60% chance of £6 
40% chance of £5 
OR 
     60% chance of £12 
     40% chance of £1 
 
7 70% chance of £6 
30% chance of £5 
OR 
     70% chance of £12 
     30% chance of £1 
 
8 80% chance of £6 
20% chance of £5 
OR 
     80% chance of £12 
     20% chance of £1 
 
9 90% chance of £6 
10% chance of £5 
OR 
     90% chance of £12 
     10% chance of £1 
 
10 100% chance of £6 
 
OR 
     100% chance of £12 
 
 
 
Let’s begin to fill in the table together.  
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 1] 
Please write your initials and the date on your answer sheet. 
 
[CLICK: BLANK OUT 2-10 ON OH TO DEMONSTRATE THE FOLLOWING] 
 
So for decision 1:  That’s like having 10 green squares and 90 white squares.  In option 
A, a green would get you £6 and a white gets you £5.  In option B, a green gets you 
£12 and a white gets you £1.  Think about which option you would prefer, and write 
your answer in the top box in the last column.  [WAIT] 
 
[CLICK: REVEAL ROW 10] 
 
Now let’s think about the bottom row.  Option A gives you £6 for definite and option B 
gives you £12 for definite.  Which would you choose?  Write your answer in the bottom 
row.  
 
[ALL SHOULD CHOOSE B IF THEY UNDERSTAND.  ASSISTANT GO ROUND AND 
CHECK]   
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Out of interest, did anyone choose B for decision 1?  [CLARIFY: RISK LOVING OR A 
MISTAKE?]   
 
And did anyone choose A for decision 10? [CLARIFY: MISTAKE?] 
 
[CLICK: REVEAL ALL] 
 
As we go down the table, the chance of the good outcome in each lottery (6 or 12) gets 
bigger and bigger.  Fill in the rest of the table, until you have filled in all of the rows.  
Remember though, there aren’t any right or wrong answers. 
 
Has everyone finished?   
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FINANCIAL TIME PREFERENCE 
We now a similar type of question, but this time, instead of there being different 
chances of the outcomes, there are different timings of the outcomes. [SLIDE 44]  
So, you will be asked to choose between getting £350 for certain in one month’s time, 
or some other amount for certain in seven months’ time. 
We’ve got a table with 15 decisions. Like before, we need you to write your choice (A or 
B) in the end column. 
Decision 
number 
Option A 
Sooner:  Receive the 
money 1 month from 
today 
 
Option B 
Later: Receive the 
money 7 months 
from today 
Your 
choice 
 
1 £350 sooner £354 later 
 
 
2 £350 sooner £359 later 
 
 
3 £350 sooner £363 later 
 
 
4 £350 sooner £368 later 
 
 
5 £350 sooner £372 later 
 
 
6 £350 sooner £377 later 
 
 
7 £350 sooner £381 later 
 
 
8 £350 sooner £386 later 
 
 
9 £350 sooner £390 later 
 
 
10 £350 sooner £395 later 
 
 
11 £350 sooner £404 later 
 
 
12 £350 sooner £414 later 
 
 
13 £350 sooner £423 later 
 
 
14 £350 sooner £433 later 
 
 
15 £350 sooner £443 later 
 
 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT ANSWER SHEET 2]  
 
Please write your initials and the date on your answer sheet 
 
[CLICK: REVEAL ROW 1] 
 
So for decision 1, you need to choose whether you would prefer £350 in one month or 
£354 in seven months’ time.  Write A for £350 sooner, or B for £354 later in the choice 
box. 
 
[WAIT UNTIL EVERYONE HAS DECIDED ON ROW 1 THEN CLICK: REVEAL ROW 
15] 
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In the bottom row, decide between £350 in 1 month (just like before) or £443 in seven 
months’ time.  Again write A for £350 sooner, or B for £443 later. 
 
[WAIT UNTIL EVERYONE HAS DECIDED ON ROW 10 THEN CLICK: REVEAL ALL] 
 
Fill in the whole table, choosing between getting the smaller amount of £350 in one 
month’s time, or waiting until seven months later to get the larger amount on offer in 
that row.  Keep going until you have filled in all of the rows. 
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HEALTH RISK AVERSION 
 
[SLIDE 45 and INFO SHEET 2 (ASSISTANT HAND OUT)] 
 
This is the last question we will be asking you to do today. We’re back to thinking about 
illnesses, although this time the illnesses are less serious and you will recover.   
 
We’re going to think about four illnesses, which vary in how severe they are from minor 
to severe.  In each case the illness would last for ten days and then go away by itself.   
 
We won’t name the illnesses, but we will describe their effects. 
 
[READ SYMPTOMS FROM THE OVERHEAD] 
 
Let’s consider your chance of getting these illnesses like the money amounts before.  
But the outcomes are these health issues instead of money. 
 
[SLIDE 46] 
 
So option A will always be between the moderate and moderately severe illnesses.   
 
Option B will always be between the severe and minor illnesses.  The chances of the 
illnesses will change as you go down the table, with the chance of the least severe 
illness (minor or moderate illness) getting bigger and bigger  [ILLUSTRATE WITH 
REFERENCE TO TABLE].   
 
 
You need to think about which of the options you would prefer to face in each row of 
the following table.  You will choose by writing A for option A or B for option B in each 
row of the table, just like before. 
 
[ASSISTAND HAND OUT AS3] 
 
Fill in each row of the table, deciding which option you would prefer in each row. 
 
It may help you to fill in the top and bottom rows first like before. 
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Decision 
number 
Option  A 
 
           Option B Your  
choice 
 
1 10% chance of moderate illness  
90% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     10% chance of minor illness 
     90% chance of severe illness 
 
2 20% chance of moderate illness 
80% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     20% chance of minor illness 
     80% chance of severe illness 
 
3 30% chance of moderate illness 
70% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     30% chance of minor illness 
     70% chance of severe illness 
 
4 40% chance of moderate illness 
60% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     40% chance of minor illness 
     60% chance of severe illness 
 
5 50% chance of moderate illness 
50% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     50% chance of minor illness 
     50% chance of severe illness 
 
6 60% chance of moderate illness 
40% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     60% chance of minor illness 
     40% chance of severe illness 
 
7 70% chance of moderate illness 
30% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     70% chance of minor illness 
     30% chance of severe illness 
 
8 80% chance of moderate illness 
20% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     80% chance of minor illness 
     20% chance of severe illness 
 
9 90% chance of moderate illness 
10% chance of moderately severe 
illness 
OR 
     90% chance of minor illness 
     10% chance of severe illness 
 
10 100% chance of moderate illness 
 OR 
     100% chance of minor illness 
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PART SIX:  DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
[ASSISTANT HAND OUT DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE] 
 
Please take some time to fill in this last set of questions. The questions ask about 
yourself.  There are questions on both sides of the page. Once you have filled in this 
information, the session will be over. When you have finished, put your answer sheets 
in your folder. We’ll collect them in once everyone has finished and then you will 
receive payment for having come to the session today. Thank you very much for 
coming. [SLIDE 47] 
 
About yourself 
 
Are you male or female?    M/F 
 
Is your age:      O  18-21 
       O  22-25 
       O 26-30 
       O 31-40 
       O 41-50 
       O 51-60 
       O 61 or above? 
 
How many people live in your household (including yourself)? ____________ 
 
How many children live in your household?  __________________________ 
 
Ages of those children: __________________________________________ 
  
Do you rent or own your house/flat?       
       Rent/Own 
 
What is your highest Education level?       
        Secondary/Further  
 
Are you currently unemployed?   Yes/No 
 
If not, what is your current job? ____________________________________  
 
What does your spouse/partner do?  ________________________________ 
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Is your personal monthly income – before tax:   
O   Up to £1000  
O  £1001 to £1500  
O £1501 to £2000 
O £2001 to £3000  
O £3001 to £4000 
O £4001 to £5000 
O £5001 to £6000  
O More than £6000?  
 
Is your Household monthly income– before tax: 
       O   Up to £1000  
O  £1001 to £1500  
O £1501 to £2000 
O £2001 to £3000  
O £3001 to £4000 
O £4001 to £5000 
O £5001 to £6000  
O More than £6000? 
 
Do you work in any of the following industries? 
       O Chemicals 
       O Agricultural 
       O  Nuclear 
       O Construction 
 
What are the first three or four digits of your postcode? (eg NE2,  NE26) 
        
______ 
 
Have you or a close relative ever suffered from cancer?    
       Y/N 
 
Have you or a close relative ever been involved in a car accident?   
       Y/N 
 
For your age, would you consider your current health as:  
O Below average 
O Average 
O Above average 
Newcastle Winter 2011/2012 
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Appendix B. Variable Correlation 
 
Highly correlated variables ought to be omitted from the regression analysis.  Table B1 
gives the correlation coefficients above 0.3 for this dataset.  Any correlation below 0.3 
is not reported.  Correlation coefficients are omitted for variables that are, by definition, 
highly correlated, for example the interaction terms and their constituent parts 
 
Problematically high correlation is not found between any of the variables tested, with 
the exception personal and household income.  Personal income is very strongly skewed 
towards the lower end of the distribution, perhaps because of the overrepresentation of 
respondents not in employment.  As such, household income will be used for future 
variable selection and analysis.  Having said this, considerable negative correlation can 
be observed between having experience of road accidents and having children under six 
living in the household, with no obvious intuitive explanation.  However the correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.4 in both cases.   
In addition, there is logical correlation, again below 0.4, between a number of other 
variables in the dataset as reported in table B1.  Some correlation is apparent for a 
number of the variables that could proxy for income.  The VIFs (variance inflation 
factors) are given in table B2 for completeness, and because none is over 10 there is no 
evidence of serious multicollinearity in the model, with the exception of age, which 
Table B1: Correlation coefficients above 0.3 
 
 Variable A Variable B Correlation coefficient 
Under6 age -0.3617 
Under6 under18 0.3856 
furthered Under18 -0.3351 
Roadexp Under6 -0.3259 
Roadexp Canexp 0.3661 
logincome furthered 0.3287 
loghhinc rent -0.3701 
loghhinc furthered 0.3331 
loghhinc spouseclass -0.4037 
Loghhinc logincome 0.6401 
Loghhinc_age rent -0.4010 
Loghhinc_age furthered 0.3274 
Loghhinc_age spouseclass -0.3778 
Loghhinc_age logincome 0.6261 
Female6 ownclass 0.3300 
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shows as collinear because of the inclusion of the dummies for old age at latent risk 
outcomes. 
 
As such, there is not a large amount of correlation and the vselect model can be used 
with some confidence in order to select of variables in regression analysis from the full 
set of potential predictor variables. 
Table B2: Variance inflation factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
age 12.00 0.08 
Being over 65 in 25 years 7.02 0.14 
Motherhood (to under 18) 6.34 0.16 
Gender (female) 4.63 0.22 
Under 6 3.38 0.30 
Motherhood (to under 6) 3.22 0.31 
Being over 55 in 10 years 3.12 0.32 
Interaction between household income and age 2.96 0.34 
Under 18 2.88 0.35 
Log of income 2.62 0.38 
Own class (job-defined) 1.93 0.52 
Spouse’s class(job-defined) 1.67 0.60 
Road accident experience 1.59 0.63 
Cancer experience 1.56 0.64 
Renting one’s home 1.53 0.65 
Risk aversion (defined over health outcomes) 1.47 0.68 
Self-reported health state 1.46 0.68 
Further education 1.41 0.71 
Risk aversion (defined over financial outcomes) 1.29 0.78 
Self-reported road accident risk 1.27 0.79 
Time preference (defined over financial 
outcomes) 1.17 0.85 
Mean VIF 3.07 
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Appendix C. Alternative Health State Measures for Input to Health 
Risk Aversion Elicitation 
Person trade-off (PTO) 
The person trade-off method involves describing a number of people that would be 
affected by the illness, as opposed to describing a health state itself.  The lotteries would 
be along the lines of the ones in table C1, and the illness will be the same in each case. 
 
Time spent ill (TSI) 
The TSI method involves describing a number of days or weeks for which the 
individual would be affected by the illness, again as opposed to describing varying 
health states.  This time the lotteries would be as described in table C2 and the illness 
will be the same in each case.
Table C1:  PTO Holt-Laury style health lotteries 
Decision 
number 
Option A OR Option B Your 
choice 
1 
10% chance of 12 people ill 
90% chance of 18 people ill OR 
10% chance of  2 people ill 
90% chance of 28 people ill 
 
2 
20% chance of 12 people ill 
80% chance of 18 people ill 
OR 
20% chance of  2 people ill 
80% chance of 28 people ill 
 
… … … …  
10 
100% chance of 12 people ill 
 
OR 
100% chance of  2 people ill  
 
Table C2:  TSI Holt-Laury style health lotteries 
Decision 
number 
Option A OR Option B Your 
choice 
1 
10% chance of 6 days ill 
90% chance of 8 days ill 
OR 
10% chance of  2 days ill 
90% chance of 12 days ill 
 
2 
20% chance of 6 days ill 
80% chance of 8 days ill 
OR 
20% chance of  2 days ill 
80% chance of 12 days ill 
 
… … … …  
10 
100% chance of 6 days ill 
 
OR 
100% chance of  2 days 
ill 
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Appendix D.  What if the Values Input are Utility Scores? 
Standard-gamble derived population utility scores could be used for the health states h1-
h4.  This adds a further layer of complexity, because the comparison becomes simply 
the respondent’s risk preference in comparison to the population’s.   
If on average, the population was risk neutral, then the interpretation of the curvature of 
the second order utility function would be exactly that of the financial coefficient  .  
However, substituting in the population utility scores for the value of the health states 
means that the implied difference between the health states, and as such the implied 
riskiness of the gambles, does not reflect the lotteries the individuals were really 
considering.  As such, without knowing the underlying population utility function and 
CRRA, it is impossible to fully interpret the elicited value.   
Call the elicited value  .  While the researcher assumes they are eliciting   using the the 
equation specified, in fact they are eliciting the following: 
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Where            
   
 
       is the inverse of the population utility function for health 
level  .   
It is clear that if the population in general is risk neutral (    ), the interpretation of 
the elicited   value is exactly as if the true health state values were known.  However, 
given risk aversion in the population it is unlikely that (    ) and as such the 
interpretation of the elicited   values requires further consideration. 
The values essentially represent risk aversion relative to the average person in the 
population.
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Appendix E:  Regression of Risk Preferences on Best-fit Demographics 
 
 
 
Table E1: Best fit regression of health risk preferences on demographics 
 
Population average 
EQ-5D (adjusted) 
 RA coefficient 
n=110 
r2=0.042 
Sample 
average VAS 
score  
RA 
coefficient 
n=110 
r2=0.042 
Individual 
VAS score 
(untrimmed)  
RA 
coefficient 
n=97 
r2=0.020 
Individual 
VAS score 
(trimmed) 
RA 
coefficient 
n=81 
r2=0.031 
 Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e.) 
Coef. 
(r.s.e) 
Female -0.015 
(0.19) 
-0.012 
(0.19) 
0.571 
(0.51) 
0.535 
(0.47) 
Age 0.071 
(0.05) 
0.069 
(0.05) 
0.205 
(0.18) 
-0.017 
(0.182) 
Self-reported 
roads risk 
0.189* 
(0.11) 
0.184* 
(0.11) 
0.060 
(0.30) 
0.273 
(0.28) 
constant -1.150 
(1.08) 
-1.157 
(1.05) 
-3.527 
(3.66) 
0.354 
(3.69) 
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Appendix F: Derivation of the Relativities Under Alternative 
Discounting Assumptions 
 
EXPONENTIAL 
    
       
   
         (F1) 
    
  
   
         (F2) 
HYPERBOLIC 
    
       
         
         (F3) 
    
  
         
         (F4) 
To solve for  , combining two relativities CTRt and CT’Rt’ , and letting 
    
      
   gives: 
   ((
      
      
)  (
       
       
))
   
       (F5) 
Clearly this is a single equation in two unknowns (  and  ) and as such cannot be 
solved as simply as the exponential equation.  Commonly it is simplified in the 
literature using the assumption that   =  .   
   (
      
      
)  (
       
       
)       (F6) 
While this is one equation in one unknown, it is not always possible to find a solution 
without resorting to complex numbers.  This is likely due to the functional form 
assumed. 
 
SUB-ADDITIVE (HYPERBOLIC BASE) 
   (
            
          
)        (F7) 
   (
   
                 
)        (F8) 
Similarly with the generalised exponential model, the estimation of the parameters 
      is not straightforward, especially given the way that they enter into the equation.  
Assuming s=0.5 allows some simplification of the estimation procedure, with the 
equation for solution being 
   (
   
  √      √       
)       (F9) 
 
SUB-ADDITIVE (EXPONENTIAL BASE) 
   (
      
 
   
      
)   [     
          ]      (F10) 
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(
   
[               ]
)
    
(
   
[√      √(     )]
)
     (F11) 
Again, the estimation of the parameters       is not straightforward, especially given 
the way that they enter into the equation.  Assuming s=0.5 allows some simplification 
of the estimation procedure, with the equation for solution being 
    
(
   
[√      √(     )]
)
        (F11) 
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Appendix G.  Exponential Discount Rates Removing Q1 & Q10 
Figure G1: Exponential discounting using averages per-question and average latency 
differential, deleting Q1. 
 
Figure G2: Exponential discounting using averages per-question and average latency 
differential, deleting Q1 and Q10. 
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Figure G3: Exponential discounting using averages per-question and average delay, 
deleting Q1. 
 
Figure G4: Exponential discounting using averages per-question and average delay, 
deleting Q1 and Q10. 
 
292 
 
Appendix H. Regression Analysis of Relativities on Demographics: 
Comparing Study 1 and Study 2 
The explanatory variables are included stepwise.  Model (1) presents only the latency 
differential, Model (2) incorporates the variables that are persistently significant, Model 
(3) is the best fit model as estimated using the vselect command in Stata and includes all 
relevant demographics for the student sample.  The results are presented in table H1, 
with the student sample alongside the main.  As previously, the standard errors are 
clustered on the individual.  
Table H1:  All models pooled analysis 
log ratio Model (1) 
Study 2 
Model (1’) 
Study 1 
Model (2) 
Study 2 
Model (2’) 
Study 1 
Model (3) 
Study 2 
Model (3’) 
Study 1 
N=1022 N=1410 N=993 N=1350 N=814 N=1224 
R
2
= 0.064 R
2
= 0.136 R
2
= 0.110 R
2
=0.156 R
2
=0.155 R
2
=0.194 
Latency 
(differential in years) 
-0.084*** 
(0.009) 
-0.185*** 
(0.015) 
-0.085*** 
(0.009) 
-0.189*** 
(0.016) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
-0.190*** 
(0.016) 
Self-Reported road 
accident risk 
- - -0.420** 
(0.174) 
-0.118 
(0.189) 
-0.464** 
(0.188) 
-0.113 
(0.187) 
Experience of cancer 
 
- - 0.609 
(0.379) 
0.930*** 
(0.344) 
0.706* 
(0.421) 
1.282*** 
(0.407) 
Health state  - 
 
- - - 0.420 
(0.286) 
-0.299 
(0.227) 
Health risk aversion - 
 
- - - -0.132 
(0.128) 
-0.115 
(0.078) 
Financial time 
preference  
- 
 
- - - -1.067 
(1.423) 
0.179 
(0.628) 
Female - 
 
- - - -0.130 
(0.390) 
-0.768** 
(0.306) 
Financial risk 
preference 
- 
 
- - - -0.287 
(0.396) 
-0.045 
(0.202) 
Constant 0.837*** 
(0.178) 
1.371*** 
(0.167) 
1.145*** 
(0.411) 
0.913** 
(0.431) 
1.766* 
(0.950) 
2.113*** 
(0.707) 
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Appendix J: Probit Analysis for Exponential Discounting 
Table J1:  Probit analysis- exponential 
PROBIT: Exponential Exponential 
Model (1) 
n=71 
LL= -40.91, 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0993 
Exponential 
Model (2) 
n=87 
LL= -52.25, 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0546 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Coef. 
(Standard Error) 
Self-Reported road accident 
risk 
-0.203 
(1.749) 
- 
Experience of cancer 
 
0.272 
(0.214) 
- 
Health state  -0.248 
(0.309) 
- 
Health risk aversion -0.292 
(0.174) 
-0.286* 
(0.156) 
Financial time preference  1.281 
(1.702) 
1.551 
(1.315) 
Safety time preference 
estimate (Q2-3 exponential) 
0.675 
(1.749) 
0.703 
(1.426) 
Financial risk preference 0.449 
(0.303) 
0.378 
(0.252) 
Road accident experience 0.157 
(0.342) 
- 
Female -0.283 
(0.380) 
- 
Age (years) 0.002 
(0.097) 
- 
Household  income 0.000 
(0.000) 
- 
Constant  -0.982 
(2.154) 
-0.805*** 
(0.290) 
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Appendix K.  Sensitivity Analysis for   and   
This sensitivity analysis focuses on the estimates of r and x as derived from Q2-3.  The 
data is re-combined to estimate the overall premium (CTR2) using different assumptions 
about the discount rate and the context premium to explore how sensitive the results are 
to differences in these parameters.  The overall conclusion- that dread and latency work 
to offset one another given long latency- appears robust to these tests.  
These overall premia are reconstructed substituting various values for   and  , and 
using the relationship as defined above,  
      
     
        
        (K1) 
The values chosen for inclusion as possible discount rates   are the unaugmented social 
time preference rate (STPR) which is typically used in policy, which is 1.5%; the STPR 
augmented for survival probability and life expectancy effects,
46
 which is 4.5%; the 
elicited 7.37% effective discount rate; and an arbitrarily chosen ‘high’ discount rate of 
10%. 
The values chosen for the time of the latent cancer risk increase, T, are 10 and 25 years 
for comparability with the study, and 40 years to explore the impacts of long latency 
(although of course this cannot fully include the implication of the oldest members of 
the cohort being less likely to survive to the 40 year mark, so any relativity is likely to 
be inflated compared to its ‘true’ level). 
The values chosen as potential values for the time-invariant cancer premium       are 
1.4 as elicited in the above, 2 to test the ‘x2’ cancer multiplier employed by the HSE in 
policy decisions with implications for cancer fatality risks, 4 as a midpoint between the 
upper and lower ends of the spectrum, and 10 to account for the results of the ‘context’ 
questions, Q4-5. 
Different combinations of these values are used in conjunction with the relationship in 
equation (K1), and the resulting VSLCAN:VSL relativities constructed from these 
combinations are reported in tables K1 to K3, and discussed below. 
Initially,             is maintained, but   and T vary. 
                                                          
46
 see Jones-Lee and Loomes (2010) for a discussion, which is outlined in more detail in 
the policy implications section of this thesis, chapter 8. 
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Holding the context multiplier equal to 1.4 generates an overall relativity below 1 for 
almost all cases.  The only exception is when using the non-augmented STPR of 1.5% 
and the shortest (10 year) latency period. 
Next,            is maintained but   and   vary. 
 
Holding the effective discount rate equal to 7.37% per annum generates an overall 
relativity below 1 in most cases, as above.  Exceptions include cases with short latency 
(10 years) and high dread.  Even with a seemingly high context multiplier of 4; the 
overall relativity is less than one for longer latency periods of 25 years or more. 
Finally, T=25 is maintained and   and   vary. 
 
Table K1: Sensitivity analysis 1: reconstructed CTRt relativities 
 r = 0.015 r = 0.045 r = 0.0737 r = 0.1 
T = 10 1.242 0.984 0.793 0.653 
T = 25 0.994 0.509 0.273 0.156 
 T = 40 0.795 0.263 0.094 0.037 
Table K2:  Sensitivity analysis 2: reconstructed CTRt relativities 
 (1+x) = 1.4 (1+x) = 2 (1+x) = 4 (1+x) = 10 
T = 10 0.793 1.132 2.265 5.661 
T = 25 0.273 0.390 0.779 1.948 
T = 40 0.094 0.134 0.268 0.671 
 
Table K3: Sensitivity analysis 3: reconstructed CTRt relativities 
 r = 0.015 r = 0.045 r = 0.0737 r = 0.1 
(1+x) = 1.4 0.994 0.509 0.273 0.156 
(1+x) = 2 1.420 0.727 0.390 0.223 
(1+x) = 4 2.840 1.453 0.779 0.447 
(1+x) = 10 7.100 3.634 1.948 1.117 
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Again, most of the calculated relativities are below 1.  The exceptions are once again 
the more extreme values including the lowest discount rate, and highest levels of dread. 
To summarise, the majority of the cases that use figures within the bounds of this data 
and of the estimates in the literature generate an overall relativity below 1, for these 
latent cancer to current roads relativities.  This supports the conclusion that a 2:1 
relativity is inappropriate under reasonable assumptions about public preferences.  
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Appendix L: Comparison of samples and results, studies 1 and 2  
Central tendencies 
Q1-3 were identical between the studies.  In these questions the central tendency 
measures for the two samples are all but indistinguishable, although the student sample 
has much tighter confidence intervals.  This implies a remarkable similarity between the 
two samples, which indicates a consistency of preferences for different fatality risks  
 
across age groups.  The smaller variety in the students’ responses could be as a result of 
the more homogenous demographics of this age group, both in terms of their age, their 
social status (all are in higher education) and their stage in life (predominantly on low 
Question Arithmetic 
Mean 
[confidence 
interval] 
(standard 
deviation) 
Median 
(percentiles) 
Geometric 
mean 
[confidence 
interval] 
 
Index 
[confidence 
interval] 
 
(C10R1) 
 
Study 1 
(N=  133) 
3629 
[-2340, 9598] 
(34799) 
1 
(25% =   
0.111) 
(75% =   7.20) 
1.116 
[0.576, 2.161] 
1.089 
[0.847, 1.406] 
 Study 2 
(N=106) 
1162 
[-1126, 3451] 
(11766) 
0.67 
(25% = 0.25) 
(75% = 4.40) 
0.97 
[0.59, 1.60] 
0.93 
[0.73, 1.19] 
(C10R2) Study 1 
(N=  128) 
2042 
[-1088, 5172] 
(17894) 
1 
(25% =   
0.108) 
(75% =   7.20) 
0.814 
[0.429, 1.643] 
1.041 
[0.805, 1.347] 
 Study 2 
(N=105) 
8.65 
[2.58, 14.72] 
(31.20) 
0.67 
(25% = 0.19) 
(75% = 4.00) 
0.72 
[0.42, 1.23] 
0.89 
[0.70, 1.14] 
 (C25R2) 
 
Study 1 
(N=  127) 
1265 
[-376, 2905] 
(9342) 
0.179 
(25% =   0.05) 
(75% =   4.80) 
0.280 
[0.139, 0.566] 
0.595 
[0.446, 0.7766] 
 Study 2 
(N=106) 
61.14 
[-52.14, 
174.41] 
(585.33) 
0.25 
(25% = 0.14) 
(75% = 2.40) 
0.35 
[0.21, 0.59] 
0.57 
[0.43, 0.73] 
(C10R10) Study 1 
(N=  129) 
9040.34 
[1000, 17081] 
(46154) 
7.8 
(25% =   1) 
(75% =   40) 
9.647 
[4.841, 19.22] 
2.460 
[1.904, 3.308] 
  Study 2 
(N=98) 
17.24 
[8.29, 26.19] 
(44.17) 
4.60 
(25% = 1.40) 
(75% = 8.10) 
3.58 
[2.37, 5.41] 
2.18 
[1.73, 2.83] 
 
Table L.1:  30 million trim central tendencies  
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incomes and without family responsibilities).  However, it may also be due to more 
familiarity with risk as communicated in these Studies, and the students are arguably 
more adept at processing difficult choice tasks like the ones presented to them in this 
study.  If so, this could be expected to generate data with less noise.  However, the 
students still displayed some of the idiosyncrasies as the 30-50 year olds, with a 
proportion indicating that they would “never switch” on certain questions, but this was 
less prevalent in the student sample. 
Inferred r and x from studies 1 and 2 
The context premium and discount rate inferred from Q2-3 for both studies are 
presented in table 8.1 for comparison. 
Table L.2: Effective discount rate and context premium 
 Study 1 (age range 30-50) Study 2 (age range 18-25) 
r (effective discount rate) 7.37% 4.93% 
(1+x) (context premium) 1.434 1.058 
 
The effective discount rates are not dissimilar for the two groups, with the students’ 
result slightly lower but still within a comparable range.   The students’ context 
premium is much lower, however. This result suggests that less emphasis is placed on 
the cancer context by students than by their older counterparts, a result that is also 
reflected in the answers to the C10R10 comparison, where the 30-50 year old sample 
average relativity is significantly higher, at least when comparing the geometric means.  
The difference seems more pronounced when using the elicited (1+x) values. 
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